New York Law Review

Tag: Criminal Procedure

  • People v. Hoke, 62 N.Y.2d 1022 (1984): Preserving Objections to Jury Instructions

    People v. Hoke, 62 N.Y.2d 1022 (1984)

    A defendant preserves an objection to a jury charge when the trial court expressly denies a requested charge, and no further explanation is required to avoid waiving the error.

    Summary

    This case concerns the preservation of objections to jury instructions in New York criminal procedure. The defendant requested a specific alibi charge that the People had the burden of disproving the alibi beyond a reasonable doubt, which the trial court denied. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding that the alibi charge improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. The Court of Appeals addressed whether the defendant adequately preserved his objection to the jury charge for appellate review. The Court of Appeals held the objection was not preserved because the defendant failed to specifically object to the charge given after it was delivered.

    Facts

    The defendant was prosecuted for attempted robbery and raised an alibi defense, claiming he was not present at the scene of the crime. Prior to the jury charge, the defendant requested a specific instruction stating the People had the burden of disproving the alibi beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial judge expressly denied the defendant’s request.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction on the law, finding that the alibi charge improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the defendant did not properly preserve his objection to the jury charge.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant preserves a claim of error regarding a jury instruction when the defendant’s request for a specific charge is expressly denied, but the defendant fails to object specifically to the charge as given.

    Holding

    No, because to preserve a claim of error for appellate review in New York, a party must make their position known to the court, affording the court an opportunity to correct the error. A general objection is insufficient when the court has already ruled on a specific request.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals majority held that the defendant did not preserve the issue for appellate review. While the defendant initially requested a specific alibi charge, after the judge gave the jury charge, the defense counsel only made a general objection, stating he was renewing previously mentioned requests. The Court of Appeals stated, “To hold that the general objection sufficed to preserve the error would be to undermine the policy considerations which prompted the enactment of CPL 470.05 (subd 2), namely, to provide the trial court with an opportunity to correct claimed error at a time when it could do so, without necessarily aborting the trial and without subjecting the People to the necessity of a new trial.”

    The dissent, authored by Chief Judge Cooke, argued that the defendant’s request for a specific charge, which was expressly denied, was sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. The dissent cited CPL 470.05 (subd 2), which states that a party who has unsuccessfully requested a particular ruling is deemed to have protested the court’s ultimate disposition, regardless of whether any actual protest was registered. The dissent maintained that once a request to charge is denied, no further objection is necessary, as the judge is on notice that the defendant views any deviation from the requested charge as error. The dissent reasoned that the majority was carrying the concept of preservation too far and emphasized the importance of ensuring that the jury is properly instructed on the applicable law.

  • People v. Kelly, 62 N.Y.2d 516 (1984): Sanctions for Failure to Preserve Evidence

    People v. Kelly, 62 N.Y.2d 516 (1984)

    When the prosecution fails to preserve discoverable evidence, the court must fashion an appropriate sanction to eliminate prejudice to the defendant while protecting society’s interests; dismissal of charges is a drastic remedy that should only be invoked when less severe measures cannot rectify the harm.

    Summary

    Nathaniel Kelly and Angel Marrero were charged with criminal possession of stolen property and petit larceny after allegedly stealing from an undercover officer. The police recovered a wallet and $22, but then returned the evidence to the decoy officer, resulting in its irretrievable loss. The defendants moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the lost evidence hindered their ability to assert an entrapment defense. The trial court granted the motion, and the appellate term affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that dismissal was an abuse of discretion because less drastic sanctions could have cured any prejudice to the defendants. The court emphasized that the primary concern is to eliminate prejudice to the defendant while protecting society’s interests.

    Facts

    Defendants Kelly and Marrero allegedly stole a wallet containing $22 from an undercover police officer.

    The recovered wallet and cash, consisting of one $20 bill and two $1 bills, were vouchered but then immediately returned to the decoy officer according to police practice.

    The evidence was irretrievably lost.

    Defendants claimed the $20 bill was doctored from a $1 bill to resemble a $20, suggesting police inducement and entrapment.

    Procedural History

    The Criminal Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the charges due to the lost evidence.

