New York Law Review

Tag: Criminal Procedure

  • People v. Jackson, No. 22 (N.Y. 2017): Preservation of Sandoval Challenges and Waiver of Antommarchi Rights

    People v. Jackson, No. 22 (N.Y. March 28, 2017)

    To preserve a challenge to a trial court’s Sandoval ruling, a party must make a specific and timely objection at the time of the ruling or when the court has an opportunity to change it, unless the court expressly decides the issue raised on appeal in response to a protest. A defendant can waive their right to be present at sidebar conferences.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed two primary issues in People v. Jackson: (1) whether the defendant preserved for appellate review a challenge to the trial court’s Sandoval ruling, which permitted the prosecution to introduce the fact of a prior juvenile delinquency adjudication, and (2) whether the defendant validly waived his right to be present at sidebar conferences during jury selection. The Court held that the defendant’s challenge to the Sandoval ruling was unpreserved because he failed to make a specific objection. The Court further held that the defendant had validly waived his right to be present at sidebar conferences. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division order.

    Facts

    The defendant was prosecuted on charges arising from unrelated sexual attacks on two female acquaintances. Prior to trial, the prosecution sought permission to question the defendant, if he testified, about prior convictions and bad acts. During a Sandoval/Molineux hearing, the defendant opposed the prosecution’s request, arguing that the prior offenses were juvenile offenses. The court ruled that the prosecution could elicit that the defendant had been adjudicated a juvenile delinquent and received probation, but not the facts underlying the adjudication. The defendant did not object. Later, during a People v. Antommarchi hearing, the court informed the defendant of his right to be present during sidebar conversations, but he could waive the right to avoid being seen in custody by the jury. The defendant signed a written waiver of his right to be present.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of predatory sexual assault and criminal sexual act in the first degree. The trial court imposed a sentence of 25 years to life on the predatory sexual assault conviction and 25 years on the criminal sexual act conviction. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, concluding that the Sandoval ruling was harmless error and the defendant validly waived his right to be present at sidebar conferences. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant preserved for appellate review his challenge to the trial court’s Sandoval ruling.
    2. Whether the defendant validly waived his right to be present at sidebar conferences.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant failed to make a specific and timely objection to the Sandoval ruling.
    2. Yes, because the record showed that the defendant was informed of his rights, consulted with his attorney, and signed a written waiver.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals explained that a challenge based on a Sandoval error must be preserved for appellate review by a specific and timely objection. To preserve an issue, counsel must register an objection and apprise the court of the grounds for the objection. The Court found that the defendant’s challenge to the Sandoval ruling was unpreserved because the defendant did not argue at the hearing that it would be legal error to permit the prosecution to elicit that he was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent. The defendant merely argued that the actions should not be judged based on a young offender’s undeveloped mind. Since the defendant did not object, the trial court had no opportunity to change its ruling and avoid the alleged error. The Court also held that the trial court did not expressly decide the issue of whether it was erroneous to allow the prosecution to introduce the fact of the juvenile adjudication because the objection wasn’t based on the legal prohibition.

    Regarding the waiver of the right to be present at sidebar conferences, the Court cited People v. Antommarchi and noted that a defendant has the right to be present. However, a defendant may waive this right. The Court found that the defendant validly waived his rights because he was informed of his right to be present, consulted with his attorney, and signed a written waiver.

    Practical Implications

    This case emphasizes the importance of making specific and timely objections to preserve issues for appellate review. Attorneys must clearly articulate the legal basis for their objections to provide the trial court with an opportunity to correct any errors. If counsel fails to object, the issue is not preserved, and will be unable to raise the issue on appeal. Moreover, the case confirms that a defendant can waive their right to be present at sidebar conferences if the waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Legal practitioners should ensure that any waivers are properly documented, with the defendant fully informed of their rights and the consequences of waiving them. If the objection is not specific, it can result in the defendant being unable to appeal a potential error made by the trial court.

