New York Law Review

Tag: Criminal Procedure

  • People v. Mitchell, 80 N.Y.2d 524 (1992): Retroactivity of Rule on Defendant’s Presence During Jury Selection

    People v. Mitchell, 80 N.Y.2d 524 (1992)

    A new rule of criminal procedure regarding a defendant’s right to be present during jury selection will generally be applied prospectively only, considering the purpose of the new rule, reliance on the old rule, and the effect on the administration of justice.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the rule established in People v. Antommarchi, which expanded a defendant’s right to be present during jury selection, should be applied retroactively. The Court of Appeals held that the Antommarchi rule, based on state statutory law, should be applied prospectively only. The Court considered the purpose of the rule, the extent of reliance on the old practice, and the potential impact on the administration of justice. Because the prior procedure was long-standing and a retroactive application would create a substantial burden, the Court declined to apply the new rule retroactively.

    Facts

    The defendants in these consolidated appeals were tried before the Court of Appeals decided People v. Antommarchi. During jury selection, portions of the examination of prospective jurors occurred at sidebar conferences outside the presence of the defendants. These conferences covered topics such as whether jurors or their relatives had been crime victims or involved in criminal proceedings. The defendants did not object to their exclusion from these sidebars.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions of Mitchell and Casiano. The Appellate Division also affirmed Chambers’ conviction initially, but the Court of Appeals reversed the order in Chambers due to a Batson violation (racial discrimination in jury selection), while affirming the orders in Mitchell and Casiano after determining that the Antommarchi rule should not be applied retroactively.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the rule established in People v. Antommarchi, regarding a defendant’s right to be present during jury selection, should be applied retroactively.

    Holding

    1. No, because the Antommarchi rule is based on state statutory law, and applying the factors outlined in People v. Pepper (purpose of the new rule, reliance on the old rule, and effect on the administration of justice) favors prospective application only.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Antommarchi decision was based on New York’s Criminal Procedure Law (CPL 260.20), which requires a defendant to be present during trial, a right extended to jury impanelment under state law. While this right has due process underpinnings, its scope is broader than federal constitutional rights. The Court distinguished the statutory right from the federal constitutional right to be present, which is evaluated based on whether a defendant’s absence would thwart a fair hearing. Because the questioning involved matters of general bias and hostility, the Court found no violation of the defendants’ constitutional rights under the pre-Antommarchi standard.

    The Court then applied the retroactivity analysis from People v. Pepper, which considers the purpose of the new rule, the extent of reliance on the old rule, and the effect on the administration of justice. The purpose of the Antommarchi rule is to permit a more active role for the defendant in jury selection, not to cure a constitutional infirmity. Courts had substantially relied on the prior practice of examining jurors in the defendant’s absence to expedite jury selection and encourage candor. Retroactive application would create a substantial burden on the administration of justice by requiring the reconsideration of countless pending cases, many with no record of the side-bar conferences. The Court stated, “The reversal, or even the reconsideration, of these appeals on Antommarchi grounds would create a substantial burden on the administration of justice and delay the disposition of countless pending cases.”

    Therefore, the Court held that the Antommarchi rule applies only to jury selections occurring after October 27, 1992, the date People v. Antommarchi was decided. Because the side-bar questioning in Mitchell and Casiano involved matters of general bias, the Court found no violation of the defendants’ statutory or constitutional rights.

  • People v. Morales, 80 N.Y.2d 450 (1992): Defendant’s Right to Presence at Child Witness Competency Hearing

    People v. Morales, 80 N.Y.2d 450 (1992)

    A defendant does not have a constitutional or statutory right to be present at a preliminary competency hearing to determine whether a child witness understands the nature of an oath, as such a hearing is ancillary to the main trial and the defendant’s presence is unlikely to contribute to a more reliable determination of competency.

    Summary

    Edwin Morales was convicted of rape and sodomy against a nine-year-old child, R.H. Prior to R.H.’s testimony, the trial court conducted a competency hearing outside the defendant’s presence to determine if R.H. understood the nature of an oath, as required by CPL 60.20(2). The court allowed defense counsel and the prosecutor to attend, but not the defendant. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that excluding the defendant from the competency hearing did not violate his constitutional or statutory rights, as the hearing was unrelated to the substantive issues at trial, and the defendant’s presence would not have materially contributed to the competency determination. The court reasoned that the core purpose of CPL 60.20 hearing is to assess testimonial capacity, making it distinct from the trial’s central concerns.

