New York Law Review

Tag: Criminal Procedure

  • People v. Friedgood, 58 N.Y.2d 467 (1983): Standards for Vacating a Judgment Based on Misconduct

    People v. Friedgood, 58 N.Y.2d 467 (1983)

    A trial court’s denial of a motion to vacate a judgment of conviction without a hearing will only be reversed if the court abused its discretion; a defendant must demonstrate due diligence in uncovering the facts supporting the motion and show that the alleged misconduct prejudiced their defense.

    Summary

    Friedgood was convicted of murdering his wife and grand larceny. More than three years after the trial, he moved to vacate the judgment, alleging prosecutorial misconduct, juror misconduct, and misrepresentation by a prosecution witness. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Friedgood failed to demonstrate due diligence in presenting his claims and failed to sufficiently allege prejudice from the alleged misconduct, thus failing to meet the requirements for either vacating the conviction or ordering an evidentiary hearing.

    Facts

    Defendant was convicted of murdering his wife by injecting her with Demerol and stealing from her estate. After his conviction and unsuccessful appeal, he filed a motion to vacate the judgment based on: (1) prosecutorial misconduct related to coercing a witness, Binnie Lazarus; (2) juror misconduct; and (3) misrepresentation by a medical expert, Dr. Helpern, who testified for the prosecution. Binnie Lazarus initially stated she spoke to the victim on the day of her death, but later signed a contradictory statement after being interviewed by the District Attorney.

    Procedural History

    The Nassau County Court denied Friedgood’s motion to vacate the judgment of conviction without a hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to determine whether the denial of the motion without an evidentiary hearing was an abuse of discretion.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant’s motion to vacate the judgment of conviction without holding an evidentiary hearing on the claims of prosecutorial misconduct?

    2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant’s motion to vacate the judgment of conviction without holding an evidentiary hearing on the claims of juror misconduct?

    3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant’s motion to vacate the judgment of conviction based on the claim that a prosecution witness misrepresented facts critical to his opinion?

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant failed to demonstrate due diligence in adducing facts related to the alleged prosecutorial misconduct and failed to sufficiently allege prejudice resulting from that misconduct.

    2. No, because the defendant failed to demonstrate due diligence in investigating and reporting the alleged juror misconduct, and the claims were largely supported by inadmissible hearsay.

    3. No, because the defendant’s claim regarding the prosecution witness’s misrepresentation was essentially a claim of newly discovered evidence, and the review of the trial court’s denial on this ground is beyond the power of the Court of Appeals.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that a trial court’s denial of a motion to vacate without a hearing can only be reversed if the court abused its discretion. Regarding prosecutorial misconduct, the court emphasized the defendant’s failure to explain his three-year delay in bringing the motion and his failure to show due diligence in uncovering the facts. The court found that the defendant was aware of the witness’s contradictory statements but did not call her as a witness or promptly investigate the circumstances. The Court stated that the defendant had to allege and prove that the prosecutor’s allegedly coercive tactics prejudiced his defense. As the Court noted, “Finding himself on the horns of this dilemma, defendant not only failed to make the requisite showing of due diligence (CPL 440.10, subd 3, par [a]), but he also failed to sufficiently allege that he was prejudiced by the alleged misconduct which, because it would have to be proven for defendant to succeed in having his conviction vacated, must be alleged. (CPL 440.30, subd 4, par [b].)”

    Regarding juror misconduct, the court again cited the lack of due diligence in investigating and reporting the alleged incidents. Most of the claims were supported only by hearsay allegations, and the defendant failed to provide explanations for not obtaining affidavits from the jurors involved. The court emphasized the policy against undermining jury verdicts through post-trial questioning of jurors. “[E]fforts to undermine a jury’s verdict by systematically questioning the individual jurors long after they have been dismissed in hopes of discovering some form of misconduct should not be encouraged.”

    Finally, the court determined that the defendant’s claim regarding the medical expert’s misrepresentation was based on newly discovered evidence, making the trial court’s decision unreviewable.

  • People v. Macerola, 47 N.Y.2d 258 (1979): Duty to Advise Defendant of Conflict in Joint Representation

    People v. Macerola, 47 N.Y.2d 258 (1979)

    When multiple defendants are represented by the same attorney, the trial court has a duty to adequately advise each defendant of the potential conflict of interest and the right to separate counsel.

