New York Law Review

Tag: Criminal Procedure Law

  • People v. Coppa, 45 N.Y.2d 244 (1978): Appealability of Dismissals Based on Prosecutor’s Opening Statement

    People v. Coppa, 45 N.Y.2d 244 (1978)

    When a trial court dismisses an indictment pursuant to CPL 210.20, citing the prosecutor’s failure to state a prima facie case in their opening statement, the People have the right to appeal that dismissal to an intermediate appellate court, regardless of whether the trial court’s reliance on the statute was ultimately correct.

    Summary

    Defendant was indicted for grand larceny. After jury selection and opening statements, the defense moved to dismiss, arguing the prosecution failed to present a prima facie case in its opening. The trial court, citing CPL 210.20, dismissed the indictment but ensured the defendant waived double jeopardy protections. The Appellate Division dismissed the People’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, deeming CPL 210.20 inapplicable. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the explicit citation of CPL 210.20 in the dismissal order conferred appellate jurisdiction, and whether the reliance on that statute was proper should be considered on the merits of the appeal, not as a bar to it.

    Facts

    1. A grand jury indicted the defendant on two counts of grand larceny.
    2. After the jury was selected and sworn, the prosecutor presented an opening statement.
    3. Defense counsel moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming the prosecutor failed to state a prima facie case in the opening statement.
    4. The trial court reserved decision, then later indicated its intent to dismiss the indictment under sections preserving the People’s right to appeal.
    5. The defendant stipulated to waive double jeopardy protections should the dismissal be reversed on appeal.
    6. The court dismissed the indictment, citing the prosecutor’s failure to state a prima facie case in the opening address and CPL 210.20(1)(h) and (i).

    Procedural History

    1. The trial court dismissed the indictment after the prosecutor’s opening statement.
    2. The People appealed the dismissal to the Appellate Division.
    3. The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding CPL 210.20 inapplicable.
    4. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Appellate Division has jurisdiction to hear the People’s appeal of a trial court order dismissing an indictment when the order explicitly cites CPL 210.20 as the basis for dismissal, even if the Appellate Division believes the statute was misapplied.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because CPL 450.20(1) allows the People to appeal as a matter of right to an intermediate appellate court from an order dismissing an indictment entered pursuant to section 210.20. The explicit reference to CPL 210.20 in the trial court’s order is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Appellate Division.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Legislature intended to grant the People the right to appeal dismissals of indictments under CPL 210.20, regardless of whether the trial court’s application of the statute was ultimately correct. The court stated, “Obviously the Legislature did not intend to grant the People the right to appeal only in those cases where the dismissal was proper or arguably proper. Nor did the Legislature intend that the People should be denied appellate relief when the dismissal of the indictment was unauthorized by the statute relied upon.” The propriety of the trial court’s reliance on CPL 210.20 should be considered on the merits of the appeal, not as a jurisdictional bar. While appellate courts may “look through” an order in certain cases (e.g., to ensure that restrictions on interlocutory appeals are not breached), an order granting a motion to dismiss an indictment does not present such a jurisdictional impediment because it finally determines the People’s case unless reversed on appeal.

  • Steingut v. Gold, 42 N.Y.2d 311 (1977): Establishing Jurisdiction Based on Impact of Criminal Conduct

    Steingut v. Gold, 42 N.Y.2d 311 (1977)

    For a county to assert criminal jurisdiction based on the “injured forum” provision, the criminal activity must have a materially harmful impact on the governmental processes or community welfare of that county, and the activity must have been performed with the intent or knowledge that such an impact was likely to occur there.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether Kings County had jurisdiction to indict the Steinguts for corrupt use of position, based on actions in New York County. The alleged crime involved a promise to assist someone in obtaining an appointment in exchange for campaign contributions to Robert Steingut, who was running for office in Kings County. The Court held that the “injured forum” provision of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL 20.40, subd. 2) did not confer jurisdiction on Kings County because the alleged criminal activity did not have a sufficiently material and demonstrable harmful impact on the governmental processes or community welfare of Kings County. The court affirmed the Appellate Division’s grant of a writ of prohibition preventing Kings County from prosecuting the Steinguts.

