New York Law Review

Tag: Criminal Procedure

  • People v. Sinistaj, 81 N.Y.2d 232 (1993): Criminal Court Jurisdiction and Grand Jury Indictments

    People v. Sinistaj, 81 N.Y.2d 232 (1993)

    A local criminal court is divested of jurisdiction over a misdemeanor charge when the charge is presented to a grand jury within a designated adjournment period, and either an indictment or dismissal results, which occurs when the indictment is filed with a superior court.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the issue of when a criminal court is divested of jurisdiction under CPL 170.20(2)(a) when a case is presented to a grand jury. The defendant was arrested and charged with misdemeanors. The Assistant District Attorney (ADA) sought an adjournment to present the case to the Grand Jury, which voted to indict the defendant on felony charges before the adjourned date. On the adjourned date, the defendant pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor. The indictment was filed after the plea. The Court held that Criminal Court was divested of jurisdiction when the indictment resulted (filing), prior to the guilty plea.

    Facts

    Defendant was arrested on December 1, 1989, and charged with misdemeanor criminal trespass and criminal mischief.

    On December 4, 1989, the ADA obtained an adjournment to December 8, 1989, to seek a felony indictment from the Grand Jury.

    On December 7, 1989, the Grand Jury voted to indict defendant for second-degree burglary.

    On December 8, 1989, defendant pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor trespass charge in Criminal Court, with the People’s consent.

    On December 13, 1989, the burglary indictment was filed in Supreme Court.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was convicted of attempted burglary in the second degree in Supreme Court, Kings County, after his motion to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds was denied.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Criminal Court was divested of jurisdiction pursuant to CPL 170.20 when the ADA requested an adjournment to present the case to the Grand Jury, and an indictment resulted prior to the defendant’s guilty plea in Criminal Court.

    Holding

    Yes, because Criminal Court was divested of jurisdiction pursuant to CPL 170.20 when the indictment was filed, which occurred before the guilty plea. The Court interpreted the statute to mean that divestiture occurs when an indictment “results,” which is upon filing with the superior court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court focused on interpreting CPL 170.20 (2) (a), which states that a local criminal court is divested of jurisdiction when a charge is presented to a grand jury within the designated period and either an indictment or dismissal of such charge results. The Court emphasized that the word “results” accommodates either an indictment or a dismissal. An indictment, as defined in the CPL 200.10, is “a written accusation by a grand jury, filed with a superior court.” The Court reasoned that an indictment “results” when it is filed, not merely when the grand jury votes to indict. The majority held that because the indictment was filed with the Supreme Court prior to the acceptance of the guilty plea in criminal court, that the criminal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to accept the plea. Chief Judge Kaye dissented, arguing that Criminal Court jurisdiction is divested only when an indictment is filed, and the majority’s interpretation condones sloppy practice and enlarges the statutory definition of an indictment. She cited People v. Cade, 74 N.Y.2d 410, 416, noting that the case held there is no strict time limit for filing the indictment, but does not hold that an indictment is valid without being filed.

  • People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862 (1994): Admissibility of Grand Jury Testimony After Defendant Breaches Plea Agreement

    People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862 (1994)

    When a defendant breaches a plea agreement after providing Grand Jury testimony, the prosecution may use that testimony against the defendant at trial, provided the use was a foreseeable benefit bargained for in the agreement.

    Summary

    Curdgel agreed to testify against his accomplices in exchange for a reduced sentence. After testifying before a Grand Jury, he publicly recanted his testimony. The prosecution then used his Grand Jury testimony against him at his own trial, resulting in a conviction. Curdgel argued he was entitled to specific performance of the plea agreement and that his Grand Jury testimony should not have been used against him. The New York Court of Appeals held that because Curdgel breached the agreement, the prosecution could use his prior testimony, as its use was a foreseeable benefit of the plea agreement.

