New York Law Review

Tag: Criminal Procedure

  • People v. Howard, 2025 NY Slip Op 00184: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and the Right to a Fair Trial

    People v. Howard, 2025 NY Slip Op 00184 (2025)

    Under the New York Constitution, a defendant is denied effective assistance of counsel when, viewed in totality, the attorney did not provide “meaningful representation,” even if the federal standard under Strickland is not met.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant was convicted of burglary, assault, aggravated criminal contempt, and resisting arrest. The dissenting judge argued that trial counsel’s performance was deficient because the attorney’s actions, including failing to adequately prepare, eliciting damaging testimony about the defendant’s prior criminal history, and failing to object to a potentially ambiguous jury instruction, deprived the defendant of a fair trial. The dissent emphasized that under New York’s constitution, the focus is on whether the defendant received meaningful representation and a fair process, regardless of the apparent strength of the evidence against the defendant.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with multiple crimes, including burglary, assault, and aggravated criminal contempt, stemming from an incident involving his spouse. The defendant’s attorney filed a boilerplate motion, which was deemed inadequate. The attorney failed to show the defendant crucial video evidence until shortly before trial. During trial, the defense counsel elicited testimony about the defendant’s prior criminal history. The court denied the prosecution’s Sandoval motion, to explore defendant’s prior bad acts, including a prior conviction for criminal mischief; however, the defense counsel failed to request redaction of a reference to that conviction from the order of protection. The defense counsel also failed to object to an ambiguous jury instruction. The defendant repeatedly complained about his counsel’s performance to the court.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted after a jury trial in the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction in a 3-2 decision. One of the dissenting judges granted the defendant leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel under the New York Constitution, even if the federal standard was not met.

    Holding

    1. No, because on this record, defendant failed to demonstrate that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The majority affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding that the defendant did not prove ineffective assistance of counsel. The dissent argued that the attorney’s performance fell below the standard of meaningful representation, particularly in light of several specific failures. The dissenting judge emphasized that counsel’s actions, such as the boilerplate motion, the delayed viewing of crucial video evidence, eliciting prejudicial testimony, and failing to object to an ambiguous jury instruction, collectively undermined the fairness of the trial. The dissent cited the New York State Constitution’s broader protections of the right to counsel, which emphasize the fairness of the process. The dissent highlighted the attorney’s failure to investigate the case adequately, which led to detrimental actions during the trial. The dissent’s position was that these actions, which were not part of any reasonable trial strategy, prejudiced the defendant’s right to a fair trial. The dissent referenced: “We do not require effective counsel merely to shield the seemingly innocent, but to protect the ‘integrity of the judicial process’ by affording the ‘[t]he worst criminal, the most culpable individual’ the same chance to be heard as ‘[t]he most blameless member of society.’”

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the distinction between the federal and New York standards for ineffective assistance of counsel, particularly the importance of “meaningful representation” under the New York Constitution. Attorneys in New York must prioritize thorough investigation and preparation, tailoring legal arguments to the specifics of the case. Failing to prepare adequately, and making prejudicial errors at trial that are not strategically motivated, can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, even if the evidence of guilt is strong. Counsel must be mindful of the potential impact of their actions on the fairness of the process as a whole, including the eliciting of damaging evidence or failing to make necessary objections. The case also suggests that repeated errors by counsel, even if individually minor, can cumulatively undermine a defendant’s right to a fair trial. Cases such as People v. Debellis, People v. Donovan and People v. Turner, provide additional legal support for the outcome.

  • People v. Brisman, 2025 NY Slip Op 00123: Appellate Division Standard of Review for Excessive Sentence Claims

    2025 NY Slip Op 00123

    The Appellate Division, when reviewing a challenge to the severity of a sentence, must determine whether the sentence is “unduly harsh or severe,” without requiring the defendant to show extraordinary circumstances or abuse of discretion by the sentencing court.

    Summary

    In this case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the proper standard the Appellate Division must apply when reviewing a challenge to the severity of a sentence. The Court held that the Appellate Division erred by applying a standard that required the defendant to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances or an abuse of discretion by the sentencing court. The Court of Appeals emphasized that the correct standard is whether the sentence is “unduly harsh or severe,” a determination made in the interest of justice and without deference to the sentencing court. The case underscores the Appellate Division’s broad authority to modify sentences it deems excessive.