  • People v. Morgan, 29 N.Y.3d 517 (2017): Permissible Supplemental Jury Instructions Regarding Unanimity After a Defective Verdict

    People v. Morgan, 29 N.Y.3d 517 (2017)

    A trial court’s supplemental instruction to a jury after it returns a non-unanimous verdict, directing the jury to resume deliberations, is permissible as long as it does not coerce the jury to reach a specific verdict.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals considered whether a supplemental instruction, given by the trial court after the jury announced a verdict that was not unanimous, was coercive and violated the defendant’s right to a fair trial. The court held that the trial judge’s instruction, which informed the jury that their verdict must be unanimous and directed them to resume deliberations, was appropriate. The Court reasoned that the instruction did not pressure the jury to reach a specific verdict and that, because the jury deliberated for a full day after the instruction, it was not unduly coercive. The court also addressed the issue of the trial court’s refusal to read back the defense counsel’s summation, finding the issue unpreserved.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with murder and other crimes. During deliberations, the jury indicated that it was deadlocked. After further instruction, the jury announced it had reached a verdict: guilty on some counts, not guilty on others. However, the subsequent polling of the jurors revealed that the verdict was not unanimous. The trial court then instructed the jurors to resume deliberations to reach a unanimous verdict. The jury deliberated for another day and ultimately returned a unanimous verdict of guilty on some counts. The defendant argued that the supplemental instruction was coercive and deprived him of a fair trial.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for a mistrial after the initial non-unanimous verdict and gave a supplemental instruction. The defendant was convicted and appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, concluding the supplemental instruction was appropriate. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court’s supplemental instruction, after the jury returned a non-unanimous verdict, was coercive and violated the defendant’s right to a fair trial.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in denying the jury’s request to rehear defense counsel’s summation during deliberations.

    Holding

    1. No, because the instruction was not coercive and did not violate the defendant’s right to a fair trial.

    2. No, because the issue was not properly preserved.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the standard set forth in Criminal Procedure Law § 310.80, which mandates that if the jury’s verdict is not unanimous, the court must direct the jury to resume deliberations. The court cited People v. Aponte and People v. Pagan to distinguish between permissible and impermissible supplemental jury instructions. The court held that the trial court’s instruction in this case was proper because it did not pressure the jury to reach a particular verdict and it left open the possibility of principled disagreement among the jurors. The court noted that the instruction was not coercive, because it did not overemphasize the need to return a verdict, nor did it suggest the jury was failing in its duty. The absence of “cautionary language” was not considered fatal to the supplemental charge because such language had already been given to the jury two hours earlier.

    Practical Implications

    This case provides guidance on the permissible scope of supplemental instructions when a jury returns a non-unanimous verdict. Attorneys must be aware of the fine line between encouraging a jury to reach a verdict and coercing them. The court’s holding underscores that a supplemental instruction is permissible if it simply reminds the jury of the unanimity requirement and directs them to continue deliberations. The case also suggests that the content of prior instructions can be considered when evaluating the propriety of supplemental instructions. Moreover, the fact that the jury deliberated for a significant period after the instruction suggests that the court can avoid claims of coercion if the jury deliberates for a substantial amount of time after the instruction is given. Courts must consider the totality of the circumstances when assessing the impact of supplemental instructions on the jury’s deliberations.

  • People v. Perkins, 27 N.Y.3d 435 (2016): Suggestiveness of Lineups When Defendant Possesses a Distinctive Feature

    People v. Perkins, 27 N.Y.3d 435 (2016)

    A lineup is unduly suggestive if the defendant has a distinctive feature, such as dreadlocks, that makes him stand out, even if that feature was not mentioned in the witness’s prior description of the perpetrator.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the suggestiveness of a lineup where the defendant was the only participant with dreadlocks, a distinctive feature. The court held that the lineup was unduly suggestive, regardless of whether the witness mentioned the defendant’s dreadlocks in their initial description to the police. The court emphasized that the totality of the circumstances must be considered when assessing the suggestiveness of a lineup. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, finding that the lower court erred in determining that a lineup was not unduly suggestive just because the witness had not mentioned the distinctive feature in their initial description. This case highlights the importance of conducting fair lineups to avoid suggestive identification procedures that could lead to misidentification.