    Facts

    Curdgel admitted to involvement in an arson that resulted in four deaths. He agreed to cooperate with the investigation and testify against his accomplices in exchange for a lenient sentence. He signed a waiver of immunity, relinquishing his privilege against the use of his testimony in any proceeding. After testifying before the Grand Jury, Curdgel publicly recanted his testimony, apologizing to his accomplices.

    Procedural History

    Curdgel was convicted of murder and related charges. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to consider the admissibility of Curdgel’s Grand Jury testimony and the plea agreement.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution could use Curdgel’s Grand Jury testimony against him at his trial after he publicly recanted the testimony, thus breaching the plea agreement?

    Holding

    Yes, because Curdgel breached the plea agreement by recanting his testimony, the prosecution was entitled to use the Grand Jury testimony against him at his trial, as this was a foreseeable benefit of the agreement and the People are permitted to keep what they already had.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the principle of “essential fairness” in plea agreements. It distinguished this case from situations where defendants fully comply with their plea agreements. The court cited People v. Evans, stating that “each party to the voluntarily entered-into plea agreement is entitled to the benefits emanating from the agreement which cannot be retroactively vitiated.” The court reasoned that Curdgel’s breach rendered the agreement valueless to the People, justifying their refusal to call him as a witness. His Grand Jury testimony, induced by the plea agreement, was a benefit the prosecution had already obtained. The court distinguished People v. Spitaleri, which bars the use of withdrawn guilty pleas, noting that the Spitaleri doctrine rests entirely on fairness grounds. Here, fairness dictated allowing the prosecution to use the testimony, as Curdgel’s conduct caused him to lose the benefit of his bargain, while the People were permitted to keep what they already had. The court emphasized that the use of his testimony was a counseled, foreseeable use, and a benefit that should not be retroactively vitiated. Ultimately, since Curdgel undermined the agreement’s purpose, he could not then prevent the State’s use of the information he provided.

  • People v. Odiat, 82 N.Y.2d 872 (1993): Defendant’s Right to Be Present at Sandoval Hearing

    People v. Odiat, 82 N.Y.2d 872 (1993)

    A defendant has a right to be present at a Sandoval hearing unless their presence would be superfluous because the nature of their criminal history and the issues to be resolved render their presence unnecessary.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of assault but acquitted of robbery charges. The Appellate Division affirmed his conviction, holding that his absence from the Sandoval hearing was permissible because it would have been superfluous. The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that neither the prosecutor nor the defense attorney was fully able to apprise the Sandoval court of the underlying acts of defendant’s prior convictions, and the outcome of the Sandoval hearing was not wholly favorable to the defendant. The Court remitted the case for a reconstruction hearing to determine if the defendant was present at the Sandoval hearing, ordering a new trial if he was not.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted for robbery and assault. Prior to trial, a Sandoval hearing was held to determine the permissible scope of cross-examination regarding the defendant’s prior convictions. The prosecutor expressed unfamiliarity with the facts underlying the defendant’s prior convictions. At trial, the defendant testified about his prior drug dealings, claiming the victim was his supplier and that he acted in self-defense. The jury acquitted him of robbery but convicted him of assault.

    Procedural History

    The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing he was deprived of his right to be present at the Sandoval hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding the defendant’s presence would have been superfluous. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and remitted the case for a reconstruction hearing to determine whether the defendant was present at the Sandoval hearing.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s presence at the Sandoval hearing was “superfluous,” such that his absence violated his rights, given the prosecutor’s unfamiliarity with the underlying facts of the defendant’s prior convictions and the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of those convictions.

    Holding

    No, because neither the prosecutor nor the defense attorney was fully able to apprise the Sandoval court of the underlying acts of defendant’s prior convictions, and the outcome of the Sandoval hearing was not wholly favorable to the defendant, the defendant’s presence was not superfluous.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on People v. Dokes, stating that a defendant should be present at a Sandoval hearing unless their presence would be superfluous. The Court disagreed with the Appellate Division that the superfluous presence exception applied here. The Court emphasized that the prosecutor’s unfamiliarity with the underlying facts of the defendant’s prior convictions, combined with the fact that the Sandoval ruling was not wholly favorable to the defendant, meant that the defendant could have made a meaningful contribution to the colloquy. The Court stated, “the surrounding circumstances do not negate the possibility that defendant might have made a meaningful contribution to the colloquy.”