    Facts

    While incarcerated for manslaughter, Jason Brisman was involved in a fight with another inmate. During the fight, Brisman cut his finger, and his opponent sustained a facial wound. Correction officers discovered a sharpened porcelain shard near Brisman. Brisman was convicted of promoting prison contraband and sentenced as a second felony offender to 3½ to 7 years in prison. The Appellate Division rejected Brisman’s challenge to the sentence’s severity, stating that there were “no extraordinary circumstances or abuse of discretion warranting a reduction of the sentence in the interest of justice.”

    Procedural History

    Brisman was convicted in the trial court and sentenced to 3½ to 7 years. The Appellate Division affirmed the sentence, applying an “extraordinary circumstances or abuse of discretion” standard. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the case, focusing on the standard of review employed by the Appellate Division, and reversed, remitting the matter back to the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Appellate Division applied the correct legal standard when reviewing the severity of Brisman’s sentence.

    Holding

    1. No, because the Appellate Division applied an incorrect standard, requiring a showing of extraordinary circumstances or abuse of discretion instead of determining whether the sentence was unduly harsh or severe.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals began by acknowledging the Appellate Division’s “broad, plenary power” to modify a sentence that is “unduly harsh or severe.” The Court clarified that the standard for such review is purely based on the interest of justice. The Court found that the Appellate Division’s use of the “extraordinary circumstances or abuse of discretion” standard was incorrect. The Court pointed to the plain language of CPL 470.15(6)(b), which empowers the Appellate Division to modify a sentence “though legal, was unduly harsh or severe.” The Court also reviewed the historical context, highlighting that the Appellate Division has long held the power to reduce sentences deemed “excessive.” The Court distinguished cases where abuse of discretion is the correct standard, such as in the admission of evidence, from cases involving sentence severity, where the standard is purely the interest of justice. The Court emphasized that the Appellate Division’s determination should be made without deference to the sentencing court, contrary to the standard applied by the Appellate Division in this case. The Court highlighted how, after this case, the Third Department abandoned the “extraordinary circumstances or abuse of discretion” standard, further supporting its holding. The Court found the dissent’s interpretation of precedent, specifically People v Delgado, to be flawed and inconsistent with the Appellate Division’s jurisprudence. As the Court stated, “a criminal defendant need not show extraordinary circumstances or an abuse of discretion by the sentencing court in order to obtain a sentence reduction under CPL 470.15 (6) (b).”

    Practical Implications

    This decision clarifies the standard of review for excessive sentence claims in New York. It reinforces that the Appellate Division must independently determine whether a sentence is unduly harsh or severe. Attorneys should advise their clients that they do not need to show extraordinary circumstances or abuse of discretion to seek a sentence reduction on appeal. This case likely changes the way attorneys argue excessive sentence claims. It confirms the Appellate Division’s broad power to review sentences and can lead to more frequent successful sentence reductions in cases where the Appellate Division finds the original sentence excessive. Later cases will likely cite Brisman when challenging the Appellate Division’s standard of review in excessive sentencing cases.

  • People v. Mero, 2024 NY Slip Op 06385: Severance of Charges for Unrelated Crimes and Conflict of Interest of Counsel

    People v. Mero, 2024 NY Slip Op 06385 (N.Y. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2024)

    A trial court’s decision to join or sever criminal charges for trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and the primary concern is whether the jury can consider the evidence separately for each charge, focusing on the risk of prejudice and fairness to the defendant.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of Edward Mero for two counts of second-degree murder and two counts of tampering with physical evidence. The court addressed two main issues: the denial of Mero’s motion to sever the charges relating to two distinct murders and the claim of a conflict of interest arising from an improper business relationship between Mero’s trial counsel and a prosecutor. The court found that the joinder of the charges did not prejudice Mero because the jury was properly instructed, and the business relationship between the attorneys, while improper, did not create a conflict that operated on the defense. The court also rejected the defendant’s remaining claims, including those relating to ineffective assistance of counsel and evidentiary sufficiency.