    Facts

    After being identified as a suspect, the defendant was placed in photo arrays and lineups. In the relevant lineups, the defendant was the only participant with long dreadlocks. Four robbery victims identified the defendant in the lineups. Two of the victims had described the perpetrator as having dreadlocks, while the other two had not. The Supreme Court suppressed the lineup identifications for the two victims who had mentioned dreadlocks and not for the others. The Appellate Division affirmed, focusing on whether the distinctive feature was part of the complainants’ descriptions. All four victims identified the defendant in court, but the defendant was acquitted of the robbery counts with respect to two of the victims and convicted of the counts with respect to the others.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the lineup identifications for two victims but denied it for the others. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted the defendant leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a lineup is unduly suggestive when the defendant possesses a distinctive feature, even if the witness did not mention that feature in their prior description of the perpetrator?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a lineup’s suggestiveness should be determined by considering all circumstances to determine whether the lineup created a substantial likelihood that the defendant would be singled out for identification.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that a bright-line rule that a distinctive feature only renders a lineup unduly suggestive if it was mentioned in the witness’s prior description would be unworkable and unwise. Instead, the court emphasized that the focus should be on whether the lineup created a substantial likelihood of misidentification. The court found the lineup was unduly suggestive as the defendant was the only person with long dreadlocks. The court referenced its prior decision in People v. Chipp, stating that it must consider all circumstances to determine suggestiveness. The court held that there was no record support for the lower courts’ conclusion. The court held that, as a matter of law, a witness’s failure to mention a distinctive feature in his or her initial description is not necessarily the determinative factor in assessing a lineup’s suggestivity. The Court reversed the Appellate Division, ordered that both lineups should have been suppressed, and remanded to Supreme Court for further proceedings.

    Practical Implications

    This decision clarifies the standard for determining the suggestiveness of a lineup in New York. Law enforcement must be cautious when conducting lineups and ensure that distinctive features do not make the defendant stand out. Prosecutors must be prepared to establish an independent basis for in-court identifications if a lineup is found to be unduly suggestive. Defense attorneys should challenge lineups where the defendant is the only participant with a distinctive feature, regardless of whether the witness mentioned that feature in their initial description. This case emphasizes that a totality of the circumstances test must be applied. Post-Perkins, courts must consider all factors when assessing the reliability of an identification procedure and not rely solely on the witness’s prior description.

  • People v. Ortiz, 27 N.Y.3d 127 (2016): Facial Sufficiency of a Misdemeanor Complaint in a Weapon Possession Case

    27 N.Y.3d 127 (2016)

    An accusatory instrument for a misdemeanor complaint must provide the defendant with sufficient notice of the charged crime to satisfy due process and double jeopardy, and when describing a common object like metal knuckles, it does not require recitation of an officer’s training or experience if the description is clear.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the facial sufficiency of a misdemeanor complaint charging the defendant with criminal possession of a weapon, specifically metal knuckles. The court held that the accusatory instrument was sufficient because it clearly stated that the defendant possessed “brass metal knuckles,” a per se weapon. The court found that the term had a commonly understood meaning, providing the defendant with adequate notice of the charge. It distinguished this case from those involving items like gravity knives, where the officer’s training and experience in identifying the specific operational mechanism are relevant. The court emphasized that the description of metal knuckles did not require any specific explanation of the officer’s training or experience.

    Facts

    A police officer stopped the defendant and recovered “brass metal knuckles” from his pocket. The defendant was charged with criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, specifically violating Penal Law § 265.01 (1). The accusatory instrument stated that the officer “recovered one set of brass metal knuckles from defendant’s right front pants pocket.” The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing it was facially insufficient. The Criminal Court denied the motion. The defendant then pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct. On appeal, the defendant argued that the accusatory instrument was facially insufficient.

    Procedural History

    The Criminal Court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint. The Appellate Term affirmed the Criminal Court’s decision, holding the factual allegations in the accusatory instrument were sufficient. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the accusatory instrument, alleging that the defendant unlawfully possessed “brass metal knuckles,” was facially sufficient under Criminal Procedure Law § 100.15 (3) and § 100.40 (4)(b).

    Holding

    Yes, because the accusatory instrument provided sufficient notice of the crime charged, the defendant was adequately informed of the charge, and the term “brass metal knuckles” has a common and natural definition.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court began by noting that because the defendant waived prosecution by information, the standard of review was for a misdemeanor complaint. Under Criminal Procedure Law § 100.15 (3), the factual part of the complaint must contain facts of an evidentiary character supporting the charges. The complaint must also establish reasonable cause. The court emphasized that the test for facial sufficiency is whether the instrument provides sufficient notice to satisfy due process and double jeopardy. The Court looked at dictionary definitions and the common understanding of “metal knuckles.” They are described as a metal object with finger holes used as a weapon to increase the impact of a fist. The Court found the accusatory instrument sufficient because it clearly informed the defendant of the crime charged and the object recovered. The court distinguished the case from instances involving a gravity knife, where an officer must explain their basis for concluding the item is such.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies the requirements for the facial sufficiency of accusatory instruments related to weapon possession, specifically when the weapon is a commonly understood item. Prosecutors and law enforcement officers should ensure that the accusatory instruments clearly describe the item in question. For common items like metal knuckles, specific explanations of an officer’s training may not be needed, but a clear description in the accusatory instrument is still critical. This case also reinforces the distinction between weapons with clear characteristics, and those, like gravity knives, that require an explanation of the weapon’s operation. Defense attorneys should focus on whether the accusatory instrument provides sufficient notice, arguing if the description is vague, lacking detail, or does not accurately portray the object, the complaint can be insufficient. Subsequent cases will likely cite this decision to reinforce the need for sufficient detail in the accusatory instruments.