    Summary

    Macerola and four codefendants were jointly represented at a trial for assault. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Term and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial court failed to adequately advise Macerola of the potential conflict of interest arising from the joint representation. The court found that the trial court’s inquiry was insufficient because it did not clearly inform Macerola of his right to separate counsel or alert him to the potential conflict. Because of the nature of the evidence against multiple defendants in the brawl, prejudice was possible, requiring reversal.

    Facts

    The case arose from a brawl in a public place involving several young men. Macerola and four codefendants were represented by the same attorney at their trial for assault. At trial, many eyewitnesses were unable to identify individual defendants as participants in the brawl. Few witnesses could specifically identify Macerola as an assailant.

    Procedural History

    Following Macerola’s conviction at trial, he appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to adequately advise him of a potential conflict of interest due to the joint representation. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction. Macerola then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court adequately advised Macerola of the potential conflict of interest arising from the joint representation and his right to separate counsel.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court did not clearly inform Macerola that he had a right to separate counsel or attempt to alert him, even in general terms, to the potential conflict of interest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the trial court’s duty to ensure that a defendant understands the risks of joint representation. The court noted that the trial court asked the defendants if they were aware of the joint representation and if they had discussed the matter with their attorney. However, the court found this inquiry insufficient because the trial court “never clearly informed the defendant that he had a right to separate counsel or attempted to alert the defendants, even in general terms to the potential conflict of interest.”

    The court also found that the joint representation created a possibility of prejudice to Macerola. Because eyewitnesses struggled to identify specific participants in the brawl, emphasizing the weakness of the identification against one defendant could implicitly strengthen the case against others. The court reasoned that “counsel could hardly emphasize the weakness of the identification of one defendant without implicitly underscoring the strength of the case against one or more of the others.” This potential conflict, coupled with the inadequate advisement from the trial court, warranted a new trial.

  • People v. Michel, 56 N.Y.2d 1014 (1982): Exception to Notice Requirement for Confessions

    56 N.Y.2d 1014 (1982)

    A trial court may dispense with the statutory notice requirement of CPL 710.30 regarding the prosecution’s intent to introduce a defendant’s confession at trial when good cause is shown, such as when the defendant and their attorney negotiated, drafted, and signed the confession knowing it would be used in court.

    Summary

    Rafael Michel appealed his conviction, arguing that the prosecution failed to provide statutory notice of its intent to use his written confession at trial, as required by CPL 710.30. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the trial court acted within its discretion to dispense with the notice requirement because the defense had actual notice. The confession was negotiated, drafted, and signed by both Michel and his attorney, explicitly stating it would be used in court. The Court found that Michel’s awareness of the confession’s intended use constituted good cause to waive the formal notice requirement.

    Facts

    Rafael Michel and his attorney negotiated, drafted, and signed a written confession. The confession itself stated that it was “going to be used in court.” Michel was aware that the confession was an integral part of an agreement and that failing to comply with the agreement would result in prosecution and the use of the confession against him.

    Procedural History

    The trial court admitted Michel’s confession into evidence. Michel appealed, arguing the prosecution failed to provide statutory notice of intent to use the confession. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. Michel then appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in dispensing with the statutory notice requirement of CPL 710.30 regarding the prosecution’s intent to introduce Michel’s confession into evidence at trial, given that Michel and his attorney negotiated, drafted, and signed the confession knowing it would be used in court.

    Holding

    No, because the defense had actual notice of the prosecution’s intent to introduce the confession at trial, providing good cause for dispensing with the statutory notice requirement under CPL 710.30(2).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the “good cause” exception explicitly provided in CPL 710.30(2), which allows a trial court to dispense with the notice requirement. The court emphasized that the confession was negotiated, drafted, and signed by both the defendant and his attorney and that the confession itself stated it was “going to be used in court”. This showed the defense had actual notice of the prosecution’s intent. The court reasoned that requiring strict adherence to the notice requirement in this case would elevate form over substance, as the defense was undeniably aware of the confession’s intended use. The court found that, “it was clear to the defense that the confession was an integral part of the agreement ultimately concluded and that a default on defendant’s part would result in prosecution and use of the confession.” Since Michel was already aware the prosecution would use the confession, he could not claim surprise or prejudice due to lack of formal notice. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in determining that good cause existed to dispense with the statutory notice.