    Facts

    Edward Mero was charged with two counts of second-degree murder and related tampering charges. The first murder involved his roommate, who died in a fire under suspicious circumstances in 2013. The second murder occurred in 2014; the victim’s body was found in a shallow grave in 2015. These charges were joined in a single indictment. Mero moved to sever the charges, arguing the victims were unrelated and the circumstances of their deaths were dissimilar. The trial court denied the motion. Additionally, Mero moved to vacate his convictions under CPL 440.10, arguing that his trial counsel had an improper business relationship with the prosecuting ADA, constituting a conflict of interest. The trial court denied this motion as well. Mero appealed, claiming the trial court abused its discretion by denying severance and erred in denying his CPL 440 motion.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Mero’s motion to sever and his motion to vacate his conviction. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment and the denial of the CPL 440 motion. Two Justices dissented on the severance issue, and a dissenting Justice granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mero’s motion to sever the charges.
    2. Whether the improper business relationship between Mero’s trial counsel and the prosecuting ADA created a conflict of interest that required vacatur of the conviction.

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mero’s motion to sever the charges because the jury was properly instructed, and there was no substantial likelihood that the jury would be unable to consider separately the proof as it relates to each offense.
    2. No, because the improper business relationship did not create a conflict of interest that operated on the defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding severance, the court acknowledged the joinder of offenses was proper under CPL 200.20 (2)(c). The court found that the trial court’s denial of severance was not an abuse of discretion. The court reasoned that while the offenses were factually distinct, the key was whether the jury could separately consider the evidence for each. The court pointed out that the trial court gave thorough jury instructions. Additionally, the court found that Mero failed to show there was substantially more proof of one offense than the other or a substantial likelihood that the jury could not consider the evidence separately. The court emphasized the importance of jury instructions and their role in ensuring that the jury could properly segregate the evidence relating to each charge.

    Regarding the conflict of interest, the court found that the business relationship between Mero’s counsel and the prosecuting ADA created a potential conflict of interest but did not operate on the defense. The court noted that the work performed by the ADA was unrelated to Mero’s case. The court stated that Mero produced no evidence suggesting the business conflict had anything to do with any part of the proceedings. The court found that trial counsel provided meaningful and zealous representation.

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the broad discretion trial courts have in deciding motions for severance. The ruling highlights the importance of jury instructions in mitigating potential prejudice from the joinder of offenses. For attorneys, it is important to consider whether it is possible for a jury to segregate the evidence. The case also sets a high bar for establishing that a conflict of interest warrants overturning a conviction, requiring evidence that the conflict negatively impacted the defense. The case shows that even improper relationships between opposing counsel do not require vacatur if they did not affect the defendant’s case.

  • People v. Mero, 2024 NY Slip Op 06385: Severance of Unrelated Murder Charges

    2024 NY Slip Op 06385

    A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying severance of unrelated criminal charges where the jury is properly instructed and the evidence on each charge is presented separately, provided there is no substantial likelihood the jury could not segregate the evidence.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder and related charges in New York. The charges involved the deaths of two different individuals, occurring years apart under dissimilar circumstances. The trial court joined the charges in a single indictment, and the defendant’s motion to sever the charges was denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals considered, among other things, whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to sever the charges related to each murder and whether the undisclosed business relationship between the defendant’s trial counsel and an Assistant District Attorney constituted a conflict of interest. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sever and that no conflict of interest requiring vacatur of the conviction occurred. The Court found that the jury was properly instructed and able to consider the evidence separately for each charge.

    Facts

    • The defendant was charged with two counts of second-degree murder and two counts of tampering with physical evidence, concerning the deaths of two separate victims.
    • The first victim, the defendant’s roommate, was found dead in their shared apartment in 2013 after a fire.
    • The second victim, a woman the defendant hired for a date, was found in a shallow grave in May 2015.
    • The defendant was arrested in 2017, and the charges were joined in a single indictment.
    • The defendant moved to sever the charges, arguing the cases were distinct and joinder would be prejudicial. The trial court denied the motion.
    • A jury convicted the defendant on all charges.
    • During trial, defense counsel disclosed a potentially prejudicial incident involving a juror’s comments about the defendant.
    • After trial, the defendant moved to vacate his convictions under CPL 440.10, alleging a conflict of interest due to an undisclosed business relationship between his trial counsel and the prosecuting ADA.
    • The trial court denied the motion, finding no prejudice.

    Procedural History

    • Trial court denied the defendant’s motion to sever charges.
    • Trial court denied the defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction due to conflict of interest.
    • The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment and the order.
    • The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to sever the charges related to the two murders.
    2. Whether an improper business relationship between the defendant’s trial counsel and a prosecutor created a conflict of interest that required vacatur of the conviction.