  • People v. Smith, 27 N.Y.3d 645 (2016): Affidavit of Errors as Jurisdictional Requirement for Appeals from Local Courts Without Stenographers

    27 N.Y.3d 645 (2016)

    An affidavit of errors is a jurisdictional prerequisite for an appeal from a local criminal court where no court stenographer recorded the proceedings, even if the proceedings were electronically recorded.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed two consolidated cases, People v. Smith and People v. Ramsey, to determine whether an affidavit of errors is required for an appeal from a local criminal court when proceedings were electronically recorded, but no court stenographer was present. The court held that under CPL 460.10, the absence of a court stenographer necessitates the filing of an affidavit of errors to perfect the appeal, regardless of the availability of an electronic recording. The Court reasoned that the statute’s plain language distinguishes between proceedings recorded by a court stenographer and those that are not, and the requirement of an affidavit of errors is a jurisdictional prerequisite for the appeal in the latter case.

    Facts

    People v. Smith: Smith was convicted in a village court and the proceedings were electronically recorded. No court stenographer was present. Smith provided a transcript of the electronic recording as the record on appeal, but did not file an affidavit of errors. The Appellate Term reversed the conviction, finding the transcript sufficient. The People appealed.

    People v. Ramsey: Ramsey pleaded guilty in a village court, with an electronic recording of the plea proceeding. Again, no court stenographer was present. The transcript of the recording contained numerous instances of inaudible or unidentified speakers. Ramsey filed a notice of appeal with the transcript but no affidavit of errors. The County Court dismissed the appeal because of the failure to file an affidavit of errors, finding that gaps in the transcript prevented a review of the plea’s voluntariness.

    Procedural History

    People v. Smith: Smith was convicted in Village Court. The Appellate Term reversed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted the People leave to appeal.

    People v. Ramsey: Ramsey pleaded guilty in Village Court. County Court dismissed the appeal. The Court of Appeals granted Ramsey leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether CPL 460.10 requires the filing of an affidavit of errors when appealing a conviction from a local criminal court where proceedings were electronically recorded but no court stenographer was present.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the statutory language requires an affidavit of errors in the absence of a court stenographer.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court’s reasoning centered on a strict interpretation of CPL 460.10, which outlines the procedures for criminal appeals. The statute distinguishes between cases where a court stenographer recorded the proceedings and those where they did not. When a court stenographer is absent, the statute mandates the filing of an affidavit of errors as a jurisdictional requirement for taking an appeal. The court emphasized that CPL 460.10 provides two divergent procedures for taking a criminal appeal from a local court and the application is dependent on the presence or absence of a court stenographer at the underlying proceedings.

    The court rejected the argument that electronic recording is the functional equivalent of stenographic recording, pointing out the roles of stenographers under the Judiciary Law. The court also noted that the electronic recordings may contain gaps and omissions that a stenographer wouldn’t have, which the affidavit of errors is designed to address. The court quoted the statute that states, “the appeal is deemed to have been taken” “[u]pon filing and service of the affidavit of errors as prescribed” (CPL 460.10 [3] [c]).

    Practical Implications

    This decision has significant implications for criminal appeals from local courts in New York. It underscores the importance of strict compliance with CPL 460.10, particularly the affidavit of errors requirement. Attorneys must ensure the timely filing of an affidavit of errors when appealing cases from courts without a stenographer, even if electronic recordings exist. Failure to do so will result in dismissal of the appeal. The decision clarifies that the existence of an electronic recording does not obviate the need for an affidavit of errors, and it highlights the limitations of electronic records in the absence of a stenographer’s real-time record of the proceedings. It also suggests the potential value in a stenographer’s role, even in the age of electronic recordings, as their presence can ensure the completeness and accuracy of the record.

