New York Law Review

Tag: Criminal Possession

  • People v. Davis, 14 N.Y.3d 20 (2009): When Criminal Possession is Not a Lesser Included Offense of Criminal Sale

    14 N.Y.3d 20 (2009)

    Criminal possession of a controlled substance is not a lesser included offense of criminal sale of a controlled substance under New York law, even when an agency defense is presented, because it is theoretically possible to commit the sale crime without necessarily committing the possession crime.

    Summary

    George Davis was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. At trial, he requested a jury instruction on the agency defense (arguing he acted as the buyer’s agent) and also requested that the court charge criminal possession as a lesser included offense. The trial court granted the agency defense instruction but denied the lesser included offense charge. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that criminal possession is not a lesser included offense of criminal sale, even when the agency defense is raised, because the theoretical possibility exists to sell without possessing. This decision emphasizes a strict application of the ‘impossibility’ test for lesser included offenses.

    Facts

    An undercover officer approached Davis outside a building known for drug sales, requesting two bags of crack cocaine and providing $60. Davis entered the building, returned, and handed the officer the drugs. At trial, Davis testified that the officer solicited his help in purchasing crack, promising to “look out for” him. Davis claimed he led the officer to the building, took $40, purchased the crack inside, and gave it to the officer, receiving no payment for his services. He argued he was merely acting as an agent for the buyer.

    Procedural History

    Davis was indicted for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. At trial, he requested and received an agency defense instruction. He also requested a charge for criminal possession of a controlled substance as a lesser included offense, which was denied. He was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s ruling.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree as a lesser included offense of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, when an agency defense was properly submitted to the jury.

    Holding

    No, because it is theoretically possible to commit the crime of criminal sale of a controlled substance without, by the same conduct, committing the crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance. The agency defense does not alter this analysis.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the two-pronged test established in People v. Glover to determine whether a defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense charge. The first prong requires that it be theoretically impossible to commit the greater crime without committing the lesser. The Court emphasized that this determination is made by a “comparative examination of the statutes defining the two crimes, in the abstract” (Glover). Here, the court reasoned that one can “offer or agree to” sell drugs without having physical possession or control over them. The court dismissed the argument that the agency defense changes this analysis. The agency defense is an interpretation of the definition of “sell.” The Court stated, “Although ‘[r]eading the statute literally, any passing of drugs from one person to another would constitute a sale,’ we have held that ‘[o]ne who acts solely as the agent of the buyer cannot be convicted of the crime of selling narcotics’.” Because the agency defense is still a defense to sale, the Court reasoned that the Glover test remains applicable and an exception to the test is not warranted. As such, the Court affirmed the lower court’s conclusion. The dissenting opinion argued for an exception to the Glover test when the agency defense is invoked. The dissent contended that because a defendant asserting the agency defense essentially admits to possessing the drugs on behalf of the buyer, a charge of simple possession should be included to avoid coercing the jury into either acquitting a defendant who admits to criminal conduct or convicting them of a greater crime.

  • People v. Torres, 89 N.Y.2d 920 (1996): Establishing Constructive Possession in Drug Factory Cases

    People v. Torres, 89 N.Y.2d 920 (1996)

    Evidence beyond mere presence, indicating a defendant’s connection to a drug factory operation, can establish constructive possession of narcotics and weapons found within the premises.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for criminal possession of controlled substances and a weapon. The evidence established more than the defendant’s mere presence at the apartment. The jury could reasonably infer that the defendant was a trusted member of the drug operation and thus had constructive possession of the drugs, money, and weapons that were in plain view inside the apartment. The court also noted that because the jury could infer that some drugs were part of the drug factory’s supply, they could infer that all the contraband was controlled by the factory’s operatives.

    Facts

    Police charged the defendant with multiple counts of criminal possession related to controlled substances and weapons. The charges stemmed from evidence discovered in an apartment where a large cache of drugs, money, and weapons was found in plain view. A photograph of the defendant suggested a connection to the drug factory operation within the apartment.

    Procedural History

    The trial court submitted one count to the jury based on the drug factory presumption and the remaining eight counts on constructive possession. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions based on the theory of constructive possession. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish the defendant’s constructive possession of the narcotics and weapons found in the apartment.

