New York Law Review

Tag: Criminal Possession

  • People v. Tucker, 55 N.Y.2d 1 (1981): Resubmission of Verdicts for Jury Reconsideration

    People v. Tucker, 55 N.Y.2d 1 (1981)

    When a jury returns a verdict that fails to comply with the court’s instructions regarding inclusory concurrent counts, resubmission to the jury is required only if the verdict demonstrates confusion about the jury’s intent.

    Summary

    Tucker was convicted of both criminal possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell and simple possession, despite the trial court’s instruction to consider these counts in the alternative. The trial court dismissed the simple possession counts after the verdict. The New York Court of Appeals held that resubmission to the jury is only required if the verdict showed confusion about the jury’s intent. Because the jury’s intent to convict on possession with intent to sell was clear, the additional finding of simple possession was considered surplusage, and the trial court’s dismissal of the lesser counts was affirmed.

    Facts

    Tucker was arrested and indicted on six counts related to two separate drug transactions, including criminal sale, criminal possession with intent to sell, and simple possession of a controlled substance. The indictment charged the defendant duplicatively with respect to each drug transaction.

    Procedural History

    The trial court instructed the jury to consider inclusory concurrent counts in the alternative. The jury convicted Tucker of both possession with intent to sell and simple possession for each transaction, acquitting him of the sale counts. The trial court dismissed the simple possession counts sua sponte. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the jury’s failure to comply with the trial court’s instructions to consider inclusory concurrent counts in the alternative requires, per se, resubmission of the case to the jury for reconsideration of its verdict under CPL 310.50(2)?

    Holding

    No, because absent a verdict indicating confusion about the jury’s intention, the jury’s failure to comply with the court’s instructions does not automatically require resubmission.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals interpreted CPL 310.50(2), stating it does not create a strict rule requiring resubmission whenever a jury fails to follow instructions. Resubmission is necessary only when the verdict reveals confusion about the jury’s intent regarding specific counts. In this case, the jury’s intent to convict Tucker of criminal possession with intent to sell was clear. The conviction for simple possession was deemed surplusage and did not indicate inconsistency or confusion. The court distinguished this case from People v. Salemmo, where the jury’s verdict was inherently inconsistent, demonstrating confusion. The court stated that “resubmission is required only where the verdict returned by the jury exhibits a confusion on the part of the jury such that its intention with respect to individual counts of the indictment is uncertain.” The court found that the trial court acted properly in dismissing the lesser inclusory concurrent counts, as appellate courts often do when a defendant could not have committed the greater offense without also committing the lesser offense. The court reasoned, “absent an indication of confusion clouding the jury’s intent in returning a verdict, we see no reason why the trial court cannot dismiss, as appellate courts have, lesser inclusory concurrent counts of an indictment upon the return of a verdict finding the defendant guilty of a greater count.”

  • People v. Colasanti, 35 N.Y.2d 434 (1974): Determining Value of Stolen Contraband

    People v. Colasanti, 35 N.Y.2d 434 (1974)

    The market value of stolen goods, even in an illegitimate market, can be used to determine the value of the property for purposes of grading criminal possession charges, particularly when the stolen goods have an equivalent in a legitimate market.

    Summary

    Colasanti was convicted of criminal possession of stolen property in the first degree after possessing approximately 600,000 stolen Librium pills (Libratabs). The pills had been distributed free of charge to hospitals and physicians for experimental use. The key issue was whether the prosecution adequately established that the value of the pills exceeded $1,500, the threshold for first-degree criminal possession. The Court of Appeals held that the market value of substitute pills with substantially the same chemical composition, which were being manufactured and marketed at the time of the theft, was relevant to determining the value of the stolen pills. The Court further reasoned that even the illegitimate market value could be considered and that the scale of the criminal operation, not market regulation, is the purpose of the statute.

    Facts

    Approximately 600,000 Librium pills (Libratabs) were stolen.
    These pills had been originally distributed by the manufacturer to hospitals and physicians without charge for experimental use.
    At the time of the theft, the manufacturer had recalled the experimental pills and was marketing substitute pills of substantially the same chemical composition.
    The defendant requested $19,500 for the stolen pills.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of criminal possession of stolen property in the first degree.
    The appeal focused on whether the prosecution established the value of the stolen property to be in excess of $1,500, which would justify the conviction.
    The Appellate Division order was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals found that the prosecution had sufficiently proved the value of the stolen pills.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution established the value of the stolen pills to be in excess of $1,500, justifying a conviction for criminal possession of stolen property in the first degree, when the pills had no “market price” or “market value” at the time of original distribution because they were given away for experimental purposes.

    Holding

    Yes, because the market value of the substitute pills, which were equivalent in composition, cost of ingredients, function, and use, was relevant to establishing the current value of the recalled pills. Furthermore, even the illegitimate market value could be considered to assess the scale of the criminal operation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the fact that the pills were originally distributed free of charge does not diminish their value to a thief. The key consideration is the value of the pills at the time they were possessed as stolen property. The court stated that the substitute pills being manufactured and marketed at the time were equivalent in composition, cost of ingredients, function, and use to the stolen pills. The court noted that this equivalence was strong evidence of equivalent market value. Further, the court found the defendant’s request of $19,500 for the stolen pills to be a “significant admission of value and confirmation of a market value even if that market be an illegitimate market.”

    The Court explicitly stated that “the purpose of the statutes fixing the higher degrees of crime is not related to regulating the economic market but to assessing the scale of criminal operations by the persons charged with offenses under the statutes.” The court cited other cases, such as United States v. Tyers, which held that the underworld value of contraband may be used in determining value for the purposes of a larceny or criminal possession statute. Allowing defendants to specialize in stolen goods which had no value in a legitimate market would be an intolerable outcome. The court concluded that the prosecution’s proof established the market value of the stolen pills in accordance with subdivision 1 of section 155.20 of the Penal Law.