    The Court also rejected the argument that the defendant’s trial testimony about drug transactions rendered his presence at the Sandoval hearing superfluous. The Court noted that the superfluousness inquiry focuses on the nature of the defendant’s record and the issues to be resolved at the Sandoval hearing itself. Additionally, the Court noted that the Appellate Division’s holding that admission of misdemeanor convictions must have been insignificant to the jury, was a test of prejudice rather than superfluousness.

    The Court ordered a reconstruction hearing to determine whether the defendant was present at the Sandoval hearing. If the defendant was not present, a new trial must be ordered.

  • People v. Antommarchi, 80 N.Y.2d 247 (1992): Attorney Waiver of Jury Sequestration

    People v. Antommarchi, 80 N.Y.2d 247 (1992)

    An attorney’s on-the-record consent, in the defendant’s presence, to allow a deliberating jury to go home overnight, constitutes a valid waiver of the statutory jury sequestration requirement under CPL 310.10, without requiring explicit personal consent from the defendant.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether an attorney’s stipulation, made in open court and in the defendant’s presence, to allow a jury to go home overnight after deliberations had begun, constituted a valid waiver of the jury sequestration requirement under CPL 310.10. The Court held that such consent by counsel effectively waived the statutory requirement. The court reasoned that the sequestration provision does not implicate fundamental trial rights and is purely statutory. Therefore, the attorney’s waiver was sufficient without explicit personal consent from the defendant.

    Facts

    After the jury retired to deliberate, the defendant’s attorney stipulated, on the record and in the defendant’s presence, that the jury could go home overnight. CPL 310.10 requires that a deliberating jury “must be continuously kept together under the supervision of a court officer or court officers.” The defendant later argued that the waiver of this sequestration requirement was invalid because he did not personally consent to it.

    Procedural History

    The lower court convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an attorney’s on-the-record consent, in the presence of the defendant, to allow a deliberating jury to go home overnight, constitutes a valid waiver of the statutory jury sequestration requirement under CPL 310.10, absent explicit personal consent from the defendant.

    Holding

    Yes, because the sequestration provision of CPL 310.10 is statutory and does not implicate fundamental rights, an attorney’s consent to waive the sequestration requirement, made in open court and in the defendant’s presence, is sufficient to waive the requirement even without explicit personal consent from the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holding in People v. Webb, 78 N.Y.2d 335, where it established that a defendant could waive the CPL 310.10 jury sequestration requirement. The Court clarified that Webb did not mandate that the defendant personally consent to the waiver or that the record reflect a discussion between counsel and the defendant regarding a knowing and intelligent waiver. The Court emphasized that “the sequestration provision does not implicate fundamental rights that are an integral part of the trial; rather, the requirement ‘is entirely statutory and reflects no established common-law right of the defendant’ (78 NY2d 335, 339-340, supra; see, id., at 340, n).” The court analogized to other situations where attorney consent is binding on the client, referencing Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237; People v Ferguson, 67 NY2d 383, 390; People v Rosen, 81 NY2d 237, 244-245. Therefore, because the attorney stipulated before the court, on the record, and in the presence of the defendant, that the jury be permitted to go home overnight after it had commenced deliberations, such consent effectively waived the statutory sequestration requirement.

  • People v. Dawkins, 82 N.Y.2d 226 (1993): Rescinding Mistrials Before Jury Discharge

    82 N.Y.2d 226 (1993)

    A trial court retains the power to rescind a declaration of a mistrial, particularly one based on a perceived jury deadlock, until the jury is actually discharged.

    Summary

    Lamonte Dawkins was convicted of attempted murder. During jury polling, one juror disagreed with the verdict, leading to a mistrial declaration. However, the jury then claimed to have reached a verdict. The trial court rescinded the mistrial, accepted the verdict, and Dawkins was convicted. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the mistrial was not final until the jury’s discharge. Because the jury had not been discharged, the trial court retained the power to reconsider its decision and accept the verdict. This case highlights the importance of the jury’s actual discharge in finalizing a mistrial ruling based on deadlock.