    The Appellate Term affirmed the Criminal Court’s decision without opinion.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term’s order, reinstated the informations, and remitted the case to the Criminal Court for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether dismissal of two informations was an appropriate response to the prosecution’s wrongful failure to preserve discoverable evidence, where less drastic sanctions could have cured any prejudice to the defendants.

    Holding

    No, because the drastic remedy of dismissal should not be invoked where less severe measures can rectify the harm done by the loss of evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the People had a duty to preserve discoverable evidence. The court noted that the intentional relinquishment of the wallet and currency was inexcusable, even if the police practice of returning property in decoy cases demonstrated the absence of any intent to harm the defendants. The court stated, “A necessary corollary of the duty to disclose is the obligation to preserve evidence until a request for disclosure is made.”

    The court emphasized that CPL 240.70(1) requires an “appropriate” response to the prosecution’s wrongful failure to preserve evidence. While prosecutorial fault may be considered, “the overriding concern must be to eliminate any prejudice to the defendant while protecting the interests of society.” The Court cited various sanctions imposed in other cases, including reducing charges, precluding witnesses from testifying, ordering reconstruction hearings, and issuing unfavorable inference charges.

    The court reasoned that dismissal was not necessary in this case because less severe measures could rectify any prejudice to the defendants. The court reasoned that defendants’ argument that the money was intentionally placed in a highly visible position was not something the People would likely dispute at trial. The court also stated that any potential issues of impeaching the credibility of police officers could be addressed through jury instructions as to the bogus nature of the bill used. The Court indicated that the lower court could have instructed the jury to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution on account of the missing evidence.

    The Court concluded that while the choice of “appropriate” action is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, “as a general matter the drastic remedy of dismissal should not be invoked where less severe measures can rectify the harm done by the loss of evidence.”

  • People v. Williams, 62 N.Y.2d 285 (1984): Validity of Miranda Waiver by Person with Subnormal Intelligence

    People v. Williams, 62 N.Y.2d 285 (1984)

    An individual with subnormal intelligence can validly waive their Miranda rights if they understand the immediate meaning of the warnings, even if they don’t fully grasp the broader legal implications.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a person with subnormal intelligence can validly waive their Miranda rights. The defendant, a man with borderline mental retardation and organic brain damage, confessed to murder and rape after receiving Miranda warnings. Although experts testified that the defendant understood the simplified warnings, they doubted his ability to grasp their full legal implications. The Court held that a valid waiver occurs if the individual comprehends the immediate meaning of the warnings, regardless of their understanding of the broader legal context. The focus is on whether the defendant understood they didn’t have to speak, that their statements could be used against them, and that they had a right to an attorney.

    Facts

    The defendant, a 20-year-old functionally illiterate man with borderline mental retardation and organic brain damage, was arrested and taken to the police station for questioning. A detective, aware of the defendant’s cognitive limitations, provided Miranda warnings using simpler language and ensured the defendant understood each right before proceeding. The defendant agreed to speak and made inculpatory statements after a conversation with his mother.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was found competent to stand trial. He moved to suppress his confession, arguing his waiver of Miranda rights was invalid due to his limited mental capacity. The trial court denied the motion. The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and first-degree rape. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an accused with subnormal intelligence can make a knowing and intelligent waiver of their Miranda rights if they understand the immediate meaning of the warnings but not the broader legal implications of those rights.

    Holding

    Yes, because the focus is on whether the accused understood the immediate import of the Miranda warnings – that they did not have to speak, that any statement could be used against them, and that they had the right to an attorney – regardless of whether they comprehend the mechanics of how that waiver might later be used in the criminal process.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that a valid Miranda waiver must be knowing and intelligent, a factual issue determined by the circumstances of each case. Subnormal intelligence is a factor in the totality of circumstances, but it doesn’t automatically invalidate a waiver unless the retardation is so severe that the accused cannot understand the meaning and effect of their confession. The Court noted that police aren’t required to provide a general legal education; they must ensure the individual understands they don’t have to speak, that statements can be used against them, and that they have a right to counsel. The detective took appropriate steps by simplifying the warnings. The court reasoned that distinguishing between those with normal and subnormal intelligence concerning the comprehension of the policy behind Miranda rights is impractical because neither fully understands the implications of waiving those rights. The crucial inquiry is the accused’s understanding of the immediate meaning of the warnings. The Court cited previous cases such as Harris v Riddle, noting the focus on immediate comprehension rather than a complete understanding of the criminal process. The court stated, “If that comprehension is present, then the waiver will be given effect in the absence of other factors suggesting a lack of voluntariness”. Because the defendant’s own expert witnesses testified that he understood the simplified warnings, the lower courts did not err in finding a valid waiver.