  • People v. Lane, 56 N.Y.2d 1 (1982): Standard for Consolidating Indictments When Defendant Wishes to Testify on One But Not Another

    People v. Lane, 56 N.Y.2d 1 (1982)

    To defeat a motion to consolidate indictments when a defendant claims they wish to testify on one charge but not another, the defendant must convincingly show they have important testimony for one offense and a strong need to remain silent on the other.

    Summary

    Defendants Lane and Wells were charged with two robberies with similar facts. The prosecution moved to consolidate the indictments, arguing evidence of one robbery would be admissible in the trial for the other. The defendants opposed, stating they wished to testify about the first robbery (claiming it involved consensual sexual acts, not robbery) but not the second (relying on perceived weaknesses in the prosecution’s identification evidence). The trial court granted consolidation, and the defendants were convicted of at least one charge. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the defendants failed to demonstrate a sufficiently compelling reason to avoid testifying on the second charge. The Court adopted a standard requiring a “convincing showing” of both important testimony for one offense and a strong need to remain silent on the other to defeat consolidation.

    Facts

    Two men fitting the defendants’ descriptions were picked up hitchhiking on two separate occasions. In each incident, the driver was forced at knifepoint to drive to a location near Driving Park Bridge. The driver was then robbed, locked in the trunk, and the car was abandoned near the Genesee River Gorge.

    Procedural History

    The People moved to consolidate two indictments for robbery. The trial court granted the motion based on oral arguments. The defendants moved for reconsideration, submitting affidavits stating their desire to testify regarding the first robbery but remain silent on the second. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. Neither defendant testified at trial. The jury convicted both defendants of the first robbery. Wells was convicted of the second robbery, but Lane was acquitted. The Appellate Division affirmed all convictions, and the defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant must make a convincing showing of both important testimony concerning one offense and a strong need to refrain from testifying about another offense to defeat a motion by the People to consolidate two indictments, where consolidation is sought because proof of one offense would be material and admissible in the trial of the other.

    Holding

    Yes, because to defeat a consolidation motion under these circumstances, a defendant must make a “convincing showing” of both important testimony concerning one offense and a strong need to refrain from testifying about the other.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the trial court’s decision to consolidate indictments is discretionary and reviewable only for abuse of discretion as a matter of law. The Court weighed the public interest in efficient trials against the defendant’s right to a fair trial. The Court adopted the standard from Baker v. United States, which requires a defendant to make “a convincing showing that he has both important testimony to give concerning one count and strong need to refrain from testifying on the other.” The Court found this standard applicable to consolidation motions because the same concerns of fairness and prejudice are present as in severance motions. The Court distinguished its prior holding in People v. Shapiro, noting that in Shapiro, the defendant had made a sufficient showing under the Baker test. In this case, the Court found the defendants’ stated desire to exploit a perceived weakness in the People’s identification evidence insufficient to demonstrate a “strong need” to refrain from testifying. The Court stated, “It was incumbent upon defendants to articulate in concrete terms why they would be unduly prejudiced by giving testimony on the December 2 count either supporting misidentification or simply denying the charge.” The Court noted that an in camera review could be used to protect a defendant from revealing privileged information to the prosecution. The court emphasized that “speculative fears of exposure to cross-examination regarding undocumented events and abstract claims of impeachment…should never be considered dispositive absent the most obviously egregious circumstances.”

  • People v. Blackman, 43 N.Y.2d 585 (1978): Harmless Error in Bolstering Identification Testimony

    People v. Blackman, 43 N.Y.2d 585 (1978)

    Improper bolstering of a witness’s identification testimony by police officers is harmless error when the evidence of the defendant’s identity and guilt is overwhelming.

    Summary

    Defendants Blackman and Williams were convicted of robbery and weapons charges. At trial, three police officers testified that the victim identified the defendants shortly after the robbery. The New York Court of Appeals held that this testimony improperly bolstered the victim’s identification, violating established rules of evidence. However, the Court affirmed the convictions, finding the error harmless because the other evidence against the defendants, including their physical description matching the robbers, their presence in an apartment where the perpetrators fled, and the discovery of a matching weapon, was overwhelming. This holding illustrates the application of the harmless error doctrine in cases involving improper bolstering of identification testimony.