  • People v. Garcia, 27 N.Y.3d 601 (2016): Preservation of Error and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Grand Jury Proceedings

    <strong><em>People v. Garcia</em></strong>, 27 N.Y.3d 601 (2016)

    To preserve an issue for appellate review in New York, a defendant must make a timely and specific objection at the trial level; failure to do so generally results in the issue being unpreserved and not reviewable on appeal, unless a mode of proceedings error occurred.

    <strong>Summary</strong>

    In <em>People v. Garcia</em>, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether various errors during grand jury proceedings required dismissal of an indictment. The court held that the defendant’s claims, including being shackled, improper questioning, and the failure to present a witness, were unpreserved because his attorney did not make timely objections. The court also rejected the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, finding that the attorney’s actions were reasonable under the circumstances, particularly given the defendant’s decision to proceed pro se. The ruling underscores the importance of preserving legal issues at the trial court level for appellate review and clarifies the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel.

    <strong>Facts</strong>

    Defendant was charged with first-degree robbery. During grand jury proceedings, he was represented by counsel and shackled. The prosecutor failed to inform the grand jury about the defense’s request for a witness to testify. Defendant’s counsel raised concerns about the shackling and the missing witness. The defendant then requested to proceed pro se, and the court granted the request. A jury later found the defendant guilty, and he was sentenced to a 20-year term.

    <strong>Procedural History</strong>

    Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment based on the insufficiency of evidence, which was denied. After the guilty verdict, the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that most of the defendant’s challenges were unpreserved. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    <strong>Issue(s)</strong>

    1. Whether the defendant’s challenges to the grand jury proceedings (shackling, improper questioning, and the failure to present a witness) were preserved for appellate review.

    2. Whether defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to preserve these claims.

    <strong>Holding</strong>

    1. No, the challenges were not preserved because the defense counsel did not make timely and specific objections.

    2. No, the defense counsel’s performance was not ineffective.

    <strong>Court’s Reasoning</strong>

    The court emphasized the importance of the preservation rule in New York law. A failure to object at the trial level generally prevents appellate review, unless the error is a mode of proceedings error. The court found that none of the alleged errors (shackling, questioning, and the witness issue) constituted a mode of proceedings error. It reasoned that the shackling issue did not automatically qualify as a mode of proceedings error, and that defendant’s counsel did not preserve the other issues by objecting. Regarding ineffective assistance, the court applied the standard of “meaningful representation” and considered the totality of the circumstances. The court found that the counsel’s actions were reasonable, especially considering the defendant’s decision to proceed pro se. The court noted counsel had attempted to raise certain errors prior to being relieved as counsel.

    <strong>Practical Implications</strong>

    This case reinforces the necessity of making timely and specific objections during trial proceedings to preserve issues for appeal. For attorneys, this means being vigilant in identifying and objecting to potential errors as they arise. The case also provides guidance on the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, demonstrating that strategic decisions, even if they result in unpreserved arguments, may not constitute ineffective assistance, especially if the defendant’s actions complicate the situation. This case suggests that it is important for trial counsel to create a complete record of objections. Furthermore, this case highlights the significance of a defendant’s decision to represent themselves and its potential effect on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

  • People v. Reynolds, No. 78 (N.Y. 2016): Validity of Plea Agreements Conditioned on Presentence Incarceration

    People v. Reynolds, No. 78 (N.Y. June 7, 2016)

    A plea agreement that includes an illegal condition, such as presentence incarceration lacking statutory authority, renders the plea invalid.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the validity of a plea agreement where the defendant’s sentencing was conditioned on a period of presentence incarceration. The court affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the defendant failed to preserve his claim that his plea should be vacated. The court distinguished this case from previous rulings, finding that the defendant’s challenge was based on a violation of a lawful, not an illegal, presentence condition (being arrested). The dissent argued that the presentence incarceration lacked statutory basis and rendered the plea invalid, and that the defendant’s claim was preserved despite the lack of objection before sentencing. The dissenting opinion argued that the six months of presentence incarceration was punitive, rather than rehabilitative and therefore illegal.