    Facts

    Dawkins was tried for attempted murder, assault, and weapons possession. After deliberations, the jury announced a guilty verdict on the attempted murder count but not guilty on the others. During polling, juror number 4 initially disagreed with the verdict after Dawkins protested. The court sent the jury back for further deliberation. Later, the jury sent a note stating they couldn’t reach a verdict. The defense requested a mistrial, opposing an Allen charge. The court initially granted the mistrial. Approximately 40 minutes later, the jury sent another note claiming they reached a verdict. The court then set aside the mistrial ruling and accepted the new verdict.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Dawkins. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in rescinding its declaration of a mistrial and accepting the jury’s verdict after initially declaring a mistrial based on the jury’s indication of deadlock but before the jury was formally discharged.

    Holding

    Yes, the trial court did not err because the declaration of a mistrial is not final until the jury is discharged; therefore, the court retained the power to rescind its declaration and accept the jury’s subsequent verdict.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 280.10, concerning mistrials, did not apply because the mistrial was declared due to perceived jury deadlock, not an error or defect in the proceedings. For jury deadlock, CPL 310.60(1)(a) governs, requiring the jury’s actual discharge to terminate the trial. Because the jury had not been discharged, the mistrial declaration was considered “inchoate” and subject to rescission. The court distinguished People v. Catten, where the mistrial was granted due to a prejudicial error, making CPL 280.10 applicable. The court also rejected the argument that rescinding the mistrial was an abuse of discretion, noting that the trial judge was in the best position to assess whether a fair verdict could be reached, particularly given the initial concern about pressuring the dissenting juror which was alleviated by the second verdict without any further instruction. The dissent argued the mistrial was granted due to the prejudicial effect of pressuring a dissenting juror, making it a CPL 280.10 issue and thus not rescindable.

  • People v. Johnson, 81 N.Y.2d 980 (1993): Prohibition Against Providing Statutory Text to Deliberating Jury

    People v. Johnson, 81 N.Y.2d 980 (1993)

    CPL 310.30 prohibits providing copies of statutory text to a deliberating jury without the consent of all parties.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that a trial court commits reversible error when it provides the jury with a written copy of the entire jury charge, including statutory text, over the defendant’s objection. This is a violation of CPL 310.30, which prohibits giving copies of statutory text to a deliberating jury without the consent of all parties. The defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon, but the conviction was overturned due to the trial court’s error in providing the full written charge to the jury during deliberations.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree after a jury trial. During jury deliberations, the jury requested a written copy of the court’s entire charge. The trial court, over the defendant’s objections, complied with this request.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division reversed the judgment of conviction, concluding that providing the written charge was error, and ordered a new trial. A Justice of the Appellate Division dissented from the reversal. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by leave of the dissenting Justice.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in providing the deliberating jury with a written copy of the entire jury charge, which included statutory text, over the defendant’s objection, in violation of CPL 310.30.

    Holding

    Yes, because CPL 310.30 prohibits giving copies of statutory text to a deliberating jury without the consent of the parties, and the defendant expressly objected to providing the entire charge in writing, which included statutory material.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 310.30 specifically prohibits providing copies of statutory text to a deliberating jury unless all parties consent. The court emphasized that the statute’s allowance for the jury to request further instruction or information on pertinent matters does not override the specific prohibition against providing statutory text. The Court distinguished between answering specific questions from the jury and providing the entire written charge, which included statutory material that is forbidden. Since the entire written jury instruction included statutory text, the Appellate Division correctly concluded that providing it over the defendant’s objection constituted reversible error.

    The court cited prior cases, including People v Taylor, 76 NY2d 873; People v Nimmons, 72 NY2d 830; and People v Owens, 69 NY2d 585, to support the holding that providing statutory text to the jury without consent is reversible error.