    Facts

    A man was beaten and robbed on a Bronx street. An eyewitness described the robbers as one tall and one short and heavyset. The robbers fled into a nearby building. Police apprehended Blackman and Williams in an apartment in the same building. A third man, whom the victim also identified as being with the defendants before the robbery, was also present. The apartment owner testified that the defendants and the third man had left the apartment for about 30 minutes, coinciding with the robbery, and returned with money that they gave her to buy liquor. A gun matching the description of the weapon used in the robbery was found near one of the defendants hiding under a bed.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted of robbery in the first degree in a jury trial. Blackwell was also convicted of criminal possession of a weapon and reckless endangerment. The defendants appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the police officers’ testimony that bolstered the victim’s identification. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court committed reversible error by admitting testimony from police officers that improperly bolstered the victim’s identification of the defendants.

    Holding

    No, because the error in admitting the bolstering testimony was harmless due to the overwhelming evidence of the defendants’ identification and guilt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged that the police officers’ testimony, describing the victim pointing to the defendants shortly after the robbery, improperly bolstered the victim’s identification. The court cited People v. Trowbridge, 305 N.Y. 471, emphasizing that such bolstering testimony should be excluded, regardless of whether it involves oral statements or gestures. However, the Court applied the harmless error doctrine, stating that a Trowbridge error is harmless when “the evidence of identity is so strong that there is no substantial issue on the point” (People v. Malloy, 22 NY2d 559, 567), or when the identification is “clear and strong” (People v. Johnson, 32 NY2d 814, 816). The Court found that the circumstantial evidence strongly confirmed the victim’s identification. The defendants matched the physical descriptions provided by an eyewitness. They were found in an apartment in the building where the robbers fled. A third man identified by the victim was also present. The apartment owner’s testimony placed the defendants at the scene of the crime at the time of the robbery. The matching gun was found near one of the defendants. Considering these facts, along with the victim’s opportunity to observe and prior sightings of one defendant, the Court concluded that the evidence of identification and guilt was overwhelming, rendering the error harmless. The court reasoned that when the other evidence is so strong the bolstering is not prejudicial.

  • People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227 (1974): Enforceability of Plea Bargains and On-the-Record Agreements

    People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227 (1974)

    Off-the-record promises made during plea bargaining are unenforceable if they contradict the formal record of the plea agreement.

    Summary

    Selikoff pleaded guilty to a lesser charge based on an alleged promise by the prosecutor of a specific sentence. This promise was not recorded during the plea colloquy. When the sentencing court imposed a harsher sentence, Selikoff appealed. The New York Court of Appeals held that unrecorded promises made during plea negotiations are unenforceable if they contradict the record of the plea. The Court emphasized the need for transparency and completeness in plea agreements to maintain the integrity of the criminal justice system and prevent later disputes about the terms of the bargain.

    Facts

    Selikoff was indicted on multiple charges. During plea negotiations, his attorney and the prosecutor allegedly agreed to a specific sentence in exchange for a guilty plea to a lesser charge. Selikoff pleaded guilty, but the sentencing court imposed a more severe sentence than the one allegedly promised. The details of the plea agreement, including the sentencing promise, were not placed on the record during the plea proceedings.

    Procedural History

    The defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that the prosecutor’s promise during plea negotiations should be enforced. The lower courts upheld the sentence. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to determine whether the alleged off-the-record promise was enforceable.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an off-the-record promise made during plea bargaining, but not reflected in the plea proceeding record, is enforceable against the state.

    Holding

    No, because off-the-record promises made during plea bargaining are unenforceable if they contradict the formal record of the plea agreement. To ensure fairness and maintain the integrity of the plea bargaining process, all terms of the agreement must be explicitly stated on the record.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that plea bargaining is a critical component of the criminal justice system, and its effectiveness depends on transparency and the accurate recording of agreements. The Court reasoned that allowing defendants to later claim unrecorded promises would undermine the entire plea bargaining process. The court stated, “[I]f the agreement is placed on the record, the defendant and his counsel will be bound by it.” The court further stated that “[O]nly in the most unusual circumstance should a court be foreclosed from an inquiry of the pleading defendant to ascertain whether any promises, not contained in the record, were made to him.” The court held that the sentencing court was not bound by the alleged promise because it was not part of the official record. The Court acknowledged the potential for abuse if unrecorded promises were enforceable, as it would incentivize defendants to falsely claim such promises after receiving a less favorable outcome. The court emphasized that any promises made to induce a guilty plea must be placed on the record to be enforceable, preventing secret agreements and ensuring the fairness and integrity of the plea bargaining process. The court explicitly overruled prior case law suggesting that an off-the-record promise may be binding. The court effectively created a bright-line rule: promises are only enforceable if recorded.