    Facts

    Robert Steingut, seeking election as Councilman-at-Large in Kings County, and his father, Stanley Steingut, allegedly met with Hans Rubenfeld in New York County. During the meeting, they purportedly promised to help Rubenfeld obtain an appointment to the Civilian Complaint Review Board in exchange for Rubenfeld arranging a fundraising dinner and contributing to Robert Steingut’s campaign. Rubenfeld contributed $2,500, but the dinner never occurred.

    Procedural History

    A Kings County Grand Jury indicted the Steinguts for corrupt use of position. The Steinguts moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing Kings County lacked jurisdiction. The motion was denied. The Steinguts then initiated an Article 78 proceeding in the Appellate Division seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent the prosecution. The Appellate Division granted the petition. The Kings County District Attorney appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the “injured forum” provision of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL 20.40, subd. 2) conferred geographical jurisdiction on Kings County to indict and prosecute the Steinguts for alleged offenses that occurred entirely in New York County.

    Holding

    No, because the alleged criminal activity did not have a materially harmful impact on the governmental processes or community welfare of Kings County, nor was it performed with the intent or knowledge that such an impact was likely to occur there.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that while prohibition is a proper remedy to challenge geographical jurisdiction, Kings County lacked such jurisdiction in this case. The court emphasized that under common law, criminal offenses are prosecuted where they are committed. CPL 20.40(2) provides an exception, allowing jurisdiction in a county where conduct outside the county has a “particular effect.” CPL 20.10(4) defines “particular effect” as a “materially harmful impact upon the governmental processes or community welfare.” The court found that the mere fact that the election was to take place in Kings County was insufficient to establish the required “particular effect.” The court reasoned that a contrary interpretation would allow any county in the state to assert jurisdiction over a statewide election tainted by criminal activity localized in a single county, which was not the intent of the statute. The court noted, “The type of injury or offense contemplated by the statute must be perceptible and of the character and type which can be demonstrated by proof before a Grand Jury.” Furthermore, the indictment itself failed to specify the effect the purported crime would have on Kings County, stating only in a conclusory fashion that the defendants’ conduct had and was likely to have a particular effect on Kings County. The court found that there was no evidence presented to the Grand Jury that the alleged criminal activity was performed with the intent or knowledge that a materially harmful impact would occur in Kings County. Therefore, Kings County lacked the power to indict and prosecute the Steinguts.

  • People v. Hickey, 40 N.Y.2d 761 (1976): Justice Court Authority and Search Warrant Jurisdiction

    People v. Hickey, 40 N.Y.2d 761 (1976)

    A Justice Court lacks the authority to issue a search warrant for premises located outside its territorial jurisdiction unless there’s a connection between the target of the search and an offense committed within that jurisdiction.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a town justice court had the authority to issue a search warrant for a residence located outside of the town’s boundaries. The warrant was issued by a Town Justice of Orchard Park to search the defendant’s apartment in Buffalo for narcotics. The court held that the Justice Court lacked jurisdiction because the affidavit supporting the warrant did not allege any offense occurred within the Town of Orchard Park. The Court emphasized the necessity of a nexus between the criminal activity and the Justice Court’s geographic jurisdiction for the warrant to be valid.

    Facts

    A State Police investigator obtained a search warrant from the Town Justice of Orchard Park to search Dennis Hickey’s apartment in Buffalo for narcotics. The supporting affidavit indicated probable cause to believe Hickey possessed narcotics at his residence. The search warrant was executed, and marijuana was found. Hickey was subsequently charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance.

    Procedural History

    Hickey pleaded not guilty and moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search. The Supreme Court granted the motion, finding the Justice Court lacked geographical jurisdiction. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision without opinion.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a Town Justice Court has the authority to issue a search warrant for premises located outside its territorial jurisdiction when there is no evidence connecting the target of the search to an offense committed within the town.