    Facts

    Edwin Morales was indicted for rape, sodomy, and other crimes against R.H. and E.T., children he lived with. As R.H. was nine years old, the trial court was required to determine if she understood the nature of an oath before allowing her to give sworn testimony. The trial court conducted a competency inquiry after the trial had commenced, but outside the presence of the jury. The judge excluded Morales from the hearing, stating that the proceeding was “not something that your client has a right to be present at.”

    Procedural History

    The jury convicted Morales of rape and sodomy. Morales appealed, arguing that his constitutional and statutory rights to be present at trial were violated when he was barred from the competency hearing. The Appellate Division unanimously rejected Morales’ claims. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant has a constitutional or statutory right to be present when the trial court preliminarily examines a child witness to determine whether she understands the nature of an oath?

    Holding

    No, because the competency hearing’s purpose is to determine a witness’ testimonial capacity, making it unrelated to the basic issues at trial, and the defendant failed to show that his presence would have ensured a more reliable competency determination.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s exclusion from the CPL 60.20 hearing did not violate his federal due process rights. Citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, the Court noted that a defendant’s presence is required only to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence. The Court relied on Kentucky v. Stincer, which held that a competency hearing is not related to the witnesses’ substantive testimony, and the defendant had not demonstrated that his presence would have been useful in ensuring a more reliable determination of competency. The court dismissed the defendant’s argument that the hearing involved substantive testimony, finding that R.H.’s brief statement about the abuse did not create a substantial relationship to the opportunity to defend at trial. The Court also rejected the argument that the defendant’s relationship with R.H. could have made his presence useful, as the defendant presented no evidence that his knowledge of the child’s background could have resulted in a more assured determination of competency.

    The Court further held that the defendant was not deprived of his right to be present under New York State law (CPL 260.20). The Court acknowledged that the statute guarantees the defendant’s right to be present at all important stages of the trial. However, the Court clarified that while a defendant has an unfettered right to attend trial, they only have a qualified right to attend ancillary proceedings. Analyzing prior decisions, the Court reasoned that a CPL 60.20 hearing is not a core part of the trial and could have been conducted pretrial. Since it related to a witness’ testimonial capacity, it was a legal determination unrelated to trial issues.

    The court distinguished the case from those where the defendant’s presence was required because they had something valuable to contribute, such as knowledge of errors in a rap sheet (People v. Dokes) or inconsistencies in a witness’ testimony (People v. Anderson). Here, the hearing concerned a witness’s testimonial capacity, a legal determination unrelated to trial issues. Quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, the Court concluded that the defendant’s presence at the competency hearing would have been “useless, or the benefit but a shadow.”

  • People v. Roselle, 74 N.Y.2d 838 (1989): Waiver of Written Notice for Suppression Motions

    People v. Roselle, 74 N.Y.2d 838 (1989)

    While the statutory requirement for written notice of a suppression motion exists to protect the People from unfair surprise, the People can waive this requirement, but such waiver must be clear and voluntary.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the People can waive the statutory requirement (CPL 710.60(1)) that pretrial motions to suppress evidence must be in writing. The Court of Appeals held that while such a waiver is permissible, it did not occur in this case because the prosecutor initially requested a written motion, indicating no intent to waive the requirement. The court emphasized that the People’s participation in subsequent proceedings after the trial court allowed an oral motion did not constitute waiver, as further objection would have been futile. The Appellate Division erred in addressing the merits of the suppression motion after determining the oral motion was improperly considered.

    Facts

    Defendant was arraigned on burglary charges. Defense counsel made an oral application to suppress evidence seized during the arrest. The prosecutor initially requested a written motion to expedite the process. The County Court decided to entertain the oral application, stating the People wouldn’t be prejudiced. The prosecutor, unprepared due to the lack of written notice, primarily relied on the police report during the discussion. A suppression hearing was held, and the County Court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress.

