New York Law Review

Tag: Criminal Procedure

  • People v. Mehmel, 649 N.E.2d 795 (N.Y. 1995): Right to Stenographic Record of Voir Dire

    People v. Mehmel, 649 N.E.2d 795 (N.Y. 1995)

    A defendant in a criminal trial has a right to a stenographic record of the voir dire, and the denial of this right, when objections were made, requires reversal if the record cannot be accurately reconstructed.

    Summary

    Mehmel was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred in refusing to record portions of the jury voir dire despite repeated requests from his counsel to record objections to statements by the prosecutor and the court. The New York Court of Appeals agreed that this denial impaired effective appellate review and reversed the conviction, ordering a new trial. The court emphasized the importance of a stenographic record under Judiciary Law § 295 and found that the disputes about the unrecorded comments made an accurate reconstruction impossible.

    Facts

    During the first round of jury selection, the trial court refused defense counsel’s repeated requests to record her objections to the prosecutor’s comments, which she believed contained erroneous commentary on the law. After a recess, defense counsel reiterated her request to record the voir dire and stated that she had objected to the prosecutor’s comments “a number of times”. The court again denied the request. During challenges to a later panel, defense counsel objected to statements made about the defendant taking the stand, alleging they improperly reflected on his Fifth Amendment rights. The prosecutor disputed her recollection of the statements.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and sentenced to imprisonment. He appealed the conviction to the Appellate Division, arguing that the trial court’s refusal to record portions of the jury voir dire denied him effective appellate review. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court’s refusal to order a stenographic record of portions of the jury voir dire, despite defense counsel’s objections, constitutes reversible error when an accurate reconstruction of the record is impossible.

    Holding

    Yes, because the trial court erred by foreclosing defendant from exercising his right to obtain a stenographic record of voir dire as Judiciary Law § 295 requires, and this error cannot be cured by a reconstruction proceeding due to disputes regarding the substance of the comments, which establishes that an accurate account could not be reconstructed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Judiciary Law § 295, which requires full stenographic notes of all trial proceedings, including the voir dire. While the absence of a stenographic record does not automatically require reversal, it does if the defendant is prejudiced. The court cited prior cases like People v. Fearon and People v. Glass which held that if the record can be accurately reconstructed, no prejudice results from its loss. However, the Court distinguished this case, stating, “when a record cannot be reconstructed because of the lapse of time, the unavailability of the participants in the proceeding or some similar circumstance, there must be a reversal.” Because the prosecutor disputed defense counsel’s recollection of the statements made during voir dire, the court found that an accurate reconstruction was impossible. The court stated, “It is obvious from these facts that the trial court erred by foreclosing defendant from exercising his right to obtain a stenographic record of voir dire as Judiciary Law § 295 requires… It cannot be cured by a reconstruction hearing because the dispute regarding the substance of the comments by the court and counsel establishes that an accurate account could not be reconstructed even if we were to order remittal for that purpose.” The Court emphasized the importance of preserving a record for effective appellate review.

  • People v. Dunn, 85 N.Y.2d 956 (1995): Admissibility of Spontaneous Statements from Mentally Incapacitated Individuals

    85 N.Y.2d 956 (1995)

    A defendant’s claim regarding the admissibility of a spontaneous statement made due to mental incapacity must be raised at the suppression hearing or as a ground for objection at trial to be preserved for appellate review.

    Summary

    Earl Dunn, an inmate at Rockland Psychiatric Center, was convicted of manslaughter and aggravated sexual abuse of a fellow inmate. After the assault, Dunn made inculpatory statements to hospital personnel while under the guard of a security officer, before receiving Miranda warnings. The lower court ruled these initial statements were spontaneous and admissible. Dunn argued subsequent statements were involuntary due to his mental incapacity, but he did not argue that his initial spontaneous statement was inadmissible due to the same mental incapacity. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the issue of whether Dunn’s mental incapacity rendered his initial spontaneous statement inadmissible was not preserved for appellate review because it was not raised at the suppression hearing or as a ground for objection at trial.

    Facts

    Earl Dunn, an inmate at Rockland Psychiatric Center, assaulted a fellow inmate. Following the assault, hospital personnel seized Dunn and transferred him to the custody of the State Police. While under the guard of a hospital security officer, Dunn made certain inculpatory statements. The lower court found that no conduct on the part of the officer was likely to elicit a statement from Dunn. Dunn later argued that subsequent statements were involuntary because his mental incapacity made it impossible for him to understand the consequences of a Miranda warning.