    Holding

    Yes, because the evidence established more than the defendant’s mere presence at the apartment; it showed the defendant’s presence under a set of circumstances from which a jury could infer possession.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the trial evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant’s possession of all narcotics and weapons recovered. The court relied on the principle that possession can be inferred from circumstances indicating the defendant’s control over the contraband, citing People v. Tirado, 38 N.Y.2d 955, 956. In addition to the defendant’s photograph, the court reasoned that a reasonable jury could conclude that only trusted members of the operation would be allowed into an apartment containing a large quantity of drugs, money, and weapons in plain view. “In the particular facts of this case, the jury could also infer that, if the drugs to which the statutory presumption applied were part of the drug factory’s supply, all the contraband found must have been controlled by the factory’s operatives.” The court highlighted that the Appellate Division properly affirmed the convictions based on constructive possession.

  • People v. Cooper, 88 N.Y.2d 1057 (1996): Appellate Division’s Interest of Justice Review

    People v. Cooper, 88 N.Y.2d 1057 (1996)

    The New York Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division’s exercise of its interest of justice jurisdiction is beyond the review power of the Court of Appeals.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree. The Appellate Division initially modified the conviction, reducing it to the seventh degree due to a lack of proof that the defendant knew she possessed 500 milligrams of cocaine. The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted, noting the defendant hadn’t preserved her claim but could request the Appellate Division to apply its ‘interest of justice’ jurisdiction. Upon remittitur, the Appellate Division affirmed the fifth-degree conviction, declining to exercise its interest of justice authority. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Appellate Division’s exercise of its interest of justice jurisdiction is unreviewable.

    Facts

    Defendant was found to be in possession of cocaine. She was subsequently convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree, requiring possession of 500 milligrams or more. At trial, the prosecution presented evidence of possession but arguably not of the defendant’s knowledge of the weight of the drugs. The defendant did not object to the jury charge regarding the elements of the crime.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division modified the conviction, reducing it to criminal possession in the seventh degree. The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted for consideration of the facts, because the defendant had failed to preserve the argument about knowledge of the drug weight. On remittitur, the Appellate Division affirmed the original conviction. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s final decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division’s decision to affirm the conviction after remittitur, based on lack of preservation and declining to exercise its interest of justice jurisdiction, is reviewable by the Court of Appeals; and whether the Appellate Division failed to conduct a proper weight of the evidence review.

    Holding

    1. No, because the exercise by the Appellate Division of its interest of justice jurisdiction is beyond the review power of the Court of Appeals.

    2. No, because the Appellate Division is constrained to weigh the evidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged without objection by defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that its power to review decisions of the Appellate Division is limited by statute and precedent. Specifically, CPL 450.90(2) and the Court’s holding in People v. Cona, 49 N.Y.2d 26 (1979), establish that the Court of Appeals cannot review the Appellate Division’s discretionary exercise of its interest of justice jurisdiction under CPL 470.15(3). The Court further reasoned that because the defendant did not object to the trial court’s jury charge, the Appellate Division was correct to weigh the evidence in light of the elements as charged, which did not include knowledge of the specific quantity as an element. The Court quoted People v. Noble, 86 N.Y.2d 814, 815 (1995), stating “[T]he Appellate Division is constrained to weigh the evidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged without objection by defendant.” Because the jury charge, presented without objection, did not convey that knowledge of the precise quantity of cocaine was a specific element, the Appellate Division’s affirmance was appropriate. This case clarifies the limited scope of review available to the Court of Appeals regarding Appellate Division decisions based on interest of justice considerations and the importance of objecting to jury charges to preserve arguments on appeal.

  • People v. Macana, 84 N.Y.2d 173 (1994): Missing Witness Charge When Witness May Invoke Fifth Amendment

    84 N.Y.2d 173 (1994)

    A missing witness charge regarding a witness who may invoke their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is inappropriate unless the defendant verifies that the witness’s testimony would be self-incriminating and that they would likely invoke the privilege.

    Summary

    Macana was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon. He argued that he possessed the weapon temporarily and lawfully, having taken it from his suicidal, blind father. The prosecution requested a missing witness charge because Macana didn’t call his father to testify. The trial court granted the charge. Macana appealed, arguing that a missing witness charge is inappropriate when the witness might invoke the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that because Macana did not substantiate that his father would likely invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege, the missing witness charge was appropriate.