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court properly instructed the jury to consider the evidence separately for each charge, and the defendant did not show a substantial likelihood that the jury could not do so.
    2. No, because the undisclosed business relationship did not operate on the defense and there was no actual conflict of interest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals addressed the denial of the severance motion by applying CPL 200.20 (3), which allows severance when “in the interest of justice and for good cause shown.” The court found that the defendant failed to meet the burden of demonstrating “good cause” for severance. Specifically, the court found that the defendant did not establish that “substantially more proof” existed for one offense or that the jury was unable to consider each charge separately. The trial court provided the jury with clear instructions to consider each case separately, and the court presumed that jurors followed these instructions. The Court differentiated the case from People v. Shapiro, which mandated severance in a case with “aberrant sexual practices,” a request by the defendant to testify regarding one set of offenses, but not the other, and an aggregation of counts. Moreover, the court noted the Appellate Division departments have permitted joinder of homicides on numerous occasions. Regarding the conflict of interest claim, the court determined that the business relationship between defense counsel and the prosecutor did not rise to the level of an actual conflict of interest. Furthermore, the court found that the potential conflict did not operate on the defense. The court noted that the defendant presented no evidence that the relationship affected counsel’s performance and found counsel’s advocacy as “zealous and effective.”

    Practical Implications

    • When facing similar cases, attorneys should note that courts have discretion in deciding whether to sever charges based on the facts of each case.
    • Thorough jury instructions on separating the evidence for each count are crucial to prevent appellate reversal.
    • Evidence that shows potential conflicts of interest should be evaluated to determine whether a conflict affected the counsel’s performance.
    • Defense counsel should be aware of the limitations on the admissibility of prior crimes or bad acts as propensity evidence to avoid undue prejudice to the defendant, which may require separate trials.
    • It is important to weigh the balance of judicial economy against the defendant’s right to a fair trial free of undue prejudice to ensure fairness.

  • People v. Robles, 2024 NY Slip Op 05819: Harmless Error in Guilty Plea Cases Involving Suppressed Evidence

    2024 NY Slip Op 05819

    When a defendant pleads guilty after an unsuccessful motion to suppress evidence, and the appellate court determines that the suppressed evidence was erroneously admitted, the conviction will be reversed unless there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the defendant’s decision to plead guilty.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the application of harmless error analysis to guilty pleas when a suppression motion is denied, and the evidence would have been suppressed. The court found that for a guilty plea to stand in such a situation, the error must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, meaning there must be no reasonable possibility that the erroneous ruling contributed to the defendant’s decision to plead guilty. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, finding that the lower court incorrectly applied harmless error and that the record did not sufficiently demonstrate that the defendant’s guilty plea was independent of the erroneously admitted evidence. The court emphasized the importance of the defendant’s unsuccessful motion to suppress evidence and the impact that this played in the defendant pleading guilty. The case was remitted for further proceedings.

    Facts

    Police responded to a shots fired report and approached Eddie Robles. After a struggle, police recovered a handgun from Robles. Before Miranda warnings were given, an officer asked Robles a question, and Robles replied, “Bro, you saw what I had on me. I was going to do what I had to do.” Robles was charged with criminal possession of a weapon. The trial court denied Robles’ motion to suppress both the handgun and his statement. Robles then pleaded guilty to a lesser charge and the court imposed an agreed-upon sentence. During the plea colloquy, Robles expressed a desire to appeal the suppression hearing.

    Procedural History

    Robles moved to suppress evidence, which was denied by the trial court. Robles pleaded guilty to a lesser charge and was sentenced accordingly. The Appellate Division agreed that the statement should have been suppressed but found the error harmless because the gun would have been admissible. The dissenting justice granted leave to appeal, and the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Appellate Division correctly applied a harmless error analysis to the guilty plea, given the erroneous denial of the suppression motion.

    Holding

    1. No, because there was a reasonable possibility that the court’s error in failing to suppress defendant’s statement contributed to his decision to plead guilty.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court recognized that guilty pleas are generally not subject to harmless error review. However, in cases where the error is of constitutional dimension, the court must determine if there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the defendant’s decision to plead guilty. The court found that the record was ambiguous regarding Robles’ motivation for pleading guilty. His statement, in the face of admissible evidence, indicated the importance of the suppression ruling. Furthermore, Robles’ affirmative request during the plea colloquy to appeal the suppression ruling indicated the importance he placed on that ruling. The court concluded that it could not say with certainty that the erroneous suppression ruling did not affect Robles’ decision to plead guilty and reversed the decision. The court rejected the request to dismiss the indictment.