    Procedural History

    Dunn was convicted of first-degree manslaughter and aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree. At a suppression hearing, the court ruled Dunn’s initial statements were spontaneous and admissible. Dunn appealed, arguing his subsequent statements were involuntary, but he did not raise the issue of the initial statement’s admissibility due to mental incapacity. The Appellate Division considered whether his mental incapacity might render him particularly vulnerable to coercion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the issue of the admissibility of an initial, “spontaneous” statement made by a mentally incapacitated defendant is preserved for appellate review when it was not raised at the suppression hearing or as a ground for objection at trial.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant did not raise the issue of the initial statement’s admissibility due to mental incapacity at the suppression hearing or as a ground for objection at trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that a defendant must properly preserve an issue for appellate review by raising it at the appropriate time in the lower courts. Here, Dunn argued that subsequent statements were involuntary because of his mental incapacity, but he failed to argue that his initial “spontaneous” statement was inadmissible on the same grounds. Because the argument concerning the initial statement’s admissibility was not raised at the suppression hearing or as a ground for objection to the admission of the evidence at trial, it was not preserved for review by the Court of Appeals. While the Appellate Division considered the issue in the interests of justice, this did not create a preserved question of law for the Court of Appeals to review. The court effectively applied the well-established rule that appellate courts generally only consider issues that were properly raised and preserved in the lower courts, unless there are exceptional circumstances or fundamental errors that warrant review in the interest of justice.

  • People v. Parris, 83 N.Y.2d 342 (1994): Admissibility of Spontaneous Statements and Probable Cause for Arrest

    People v. Parris, 83 N.Y.2d 342 (1994)

    A spontaneous statement made to law enforcement requires notice under CPL 710.30(1)(a), and an arrest requires probable cause based on reliable information, not unsubstantiated hearsay or rumor.

    Summary

    Gwendolyn Parris was convicted of criminally negligent homicide for the stabbing death of her cousin. The Court of Appeals addressed whether her initial spontaneous statement to police was admissible without prior notice and whether subsequent statements should have been suppressed as fruits of an unlawful arrest. The Court held that notice was required for the initial statement. Further, the Court found that the arrest was not based on probable cause. The case was remitted to the Supreme Court to determine if Parris’s detention was a lawful temporary detention, and if not, whether subsequent statements were sufficiently attenuated from the illegal detention to be admissible.

    Facts

    After a fatal stabbing, Detective Wasserman learned from the victim’s family that the defendant, Parris, had inflicted the wound. At the scene, anonymous informants told Detective O’Brien that “Gwenny” stabbed the victim. Parris arrived at the scene and was identified as “Gwenny.” She was placed in a police car, where she spontaneously stated that she stabbed the victim. Later, at the precinct, after receiving Miranda warnings, Parris made three more statements: a written statement to Detective Wasserman, another to Detective Sanchez, and a videotaped statement to an Assistant District Attorney.

    Procedural History

    The People notified Parris of their intent to offer her statements at trial, but the notice omitted her initial statement in the police car. Parris moved to suppress the statements, arguing an unlawful arrest and an involuntary waiver of rights. The trial court denied the motion, finding probable cause for the arrest and deeming the initial statement spontaneous and thus not requiring notice. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the People were required to provide notice under CPL 710.30(1)(a) of their intent to offer Parris’s initial, spontaneous statement to police.

    2. Whether Parris’s statements to the police and the Assistant District Attorney should have been suppressed as the fruits of an arrest made without probable cause.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because CPL 710.30(1)(a) requires notice whenever the prosecution intends to offer at trial evidence of a statement made by a defendant to a public servant, regardless of its apparent spontaneity.

    2. No, not definitively; the case is remitted to determine whether the police action constituted an arrest or a temporary detention based on reasonable suspicion, and whether any taint from the initial illegality was attenuated.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that CPL 710.30(1)(a) mandates notice for any statement made to law enforcement that the prosecution intends to use at trial, to allow the defendant to challenge its voluntariness. Even a spontaneous statement requires notice because “the defendant had the right to have a court review the circumstances under which the statement was given and to determine its voluntariness.” Quoting People v. Greer, 42 N.Y.2d 170, the court stated that even if the statement was voluntary, preclusion is required if the People fail to give the required notice.