    Procedural History

    The County Court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the oral application should not have been heard under CPL 710.60(1). However, the Appellate Division then addressed the merits of the suppression motion, denied it, and remitted the case for further proceedings. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a trial court has the authority to dispense with the written notice requirement of CPL 710.60(1) in the exercise of its inherent authority to control its calendar?

    2. Whether the People can waive the requirement of written notice for a suppression motion under CPL 710.60(1)?

    3. Whether the People, by participating in the suppression hearing after initially requesting a written motion, effectively waived their right to written notice in this case?

    Holding

    1. No, because the courts cannot exercise their discretion in a manner that conflicts with existing legislative command.

    2. Yes, because the written notice requirement primarily protects the People from unfair surprise, and they should be able to waive it if they deem the protection unnecessary.

    3. No, because the prosecutor initially requested a written motion, and further objection after the court’s ruling would have been futile; participation in the hearing did not constitute a voluntary waiver.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while trial courts have some inherent authority to control their calendars and regulate motion practice, this authority cannot override clear statutory mandates like CPL 710.60(1), which requires written notice for suppression motions. The Court distinguished this case from situations where the People’s failure to object constitutes a waiver, noting that the written notice requirement primarily serves to protect the People from unfair surprise. Citing People v. Jennings, the Court stated that such a rule is “designed primarily to protect the People from unfair surprise.”

    The Court emphasized that the People’s request for a written motion indicated their desire to receive the protection afforded by the statute. Once the trial court overruled this request by stating it would permit an oral motion, any further objection would have been futile. The Court stated, “The law does not require litigants to make repeated pointless protests after the court has made its position clear.” Thus, the People’s subsequent participation in the proceedings did not constitute a waiver. Finally, the Court held that the Appellate Division, after determining the oral motion was improper, should have simply reversed the suppression order and remitted the case, rather than addressing the merits of the motion. The court emphasized that, because the motion was not properly made, “it was, in effect, a nullity.”

  • People v. Connor, 78 N.Y.2d 520 (1991): Waiver of Defect in Supporting Deposition by Guilty Plea

    People v. Connor, 78 N.Y.2d 520 (1991)

    A defendant who pleads guilty to a traffic violation waives the right to challenge the sufficiency of the factual allegations in the supporting deposition unless the defect is jurisdictional.

    Summary

    Defendant Connor was charged with driving while intoxicated and failure to keep right. He requested and received a supporting deposition, then moved to dismiss the DWI charges, arguing the deposition lacked sufficient factual evidence. The motion was denied, and Connor pleaded guilty to DWI. On appeal, Connor argued the supporting deposition was jurisdictionally defective. The County Court agreed, vacating the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Connor waived his right to challenge the deposition’s sufficiency by pleading guilty, as the alleged defect was not jurisdictional. The court relied on precedent establishing that most defects in accusatory instruments are waived by a guilty plea.

    Facts

    On October 2, 1990, Deputy Johnson issued Connor traffic tickets for failure to keep right and two counts of DWI.

    The supporting deposition stated Connor was speeding (71 mph) and driving more than 50% in the officer’s lane.

    Deputy Johnson also stated he smelled alcohol when he approached Connor’s car.

    Connor moved to dismiss the DWI charges, arguing the deposition lacked factual evidence to establish reasonable cause he was intoxicated.

    Procedural History

    The Town Justice Court denied Connor’s motion to dismiss.

    Connor pleaded guilty to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(2) (driving with .10% or more blood alcohol content).

    The Cattaraugus County Court reversed, finding the supporting deposition jurisdictionally defective and not waived by the guilty plea.

    The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, by pleading guilty to a traffic violation, waives the right to argue that the factual allegations in the supporting deposition are insufficient to establish reasonable cause to believe the defendant committed the offense, when that alleged insufficiency is not a jurisdictional defect?

    Holding

    Yes, because a guilty plea forfeits the right to renew most arguments made before the plea, including claimed deficiencies in jurisdictionally sufficient accusatory instruments; the defect alleged here is not jurisdictional and was therefore waived.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the principle established in People v. Taylor, that a guilty plea waives many pre-plea arguments, including deficiencies in accusatory instruments that are not jurisdictionally defective.

    The court distinguished between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional defects, stating that only the former survive a guilty plea.