  • People v. Smith, 68 N.Y.2d 534 (1986): Adequacy of Waiver of Right to Counsel

    People v. Smith, 68 N.Y.2d 534 (1986)

    Once a defendant indicates an interest in having counsel assigned, a subsequent waiver of that right and plea of guilty is invalid unless the trial judge makes an adequate inquiry to determine whether the defendant understands the risks and consequences of their actions.

    Summary

    The defendant, a 17-year-old, was arrested for falsely reporting an incident and obstructing governmental administration. At arraignment, he expressed interest in assigned counsel. Later, he reappeared with his mother, waived counsel, and pleaded guilty. The County Court affirmed his conviction for falsely reporting an incident. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the waiver of counsel was ineffective because the Town Justice did not adequately inquire whether the defendant appreciated the risks of proceeding without counsel. This case underscores the necessity of a thorough judicial inquiry when a defendant waives their right to counsel, especially after initially requesting it.

    Facts

    The 17-year-old defendant falsely reported a car accident to the State Police.
    He was arrested and charged with falsely reporting an incident and obstructing governmental administration.
    At his initial arraignment, he pleaded not guilty and indicated an interest in having counsel assigned.
    The Justice Court adjourned the case to consult with an ADA about assigning counsel.
    On the adjourned date, the defendant reappeared with his mother, waived counsel, and pleaded guilty.
    The Town Justice noted only that the “defendant and mother did not want attorney assigned.”

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in Justice Court and sentenced to imprisonment.
    The County Court dismissed the charge of obstructing governmental administration but affirmed the conviction for falsely reporting an incident, rejecting the defendant’s challenge to the effectiveness of his waiver of counsel.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the County Court’s order, vacated the guilty plea and sentence, and remitted the case to the Justice Court.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel is effective when the trial court fails to make an adequate inquiry to ensure that the defendant understands the risks and consequences of proceeding without counsel, especially after the defendant initially requested counsel.

    Holding

    No, because once a defendant indicates an interest in having counsel assigned, the Trial Judge may not accept the defendant’s subsequent waiver of right to counsel and plea of guilty unless the Judge has made an adequate inquiry of the defendant to determine whether the defendant understands the risks and consequences of his actions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, citing Matter of Lawrence S., 29 NY2d 206, 208 and People v. Seaton, 19 NY2d 404, 406. The court stated that the record must demonstrate that the defendant appreciated the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel, referencing People v White, 56 NY2d 110, 117.

    The Court found the record deficient because it did not show any “precautionary inquiry to insure that defendant, in waiving counsel, appreciated the value of being represented by counsel and the difficulties and pitfalls of proceeding without one.” The Court noted that merely informing the defendant of the right to counsel and appointment of counsel if indigent was insufficient for an effective waiver.

    The decision reinforces the principle that a waiver of counsel must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The court’s reasoning emphasizes the trial court’s responsibility to actively ensure that defendants understand the ramifications of self-representation, especially after initially requesting counsel. This case serves as a reminder to lower courts of the specific inquiries necessary to uphold a defendant’s waiver of this fundamental right. As the court implied, a simple statement that the defendant “did not want” an attorney is insufficient to validate a waiver of rights.

  • Harrington v. State, 54 N.Y.2d 624 (1981): Who Pays for Trial Transcripts on Appeal?

    Harrington v. State, 54 N.Y.2d 624 (1981)

    When a non-indigent defendant appeals a conviction, they are responsible for paying for the trial transcripts required to be filed with the court.

    Summary

    This case concerns who bears the cost of trial transcripts when a defendant appeals a conviction in New York. Harrington, a non-indigent defendant, appealed his conviction. The central issue is whether the state is obligated to pay for the trial transcripts required for the appeal, even though Harrington is not indigent. The New York Court of Appeals held that non-indigent defendants are responsible for paying for their own trial transcripts when pursuing an appeal. The court reasoned that a 1977 amendment to CPL 460.70 (subd 1) was intended to reduce the financial burden on taxpayers by requiring non-indigent defendants to pay for their transcripts.