    Regarding probable cause, the Court noted that probable cause requires information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed by the suspect, citing People v. Hicks, 68 NY2d 234, 238. While hearsay can provide probable cause, the informants must be reliable and have a basis for their knowledge. Here, the anonymous tips and family statements lacked a sufficient basis of knowledge, constituting mere “suspicion or ‘rumor’.”

    The Court remitted the case to determine whether the initial detention was an arrest or a lawful temporary detention based on reasonable suspicion under People v. Hicks. If the detention was unlawful, the court must determine if the subsequent statements were attenuated from the illegal detention, guided by People v. Rogers, 52 NY2d 527. If the statements were not sufficiently attenuated, they must be suppressed, potentially requiring a new trial. If the later statements are admissible, the conviction should be reviewed under a harmless error analysis, citing People v. Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230.

    The Court upheld the trial court’s admission of evidence of a prior uncharged crime, as it was central to establishing the decedent’s conflict with the defendant.

  • People v. Farrell, 85 N.Y.2d 60 (1995): Legislative Limits on Appeals from Post-Conviction Vacatur Denials

    People v. Farrell, 85 N.Y.2d 60 (1995)

    The New York Constitution does not prevent the legislature from limiting appeals of right from orders denying vacatur of final criminal convictions in post-judgment collateral proceedings.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the New York legislature can limit a defendant’s right to appeal the denial of a motion to vacate a conviction (CPL 440.10) without violating Article VI, § 4(k) of the New York Constitution, which preserves the Appellate Division’s jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals held that the legislature’s restriction of appeals as of right in such cases to a permissive review process is constitutional because a post-judgment motion to vacate is not considered a “special proceeding” resulting in a final order. The legislature can therefore limit appeals from non-final orders.

    Facts

    In People v. Farrell, the defendant sought to vacate his manslaughter conviction based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct related to a Rosario violation. In Rivera v. Justices of N.Y. State Supreme Ct., the plaintiff sought to vacate his murder conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel, a claim already rejected on direct appeal. Both Farrell and Rivera were denied leave to appeal the denial of their CPL 440.10 motions to the Appellate Division.

    Procedural History

    In Farrell, the Supreme Court denied the defendant’s CPL 440.10 motion, and the Appellate Division dismissed the appeal. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal. In Rivera, the Supreme Court dismissed Rivera’s action seeking a declaratory judgment that CPL 450.10 and 450.15 were unconstitutional. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal, consolidating it with Farrell due to the common constitutional issue.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CPL 450.10 and 450.15 violate Article VI, § 4(k) of the New York Constitution by restricting appeals as of right from the denial of a post-judgment motion to vacate a conviction under CPL 440.10(1)(f) or (h).

    Holding

    No, because a post-judgment motion to vacate a criminal adjudication, after the direct appeal process has concluded, is not a special proceeding and thus results in a non-final order. Therefore, the Legislature is not constitutionally barred from limiting appeals from such orders. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division in Farrell and modified the order in Rivera to declare CPL 450.10 and 450.15 constitutional.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Article VI, § 4(k) of the New York Constitution preserves the Appellate Division’s jurisdiction as it existed on September 1, 1962, preventing the legislature from restricting appeals from final orders where appeals as of right existed at that time. However, the Court distinguished the cases at hand, explaining that “the trial court’s denial of a motion to vacate a criminal judgment, whether that motion is predicated on prosecutorial misconduct (CPL 440.10 [1] [f]) or ineffective assistance of counsel (CPL 440.10 [1] [h]), does not occur in a special proceeding and is nonfinal for purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction.” The Court relied on People v. Gersewitz, 294 N.Y. 163 (1945), which held that a post-judgment motion to vacate a conviction is not a special proceeding like habeas corpus. “A motion to vacate a judgment of conviction bears none of the indicia of a special proceeding.” CPL 440.10 codified existing post-judgment remedies and is “inextricably tied to and incident to the original, seminal, finalized criminal proceeding.” Because the order is not final, the legislature can permissibly limit appeals as of right, only allowing those that merit further examination, without violating the New York Constitution.