  • People v. Stephens, 55 N.Y.2d 778 (1981): Appealability of Resentencing Denials

    55 N.Y.2d 778 (1981)

    The Court of Appeals held that an appeal from an order denying resentencing under Penal Law § 60.09 requires permission from a judge of the intermediate appellate court, and failure to obtain such permission warrants dismissal of the appeal.

    Summary

    Defendant Stephens, convicted under the Rockefeller Drug Laws, sought resentencing under Penal Law § 60.09. After his motion was denied without counsel or his presence, he appealed to the Appellate Division, which ruled on the merits without granting permission for the appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed Stephens’s appeal, finding that failure to obtain leave to appeal from the Appellate Division as required by CPL 450.15 and 460.15 was fatal. The dissent argued that the Appellate Division’s determination on the merits was functionally equivalent to granting permission, and that due process concerns warranted review.

    Facts

    Stephens was originally sentenced under the severe Rockefeller Drug Laws.

    He later moved for resentencing pursuant to Penal Law § 60.09, arguing he was a model prisoner who had addressed his drug issues.

    Stephens requested counsel for the resentencing proceedings, but counsel was never assigned.

    The District Attorney initially indicated no opposition to Stephens’s resentencing.

    Stephens’s motion was denied without his presence or representation by counsel, and without any specific findings by the court.

    Procedural History

    Stephens filed a motion under CPL 440.20 to set aside his sentence, which was denied by the County Court.

    He appealed to the Appellate Division, Second Department, which considered the appeal on its merits without granting permission for the appeal as required by statute.

    The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that the Appellate Division lacked jurisdiction because Stephens had not obtained leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division’s consideration of the merits of an appeal from the denial of a resentencing motion under Penal Law § 60.09, without granting permission to appeal as required by CPL 450.15 and 460.15, is a procedural defect that deprives the appellate court of subject matter jurisdiction.

    Holding

    Yes, because CPL 450.15 and 460.15 require permission for an appeal from the denial of a CPL 440.20 motion; failure to obtain that permission means the Appellate Division lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the statutory requirements of CPL 450.15 and 460.15, which mandate that permission be granted by a judge of the intermediate appellate court before an appeal can be taken from an order denying a motion to set aside a sentence under CPL 440.20. The court found that the appellant’s failure to obtain such permission was a fatal defect, depriving the Appellate Division of the power to hear the appeal. The court distinguished this case from situations where the Appellate Division lacked the power to consider an appeal by permission or otherwise. The majority opinion relied on precedent established in People v. De Jesus, 54 N.Y.2d 447, to support its holding. The dissenting judge argued that the Appellate Division’s decision to consider the merits of the case was functionally equivalent to granting permission for the appeal. The dissent also highlighted the importance of ensuring due process in resentencing proceedings, particularly when significant liberty interests are at stake. The dissent suggested that the court should fill the apparent gap in the statutory scheme to harmonize it with legislative intent, especially when constitutional matters are concerned. The dissent further pointed out that Stephens was denied counsel and the right to be present during the resentencing proceedings, which raised concerns about fairness and due process: “Believing these contentions are not without merit, it follows that I would reverse and remand the case to the County Court for proceedings on appellant’s motion under *782 section 60.09 of the Penal Law in accordance with constitutional notions of due process.”

  • People v. Favale, 56 N.Y.2d 449 (1982): Appealability of Resentencing Application Denials

    People v. Favale, 56 N.Y.2d 449 (1982)

    In New York, there is no right to appeal the denial of an application for resentencing unless a statute expressly authorizes such an appeal.

    Summary

    The defendant, Favale, sought resentencing under Penal Law § 60.09, which allows for discretionary resentencing for certain drug felonies. His application was denied, and he appealed. The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals held that because no statute explicitly allows an appeal from the denial of a resentencing application under § 60.09, no such right exists. The court emphasized the distinction between appealing a sentence or resentence and appealing the denial of an application for resentencing.