    Facts

    Harrington, a defendant who was not classified as indigent, appealed his criminal conviction. As part of the appeal process, a trial transcript was required to be filed with the court. Harrington sought to have the State of New York cover the cost of preparing this transcript.

    Procedural History

    The specific procedural history prior to the appeal is not detailed in the opinion. However, the case reached the New York Court of Appeals after a decision by the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division’s decision is referenced as supporting the idea that the public should bear the cost of the transcript. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CPL 460.70(1) requires the state to pay for trial transcripts when a non-indigent defendant files an appeal pursuant to CPL 450.10.

    Holding

    No, because the 1977 amendment to CPL 460.70(1) was intended to place the cost of preparing transcripts upon the individual prosecuting the appeal who is able to afford it, and to reduce the financial burden on taxpayers.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the legislative intent behind the 1977 amendment to CPL 460.70 (subd 1). Prior to 1977, the state bore the expense of transcripts regardless of the defendant’s indigency. The amendment conspicuously omitted the broad provision requiring the public to pay for all transcripts and instead specified that “[t]he expense of transcripts prepared for poor persons under this section shall be a state charge.” The court interpreted this omission as intentional, designed to reduce unnecessary expenditures of public funds. The dissent quotes Assemblyman Siegel, the sponsor of the legislation, stating the bill insures transcript preparation at government expense “only when the defendant manifests an actual intent to appeal and when the defendant is unable to afford transcripts.” This legislative history further supports the view that the amendment was intended to provide for public assumption of costs only when the defendant is indigent. The court also referenced a memorandum from the Office of Court Administration, stating that “[b]y the courts’ not ordering the minutes until a poor person application is made, the public is also spared the expense of paying for minutes in cases where the defense is able to afford them.” This interpretation aligns with the State Comptroller’s opinion that “where the defendant takes an appeal and is not indigent, the cost of transcripts must be borne by the defendant.” The court emphasizes that agencies charged with implementing the statute’s interpretations should not be lightly disregarded.

  • People v. Drake, 61 N.Y.2d 362 (1984): Consequences of Unreasonable Delay in Sentencing After Conviction

    People v. Drake, 61 N.Y.2d 362 (1984)

    An unreasonable delay in sentencing a defendant after conviction can result in a loss of jurisdiction by the court, requiring dismissal of the indictment, unless the delay is excusable due to the defendant’s actions or other good cause.

    Summary

    Drake, a state employee, was convicted of grand larceny for falsely claiming jury duty leave. Thirty-nine months passed between the guilty verdict and sentencing. The Court of Appeals held that this delay was presumptively unreasonable and could result in a loss of jurisdiction, requiring dismissal of the indictment unless the delay was excusable. The court emphasized that the burden to explain and justify the delay rests with the prosecution and the court, not the defendant, and that unexplained delays are prejudicial to the defendant. The case was remitted to the trial court for a hearing to determine if the delay was excusable.

    Facts

    Drake, a supervisor in the NYS Department of Taxation and Finance, was convicted of larceny for submitting a false time card claiming he was on jury duty when he was not. State employees received fully compensable leave for jury duty but were expected to work when court was not in session. Drake claimed for over 10 days of jury duty when he only served 4. As a result, he was unlawfully paid for six days of unauthorized leave time.

    Procedural History

    Drake was indicted by the Grand Jury and convicted of grand larceny in the third degree. Thirty-nine months later, he was sentenced to an unconditional discharge. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. Drake then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing insufficient evidence and unreasonable delay in sentencing.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for larceny by false pretenses.
    2. Whether the 39-month delay between the guilty verdict and sentencing was an unreasonable delay that resulted in a loss of jurisdiction by the trial court.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the evidence sufficiently established that the defendant received money from the State in the form of salary because of the State’s reliance upon his false statements concerning jury service.
    2. Yes, because a 39-month delay is facially unreasonable. The case is remitted for a hearing to determine if the delay was excusable; absent excusing facts, the indictment must be dismissed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the larceny conviction, the court found the evidence sufficient. Even though Drake received the money before the false statements were made, the State relied on the false statements to avoid deducting money from a subsequent paycheck. The larceny was complete when Drake wrongfully received funds due to his false statements.