  • People v. Cassas, 84 N.Y.2d 718 (1995): Admissibility of Attorney Statements Against a Client in Criminal Cases

    People v. Cassas, 84 N.Y.2d 718 (1995)

    An attorney’s out-of-court statement incriminating a client is inadmissible against the client in a criminal trial unless there is evidence the client authorized the statement as a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that an attorney’s statement to police, made in the presence of his client, that the client shot his wife was inadmissible as evidence against the client because there was no showing the client authorized the statement as a waiver of attorney-client privilege. The Court reasoned that admitting the statement without such authorization would violate the privilege and undermine the client’s fundamental right to make key decisions about their defense. The Court also held that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury that no adverse inference could be drawn from the defendant’s silence when his attorney made the statement.

    Facts

    Defendant was charged with murdering his wife. On the morning of the murder, the defendant and his attorney, Samuel Hirsch, went to a police precinct. Hirsch told the desk sergeant that there was a problem at defendant’s home and a prompt police response was needed. At the defendant’s home, police found the defendant’s wife dead. Back at the precinct, Hirsch allegedly stated, with the defendant present, “I brought my client in to surrender. I believe he shot his wife. You’ll find the gun in the room. It will have my client’s prints on it.” The police arrested the defendant and recovered a gun from the scene.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the attorney’s statement, reasoning that Hirsch was the defendant’s agent and authorized to speak on his behalf. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision, concluding that the statement was direct evidence of guilt from the defendant’s agent. The New York Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an attorney’s out-of-court statement incriminating his client is admissible against the client as direct evidence of guilt in a criminal trial when there is no evidence the client authorized the statement as a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.

    2. Whether the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury that no adverse inference could be drawn from the defendant’s silence at the time of the attorney’s statement.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because absent a showing that the client authorized the attorney’s statement as a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, the statement is inadmissible as it violates the privilege and undermines the client’s fundamental right to make key decisions about their defense.

    2. Yes, because the jury could have inferred that the defendant’s silence was an adoption or corroboration of his attorney’s assertions; therefore, the trial court was required to guard against the adverse inference.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while statements made by an attorney within the scope of employment can be admissible against the client, there was no evidence that the defendant authorized his attorney’s statement as a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. The Court emphasized that in criminal cases, the defendant retains the authority to make fundamental decisions regarding the case. It distinguished the case from People v. Rivera, where the attorney’s statement was a written affidavit used for impeachment after the defendant testified inconsistently. Here, the attorney’s statement was oral, made out of court, and used as direct evidence of guilt in the prosecution’s case-in-chief.

    The Court also cited United States v. Valencia, cautioning against setting a precedent for admitting all informal, out-of-court statements by attorneys against their clients, as it would violate the attorney-client privilege. The court quoted Matter of Priest v. Hennessy, stating that the attorney-client privilege “exists to ensure that one seeking legal advice will be able to confide fully and freely in his [or her] attorney, secure in the knowledge that his [or her] confidences will not later be exposed to public view to his [or her] embarrassment or legal detriment.”

    Regarding the jury instruction, the Court found that despite the defendant’s right to remain silent, the trial court should have instructed the jury that no adverse inference could be drawn from the defendant’s silence because the jury could have inferred the silence as an adoption of the attorney’s statement.

  • People v. Sanchez, 84 N.Y.2d 442 (1994): Sufficiency of Indictment and the Right to Notice of Charges

    People v. Sanchez, 84 N.Y.2d 442 (1994)

    An indictment must provide a defendant with fair notice of the charges against them, ensure the crime for which the defendant is tried is the same as that for which they were indicted, and protect against double jeopardy.

    Summary

    Sanchez was convicted on multiple counts, including grand larceny, scheme to defraud, criminal impersonation, and fortune telling. The indictment used broad time spans and did not identify victims. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, reversing convictions for grand larceny, fortune telling, and some criminal impersonation counts due to defects in the indictment. The Court held the indictment failed to provide adequate notice, imperiling the defendant’s ability to prepare a defense and protect against double jeopardy. The convictions for scheme to defraud and one count of criminal impersonation were upheld.

    Facts

    Sanchez was charged with 35 counts, including larceny, fraud, impersonation, and fortune telling. The indictment specified broad timeframes (four months to five years) for the alleged crimes, without naming victims, and stated the crimes occurred somewhere in Queens County. The prosecution’s disclosure form described a scheme where Sanchez, posing as a parapsychologist and sometimes an FBI agent, defrauded individuals. The prosecution didn’t link specific victims to specific counts until after witnesses testified.