    Holding

    No, because a Justice Court’s authority to issue process, including search warrants, is confined to matters within its jurisdiction, requiring a geographic nexus between the criminal activity and the court’s jurisdiction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that Justice Courts, as local criminal courts, have trial jurisdiction over offenses other than felonies and preliminary jurisdiction over all offenses. However, this jurisdiction is not without limits and requires a connection between the criminal conduct and the geographical area the court oversees. CPL 690.05(2) establishes a search warrant is a court process. UJCA § 2005 limits a Justice Court’s power to send process to any matter within its jurisdiction. Quoting the court, “The test, quite simply, is whether the affidavits which form the basis for issuance of the search warrant allege that an offense was committed within ‘the jurisdictional purview of the issuing court.’” Since the affidavit provided no evidence that any offense occurred within Orchard Park, the Town Justice lacked the authority to issue the search warrant for Hickey’s apartment in Buffalo. The court noted that the application should have been made to a judge within the City of Buffalo, County Court, or to a Supreme Court Justice.

  • People v. Montgomery, 24 N.Y.2d 130 (1969): Defendant’s Right to Know About Appeal

    People v. Montgomery, 24 N.Y.2d 130 (1969)

    A defendant has the right to be advised of their right to appeal, and failure to do so may warrant resentencing for the purpose of taking an appeal, provided a genuine appealable issue exists.

    Summary

    The Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant, convicted via guilty plea, is entitled to a hearing on a claim of not being advised of the right to appeal. The Court held that to warrant a hearing, the defendant must dispute the conviction’s validity and show a genuine appealable issue they might have raised but for ignorance of their rights. A mere claim of excessive sentencing, where the sentence is less than the maximum, is insufficient. Further, the Court clarified that applications for Montgomery relief are encompassed by CPL 460.30, requiring application to the intermediate appellate court.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree after pleading guilty. As a second felony offender, he faced a maximum sentence of 30 to 60 years. He received a sentence of 15 to 25 years. The defendant later claimed he was not advised of his right to appeal and that the District Attorney breached a promise of a lighter sentence. He sought resentencing to pursue an appeal.

    Procedural History

    The defendant previously litigated, unsuccessfully, the claim that the District Attorney breached a promise of a lighter sentence in prior coram nobis proceedings. He then sought a hearing based on the claim he was not advised of his right to appeal. The Appellate Division’s order was appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a defendant, convicted via guilty plea, is entitled to a hearing on a claim of not being advised of the right to appeal, based solely on a claim of excessive sentence where the sentence was less than the maximum permissible sentence?
    2. Whether applications seeking Montgomery relief are encompassed by CPL 460.30?

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant must demonstrate a genuine appealable issue, and a mere claim of excessive sentencing, where the sentence is less than the maximum, is insufficient.
    2. Yes, because CPL 460.30 directly applies to applications for extension of time for taking an appeal, encompassing the relief sought in a Montgomery claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that to be entitled to a Montgomery hearing, a defendant must dispute the validity of the conviction and demonstrate a genuine appealable issue. It cited People v. Melton, stating that an unsupported claim of excessiveness of sentence, where the defendant received less than the maximum, is not a tenable basis for relief. The Court emphasized that the defendant, facing a potential 30 to 60-year sentence, received 15 to 25 years, thus failing to establish a claim upon which Montgomery relief could be granted. The Court also noted the defendant’s claim of a breached promise had been unsuccessfully litigated previously.

    The Court further clarified the procedural mechanism for Montgomery relief. While acknowledging the traditional use of coram nobis, the Court stated that the enactment of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) sought to codify grounds for such relief. However, CPL 440.10, designed for vacating judgments, doesn’t address Montgomery claims which seek an extension of appeal time, not vacatur.

    Turning to CPL 460.30, the Court found it directly applicable to applications for extending appeal time. It stated that this statute eliminates the need for resentencing for taking a timely appeal. The application must be made to the intermediate appellate court, which may extend the appeal time if the failure to appeal was due to “improper conduct of a public servant or from improper conduct * * * of the defendant’s attorney.” The Court concluded that failing to advise a defendant of their right to appeal constitutes “improper conduct.” The Court also noted that CPL 460.30 provides for a hearing to resolve factual issues. Finally, the Court emphasized that CPL 460.30 motions must be made with due diligence and within one year of the appeal deadline and, regarding convictions prior to CPL 460.30’s enactment, within one year of the statute’s effective date.