    The Court directly quoted the statute noting CPL 310.30 prohibits giving “copies of the text of any statute” to a deliberating jury without the consent of the parties.

  • People v. Martucci, 73 N.Y.2d 816 (1988): Exception to Public Trial Right for Inadvertent Courtroom Closures

    People v. Martucci, 73 N.Y.2d 816 (1988)

    A brief and inadvertent continuation of a proper courtroom closing, unnoticed by participants, does not violate a defendant’s right to a public trial; a denial of the public trial right requires an affirmative act by the trial court explicitly overcoming the presumption of openness.

    Summary

    Martucci was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. During the trial, the courtroom was properly closed for an undercover officer’s testimony. However, it inadvertently remained closed for Martucci’s subsequent testimony. The trial court denied Martucci’s motion for a mistrial, stating the closure was inadvertent. The Appellate Division upheld the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the inadvertent continuation of the closure, unnoticed by any participants, did not violate Martucci’s right to a public trial because there was no affirmative act by the trial court explicitly overcoming the presumption of openness.

    Facts

    Martucci was on trial for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree.

    The trial court ordered the courtroom closed to the public during the testimony of an undercover police officer, which was a proper closure.

    After the undercover officer’s testimony, the courtroom inadvertently remained closed during Martucci’s own testimony.

    Martucci moved for a mistrial, arguing that his right to a public trial had been violated.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Martucci’s motion for a mistrial.

    The Appellate Division upheld Martucci’s conviction.

    The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the inadvertent continuation of a proper courtroom closing, which was not noticed by any of the participants, violates the defendant’s right to a public trial.

    Holding

    No, because a denial of the public trial right requires an affirmative act by the trial court excluding persons from the courtroom, which in effect explicitly overcomes the presumption of openness.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the right to a public trial is not absolute and that an inadvertent error does not automatically warrant a reversal. The court distinguished the case from situations where the trial court affirmatively acted to close the courtroom. The court reasoned that “[a] denial of the public trial right requires an affirmative act by the trial court excluding persons from the courtroom, which in effect explicitly overcomes the presumption of openness.”

    The court distinguished this situation from cases like People v. Jones, 47 NY2d 409, where there was an explicit closure order violating the defendant’s rights. The court emphasized that the brief and inadvertent nature of the continued closure, unnoticed by anyone, meant that none of the purposes of the public trial guarantee were offended. The court noted there was no intentional or deliberate act by the court to exclude the public during the defendant’s testimony.

    The Court held, “The brief and inadvertent continuation of a proper courtroom closing, which was not noticed by any of the participants, did not violate defendant’s right to a public trial.” This ruling establishes a narrow exception to the public trial right where the closure is inadvertent and unnoticed.

  • People v. Quevas, 81 N.Y.2d 41 (1993): Foundation Required for Third-Party Identification Testimony

    People v. Quevas, 81 N.Y.2d 41 (1993)

    Under New York Criminal Procedure Law § 60.25, before a third party can testify about a witness’s prior identification of the defendant, the prosecution must establish that the witness cannot currently identify the defendant based on present recollection.

    Summary

    Quevas was convicted of sodomy and related crimes. The prosecution introduced testimony from a police officer regarding the complainant’s prior out-of-court identification of Quevas. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the prosecution failed to lay a proper foundation for the officer’s testimony. Specifically, the prosecution did not adequately establish that the complainant’s inability to identify Quevas in court stemmed from a lack of present recollection, as required by CPL 60.25, rather than other factors such as fear or visual impairment. The court emphasized the importance of establishing the reason for the witness’s failure to make an in-court identification before allowing third-party identification testimony.

    Facts

    The complainant, a 14-year-old, testified that he was sodomized by Quevas and another man. During the trial, the prosecutor asked the complainant if he could identify either of the perpetrators in the courtroom. The complainant repeatedly stated, “Nope.” The complainant had previously identified Quevas to a police officer during a search of the area where the crimes occurred. The defense argued that because the complainant stated that the perpetrator was not in the courtroom (rather than stating he didn’t remember), the police officer should not be allowed to testify about the prior out-of-court identification.