    Regarding the delay in sentencing, the court emphasized that sentence must be pronounced without unreasonable delay (CPL 380.30(1)). Failure to do so results in a loss of jurisdiction. The court distinguished this case from Matter of Weinstein v Haft, where the delay was at the defendant’s behest. Here, the 39-month delay was unexplained, with the court merely alluding to extrajudicial pleas for leniency. The court stated, “It is unexcusable delay that does so. If the delay is caused by legal proceedings or other conduct of the defendant which frustrates the entry of judgment, it is excusable.” In contrast, negligence by judicial or prosecutorial staff is not excusable.

    The court emphasized that the New York rule assumes the defendant has been prejudiced by unreasonable delay and does not require the defendant to demand sentencing. The burden rests solely with the State. Unless the delay is excused, it requires dismissal of the indictment.

    The court noted that “[s]peedy trial requirements focus upon the need for a prompt trial so that witnesses are available, possible exoneration is swift and the public’s interest in deliberate prosecution is fulfilled. After a defendant is convicted, the focus shifts to the defendant’s right to appeal, his eligibility for pardon and commutation of sentence, and, if a retrial becomes necessary, the danger that witnesses may be unavailable. Of equal significance in the need for timely sentencing is the public perception that prompt and certain punishment has been imposed upon a defendant found guilty, uninfluenced by legally irrelevant considerations.”

  • People v. Morris, 61 N.Y.2d 290 (1984): Sufficiency of Indictment Regarding Time of Offense

    61 N.Y.2d 290 (1984)

    An indictment will not be dismissed as defective for failing to specify the exact date of an offense if the indictment or bill of particulars provides a reasonable approximation of the date or dates involved, considering the circumstances of the case.

    Summary

    Defendant was indicted for rape and sodomy, alleged to have occurred “during the month of November 1980.” He sought a bill of particulars specifying the exact dates, times, and places. The prosecution narrowed the time frame to “on or about and between Friday, November 7, 1980 and Saturday, November 30, 1980.” The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing it was defective under CPL 200.50(6) and violated his constitutional right to notice. The trial court granted the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the indictment was reasonably precise under the circumstances, considering the young ages of the victims and the nature of the crimes.

    Facts

    Defendant was accused of raping a six-year-old child and sodomizing his five-year-old daughter. Both children lived in the defendant’s home. The indictment stated that both offenses occurred “during the month of November 1980.” The prosecution served a demand for a notice of alibi. The defendant then requested a bill of particulars specifying the exact times, places, and dates of the alleged crimes. The People narrowed the time to “on or about and between Friday, November 7, 1980 and Saturday, November 30, 1980,” stating the exact times were unknown.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that it failed to designate a specific date for each crime as required by CPL 200.50(6) and violated his constitutional right to notice. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an indictment is defective under CPL 200.50 if it alleges that a crime occurred within a 24-day period, rather than on a specific date.

    Holding

    No, because under the circumstances of this case, the indictment, as supplemented by the bill of particulars, provided a reasonable approximation of the date of the offenses and afforded the defendant sufficient notice to prepare a defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the purpose of an indictment is to provide the defendant with sufficient information to prepare a defense and to satisfy constitutional notice requirements. While CPL 200.50 requires the indictment to state facts supporting every element of the offense with sufficient precision, it does not mandate an exact date and time. The statute states the crime must have been committed “on, or on or about, a designated date, or during a designated period of time” (CPL 200.50, subd 6). The court emphasized that “the requirements for a valid indictment will vary with the particular crime involved.”

    In determining the sufficiency of the time period alleged, courts should consider the span of time, the knowledge the People have or should have of the exact date, and whether the People acted in good faith in their investigation. Factors to consider include the age and intelligence of the victim, the surrounding circumstances, and the nature of the offense. The court emphasized the standard is reasonableness; “[reasonable certainty, all will agree, is required in criminal pleading” (United States v Cruikshank, 92 US 542, 568). The court noted that, in this case, the victims were young children unable to provide precise dates, there was no indication of bad faith by the prosecution, and the defendant was arrested shortly after the alleged period. The court found that the 24-day period was not so inadequate as to justify dismissal, as the defendant had been informed of the nature of the charges, the conduct underlying them, the place of the crimes, the witnesses present, and the time of the offense within a reasonably designated period. The court stated, “Defendant has been provided with reasonable and adequate notice under the Federal and State Constitutions and is not prevented from preparing a defense, notwithstanding that it would be easier to prepare an alibi defense if the exact date and time of the offense were known and provided.”