    Facts

    Baasil Reynolds was indicted on charges of criminal possession of a weapon and menacing. After approximately six months of pre-plea incarceration, he agreed to plead guilty to a felony charge with delayed sentencing, conditioned on his compliance with specific terms. The conditions included an additional six months of incarceration, followed by release on his own recognizance with the restriction that he not be arrested or violate any orders of protection. Reynolds served the additional six months. However, he was arrested on the day of his sentencing. After an Outley hearing, the court imposed the originally promised two-to-four-year sentence. Reynolds appealed, claiming his plea was invalid due to the additional incarceration, but the lower court upheld the original plea agreement.

    Procedural History

    Reynolds accepted a plea agreement, which the trial court approved. He subsequently appealed this plea after the trial court imposed sentence after he failed to comply with conditions, which was upheld by the Appellate Division. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Reynolds preserved his claim that his plea should be vacated due to the allegedly illegal presentence incarceration condition.
    2. Whether the trial court’s findings at the Outley hearing were sufficient.

    Holding

    1. No, because Reynolds did not object to the plea before sentencing, and he did not challenge an illegal sentence, the claim was not preserved.
    2. Yes, the trial court’s findings at the Outley hearing were sufficient.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The majority determined that Reynolds did not preserve his claim challenging the plea’s validity because he did not move to withdraw the plea before sentencing. The court distinguished this case from prior cases where an illegal sentence was imposed. The court found that Reynolds’ sentence was lawful. The court also affirmed the trial court’s findings from the Outley hearing, stating that the court properly determined there was a legitimate basis for Reynolds’ arrest, which was enough to uphold the initial plea.

    The dissent argued the plea was invalid because the presentence incarceration lacked statutory authorization and thus was an illegal condition. The dissent argued that the court could consider the claim because the condition imposed was illegal. It cited People v. Rodney E. and People v. Avery, where the court considered claims of illegal presentencing conditions, even without a pre-sentencing objection. The dissent emphasized that the presentence incarceration was not authorized by any statute, and thus was illegal.

    Practical Implications

    This case highlights the importance of preserving challenges to plea agreements before sentencing to protect the possibility of appeal, and that in New York, claims of illegal sentences, or even those resulting from illegal conditions, are more likely to be reviewed on appeal than those where only an illegal condition, but not the sentence itself, is challenged. Attorneys must carefully examine the conditions of plea agreements to ensure they are authorized by law, and to challenge any unauthorized conditions before sentencing to preserve the client’s rights. Courts must ensure that any presentence conditions are authorized by law and appropriately related to rehabilitation or lawful conduct. Further, the case offers insights for criminal defense attorneys on distinguishing between an illegal sentence versus an illegal condition for purposes of preservation on appeal. Finally, this case demonstrates the importance of the Outley hearing and how a court must evaluate the basis of an arrest to satisfy the conditions imposed post-plea.

  • People v. Mack, No. 74 (N.Y. 2016): Preservation Required for Claims of Improper Jury Note Response When Counsel Has Meaningful Notice

    <strong><em>People v. Mack, No. 74, 27 N.Y.3d 15 (2016)</em></strong>

    When the trial court provides meaningful notice to counsel of jury inquiries and its intended responses, any claim of error regarding the court’s failure to respond to a jury note before taking a verdict must be preserved by objection.

    <strong>Summary</strong>

    In *People v. Mack*, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court’s failure to respond to substantive jury notes before accepting a verdict constituted a mode of proceedings error, thus not requiring preservation by objection. The court held that where defense counsel had meaningful notice of the jury’s inquiries and the court’s intended actions, the failure to object to the procedure resulted in a forfeiture of the right to appeal that issue. The Court distinguished this situation from one where the court fails to provide meaningful notice of a jury inquiry, which constitutes a mode of proceedings error. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, emphasizing the importance of the preservation rule to encourage timely error correction and prevent strategic manipulation of the appeals process.

    <strong>Facts</strong>

    The defendant was charged with gang assault. During deliberations, the jury sent multiple notes requesting instructions on reasonable doubt and witness testimony, and also requested a smoking break. The court read the notes aloud in the presence of counsel and defendant, stating its plan to re-read instructions. However, before providing the responses, the jury sent a note that they had reached a verdict. The court, after an off-the-record discussion, brought the jury back, took the verdict, and polled the jury without responding to the earlier notes or inquiring whether the jury still desired a response. Defense counsel did not object. The Appellate Division reversed, finding a mode of proceedings error. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division.