    Procedural History

    Quevas was convicted in the trial court. The trial court allowed the police officer to testify about the complainant’s out-of-court identification. Quevas moved to set aside the verdict, arguing that the officer’s testimony was improperly admitted. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution laid a proper foundation under CPL 60.25 to permit a police officer to testify about the complainant’s prior out-of-court identification of the defendant, given the complainant’s explicit denial that the perpetrator was present in the courtroom.

    Holding

    No, because the prosecution failed to establish that the complainant’s inability to identify Quevas in court was due to a lack of present recollection, as opposed to other possible reasons, such as fear, visual impairment, or the possibility that Quevas was not the perpetrator.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that CPL 60.25 requires the prosecution to establish a lack of present recollection before introducing third-party identification testimony. The court noted that the complainant’s testimony was ambiguous and did not definitively establish a lack of present recollection. The court stated, “In order to lay a proper foundation under CPL 60.25 there must be testimony from the witness which establishes a lack of present recollection of the defendant as the perpetrator.” The court also pointed out that the trial court itself had suggested several possible reasons for the complainant’s failure to identify Quevas, including visual impairment and a failure to look carefully at the defendant. Because the prosecution did not establish that the complainant’s inability to identify Quevas stemmed from a lack of present recollection, the court held that the admission of the police officer’s testimony was erroneous. The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from situations where the witness is afraid to make an in-court identification, noting that here, the reason for the failure to identify was not adequately explored.

  • People v. Lykes, 81 N.Y.2d 767 (1993): Clarifying Jury Inquiries and the Requirement of Meaningful Notice

    People v. Lykes, 81 N.Y.2d 767 (1993)

    Meaningful notice to counsel of a jury’s request for information is required to allow for input before the court gives its formal response, but not for preliminary inquiries seeking clarification of the jury’s request.

    Summary

    Lykes was convicted of sexual abuse and endangering a child. During jury deliberations, the trial judge received a note requesting clarification of the charges. Without notifying the defense, the judge sent a note back asking for clarification. The jury responded, and only then was counsel notified before the judge reinstructed the jury. The New York Court of Appeals held that the judge’s initial inquiry, seeking clarification, did not violate CPL 310.30 because meaningful notice was provided before the substantive reinstruction.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of sexual abuse in the first degree and endangering the welfare of a child for molesting a five-year-old boy.

    During jury deliberations, the trial judge received a note from the jury asking for clarification on the legal terminology of the charges.

    Without notifying the defendant, defense counsel, or the prosecutor, the judge sent a note back to the jury asking whether they wanted the legal definition of each crime, the elements repeated, or something else.

    The jury responded requesting the legal definition of each crime charged.

    The judge then brought the jury back into the courtroom, in the presence of the defendant and counsel, read the last note into the record, and proceeded to charge the jury with the legal definitions of the crimes.

    The defendant did not object to the charge itself or the procedure.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial judge’s clarification sought from the jury without prior notification to counsel constitutes reversible error under CPL 310.30.

    Holding

    No, because meaningful notice of the jury’s request was provided to the defendant and counsel before the judge provided any substantive information or instruction to the jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    CPL 310.30 requires notice to both the people and counsel for the defendant when a jury requests reinstruction or information. However, the court clarified that it does not mandate notice in every instance of communication from the jury to the court, citing People v. O’Rama.

    The court emphasized that the purpose of O’Rama was not to mandate a rigid procedure, but to maximize counsel’s participation before the court gives its formal response. The court quoted, “not to mandate adherence to a rigid set of procedures, but rather to delineate a set of guidelines calculated to maximize participation by counsel at a time when counsel’s input is most meaningful, i.e., before the court gives its formal response”

    The court reasoned that the judge’s initial note was simply a request for clarification and conveyed no information pertaining to the law or facts of the case. “It conveyed no information pertaining to the law or facts of the case, and did not limit or channel the jury’s question, explicitly leaving open the possibility that the jury wanted ‘something else.’”