    Facts

    Favale was convicted of a class A-II or A-III drug felony. He applied for resentencing pursuant to Penal Law § 60.09, a statute designed to mitigate the harsh sentencing consequences of the 1973 drug laws in appropriate cases.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Favale’s application for resentencing. Favale appealed this denial to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal. Favale then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing jurisdiction was proper under CPL 470.60(3).

    Issue(s)

    Whether the denial of an application for resentencing pursuant to Penal Law § 60.09 is appealable in the absence of a specific statutory provision authorizing such an appeal?

    Holding

    No, because in the absence of a statute expressly authorizing a criminal appeal, there is no right to appeal in a criminal case in New York.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the fundamental principle that the right to appeal in a criminal case exists only when explicitly authorized by statute, citing Matter of State of New York v. King, 36 NY2d 59, 63. Since no provision in Penal Law § 60.09 or any other statute permits an appeal from the denial of a resentencing application under § 60.09, the Court concluded that the Appellate Division correctly dismissed Favale’s appeal.

    The Court distinguished the case from situations where a defendant appeals from a sentence or resentence, which are covered by CPL 450.10(2) and 450.30(1, 2), or from the denial of a motion for resentencing under CPL 450.15(2) and 440.20. The Court reasoned that Favale was not appealing a sentence, but the denial of a request for resentencing, which is a different procedural posture.

    The Court emphasized that the legislature’s failure to provide for an appeal in § 60.09 implies that no such appeal was intended. The Court stated, “Indeed, we are required to conclude that since the Legislature failed to provide for an appeal from the denial of an application for resentencing pursuant to section 60.09 of the Penal Law, no appeal was intended.”

    The court explicitly declined to address the defendant’s arguments regarding the right to a hearing or representation by counsel during the resentencing application process, deeming those issues outside the scope of the procedural question before it.

  • People v. De Renzis, 51 N.Y.2d 426 (1980): Requirement for Timely Objection to Preserve Right to Counsel Claim

    People v. De Renzis, 51 N.Y.2d 426 (1980)

    A defendant must make a timely objection to a trial court’s ruling that allegedly interferes with the right to counsel to preserve the issue for appellate review as a question of law.

    Summary

    De Renzis was convicted of second-degree murder. During the trial, the judge instructed the defendant and his counsel not to discuss the defendant’s testimony during recesses. Defense counsel did not object at the time. Later, counsel protested, arguing his client’s right to counsel was being violated. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding a denial of the right to counsel. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the failure to timely object to the trial court’s restriction on communication between the defendant and his attorney waived the right to raise the issue on appeal. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division to consider exercising its discretionary power to review the alleged error in the interest of justice.

    Facts

    De Renzis was on trial for the murder of Sandra Zahler.
    During De Renzis’s direct testimony, the trial judge instructed De Renzis and his counsel not to discuss his testimony during recesses.
    Defense counsel did not object to these instructions at the time they were given.
    The following day, defense counsel requested to speak with his client and protested that his client’s right to access counsel was being interfered with.
    The court initially denied the request but later reversed its ruling and allowed the consultation.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted De Renzis of second-degree murder.
    The Appellate Division reversed the judgment, concluding that De Renzis had been denied his constitutional right to assistance of counsel.
    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstated the conviction, and remitted the case to the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s failure to timely object to the trial court’s instructions prohibiting communication between the defendant and his counsel during recesses waived the right to raise the issue on appeal as a question of law.

    Holding

    No, because to preserve a question of law for appellate review, a protest must be registered at the time of the ruling or when the court has an opportunity to change it. Counsel’s silence when the instruction was given constituted a waiver of the claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party claiming error must register a protest at the time of the ruling or at a subsequent time when the court has an opportunity to change it, as per CPL 470.05(2). The court distinguished this case from People v. Arthur and People v. Felder, where the absence of counsel at a critical time was determinative. Here, counsel was present and could have objected to the trial court’s instructions. The court stated that “[t]o create and preserve a question of law amendable to appellate review, a defendant in a criminal case normally must raise that issue before the court of original jurisdiction.” The court emphasized the importance of a timely protest, stating it affords the trial court an opportunity to correct the error. The Court found that the belated protest on the following day was insufficient to preserve the error related to the prior day’s restrictions because the court had already acted, and counsel’s silence implied acceptance of the court’s instruction. As the Appellate Division’s reversal was based at least in part on the June 14 rulings, the case was remitted to that court to determine whether to exercise its discretionary power to review alleged errors even absent a timely objection. The Court of Appeals explicitly refrained from expressing any opinion on the merits of De Renzis’s right to counsel claim, focusing solely on the procedural issue of preservation.