    <strong>Procedural History</strong>

    The trial court found the defendant guilty. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court’s failure to respond to the jury’s substantive requests before accepting the verdict constituted a mode of proceedings error. The dissenting justice would have affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    <strong>Issue(s)</strong>

    1. Whether the trial court’s failure to provide a meaningful response to substantive jury notes before accepting the verdict constituted a mode of proceedings error, thereby excusing the need for preservation through objection.

    <strong>Holding</strong>

    1. No, because defense counsel had meaningful notice of the jury’s inquiries and the trial court’s intended course of action, the failure to respond to the jury’s notes before accepting the verdict did not constitute a mode of proceedings error and thus required preservation.

    <strong>Court’s Reasoning</strong>

    The court relied on Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) § 310.30, which requires meaningful notice of jury inquiries. The court distinguished between (1) the trial court’s failure to provide meaningful notice of the jury’s substantive inquiries, which constitutes a mode of proceedings error, and (2) the trial court’s failure to meaningfully respond to those inquiries, where meaningful notice had been given. Citing prior case law such as *People v. O’Rama*, the court found that providing counsel with meaningful notice meant that the court must inform counsel of the actual specific content of the jurors’ request. In Mack, the court found that counsel had meaningful notice of the jury’s inquiries. The Court also noted that mode of proceedings errors are a “very narrow exception” to the preservation rule and must go “to the essential validity of the process and [be] so fundamental that the entire trial is irreparably tainted.” The court reasoned that in this case, counsel had the knowledge needed to object, and a timely objection could have easily resolved the issue. Further, the court stated that a contrary ruling would incentivize defense attorneys to make strategic choices to create appellate issues. The court emphasized that the error did not prevent the defendant from participating meaningfully in the trial.

    <strong>Practical Implications</strong>

    This case underscores the importance of timely objections in criminal trials. Attorneys must be vigilant in preserving the record, even when the trial court’s actions appear to be in error. The holding clarifies that when counsel has meaningful notice of a jury’s inquiry and the trial court’s planned response, failure to object to the response procedure forfeits the right to appeal. It directly impacts how attorneys should respond to jury notes and court procedures during deliberations. Lawyers must be prepared to object when necessary to preserve claims for appeal, understanding that silence, even when an error appears to have occurred, can be fatal to an appeal. Later cases will likely cite *Mack* for the rule that a trial court’s unresponsiveness to a jury’s note is not a mode of proceedings error where defense counsel had meaningful notice and the opportunity to object.

  • People v. Carver, 27 N.Y.3d 420 (2016): Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Requires Demonstrable Prejudice

    People v. Carver, 27 N.Y.3d 420 (2016)

    To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed a defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that his attorney failed to pursue suppression motions and provide adequate representation at sentencing. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the defendant failed to demonstrate that his counsel’s actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that any alleged errors prejudiced the outcome of the trial. The court emphasized the need for a showing that counsel’s actions were not strategic and that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different absent the alleged errors. The court declined to second-guess strategic decisions made by counsel, particularly where the record did not support a suppression motion or where the defendant’s own statements at sentencing limited counsel’s options.

    Facts

    Police stopped a vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger, observing items obstructing the windshield, a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. The defendant and the driver provided false identification and information, and appeared nervous. The officer found duffel bags in the car containing a laptop and gloves. After the driver fled, the officer found the defendant attempting to exit the car. A subsequent search revealed a stolen camera on the defendant and other stolen items in the vehicle. The defendant was charged with burglary, and a jury found him guilty.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of burglary in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, rejecting the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to seek suppression of evidence due to the legality of the traffic stop and the subsequent “pat down.”
    2. Whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during sentencing.

    Holding

    1. No, because the record did not support a colorable argument to suppress evidence and the failure to pursue suppression could have been a strategic decision by counsel.
    2. No, because counsel provided reasonable representation at sentencing, given the defendant’s own statements and the record.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, requiring the defendant to show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. The court found no basis to conclude that a suppression motion would have succeeded, as the traffic stop was based on a valid Vehicle and Traffic Law violation. The court noted that “[t]here can be no denial of effective assistance of trial counsel arising from counsel’s failure to ‘make a motion . . . that has little or no chance of success.’” Furthermore, the court reasoned that even if a colorable challenge existed, counsel may have made a legitimate strategic decision not to pursue the motion. Regarding the sentencing claim, the court held that counsel’s actions were reasonable, considering the information available and the defendant’s own statements denying involvement, limiting defense counsel’s options.