    Meaningful notice was provided before the judge reinstructed the jury on the legal definitions of the crimes charged. The defense counsel had an opportunity to participate after the clarification was received from the jury and before the court gave the reinstruction.

    Therefore, the court concluded that the requirements of CPL 310.30 were not violated because the initial inquiry was merely seeking clarification, and the defendant and counsel were given meaningful notice before the substantive instruction.

  • People v. Castillo, 80 N.Y.2d 578 (1992): Confidential Informant Testimony and Defendant’s Right to Participate in Suppression Hearing

    People v. Castillo, 80 N.Y.2d 578 (1992)

    A defendant’s right to participate in a suppression hearing can be limited to protect the confidentiality of an informant when the reliability of probable cause and the necessity for confidentiality are clearly demonstrated.

    Summary

    Castillo was convicted of drug and weapon possession after a search of his apartment pursuant to a warrant. The warrant was based on information from a confidential informant. Castillo sought to inspect the warrant and supporting documents and challenge the probable cause determination. The court denied discovery and held an in camera suppression hearing without Castillo’s participation, finding that disclosure could compromise the informant’s safety. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that under these circumstances, the trial court properly denied discovery, balancing the defendant’s rights with society’s need to protect informants.

    Facts

    Police searched Castillo’s apartment on April 6, 1988, pursuant to a warrant authorized by a Supreme Court Justice based on a police officer’s affidavit and sworn testimony from a confidential informant. The Justice ordered the record sealed. The search revealed cocaine, a machine gun, handguns, ammunition, and $28,000 in cash. Castillo was present during the search and arrested. Castillo’s wife alleged that prior to the search, other officers had entered the apartment without permission, which Castillo’s counsel argued tainted the warrant.

    Procedural History

    Castillo was charged with drug and weapon possession. He moved to suppress the evidence, claiming an unlawful search. The suppression court held an in camera hearing, excluding Castillo, to determine if the prior police contact tainted the search. The court found the searches unrelated and denied the suppression motion. Castillo pleaded guilty to reduced charges after the denial. The Appellate Division affirmed, and Castillo appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a suppression procedure conducted without the defendant’s participation, due to concerns for a confidential informant’s safety, violates the defendant’s constitutional right to due process and the effective assistance of counsel.

    Holding

    No, because under the circumstances presented in the record, the trial court could properly deny the defendant discovery, balancing the defendant’s right to participate in the defense with society’s need to protect informants.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the defendant’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and the right to a suppression hearing. However, it emphasized the difference between a trial and a pretrial suppression hearing, noting that due process requirements for a hearing may be less demanding than at trial. The court balanced the defendant’s right to participate in the defense with society’s need to encourage citizen participation in law enforcement through anonymity.

    The court cited McCray v. Illinois, emphasizing that the exclusionary rule is not aimed at safeguarding the truth-seeking process but is a remedy to discourage police misconduct. The Court distinguished this case from trial situations where disclosure of an informant’s identity is often required if relevant to the defense (citing Roviaro v. United States and People v. Goggins).

    The Court relied on People v. Darden, which endorsed in camera examination of confidential informants. While acknowledging that in this case, none of the factual predicates for probable cause were revealed to the defendant, the court noted that intermediate appellate courts have approved ex parte, in camera review of search warrant applications in similar circumstances (citing People v Rodriguez, People v Peterson, and others).

    The court emphasized the suppression court diligently protected the defendant’s rights, following a four-step procedure based on People v. Seychel to assess the warrant and the need for confidentiality. The court stated that appellate review of probable cause ensures there was a substantial basis for the magistrate’s conclusion, not a reevaluation of accuracy. The Court cautioned that procedures sanctioned are reserved for cases where reliability of probable cause and necessity of confidentiality are clearly demonstrated. The court stated, “Although a defendant who does not have access to the information purporting to establish probable cause will be unable to suggest reasons why probable cause was lacking, this fact does not deprive the defendant of due process or the effective assistance of counsel.”