    The court found People v. Key controlling. In Key, the Court held that the absence of a factual allegation in a supporting deposition for a DWI charge was waivable because a simplified traffic information can proceed without a supporting deposition if one isn’t requested.

    The court quoted Key: “[e]ven if, despite the CPL provisions, there be some defects in accusatory instruments that may never be waived, the defect in this case is not of that class.”

    Therefore, Connor waived his right to challenge the sufficiency of the supporting deposition by pleading guilty.

    The court explicitly declined to determine whether the factual allegations in the supporting deposition actually provided reasonable cause, because the issue had been waived.

  • People v. Fehr, 76 N.Y.2d 83 (1990): Effect of Withdrawn Appeal on CPL 450.50 Statement

    People v. Fehr, 76 N.Y.2d 83 (1990)

    A withdrawn appeal by the People from a suppression order, with the permission of the appellate court, renders the accompanying CPL 450.50(1) statement a nullity, removing the statutory bar to further prosecution.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a CPL 450.50(1) statement, filed by the People when appealing a suppression order, remains binding after the appeal is withdrawn with the court’s permission. The Court of Appeals held that a withdrawn appeal is a nullity, and the accompanying CPL 450.50(1) statement is also withdrawn, thereby removing the bar to further prosecution. The Court emphasized that appellate courts retain the discretion to deny withdrawal requests if they suspect prosecutorial bad faith or abuse of the withdrawal option.

    Facts

    Following a trial court’s decision to suppress evidence, the People filed a notice of appeal and a CPL 450.50(1) statement, asserting the suppression order rendered their case insufficient. Approximately six weeks later, the People moved to withdraw their appeal, stating that while their case was weakened, a trial was still the most appropriate avenue. The Appellate Division granted the motion and the appeal was withdrawn.

    Procedural History

    After the appeal’s withdrawal, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing the CPL 450.50(1) statement barred further prosecution. The trial court granted the motion. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the indictment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the act of taking an appeal with a CPL 450.50(1) statement bars further prosecution, even if the appeal is subsequently withdrawn with the court’s permission?

    Holding

    No, because an appeal that has been withdrawn with the permission of the court is a nullity. Consequently, a withdrawn appeal is not an appeal that has been “taken” within the meaning of CPL 450.50(2), and the bar to further prosecution contemplated by that statute is not applicable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that CPL 450.20(8) and 450.50(1) are designed to limit appeals by the People to cases where the suppression order effectively ends the prosecution. While CPL 450.50(2) states that “[t]he taking of an appeal…constitutes a bar to the prosecution,” the Court held that a withdrawn appeal is a nullity. The court reasoned that because the appeal was withdrawn with the Appellate Division’s permission, the accompanying CPL 450.50(1) statement was also withdrawn and had no further legal effect. The Court emphasized the appellate courts’ power to deny withdrawal requests in cases of prosecutorial bad faith or abuse, and noted that a withdrawn appeal cannot be the basis for excluding time under CPL 30.30 (speedy trial). The Court stated, “[I]f the appellate court has authorized the withdrawal of an appeal, the accompanying CPL 450.50 (1) statement is necessarily withdrawn along with it and, in consequence, it is of no further legal significance.”

  • People v. Johnson, 80 N.Y.2d 798 (1992): Harmless Error and Lineup Identifications

    People v. Johnson, 80 N.Y.2d 798 (1992)

    When a key eyewitness’s testimony is internally contradictory and inconsistent, and the prosecutor emphasizes an erroneously admitted lineup identification, the error cannot be deemed harmless, even if an independent source for the in-court identification exists.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and mandated a new trial. The defendant was convicted of murder and related crimes based largely on an eyewitness identification. The court agreed that the lineup identification testimony should have been suppressed. However, the court found that the error was not harmless because the eyewitness testimony was inconsistent, and the prosecutor heavily relied on the inadmissible lineup evidence. The existence of an independent source for the in-court identification did not automatically render the error harmless.