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the high bar for proving ineffective assistance of counsel. Attorneys should be aware that they are not required to make every possible motion, especially those with little chance of success. Strategic decisions, even if they appear questionable in hindsight, are generally protected unless they are clearly unreasonable. When assessing potential ineffective assistance claims, courts will evaluate the reasonableness of counsel’s actions under the circumstances and the likelihood that a different outcome would have resulted. Clients should be advised that strategic decisions by counsel will not be second-guessed, and to provide counsel with all relevant information to make appropriate decisions.

  • People v. Maxam, 25 N.Y.3d 531 (2015): Finality of a Criminal Judgment for Retroactivity Purposes When No Direct Appeal is Filed

    People v. Maxam, 25 N.Y.3d 531 (2015)

    When a defendant does not file a direct appeal, a criminal judgment becomes final 30 days after sentencing, coinciding with the expiration of the automatic right to appeal, for the purpose of applying new rules of federal constitutional criminal procedure in state post-conviction collateral review proceedings.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the determination of finality of a judgment in a criminal case when the defendant does not file a direct appeal. The case involved a defendant seeking to apply the rule from Padilla v. Kentucky, which required counsel to advise non-citizen clients of potential deportation consequences of a guilty plea. The court held that when a defendant does not file a direct appeal, the judgment becomes final 30 days after sentencing. This finality date is based on the expiration of the timeframe for filing a notice of appeal under CPL 460.10 (1)(a), and the judgment does not remain open until the end of a potential year-long window to seek an extension to file a late notice of appeal under CPL 460.30 (1).

    Facts

    In 2008, Maxam was charged with assault. He pleaded guilty in 2009 and was sentenced to probation. Maxam did not file a direct appeal. Later, he sought to vacate his conviction, citing Padilla v. Kentucky, claiming his counsel failed to inform him about potential deportation consequences. The Supreme Court denied Maxam’s motion, concluding that Padilla should not be applied retroactively. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the judgment did not become final until the end of the CPL 460.30 (1) period. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Procedural History

    Maxam was convicted in Supreme Court in 2009. He did not appeal. He filed a CPL 440.10 motion in Supreme Court seeking to vacate the judgment which was denied. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal, and subsequently, the Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s order. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a judgment of conviction becomes final for purposes of applying a new rule of federal constitutional criminal procedure when a defendant does not file a direct appeal, specifically, whether the relevant date of finality is 30 days after sentencing or the end of the one-year period during which a defendant could seek an extension of time to appeal under CPL 460.30(1).

    Holding

    No, the judgment becomes final 30 days after sentencing, because this aligns with the expiration of the defendant’s automatic right to appeal, not when a defendant could potentially file a late notice of appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals noted that the US Supreme Court in Chaidez v. United States held that Padilla was a “new rule” that would not be applied retroactively. The court differentiated finality in cases with a direct appeal (final when direct review and discretionary review is exhausted) from those without a direct appeal. The court found that, where no direct appeal is taken, the judgment becomes final when the opportunity to appeal expires. It rejected the defendant’s argument that the finality date should be extended by the one-year grace period in CPL 460.30 (1). The court reasoned that adopting the defendant’s view would create uncertainty and potentially broaden the retroactive application of Padilla. The court emphasized that the defendant had not sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal. The court noted that “a defendant seeking to file a late notice of appeal pursuant to CPL 460.30 (1) must demonstrate that he or she was prevented from timely filing a notice of appeal due to the “improper conduct of a public servant or improper conduct, death or disability of the defendant’s attorney,” or the “inability of the defendant and his attorney to have communicated . . . concerning whether an appeal should be taken” (CPL 460.30 [1] [a], [b]).”

    Practical Implications

    This case is essential for determining the availability of new constitutional rules for defendants who did not file direct appeals. Attorneys must understand that, for cases where there’s no appeal filed, the clock starts running on the 30th day after sentencing to determine finality for the purpose of applying new rules of criminal procedure. This impacts the ability of a defendant to collaterally attack a conviction based on a new legal principle, which can affect immigration consequences such as deportation. The ruling also clarifies the finality of judgments in the context of Padilla v. Kentucky and its retroactivity. This case sets a clear rule for finality, avoiding potential extensions based on the availability of actions that were not taken. The practical effect is that the defendant’s opportunity to claim that the attorney was ineffective for failing to advise on immigration consequences is restricted because his judgment became final before the Padilla case was decided.