    Facts

    Police responded to a report of shots fired near Macana’s residence. They observed bullet holes in a window screen and garage door and found a spent round near the house. Macana consented to a search. Police observed Macana reaching toward a pile of clothes, and upon investigation, found a .45 caliber pistol. Macana claimed the gun belonged to his blind, depressed father, who had expressed suicidal intentions. Macana testified he took the gun from his father after hearing gunshots and hid it, but his father was not called to testify.

    Procedural History

    Macana was convicted in Supreme Court, Queens County. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a missing witness charge is appropriate when the uncalled witness is the defendant’s father, who could potentially incriminate himself if he testified, and the defendant has not provided verification that his father would invoke his Fifth Amendment right.

    Holding

    Yes, because where the defendant is the only source of proof that the uncalled witness would give favorable, self-incriminating testimony, some additional, non-prejudicial substantiation is needed to avoid a missing witness charge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on precedent establishing that once a defendant presents evidence, the standards for a missing witness charge apply. The party seeking the charge must show the opposing party failed to call a knowledgeable witness whose testimony would favor that party. The burden then shifts to the opposing party to explain the witness’s absence. If the uncalled witness were a co-defendant or accomplice likely to invoke the Fifth Amendment, a missing witness charge is inappropriate because the witness’s invocation casts doubt on whether they would testify favorably, and the witness is deemed unavailable. “[T]he witness should at least have been summoned and asked, for he may waive the privilege.”

    Where the defendant is the only source of proof the uncalled witness exists and that the witness’s testimony would be self-incriminating, further verification is required. Without it, a defendant could easily fabricate a story shifting blame. Requiring non-prejudicial substantiation balances the People’s interest in deterring perjury and the defendant’s interest in avoiding an unfavorable charge when a witness would likely refuse to testify. The court cited People v. Rodriguez, noting there was no “assertion by or on behalf of the witness that he would invoke the Fifth Amendment.” The Court also found no error in rejecting the defendant’s request for a missing witness charge for the officer who retrieved the gun, as his testimony would have been cumulative.

    The dissent argued that the People did not meet their initial burden of proving that the missing witness would naturally be expected to testify favorably to the defendant. Because the defendant’s father would undeniably have had to place himself in criminal jeopardy to materially support his son’s defense, an adverse inference charge was improper. “[W]here `the most likely result of calling * * * a witness would have been his refusal to testify on self-incrimination grounds’, the inference that the witness would have given testimony favorable to the party who otherwise would have naturally called him or her is negated.”

  • People v. Rivera, 82 N.Y.2d 697 (1993): Criminal Possession Requires Dominion and Control

    People v. Rivera, 82 N.Y.2d 697 (1993)

    To be convicted of criminal possession of stolen property, the prosecution must prove that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the property, mere presence is insufficient.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the evidence presented was insufficient to prove the defendant’s criminal possession of a stolen vehicle. While the defendant was aware the car was stolen, the prosecution failed to demonstrate that he exercised any dominion or control over it. The defendant was merely a passenger in the vehicle, and there was no evidence linking him to the theft or operation of the vehicle. The Court emphasized that “possess” requires more than physical presence; it necessitates the ability to exercise control over the property.

    Facts

    The defendant was found sitting in the passenger seat of a parked car. The car’s steering column was broken with exposed wires. Another individual occupied the driver’s seat. The driver’s side door lock and ignition switch were broken. A screwdriver was visible on the floor of the vehicle. The prosecution proved that the defendant knew the car was stolen.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding insufficient evidence of possession. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s presence as a passenger in a stolen vehicle, with knowledge that it was stolen, is sufficient to establish criminal possession of stolen property under New York Penal Law § 10.00 (8).

    Holding

    No, because the prosecution failed to present evidence demonstrating that the defendant exercised dominion or control over the stolen vehicle.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the statutory definition of “possess” as defined in Penal Law § 10.00 (8), which requires either “physical possession or otherwise to exercise dominion or control over tangible property.” The Court found that the prosecution’s evidence failed to satisfy this requirement. The mere presence of the defendant in the passenger seat of the stolen vehicle, even with knowledge that it was stolen, did not equate to exercising dominion or control. The Court highlighted the lack of evidence connecting the defendant to the vehicle’s theft or operation.