    Facts

    The defendant and a co-defendant were convicted of murder in the second degree and related criminal counts after a jury trial. The primary evidence against the defendant was the testimony of an eyewitness who identified him in a lineup and in court.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division reviewed the case and agreed that the lineup identification testimony should have been suppressed but did not find the error to be harmful. The dissenting Justice at the Appellate Division level argued the error was not harmless. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the erroneous admission of an eyewitness’s lineup identification testimony was harmless error, given that the eyewitness’s testimony was internally contradictory and inconsistent, and the prosecutor emphasized the inadmissible lineup evidence.

    Holding

    1. No, because there was a reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the defendant’s conviction; therefore, it was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the eyewitness’s testimony, being the sole evidence directly linking the defendant to the crime, was crucial. Given the witness’s inconsistent statements and the prosecutor’s reliance on the improperly admitted lineup identification during both the opening statement and summation, the court determined the error was prejudicial. The court emphasized that the finding of an independent source for the in-court identification by the suppression court did not, by itself, overcome the prejudice. The court applied the harmless error standard articulated in People v. Crimmins, stating that it must be determined that there was “no reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to defendant’s conviction and that it was thus harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” The court could not conclude that this standard was met in the present case. The court distinguished this case from People v. Harris, decided the same day, suggesting that the nature and impact of the erroneously admitted evidence differed significantly. The court found that other arguments raised by the defendant lacked merit.

  • People v. Cosme, 80 N.Y.2d 790 (1992): Limits on Prosecution Appeals Based on Plea Agreements

    People v. Cosme, 80 N.Y.2d 790 (1992)

    A prosecutor cannot appeal a sentence solely to challenge the validity of the underlying conviction when the sentence itself is legal.

    Summary

    Cosme was convicted of burglary and resisting arrest. His conviction was vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel, after which the trial court accepted Cosme’s guilty plea over the People’s objection. The District Attorney sought a writ of prohibition, arguing the plea violated CPL 220.10(4)(a). After appeals and dismissal as moot, the People appealed the sentence imposed, challenging the underlying conviction’s validity. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s dismissal, holding that the People cannot use a sentencing appeal to challenge the validity of a conviction when the sentence itself is legal. The court emphasized that CPL 450.30(2) only allows appeals from illegal sentences, not illegal convictions.

    Facts

    Defendant Cosme was indicted on nine counts and convicted of burglary in the second degree and resisting arrest.
    Cosme’s motion to vacate his conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel was granted.
    The trial court then accepted Cosme’s guilty plea to burglary and resisting arrest, despite the People’s objection.

    Procedural History

    The District Attorney sought a writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the plea agreement, which was denied by the Appellate Division.
    The District Attorney’s appeal to the Court of Appeals was dismissed as moot because Cosme had already been sentenced.
    The People then appealed the sentence to the Appellate Division, arguing that the vacatur of the original conviction revived all counts of the indictment, requiring the District Attorney’s consent to a plea of guilty to less than the entire indictment.
    The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal, stating its focus was on the validity of the conviction, not the legality of the sentence.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People can appeal a sentence when their true challenge concerns the validity of the underlying conviction, rather than the legality of the sentence itself.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 450.30(2) only allows the People to appeal from a sentence that is invalid as a matter of law, not from a conviction they believe to be invalid where the sentence itself is legal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the scope of CPL 450.30(2), which authorizes the People to appeal a sentence that is invalid as a matter of law. The court noted that the People were not alleging the indeterminate sentence of four to eight years’ imprisonment was illegal for second-degree burglary and resisting arrest. Instead, the People were challenging the trial judge’s decision to accept Cosme’s plea over the prosecutor’s objection. The court stated, “Thus, in the guise of challenging the sentence imposed, the People are in essence attacking the validity of the defendant’s underlying conviction. This the statute does not permit them to do.”
    The court interpreted the statute narrowly, preventing the People from using a sentencing appeal as a backdoor to challenge a conviction’s validity. The decision underscores the importance of adhering to statutory limits on appeal rights. It also highlights the policy consideration of finality in criminal proceedings. Once a legal sentence is imposed, the prosecution’s opportunity to challenge the underlying conviction is limited. The ruling prevents the prosecution from circumventing restrictions on appealing convictions by framing their arguments as challenges to the sentence.