    Procedural History

    Following a trial, Sanchez was convicted on several counts. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reducing one grand larceny count and reversing two others. Sanchez appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, challenging the remaining convictions based on alleged defects in the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the indictment and bill of particulars provided sufficient specificity to adequately inform the defendant of the charges against him, enabling him to prepare a defense.

    2. Whether the time spans alleged in the indictment for fortune telling and criminal impersonation were unreasonably broad, rendering those counts defective.

    Holding

    1. No, because the indictment, even with the bill of particulars, was too vague to allow Sanchez to prepare an adequate defense or protect against double jeopardy.

    2. Yes, for fortune telling and some counts of criminal impersonation, because the five-year time spans alleged were unreasonably broad given the nature of the offenses and the information available to the prosecution.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that an indictment must serve three critical functions: provide fair notice to the defendant, ensure the defendant is tried for the crimes actually indicted by the Grand Jury, and protect against double jeopardy. Citing People v. Iannone, 45 NY2d 589, 594, the Court stated the indictment must provide “the defendant with fair notice of the accusations made against him, so that he will be able to prepare a defense”. The Court found the indictment, combined with the bill of particulars, failed to provide adequate information about the victims, dates, or places of the alleged crimes, hindering Sanchez’s ability to prepare a defense. The Court rejected the People’s argument that access to redacted Grand Jury minutes cured the defects, stating: “it is the People’s burden to provide the defendant with notice of the charges in a clear and concise manner… it is not the burden of the defendant to piece together clues disclosed in separate unconnected documents to infer what alleged conduct supported which alleged charge”. The Court determined fortune telling is not a continuing offense and the five-year time period alleged was unreasonably broad. However, the Court reasoned criminal impersonation can be a continuing offense, so one count with the same time period was allowed. Finally, the court upheld the scheme to defraud conviction because the evidence used for the dismissed counts was admissible for the scheme to defraud charge, so the defendant was not unfairly prejudiced.

  • People v. Ortiz, 84 N.Y.2d 986 (1994): Missing Witness Rule and Cumulative Testimony

    People v. Ortiz, 84 N.Y.2d 986 (1994)

    A missing witness instruction is not warranted when the uncalled witness’s testimony would be merely cumulative of other evidence presented at trial.

    Summary

    Ortiz was convicted of drug charges stemming from a buy-and-bust operation. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred by denying his request for a missing witness instruction regarding a nontestifying police officer who was present near the scene of the crime. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court did not err in refusing the instruction because the officer’s testimony would have been cumulative, given the testimony of the purchasing undercover officer and the arresting officer who testified on identification. This case highlights the court’s discretion in evaluating whether a missing witness instruction is appropriate based on the potential contribution of the witness’s testimony.

    Facts

    An undercover officer purchased two vials of cocaine from Ortiz during a buy-and-bust operation in a drug-prone area. The undercover officer’s partner was in an unmarked car nearby. The purchasing officer testified he approached Ortiz after a codefendant yelled “Blue Tops.” Ortiz handed the drugs to the officer in exchange for prerecorded buy money. A back-up team then arrested Ortiz and the codefendant.

    Procedural History

    Ortiz was convicted at trial. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred in denying his request for a missing witness instruction. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction. Ortiz then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court committed reversible error by denying the defendant’s request for a missing witness instruction regarding a nontestifying police officer who was present near the scene of the crime.

    Holding

    No, because it was not unreasonable for the trial court to refuse to give the requested instruction on the ground that the nontestifying undercover officer’s testimony would have added only cumulative evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court did not err in denying the missing witness instruction because the nontestifying officer’s testimony would have been cumulative. The purchasing undercover officer and the arresting officer had already testified about the identification aspects of the case. The court emphasized that the trial court weighed the entirety of the People’s proof in making its ruling and did not shift any burdens. The court cited People v. Gonzalez, 68 N.Y.2d 424, 430 and People v. Macana, 84 N.Y.2d 173, 177 in support of its decision. The decision highlights the discretion afforded to the trial court in determining whether a missing witness instruction is warranted. The court determined that the trial court’s decision was well-informed and supportable, based on the record. The court implicitly acknowledged the missing witness rule, which allows a jury to draw an adverse inference when a party fails to call a witness under their control who could offer material testimony, but emphasized that this rule does not apply when the witness’s testimony would be merely cumulative. This reflects a policy consideration that trials should be fair and efficient, and that cumulative evidence should be avoided.