  • People v. Worley, 66 N.Y.2d 523 (1985): Speedy Trial Rights and Defendant-Caused Delays

    People v. Worley, 66 N.Y.2d 523 (1985)

    When a defendant makes pretrial motions on the eve of trial, the period during which the court considers those motions is excluded from the time charged to the prosecution for speedy trial purposes.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term’s order and denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. The court held that the prosecution should not be charged for delays resulting from the defendant’s pretrial motions made just before scheduled trial dates, particularly when the prosecution was ready to proceed. Additionally, the time the court spent considering the defendant’s motion to reconsider should also be excluded from the time charged to the prosecution. The court determined that the chargeable time to the People was less than the statutory limit.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with driving while intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[2]). During the proceedings, the defendant filed several pretrial motions, often just before scheduled trial dates. The trial court took these motions under advisement, which necessarily adjourned the trial dates. After deciding the motions, the court set new trial dates. The defendant later moved to dismiss the charges based on a violation of his speedy trial rights under CPL 30.30.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, charging the People with the delay from the court’s decision on the prior motions until the newly scheduled trial date. The Appellate Term affirmed this decision. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the time during which the trial court considered the defendant’s pretrial motions, made on the eve of previously scheduled trial dates, should be charged to the People for speedy trial purposes.
    2. Whether the time during which the trial court considered the defendant’s motion to reconsider a prior decision should be charged to the People for speedy trial purposes.

    Holding

    1. No, because the District Attorney had indicated readiness to proceed on the scheduled dates, the court should not have charged them with the delay following the defendant’s motions.
    2. No, because the period during which the court held under advisement the defendant’s motion to reconsider should have been excluded from the time charged to the People.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the delays were primarily attributable to the defendant’s actions. Citing People v. Brothers, 50 N.Y.2d 413 and People v. Hamilton, 46 N.Y.2d 932, the court emphasized that the prosecution should not be penalized for delays caused by the defendant’s pretrial motions, especially when the prosecution was ready to proceed on the initially scheduled trial dates.

    The court stated, “Inasmuch as the District Attorney had indicated his readiness to proceed on the scheduled dates, the court should not have charged him with the delay following defendant’s motions.” Further, the court clarified that the entire 30-day period between December 6, 1982, and January 5, 1983, should not have been charged to the People, as the court was considering the defendant’s motion to reconsider its prior decision for a portion of that time (from December 14 until January 5). This period should have been excluded.

    By excluding the periods of delay attributable to the defendant’s motions, the court calculated that the People were only responsible for 66 days of delay, which was within the permissible time frame under CPL 30.30. Therefore, the defendant’s motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds should have been denied.

  • People v. Gonzalez, 50 N.Y.2d 911 (1980): Consent to Search and Appellate Review of Factual Determinations

    People v. Gonzalez, 50 N.Y.2d 911 (1980)

    An appellate court’s determination that consent to a search was involuntary as a matter of law is a question of law reviewable by the Court of Appeals; however, the case must be remitted to the Appellate Division for determination of the facts if the Court of Appeals finds the legal determination to be in error.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted based on evidence seized after police entered his apartment with his wife’s consent. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the wife’s consent involuntary as a matter of law and suppressing the evidence. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the determination of involuntariness as a matter of law was erroneous. Because the Appellate Division based its decision on a question of law, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review it. The case was then remitted to the Appellate Division to determine the factual issues surrounding the consent.