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the importance of carefully assessing the impact of suppressed evidence on a defendant’s decision to plead guilty. Attorneys must consider the defendant’s statements, the evidence that remains, and the defendant’s express concerns during plea negotiations. The case reaffirms the high standard for demonstrating harmless error in guilty plea cases, particularly when a suppression motion is involved. This ruling requires a more cautious approach to determining harmless error in similar cases, where the possibility of the erroneously admitted evidence influencing the plea must be ruled out beyond a reasonable doubt. This case impacts the legal practice of plea bargaining, forcing prosecutors and courts to scrutinize the connection between the suppressed evidence and the defendant’s ultimate plea decision.

  • People v. Baque, 2024 NY Slip Op 05244: The Appellate Division’s Weight of Evidence Review in Circumstantial Evidence Cases

    2024 NY Slip Op 05244

    In cases relying solely on circumstantial evidence, when conducting a weight of the evidence review, the Appellate Division must ensure that the inference of guilt is the only one that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from the facts, and that the evidence excludes beyond a reasonable doubt every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the standard of review for the Appellate Division when it assesses the weight of evidence in a criminal case, particularly one based on circumstantial evidence. The court held that the Appellate Division’s role is to ensure that the jury’s inferences from the evidence were proper and that the guilt was the only reasonable conclusion. The court affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, finding no legal error in its review of a conviction based on circumstantial evidence of a defendant’s role in his infant daughter’s death due to abusive head trauma. The court clarified that the Appellate Division’s review must apply the same rigor the jury is instructed to apply when evaluating the circumstantial evidence.

    Facts

    Jorge Baque’s five-month-old daughter was found unresponsive in her crib and later died. An autopsy revealed injuries consistent with abusive head trauma. Baque was the last person known to be with the child before her death. The prosecution presented only circumstantial evidence, arguing that Baque was the perpetrator. The trial court provided the standard circumstantial evidence instruction to the jury without objection. Baque was convicted of criminally negligent homicide and endangering the welfare of a child. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, prompting Baque’s appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Procedural History

    Baque was convicted in the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to address the standard of review used by the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Appellate Division, in its weight of the evidence review, applied the correct legal standard to the circumstantial evidence presented in the case.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Appellate Division’s decision, as a whole, reflected a proper application of the weight of the evidence standard, which aligns with the jury’s approach in evaluating circumstantial evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reiterated that the Appellate Division’s review power is unique and demands independent assessment of the evidence. The court emphasized the distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence and the importance of the circumstantial evidence jury instruction, which requires that the inference of guilt is the only reasonable inference from the facts. The court held that it was not the role of the Court of Appeals to parse over every word in the Appellate Division’s opinion or exchanges in oral argument, but only to determine if it correctly performed its weight of evidence review function. The court found the Appellate Division adequately addressed the issues, noting its reliance on precedent. The court rejected the argument that the Appellate Division improperly applied a legal sufficiency analysis, referencing the Appellate Division’s citations to weight of the evidence precedents.

    Practical Implications

    This decision reinforces that the Appellate Division, when reviewing a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, must ensure that the jury’s determination that the inference of guilt is the only reasonable one. Appellate attorneys should carefully examine whether the Appellate Division’s opinion demonstrates that it understood and correctly applied the standards of the weight of the evidence review, especially in circumstantial evidence cases. The court’s emphasis on ensuring the inference of guilt is the only possible inference means that attorneys should focus on whether the evidence eliminates all reasonable alternative explanations. This case provides guidance for arguing and challenging the application of weight of the evidence review.