  • People v. Banch, 80 N.Y.2d 610 (1992): Mandating Disclosure of Rosario Material

    People v. Banch, 80 N.Y.2d 610 (1992)

    The Rosario rule mandates that the prosecution disclose any prior statements of its witnesses, and a per se reversal is required when such material is improperly withheld, unless the withheld material is the duplicative equivalent of material already disclosed.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the prosecution’s failure to disclose an “unusual occurrence report addendum” constituted a Rosario violation, requiring reversal of the defendant’s murder conviction. The court held that a per se reversal is required if the report contained statements of a trial witness and was not the duplicative equivalent of previously disclosed material. The court rejected the Appellate Division’s attempt to create a “commonsense” exception based on the perceived insubstantiality of the undisclosed material, reaffirming the strict application of the Rosario rule to ensure procedural fairness.

    Facts

    Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder based largely on the testimony of his girlfriend, Marie Somie, who claimed he described killing the victim to her. The prosecution presented testimony from police officers, including Officer Serra and Detective Daniel, who investigated the crime scene. During the appeal process, the prosecution discovered an undisclosed “unusual occurrence report addendum” authored by Sergeant Maisano. This report contained observations by the “investigating officer” regarding possible rope burns on the victim’s body, information not explicitly mentioned in other disclosed documents. The defense argued that Somie fabricated the story, and the undisclosed report could have aided in their cross-examination of the police officers.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to a 25-year-to-life term. While his appeal was pending, the undisclosed document was discovered. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding the report was duplicative and did not affect the credibility of the police officers or the defendant’s guilt. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the undisclosed “unusual occurrence report addendum” constituted Rosario material because it contained statements of a trial witness.
    2. Whether the Appellate Division erred in applying a “commonsense” exception to the Rosario rule based on the perceived insubstantiality of the undisclosed material.
    3. Whether the withheld report was the “duplicative equivalent” of other materials already disclosed to the defense.

    Holding

    1. The Court of Appeals did not definitively decide if the document constituted Rosario material, but remitted the case for a determination of whether the report contained statements made by a witness who testified at trial.

    2. Yes, because the Appellate Division’s approach substituted a harmless error analysis for the per se reversal rule mandated in Rosario violations on direct appeal.

    3. No, because the report contained details, specifically about possible rope burns, that were not explicitly mentioned in the disclosed statements of testifying officers.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division erred in both its “duplicative equivalent” analysis and its creation of a “commonsense” exception to the Rosario rule. The court emphasized that documents are not duplicative if there are variations or inconsistencies, or if they omit details that could be valuable for cross-examination. Here, the report mentioned rope burns, which were not in the disclosed police statements.

    The court also reaffirmed its commitment to the per se reversal rule in Rosario violations on direct appeal, stating that harmless error analysis is inappropriate. The court explicitly rejected the suggestion that reversal should not be required where the withheld Rosario information was “of only ‘de minimis’ or ‘minimal’ value.” The court stated that “a judge’s impartial determination as to what portions may be useful to the defense, is no substitute for the single-minded devotion of counsel for the accused.”

    Because it was unclear whether the “investigating officer” referred to in the report was a testifying witness, the court remitted the case to the trial court for a determination on that issue. If the report contained statements from a testifying witness, a new trial would be ordered; otherwise, the judgment would be amended to reflect that determination.

  • People v. Rouse, 79 N.Y.2d 934 (1992): Shackling of Defendant and Jury Instruction Requirements

    People v. Rouse, 79 N.Y.2d 934 (1992)

    A trial court is not obligated to instruct the jury to disregard a defendant’s restraints (e.g., shackles) if the defendant does not request such an instruction, provided there was a reasonable, articulated basis on the record for the restraints.

    Summary

    Rouse was convicted of second-degree murder and attempted second-degree murder. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred by requiring him to appear before the jury in leg shackles without instructing the jurors to disregard them. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that while a defendant generally should not be physically restrained before the jury without a reasonable, articulated basis, and while a curative instruction should be given, the court is not obligated to give such an instruction sua sponte if the defendant doesn’t request it. Here, a reasonable basis existed, and the defendant did not request the instruction.