    Facts

    The police entered the defendant’s apartment and seized a gun. The entry was based on the purported consent of the defendant’s wife. The suppression court made findings of fact related to the circumstances of the wife’s consent. At the suppression hearing, evidence was presented regarding the circumstances surrounding the wife’s consent to the police entry.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the motion to suppress the gun. The defendant was subsequently convicted. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s judgment, finding that the wife’s consent was involuntary as a matter of law and dismissing the indictment. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred in determining that the defendant’s wife’s consent to the police entry was involuntary as a matter of law.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Appellate Division’s conclusion that the People failed to establish voluntary consent as a matter of law was erroneous.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the Appellate Division’s holding was based on an incorrect determination of law. The Appellate Division had concluded that, based on the record, no view of the evidence could support a finding of voluntary consent. The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that this legal conclusion was in error. Because the Appellate Division’s order was based on a determination of law, the Court of Appeals had the power to review it. The Court emphasized that its power of review was limited to the question of law. Citing People v. Palumbo, 49 N.Y.2d 928 and People v. Cona, 49 N.Y.2d 26, the Court stated that it must remit the case to the Appellate Division for determination of the facts pursuant to CPL 470.40 (subd 2, par [b]). The court stated, “Although in doing so it made findings additional to those made by the suppression Judge, its holding was that the People had failed to meet their burden of establishing voluntary consent as a matter of law, that is to say, that under no view of the evidence in the record could it be found to be voluntary.”

  • People v. Douglass, 60 N.Y.2d 194 (1983): Limits on a Trial Court’s Power to Dismiss Criminal Complaints for Failure to Prosecute

    People v. Douglass, 60 N.Y.2d 194 (1983)

    A trial court lacks the inherent or statutory authority to dismiss a misdemeanor complaint for “failure to prosecute” or “calendar control” when the statutory speedy trial time has not elapsed; the power to dismiss is governed exclusively by statute.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a trial court can dismiss a misdemeanor complaint based on the prosecution’s failure to convert the complaint into an information within a court-determined timeframe, absent a speedy trial violation. The Court of Appeals held that trial courts do not have the inherent or statutory authority to dismiss criminal charges for “failure to prosecute” or “calendar control.” The court emphasized that the power to dismiss is governed by statute (CPL 170.30), which exhaustively lists grounds for dismissal, and these grounds do not include failure to prosecute. While trial courts have calendar control powers, these do not extend to dismissing cases outside statutory grounds. The court reversed the Appellate Term’s orders and reinstated the complaints.

    Facts

    Several defendants were arrested and charged with various misdemeanors. In each case, the prosecutor failed to convert the misdemeanor complaint into an information (by obtaining supporting depositions) within a timeframe set by the trial court. The statutory speedy trial period (CPL 30.30) had not yet elapsed in any of the cases.

    Procedural History

    In each case, the New York City Criminal Court dismissed the charges due to the prosecutor’s failure to timely convert the complaint into an information. The Appellate Term affirmed the dismissals, holding that the trial courts acted within their discretion to control their calendars and address the prosecutor’s unpreparedness. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether trial courts have the inherent power to dismiss misdemeanor complaints for “failure to prosecute” or “calendar control” when the statutory speedy trial time has not elapsed.

    Holding

    1. No, because neither common law nor statute grants trial courts the authority to dismiss criminal charges for failure to prosecute or calendar control; the grounds for dismissal are exhaustively listed in CPL 170.30, and these grounds do not include failure to prosecute or calendar control.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that the lower courts had no authority to dismiss the charges for “failure to prosecute” or for “calendar control.” The court analyzed the historical development of the power to dismiss criminal charges, noting that at common law, only the Attorney General (later the District Attorney with court approval) could discontinue a criminal proceeding by entering a nolle prosequi. The court emphasized that it was the fear of prosecutors dismissing too many cases that prompted the Legislature to authorize courts to intercede, granting them a veto power but not a positive power to compel a discontinuance. The court noted that prior to the enactment of the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1881, there was no inherent power vested in the courts to dismiss a criminal prosecution for “failure to prosecute”.

    The court emphasized that CPL 170.30 comprehensively lists the grounds for dismissing a misdemeanor complaint, and “failure to prosecute” or “calendar control” are not among them. To allow dismissals on these grounds would be an “abdication of the judiciary’s responsibility to safeguard the public and promote respect for the law” and would create dismissals “incapable of meaningful appellate review.”

    The court distinguished cases cited by the defendants, such as People v. Wingard, noting that those cases involved dismissals in the interest of justice pursuant to CPL 170.40 or other statutorily authorized dismissals. The court stated, “Thus, it is not for the trial courts to depart from the clear wording of CPL 170.30 and adopt, ipse dixit, a rule which empowers them to dismiss criminal proceedings on grounds, such as “failure to prosecute” and “calendar control”, which the Legislature never authorized.” The court concluded that the dismissals were unauthorized and unnecessary.