  • People v. Sharp, 2024 NY Slip Op 05132 (2024): Right to be Present at Sandoval Hearing

    People v. Sharp, 2024 NY Slip Op 05132 (2024)

    A defendant’s right to be present during a Sandoval hearing is violated when the court holds an in-chambers conference on the admissibility of prior criminal conduct without the defendant’s presence, and the subsequent in-court proceeding does not provide an opportunity for meaningful participation.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction, holding that the trial court violated his right to be present at a critical stage of the proceedings, specifically during a Sandoval hearing, by holding an in-chambers conference about the defendant’s prior criminal history without his presence. Even though a subsequent hearing was held with the defendant present, the Court found that this did not cure the initial error because the defendant was not given an opportunity for meaningful participation. The Court emphasized the defendant’s right to be present to address factual errors, controvert the prosecutor’s assertions, and provide details about the underlying facts of prior convictions.

    Facts

    Eric D. Sharp was charged with firearm offenses. Before trial, the prosecution filed a Sandoval application seeking to cross-examine Sharp about his prior convictions. The trial court held an in-chambers conference on the motion with the prosecution and defense counsel, but Sharp was not present. Subsequently, the court announced its Sandoval rulings in Sharp’s presence. Defense counsel stood by the prior discussion, and the court proceeded to rule on the admissibility of Sharp’s prior convictions. Sharp was ultimately convicted after a bench trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, but the dissenting justice granted Sharp leave to appeal.

    Procedural History

    Sharp was convicted in trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The dissenting justice granted Sharp leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court violated Sharp’s right to be present during a material stage of the prosecution by holding an in-chambers Sandoval hearing without his presence.

    2. Whether the subsequent in-court proceeding cured any violation of Sharp’s right to be present.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the in-chambers conference on the Sandoval application constituted a material stage of the proceedings at which Sharp had a right to be present.

    2. No, because the subsequent in-court proceeding did not provide Sharp with an opportunity for meaningful participation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Criminal Procedure Law § 260.20, which guarantees a defendant’s right to be present at trial, and case law, including People v. Dokes, holding that this right extends to the substantive portion of Sandoval hearings. The Court found that the in-chambers conference was a material stage because it concerned factual matters about which the defendant might have had unique knowledge, which could have been used to advance the defendant’s position. The Court distinguished the case from situations where a curative hearing provides an opportunity for meaningful participation. Here, the subsequent hearing did not cure the violation because the court did not ask the defendant if he wished to be heard, nor did the court meaningfully explain the nature of the proceeding to the defendant, nor did the court entertain any arguments on the merits. Instead, the court merely reiterated its rulings. The Court emphasized that the right to be present belonged to the defendant personally, not counsel, and required an affirmative waiver for a defendant’s exclusion.

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the critical importance of a defendant’s presence during Sandoval proceedings. Attorneys must ensure that their clients are present during all substantive discussions about prior criminal conduct. The court’s ruling emphasizes that a defendant’s presence and opportunity to participate meaningfully are required. A defendant’s mere awareness of a Sandoval application or counsel’s presence is not sufficient to protect the right to be present. When a court holds a hearing in a defendant’s absence, the court must provide a subsequent opportunity for meaningful participation, which includes the ability to present arguments and address factual issues. Failure to do so can result in reversal of a conviction and the need for a new trial. Courts should be explicit in inviting defendants to participate and explaining the significance of the proceedings.

  • People v. Spencer, 28 N.Y.3d 302 (2016): Juror’s Inability to Render Impartial Verdict Justifies Removal

    People v. Spencer, 28 N.Y.3d 302 (2016)

    A trial court must discharge a juror as “grossly unqualified to serve” under CPL 270.35(1) if the juror’s statements make it obvious that they cannot render an impartial verdict based on the evidence and the law.

    Summary

    In a murder trial, a juror repeatedly stated during deliberations that she could not separate her emotions from the case and could not decide it based solely on the facts and the law. Despite the court’s efforts to encourage her to fulfill her duty, she remained resolute in her inability to be impartial. The trial court did not discharge the juror and, ultimately, the defendant was found guilty of manslaughter. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court erred by failing to discharge the juror, as her statements made it obvious that she was grossly unqualified to serve. The court emphasized that a juror’s inability to follow the law, not just bias, could render them unfit.