  • People v. Cammarano, 83 N.Y.2d 925 (1994): Interest of Justice Dismissal and Defendant’s Medical Condition

    People v. Cammarano, 83 N.Y.2d 925 (1994)

    A court may dismiss an indictment in the interest of justice based in part on the defendant’s medical condition, even without expert medical evidence, provided the decision is not solely based on speculation and the court relies on considerable information, including observations and documented participation in treatment programs.

    Summary

    Defendant was indicted for selling heroin to undercover officers. He moved to dismiss the indictments in the interest of justice, citing his HIV infection and participation in AIDS and drug treatment programs. The trial court granted the motion, relying partly on its observations of the defendant’s deteriorating health. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, even without medical documentation, because the decision wasn’t based solely on the defendant’s condition, and the court relied on other factors, including documented program participation and its own observations.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with two counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree.

    These charges stemmed from two instances in October 1989 where the defendant sold a small amount of heroin to undercover police officers.

    In May 1991, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictments in the interest of justice, citing his HIV infection, participation in AIDS and drug treatment programs, lack of prior criminal record, and that he committed the crimes to support his own addiction.

    The defendant did not provide any medical documentation of his condition or prognosis.

    The trial court observed that the defendant had physically deteriorated, barely able to stand.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictments.

    The People appealed, arguing that it was improper for the trial court to base the dismissal on its own observations of the defendant’s health without medical documentation.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision.

    A dissenting Justice granted the People leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a court abuses its discretion as a matter of law when dismissing an indictment in the interest of justice, based in part on the defendant’s medical condition and observations of the defendant’s deterioration, without requiring expert medical evidence or documentation.

    Holding

    No, because the motion court would have been entitled to exercise its discretion to hold a hearing and require submission of additional documentation regarding defendant’s medical condition and prognosis, it was not an abuse of discretion as a matter of law on these facts to grant the motion in the absence of such evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated its review was limited to whether the dismissal was an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.

    The Court found that the motion to dismiss was not based solely on the defendant’s medical condition; the court considered other factors, including the defendant’s participation in treatment programs.

    The Court emphasized that the trial court did not engage in mere speculation but relied on the undisputed fact that the defendant was HIV infected, his documented participation in an AIDS research treatment program, and its observations of the defendant’s physical deterioration.

    The Court declined to impose an absolute rule requiring expert medical evidence for an interest of justice dismissal based partly on a defendant’s medical condition.

    The court stated, “Thus, we decline to impose any absolute rule that an interest of justice dismissal of an indictment based in part on a defendant’s medical condition must always be supported by expert medical evidence or documentation.”

    The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order because there was no abuse of discretion.

  • People v. Favor, 82 N.Y.2d 254 (1993): Defendant’s Right to be Present at Voir Dire is Statutory, Not Constitutional

    People v. Favor, 82 N.Y.2d 254 (1993)

    A defendant’s right to be present during sidebar discussions with prospective jurors, particularly when those discussions concern potential juror bias, is a statutory right under New York law (CPL 260.20), not a constitutional right.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals clarified that a defendant’s right to be present during sidebar discussions with prospective jurors is based on state statute (CPL 260.20) and not on constitutional grounds. The defendant argued that because the voir dire questioning concerned “specific bias,” his right to be present was constitutional, making the rule retroactive. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the right to be present at voir dire sidebars is statutory, whether the inquiry concerns “specific” or “general” bias, and therefore not retroactive under People v. Mitchell. This case distinguishes between the statutory right to be present and instances where no such right exists, emphasizing that the presence of counsel alone may suffice in certain ancillary proceedings.

    Facts

    Defendant was convicted of selling cocaine to an undercover officer. During jury selection (voir dire), several prospective jurors indicated potential bias or familiarity with the defendant, his family, or the crime location during sidebar discussions with the judge. These discussions occurred outside the defendant’s hearing, although defense counsel participated. The defendant objected to the jury’s racial composition after it was impaneled but did not object to his absence from the sidebar conferences during jury selection.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division initially reversed the conviction based on People v. Antommarchi, which addressed a defendant’s right to be present at sidebar conferences. However, the Court of Appeals subsequently held in People v. Mitchell that the Antommarchi rule was prospective only. The People’s motion for reargument, considering the Mitchell decision, was denied. The case reached the Court of Appeals to determine if the defendant’s situation was distinguishable from Antommarchi, warranting retroactive application.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s right to be present at sidebar conferences during voir dire, where questioning concerned potential jurors’ specific biases, is a constitutional right that should be applied retroactively.