    The Court distinguished the defendant’s situation from scenarios where a defendant’s actions indicate control, such as driving the vehicle or having the keys. The Court cited prior cases, People v. Luter and People v. Gregory, reinforcing that mere presence is insufficient to establish possession. As the Court stated, “Here, there was no showing that defendant exercised dominion or control over the car… In these circumstances, defendant’s presence in the car cannot be equated with possession.” The absence of any evidence linking the defendant to the taking or operation of the vehicle was fatal to the prosecution’s case.

  • People v. Manini, 79 N.Y.2d 561 (1992): Establishing Constructive Possession of Contraband

    People v. Manini, 79 N.Y.2d 561 (1992)

    Mere presence in a public place, even one where contraband is in plain view, is insufficient to establish dominion and control over the contraband necessary for constructive possession.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed in part the Appellate Division’s order, finding insufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction for criminal possession of a controlled substance. The defendant was arrested while exiting a back room of a grocery store where cocaine was in plain view. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the defendant owned, rented, controlled, or had a possessory interest in the store or back room, or that he was involved in any drug-related activities there. The mere presence in the room, even with visible contraband, was insufficient to establish constructive possession.

    Facts

    Police officers entered a grocery store and observed the defendant and three other individuals exiting a back room, walking quickly toward the front exit. In the back room, contraband (cocaine) was in plain view. There was no evidence presented that the defendant owned, rented, or had any control or possessory interest in the grocery store or the back room itself. Furthermore, there was no evidence linking the defendant to any drug-selling or related operations within the store.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted on multiple counts, including criminal possession of a controlled substance. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented by the People was legally sufficient to establish that the defendant had constructive possession of the cocaine found in the back room of the grocery store.

    Holding

    No, because the People failed to establish that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the cocaine or the area where it was found. Mere presence in a room where contraband is visible is insufficient to prove constructive possession.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the requirements for establishing constructive possession. Constructive possession requires demonstrating dominion and control over the contraband itself or the area where the contraband was located. The Court emphasized that the prosecution failed to provide any evidence linking the defendant to the grocery store or the back room. Specifically, there was no proof of ownership, rental agreement, or any other possessory interest held by the defendant. Furthermore, the prosecution did not present evidence that the defendant was involved in any drug-selling activities occurring at that location. The Court distinguished this case from People v. Tejeda, where a statutory presumption of possession applied because the drugs were found in an apartment where the defendant was present. The Court cited People v. Headley, stating that “Presence in a public place does not itself prove dominion and control over contraband discovered there.” The court found the evidence insufficient to establish the defendant’s constructive possession of the cocaine, requiring vacatur of the conviction on those counts.

  • People v. Moschiano, 66 N.Y.2d 631 (1985): Establishing Knowledge of Forgery Through Circumstantial Evidence

    People v. Moschiano, 66 N.Y.2d 631 (1985)

    A defendant’s knowledge that an instrument is forged can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including their conduct and statements surrounding the attempted negotiation of the instrument.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether sufficient evidence existed to prove that the defendant, Moschiano, knew a check was forged when he attempted to cash it. The court found that circumstantial evidence, including Moschiano’s false statements about the check’s origin, his willingness to accept a significantly reduced amount, and his subsequent disposal of the check, supported the inference that he knew the check was forged. The court emphasized that when reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, it must do so in the light most favorable to the prosecution, with credibility left to the trier of fact.