    Facts

    Defendant was charged with murder. During deliberations, a juror informed the court that she could not separate her emotions from the case. The court questioned the juror, and the juror repeatedly stated she was unable to base her decision solely on the evidence and the law, despite trying her best. The juror stated “I don’t have it in me,” and “I can’t separate it anymore. I don’t know, I don’t know. I don’t have the capabilities to.” The trial court, after a *Buford* inquiry, declined to discharge the juror. The jury ultimately convicted defendant of manslaughter.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant of manslaughter. The Appellate Division affirmed. The dissenting Justice in the Appellate Division granted defendant leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred by not discharging a sworn juror who repeatedly stated during deliberations that she could not separate her emotions from the case and could not decide it based solely on the facts and the law.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the juror’s statements made it obvious that she was grossly unqualified to serve, and the trial court was required to discharge her under CPL 270.35(1).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found that the juror’s statements demonstrated a clear inability to render an impartial verdict. The court explained that CPL 270.35(1) requires a trial court to discharge a juror who is “grossly unqualified to serve.” A juror is grossly unqualified “only ‘when it becomes obvious that a particular juror possesses a state of mind which would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict.’” The Court emphasized that a trial judge has discretion in making the findings regarding a juror’s qualifications, but the ultimate determination is a legal one. The court distinguished the standard for removing a sworn juror, which requires a higher burden of proof that the juror is grossly unqualified, than the standard for excusing a prospective juror for cause. The court stated that a juror is “grossly unqualified to serve” where the “juror’s statements made it plain that she possess [ed] a state of mind which would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict.” The Court held that it was “obvious the juror possessed a state of mind preventing her from rendering an impartial verdict.”

    Practical Implications

    This case reinforces the importance of a juror’s ability and willingness to follow the law and base their decision solely on the evidence. Attorneys must be prepared to challenge jurors who express an inability to do so. This case highlights a significant distinction: it’s not just bias that can disqualify a juror, but also an inability to separate emotion from the facts and the law. It emphasizes the trial court’s duty to ensure the fairness of the trial by removing unqualified jurors. Courts must conduct thorough inquiries (a Buford inquiry) to assess whether a juror is grossly unqualified to serve, and must err on the side of caution and impartiality when deciding whether to remove a juror. This case guides attorneys on when to move for a mistrial based on a juror’s inability to perform their duties.

  • People v. Viruet, 28 N.Y.3d 526 (2016): Adverse Inference Instruction for Lost Evidence

    People v. Viruet, 28 N.Y.3d 526 (2016)

    When the state loses evidence requested by the defendant, and that evidence is reasonably likely to be material, an adverse inference instruction is mandatory if requested.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the trial court erred by denying an adverse inference instruction after the police lost surveillance video of a shooting, which the defendant was charged with committing. The court held that the trial court should have given the instruction because the video was likely to contain material information. However, the court affirmed the conviction because the error was harmless given the strength of the evidence against the defendant, including eyewitness testimony and a confession.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with second-degree murder after a shooting outside a nightclub. The incident occurred shortly after the defendant’s brother was assaulted. The police obtained surveillance video from the club, but the arresting officer lost the video. The defendant requested the video during discovery and sought an adverse inference instruction based on its absence. The trial court denied the instruction, finding insufficient evidence that the video would have been favorable to the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed. The defendant appealed.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant of second-degree murder and weapons possession. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred by declining to provide an adverse inference instruction to the jury regarding the missing surveillance video, which the defendant requested in discovery.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the lost video was reasonably likely to be of material importance to the case, the court erred by denying the adverse inference instruction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the precedent set in People v. Handy, which established that when the State destroys evidence, the defendant is entitled to an adverse inference instruction if the evidence was requested, acted upon with due diligence, and was reasonably likely to be of material importance. Here, the court found that the defendant met those conditions. The video could have depicted key events such as the shooting and the positions of witnesses, making it potentially relevant. Even though the prosecution argued it did not intend to use the video, the court found it had an obligation to preserve evidence once the police collected it. Ultimately, the court held that the trial court should have given the instruction.

    The court then considered whether the error was harmless. Quoting People v. Crimmins, the court explained that “errors of law of nonconstitutional magnitude may be found harmless where ‘the proof of the defendant’s guilt, without reference to the error, is overwhelming’ and where there is no ‘significant probability . . . that the jury would have acquitted the defendant had it not been for the error.’” The court found that overwhelming evidence supported the guilty verdict, including eyewitness accounts and a confession. As a result, the error was deemed harmless, and the conviction was upheld.