    Facts

    The defendant was on trial for murder and attempted murder. Before jury selection, defense counsel requested the removal of the defendant’s handcuffs and leg irons. The trial court ordered the handcuffs removed but denied the request to remove leg irons, citing the defendant’s prior escape attempts and security concerns within the courtroom.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court of second-degree murder and attempted second-degree murder. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred in requiring him to appear in shackles and failing to instruct the jury to disregard them. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in requiring the defendant to appear before the jury in leg shackles.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jurors to disregard the defendant’s leg shackles, even though the defendant did not request such an instruction.

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court articulated a reasonable basis on the record for the restraints.
    2. No, because the court is under no obligation to provide such an instruction sua sponte when the defendant does not request it.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a defendant should not be physically restrained before the jury unless there is a reasonable, articulated basis for doing so. The court noted that in this case, the trial court expressed concerns about the defendant’s prior escape attempts and the courtroom’s security, which justified the restraints. The court distinguished the cases cited by the defendant arguing for a sua sponte instruction. Regarding the failure to instruct the jury to disregard the shackles, the court acknowledged the general rule that such an instruction should be given to minimize prejudice. However, the court also recognized that a defendant might strategically choose not to request such an instruction, believing it would draw unnecessary attention to the restraints. The court observed, “Consequently, where a defendant fails to request an instruction regarding his restraints, a court is under no obligation to instruct the jury to disregard them.” The court thus declined to impose a mandatory requirement for a sua sponte instruction, leaving the tactical decision to the defendant. The court found no other grounds for reversal.

  • People v. Laing, 79 N.Y.2d 163 (1992): People’s Right to Appeal Preclusion Orders for CPL 710.30 Violations

    People v. Laing, 79 N.Y.2d 163 (1992)

    The People cannot appeal a trial court order precluding evidence based on a violation of CPL 710.30’s notice requirements for identification testimony because CPL 450.20, which governs the People’s right to appeal, does not explicitly authorize such appeals.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the People can appeal a trial court’s order to preclude identification evidence due to the prosecution’s failure to provide timely notice under CPL 710.30. The Court of Appeals held that the People cannot appeal such orders because CPL 450.20, which lists the instances when the People can appeal, does not include CPL 710.30 preclusion orders. The Court emphasized that appellate jurisdiction is statutory and should not be expanded by judicial interpretation. The ruling underscores the importance of strict adherence to statutory language regarding appealability in criminal cases.

    Facts

    In People v. Laing, the defendant was identified in a single-photo showup. Later, before jury selection, the prosecution disclosed another witness who had also identified the defendant via a single photo. The trial court precluded this second identification due to a lack of CPL 710.30 notice. In People v. Wade, the defendant was charged with selling drugs to an undercover officer who identified him at the scene. The prosecution didn’t serve a CPL 710.30 notice. The trial court precluded the identification testimony.

    Procedural History

    In both cases, the trial courts precluded the identification evidence. The People appealed these preclusion orders to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division dismissed the appeals, holding that CPL 450.20(8) does not authorize appeals from CPL 710.30 preclusion orders. The Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CPL 450.20(8) authorizes the People to appeal from a trial court order precluding the introduction of identification evidence due to the People’s failure to comply with the notice requirements of CPL 710.30.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 450.20 does not explicitly authorize appeals from CPL 710.30 preclusion orders, and courts cannot expand the scope of appealability beyond what the statute expressly allows.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the right to appeal in criminal cases is strictly governed by statute. CPL 450.20 exhaustively lists the types of orders the People can appeal as of right. The statute specifically allows appeals from orders suppressing evidence under CPL 710.20, which concerns suppression motions based on grounds like improper identification procedures, but not for failures to provide timely notice under CPL 710.30. The court rejected the People’s argument to interpret CPL 450.20(8) broadly to include CPL 710.30 preclusion orders, stating that courts must construe clear statutes as enacted. The Court cited People v. Taylor, 65 NY2d 1, highlighting the substantive and functional differences between CPL 710.20 and CPL 710.30. The court stated that the People were asking the court to “read CPL 710.30 into CPL 710.20 and 450.20 (8) and, thus, to create a right to appeal out of thin air.” Because the Legislature omitted specific authorization for appeals of CPL 710.30 preclusion orders, the Court refused to create one by judicial fiat. The Court also rejected the invitation to “look through” the labels of the trial courts’ orders and declare that the orders are really CPL 710.20 orders for appealability purposes.