    Holding

    No, because the right to be present at voir dire sidebars, regardless of whether the inquiry concerns specific or general bias, is conferred solely by CPL 260.20, making it a statutory right, not a constitutional one, and therefore subject to prospective application only.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while a defendant has a constitutional right to be present at core proceedings where witnesses or evidence are presented, the right to be present at ancillary proceedings, such as voir dire sidebars, is governed by CPL 260.20. The court emphasized that the state statute provides broader protection than the federal constitution. The Court distinguished the case from situations like People v. Velasco, where sidebar inquiry is directed only to ministerial matters (availability for jury service), in which case the statutory right isn’t even triggered. In People v. Sloan, the court had explained that where bias is at issue, a defendant’s presence would permit assessment of a juror’s facial expressions and demeanor. However, the court clarified that reliance on Snyder v. Massachusetts in the context of the state statutory right is to construe the scope of the statutory right. The court stated, “Under our own body of State law, we now look to the effect that defendant’s absence might have on the opportunity to defend as measure of whether the statutory right to be present at an ancillary trial proceeding is triggered.” The court concluded that the defendant’s claim is determined by People v. Mitchell and cannot be given retroactive effect.

  • People v. England, 84 N.Y.2d 1 (1994): Actual Readiness Required for Speedy Trial

    84 N.Y.2d 1 (1994)

    A valid statement of readiness for trial requires the People to be actually ready to proceed at the time the statement is made, and readiness is not established where the People’s own conduct has made it impossible for the defendant to be arraigned within the statutory speedy trial period.

    Summary

    Crystal England was arrested on a felony complaint on June 24, 1992. Six months later, on December 24, 1992, the Grand Jury handed up an indictment, and the People filed a notice of readiness for trial. England moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the People were not ready for trial within the six-month statutory period under CPL 30.30. The County Court granted the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the People’s delay in securing an indictment, making arraignment impossible within the statutory period, rendered their statement of readiness illusory.

    Facts

    On June 24, 1992, Crystal England was arrested on a felony complaint. She was arraigned in Town Court and released under supervision. On December 24, 1992, six months after the initial complaint, the Grand Jury issued an indictment. The People filed a notice of readiness for trial along with the indictment on the same day. England had not yet been arraigned on the indictment as of December 24th.

    Procedural History

    England moved to dismiss the indictment for failure to comply with CPL 30.30. The County Court granted the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted the People leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People can validly declare readiness for trial when, as a result of their own delay in obtaining an indictment, the defendant cannot be arraigned and thus trial cannot commence within the statutory speedy trial period.

    Holding

    No, because the People’s statement of readiness was meaningless when arraignment within the statutory period was impossible due to the People’s delay in securing an indictment. A valid declaration of readiness requires actual readiness, not just a pro forma announcement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    CPL 30.30 requires dismissal of a felony indictment if the People are not ready for trial within six months of the commencement of the criminal action. The statutory period began with the filing of the felony complaint on June 24, 1992, and expired on December 24, 1992.

    The Court emphasized that “trial readiness in CPL 30.30 means both a communication of readiness by the People on the record and an indication of present readiness.” People v. Kendzia, 64 N.Y.2d 331, 337. The inquiry is whether the People have done all that is required of them to bring the case to a point where it may be tried. The Court distinguished delays caused by court congestion, which do not affect the People’s readiness, from delays caused by the People’s own inaction.

    The Court reasoned that because a defendant cannot be brought to trial before arraignment (CPL 1.20[9]), the People’s failure to secure an indictment in a timely manner, thereby preventing arraignment within the statutory period, rendered their statement of readiness meaningless. “Where the trial court and Appellate Division have found the relevant period to be entirely chargeable to the unexplained laxity of the People, the announcement of trial readiness before defendant was even brought before the court can only be an empty declaration, insufficient to satisfy CPL 30.30.”

    The dissent argued that the majority’s ruling effectively shortens the six-month period provided by CPL 30.30, requiring the People to ensure not only that they are ready for trial but also that the defendant can be arraigned within that period. The dissent contended that the People had performed all the tasks required of them within the 183 days and that the delay in arraignment was the court’s responsibility. The dissent viewed the majority’s decision as improperly blending the analyses for pre-readiness and post-readiness delay.