    Facts

    Defendant Moschiano asked John Scivoletto to cash a $377 check made out to Richard Moschiano, claiming the payee was on vacation and had given him the check. Moschiano offered to accept only $300 for the check. Richard Moschiano testified that he did not endorse the check or authorize anyone else to do so. After Scivoletto refused, Moschiano tried to cash the check at a diner and a bar, offering a larger discount. Unsuccessful, he threw the check in a garbage can, where it was later found with the payee’s endorsement.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, vacated the sentence, and dismissed the indictment. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals. The defendant cross-appealed, challenging his sentencing as a second felony offender.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the defendant knew when he presented the check for cashing that it was forged.
    2. Whether the defendant was properly sentenced as a second felony offender.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because circumstantial evidence, including the defendant’s statements, conduct, and the payee’s testimony, supported the inference that the defendant knew the check was forged.
    2. Yes, because the defendant failed to challenge his prior second felony offender adjudication by direct appeal or post-judgment motion, rendering the issue no longer open for review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found sufficient evidence to infer Moschiano’s knowledge of the forgery. The court highlighted that when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a guilty verdict, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the People, and credibility is for the trier of fact to determine. The court reasoned that Moschiano’s statement that Richard Moschiano gave him the check, coupled with Richard Moschiano’s testimony that he did not endorse or authorize the endorsement, allowed the inference that Moschiano knew the endorsement was forged. The court further noted that Moschiano’s attempts to cash the check at a significant discount and his subsequent disposal of the check bolstered this inference. The court distinguished this case from People v. Green, noting the presence of sufficient evidence of knowledge, similar to People v. Johnson. Regarding the sentencing, the court held that since Moschiano did not challenge his prior second felony offender status through proper channels, he could not challenge it now.

  • People v. Cullen, 50 N.Y.2d 168 (1980): Establishing Geographical Jurisdiction for Possessory Crimes

    People v. Cullen, 50 N.Y.2d 168 (1980)

    For the crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance, jurisdiction requires that knowledge and possession occur simultaneously; the element of knowledge cannot occur before possession for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction.

    Summary

    Paul Cullen was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Nassau County lacked jurisdiction because the drug sale occurred in New York County. The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted, holding that evidence existed for the jury to find jurisdiction based on possession in a vehicle traveling through multiple counties. The court clarified that while a jury could find jurisdiction if the location of the crime was unknown and the crime occurred in a vehicle traveling through multiple counties, as per CPL 20.40(4)(g), the jury instructions were deficient, and also clarified that intent to possess formed in one county cannot confer jurisdiction if possession occurred in another. The court also noted that the defendant’s admission of guilt should have been suppressed because he was not provided counsel, because the defendant was arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant.

    Facts

    A confidential informant contacted Paul Cullen to purchase peyote. The informant and an undercover officer drove to Cullen’s Nassau County home, picked him up, and proceeded to New York County for the sale. In New York County, the officer paid Cullen for the drugs, and Cullen obtained the drugs. The three men then returned to Nassau County.

    Procedural History

    Cullen was indicted in Nassau County for criminal sale and possession of a controlled substance. His motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was denied. The jury found him guilty of second-degree criminal possession but not guilty of the other charges. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding that Nassau County lacked jurisdiction because the sale occurred in New York County. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether sufficient evidence existed for the jury to find that Nassau County had geographical jurisdiction over the offense of criminal possession of a controlled substance.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because there was evidence presented at trial that the defendant possessed the drugs in a private vehicle during a trip extending through both New York County and Nassau County.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division erred in finding no evidence to support Nassau County’s jurisdiction. The informant testified that the drugs were passed around in the car during the return trip to Nassau County, and the defendant had possession of them at one point. Therefore, the jury could have found that the offense of possession occurred in a vehicle traveling through multiple counties, satisfying CPL 20.40(4)(g). The court clarified the standard for CPL 20.40(4)(g), noting that its use is only appropriate when the location of the crime is unknown, in accordance with People v. Moore. The court emphasized that the trial court’s charge on jurisdiction, although potentially erroneous, became the law of the case because the defendant did not object. Regarding the element of intent, the court stated that for possession crimes, “knowledge” and “possession” must occur simultaneously. The court found the defendant’s admission of guilt inadmissible, stating that “a defendant cannot waive his rights in the absence of counsel after being arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant,” citing People v. Samuels. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division to determine whether the jury’s finding of jurisdiction was against the weight of the evidence. The court concluded that if jurisdiction is sustained, the defendant is entitled to a new trial due to the inadmissible confession.

  • People v. Coonan, 48 N.Y.2d 772 (1979): Jury Instruction Sufficiency for Criminal Possession

    People v. Coonan, 48 N.Y.2d 772 (1979)

    A trial court is not required to provide a duplicate or cumulative jury instruction on a legal principle if the principle has already been adequately conveyed to the jury.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision to overturn James Coonan’s convictions for assault and criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division reversed the lower court based on the belief that the judge didn’t instruct the jury properly when the defense requested a specific charge. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court wasn’t wrong to refuse the defendant’s instruction because the judge had already instructed the jury adequately on the issue of momentary possession, and a further instruction would have been cumulative. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division for consideration of other legal issues.