  • People v. LaBorde, 56 N.Y.2d 973 (1982): Admissibility of Identification Evidence After Unlawful Arrest

    People v. LaBorde, 56 N.Y.2d 973 (1982)

    An in-court identification of a defendant is admissible if it stems from an independent recollection, and a pretrial lineup identification is admissible if sufficiently distinguishable from an unlawful arrest to purge any primary taint, particularly when the defendant is held under a valid arrest warrant.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a pretrial lineup identification and an in-court identification should be suppressed as fruits of an unlawful arrest. The defendant was unlawfully arrested in Suffolk County, which led to the suppression of weapons charges. Subsequently, Bronx County police, using information derived independently from Suffolk County authorities, connected the defendant to a robbery and obtained an arrest warrant. The court held that the in-court identification was admissible because it stemmed from an independent recollection. Further, the pretrial lineup identification was admissible because it was sufficiently attenuated from the initial unlawful arrest due to the intervening lawful arrest warrant.

    Facts

    Police in Bronx County connected the defendant, LaBorde, to a robbery based on information from Suffolk County authorities. LaBorde’s photograph was obtained from the Bureau of Criminal Identification, and he was identified in a photographic array by the robbery victims. LaBorde was arrested in Suffolk County on weapons charges, pursuant to a Bronx County arrest warrant for the robbery. He was then identified by one of the robbery victims in a pretrial lineup.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division reversed LaBorde’s conviction on the Suffolk County weapons charges, suppressing the seized weapons because of an unlawful arrest. Subsequently, LaBorde was convicted in Bronx County for the robbery. He appealed, arguing that the unlawful Suffolk County arrest tainted both the pretrial lineup identification and the in-court identification in the Bronx robbery case. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, upholding the robbery conviction.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an in-court identification of a defendant is inadmissible if preceded by an unlawful arrest?
    2. Whether a pretrial lineup identification is inadmissible if the defendant’s initial contact with law enforcement stemmed from an unlawful arrest?

    Holding

    1. No, because an in-court identification is admissible so long as it proceeds from an independent recollection.
    2. No, because the means used to obtain the pretrial lineup identification were sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint of the unlawful arrest, especially because the defendant was being held under a lawful arrest warrant at the time of the lineup.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that an in-court identification is admissible if based on an independent recollection, citing United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980). The court found no basis to suppress the in-court identification as it wasn’t tainted by the unlawful seizure by the Suffolk County police.

    Regarding the pretrial lineup identification, the court applied the attenuation doctrine from Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), asking if the evidence was obtained by exploitation of the initial illegality or by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. The court emphasized that the Bronx County police, who had not participated in the unlawful Suffolk County arrest, undertook the effort to connect LaBorde to the robbery. The court highlighted that LaBorde was held at the time of the lineup under a lawful criminal court process (the arrest warrant), not the unlawful seizure. Citing Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), the court stated that the fact of the arrest on a warrant was enough to dissipate any taint from the unlawful arrest.

    The court declined to address whether an illegality that reveals a defendant’s existence as a suspect can ever require suppression of evidence. The court explicitly stated, “We need not decide whether an illegality that reveals a defendant’s existence as the suspected perpetrator of another crime can ever require suppression of evidence resulting from that information. It is sufficient to note that under the circumstances here, the challenged evidence simply was not tainted by the unlawful arrest.”

    The court also addressed the photographic array identifications, noting that while inadmissible under state law (People v. Lindsay, 42 N.Y.2d 9; People v. Caserta, 19 N.Y.2d 18) as the People did not argue for their admissibility, they were obtained independently and proceeded from the witnesses’ independent recollections and thus, did not taint the lineup identification. The court cited Bynum v. United States, 274 F.2d 767, for the principle of independent source.