    Practical Implications

    This case reinforces the importance of preserving potentially relevant evidence, especially video footage, for the prosecution. It clarifies that if the prosecution loses requested evidence that might be helpful to the defendant, they could be forced to give the jury an adverse inference instruction. Defense attorneys can use this ruling to argue for adverse inference instructions when potentially exculpatory evidence is lost or destroyed by the State. This case emphasizes that it is not enough for the prosecution to claim they did not plan to use the evidence; they must still preserve it. When similar cases come before the court, this case should guide the decision on whether an adverse inference is warranted.

  • 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, Inc. v. New York County Dist., 27 N.Y.3d 236 (2016): Appealability of Orders Regarding Stored Communications Act (SCA) Warrants

    27 N.Y.3d 236 (2016)

    Orders denying motions to quash search warrants issued under the Stored Communications Act (SCA) in criminal proceedings are not appealable under New York law, as there is no statutory basis for such an appeal.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the appealability of two Supreme Court orders related to warrants issued to Facebook under the Stored Communications Act (SCA) in connection with a criminal investigation. The court held that neither order was appealable because they arose from a criminal proceeding, and New York’s Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) does not authorize appeals from orders denying motions to quash search warrants. The court distinguished SCA warrants from subpoenas, emphasizing the former’s alignment with traditional search warrants in initiating a criminal proceeding and invoking Fourth Amendment concerns. The court affirmed the Appellate Division’s dismissal of Facebook’s appeals, underscoring the importance of adhering to statutory requirements for appeals in criminal cases and the need for legislative action to create a right of appeal where none currently exists.

    Facts

    In July 2013, Supreme Court issued 381 warrants to Facebook based on probable cause, seeking subscriber information and content from user accounts related to a disability fraud investigation. Facebook moved to quash the warrants, arguing overbreadth and lack of particularity, which Supreme Court denied, directing Facebook to comply. Facebook complied with the warrants after the Appellate Division denied a stay. After the warrants were unsealed, Facebook sought disclosure of the supporting affidavit. Supreme Court denied this motion as well. Facebook appealed both Supreme Court orders.

    Procedural History

    Supreme Court denied Facebook’s motion to quash the warrants and later denied its motion to compel the disclosure of the supporting affidavit. The Appellate Division dismissed Facebook’s appeals from both orders, finding them non-appealable because they stemmed from a criminal proceeding, and there was no statutory basis for an appeal. The New York Court of Appeals granted Facebook leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Appellate Division correctly dismissed Facebook’s appeal from the order denying its motion to quash the SCA warrants?

    2. Whether the Appellate Division correctly dismissed Facebook’s appeal from the order denying Facebook’s motion to compel disclosure of the supporting affidavit?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because there is no statutory basis for an appeal of an order denying a motion to quash a warrant issued in a criminal proceeding.

    2. Yes, because the same rule applies to the order denying Facebook’s motion to compel disclosure of the supporting affidavit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court focused on the appealability of orders in criminal proceedings under New York law. The court noted that the CPL does not provide for appeals from orders denying motions to quash search warrants. The court found that SCA warrants, although compelling third-party disclosure of electronic data, are more analogous to traditional search warrants than subpoenas because they initiate criminal proceedings. They noted, “[n]o appeal lies from [an] order denying … [an] application to vacate a search warrant … as this is an order in a criminal [case], [and] an appeal from [such an order] is not provided for” by statute. The court emphasized that a motion to quash a subpoena is considered civil, but a motion to quash a warrant is criminal because the warrant itself commenced a criminal proceeding. The court found that SCA warrants are governed by the same laws as traditional warrants. The court further stated, “[a]n SCA warrant — and the relief sought in a challenge to such a warrant — arises in a criminal, not a civil, proceeding.” The court also considered the potential for protracted litigation if appeals were allowed. The court declined to create a right to appeal where the legislature had not authorized one.

    Practical Implications

    This case reinforces the strict limitations on appeals in New York criminal proceedings. Lawyers handling cases involving SCA warrants should understand that orders denying motions to quash those warrants are not directly appealable. To appeal such an order, parties must challenge it within the framework of the criminal case, typically after conviction. The case underscores the importance of distinguishing between warrants and subpoenas, with the former triggering criminal procedure and the latter civil procedure rules. This ruling clarifies that third-party providers like Facebook, who are subject to SCA warrants, do not have an automatic right to appeal the denial of a motion to quash a warrant under state law. The decision has significant implications for digital privacy, law enforcement investigations, and the procedural avenues available to challenge the acquisition of electronic data.