    Facts

    James Coonan was convicted of assault in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree in the trial court. During the trial, the defendant’s attorney requested a specific charge to the jury: that if they found Coonan picked up the gun from the ground and was immediately arrested, they must find him not guilty of criminal possession. The trial court declined to give this specific charge.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Coonan of assault and criminal possession. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction on both counts, holding that the trial court erred by failing to give the requested jury instruction. The People of the State of New York appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for determination of facts and consideration of other legal issues.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to provide the defendant’s requested jury instruction when it had already provided an instruction on the same legal principle.

    Holding

    No, because the requested charge was a duplicate or cumulative instruction on the issue of momentary possession, which had already been adequately addressed by the trial court’s prior instructions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court had already instructed the jury that “fleeting or momentary” possession was insufficient to support a conviction on the possession counts. Because the trial court had already addressed the issue of momentary possession, it was not error to refuse a duplicate or cumulative charge on the same subject. The court emphasized that the requested charge was explicitly connected to the possession counts, meaning that its rejection could not be grounds for reversing the assault conviction. The court also noted that the reversal at the Appellate Division was based on a single issue of law that was erroneously resolved, requiring the Appellate Division to address other legal issues upon remittal. The court implicitly recognized the trial court’s discretion in framing jury instructions, avoiding unnecessary repetition of legal principles already communicated to the jury. This ensures efficient trials without confusing jurors with redundant information. The court of appeals did not provide direct quotations.

  • People v. Johnson, 45 N.Y.2d 546 (1978): Jury Instructions on Lesser Included Offenses

    45 N.Y.2d 546 (1978)

    A trial court must instruct the jury on a lesser included offense if there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater offense, and a party requests the charge.

    Summary

    William Johnson was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court erred in refusing to submit to the jury the lesser included offense of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree. The Court reasoned that because the jury was free to accept or reject any part of the evidence presented, they could have reasonably found Johnson guilty of possession but not sale. This ruling reinforces the principle that juries must be given the option to convict on lesser charges when the evidence reasonably supports it, ensuring a fair trial and preventing potential overreach by the prosecution.

    Facts

    A confidential informant, working with a State Police Investigator, asked William Jackson if he knew anyone with drugs. Jackson directed them to Johnson. Jackson told Johnson the informant wanted to buy “a bundle” of heroin. Johnson agreed to supply the drugs and arranged a meeting. At the meeting, the investigator gave Johnson $125, and Johnson provided a bundle of heroin from under a child in his car. Johnson claimed he was asked to get drugs for Jackson and that Jackson supplied the heroin, possibly even handing it to the officer himself.

    Procedural History

    Johnson was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Johnson appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to submit the lesser included offense of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree to the jury. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to submit to the jury the lesser included offense of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, when the defense requested it and there was a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater offense.

    Holding

    Yes, because there was a reasonable view of the evidence presented at trial that could have supported a finding that Johnson was guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance, but not criminal sale. The jury is free to accept or reject any part of the evidence. Refusal to charge a lesser included crime is warranted only where ” ‘every possible hypothesis’ but guilt of the higher crime [is] excluded”.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on CPL 300.50, which dictates when a trial judge must charge the jury as to a lesser crime. The statute requires a request for the charge and a reasonable view of the evidence supporting a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater. The Court emphasized that a refusal to charge a lesser included crime is only warranted when every possible hypothesis but guilt of the higher crime is excluded, citing People v. Henderson, 41 N.Y.2d 233 (1976) and People v. Shuman, 37 N.Y.2d 302 (1975). The Court stated, “Equally well established is the jury’s freedom ‘to accept or reject part or all of the defense or prosecution’s evidence’” (quoting People v. Henderson). Viewing the evidence favorably to the defendant, the jury could have rejected the sale element while accepting the possession element. The court noted, “In such a situation, it cannot be said that every hypothesis ‘but guilt of the higher crime [was] excluded’”. Therefore, the trial court should have charged the jury as to the lesser included offense of possession of a controlled substance.