New York Law Review

Tag: Criminal Negligence

  • People v. S., 18 N.Y.3d 864 (2012): The Mens Rea Requirement for Reckless Assault

    18 N.Y.3d 864 (2012)

    To be convicted of reckless assault, the defendant must be aware of and consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk that their actions will cause the resulting harm; mere criminal negligence is insufficient.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, reducing the defendant’s conviction from reckless assault in the second degree to criminally negligent assault in the third degree. The defendant poured hot water on her nephew, resulting in burns. While the evidence supported a finding of criminal negligence, the Court of Appeals found that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial risk that the hot water would cause serious burns. The court remitted the case to the Appellate Division for a weight of the evidence review.

    Facts

    On August 12, 2007, Antoine S., the 15-year-old nephew of the defendant, was at the defendant’s home with his younger sister. Antoine and his sister were in the kitchen with the defendant, heating water on the stove for a bath. Antoine began splashing the defendant with water, and the defendant playfully splashed him back, stating that she was the “queen of pranks.” Antoine then went to another room to watch television. The defendant retrieved the pot of hot water from the stove and poured it on Antoine. Antoine sustained first- and second-degree burns as a result.

    Procedural History

    The County Court acquitted the defendant of intentional assault in the first degree but convicted her of reckless assault in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child. The defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the reckless assault conviction. The Appellate Division affirmed. The defendant further appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution presented legally sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted recklessly when she poured hot water on her nephew, resulting in burn injuries?

    Holding

    No, because the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that her behavior would cause Antoine’s skin to burn.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals analyzed the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the reckless assault conviction. The court referenced the standard for legal sufficiency, stating, “ ‘[a] verdict is legally sufficient when, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the People, there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found the elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt’ ” (quoting People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349 [2007]).

    The court then turned to the definition of “recklessly” under Penal Law § 15.05 (3), which states that a person acts recklessly when “ ‘[s]he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur . . . The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.’ ” The court found that while the evidence supported a finding of criminal negligence, it did not demonstrate that the defendant was “aware of” and “consciously disregarded” a known risk that her behavior would cause Antoine’s skin to burn.

    The Court remitted the case to the Appellate Division for a weight of the evidence review. Citing People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 646 (2006), the court noted the People conceded that the Appellate Division order “manifests a lack of application of that review power.”

  • People v. Caban, 14 N.Y.3d 369 (2010): Admissibility of License Suspension in Criminal Negligence Cases

    14 N.Y.3d 369 (2010)

    Evidence of a driver’s license suspension, particularly when the suspension is for conduct similar to that leading to a criminally negligent act, is admissible to demonstrate a gross deviation from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person.

    Summary

    Caban was convicted of criminally negligent homicide after fatally hitting a pedestrian while backing her car. Her driver’s license had been suspended three months prior due to a similar incident of unsafe backing. The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly admitted evidence of the license suspension because it was relevant to determining the extent of Caban’s negligence – specifically, whether her failure to perceive the risk constituted a gross deviation from reasonable care. The court reasoned that a jury could find it more unreasonable to drive carelessly when the state has already deemed the driver unfit to drive. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division to consider an unpreserved issue related to jury notes.

    Facts

    On January 2, 2003, Caban backed her car on Third Avenue in Manhattan, hitting and killing an elderly woman, Francesca Maytin, who was crossing the street. Three months prior, on October 3, 2002, Caban’s license was suspended after she attempted to evade a parking ticket by backing her car unsafely in a busy intersection, failing to yield to pedestrians. She received summonses for unsafe backing and failing to yield to pedestrians in a crosswalk. At the time of the fatal incident, Caban’s license remained suspended.

    Procedural History

    The People sought to admit evidence of the October 3 incident, but the trial court limited its admissibility to the fact of the license suspension. Caban was convicted of criminally negligent homicide. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the license suspension inadmissible. The Court of Appeals granted the People leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether evidence of a driver’s license suspension, resulting from prior similar conduct, is admissible to prove criminal negligence in a subsequent vehicular homicide case.

    Holding

    Yes, because the license suspension is relevant to determining whether the defendant’s failure to perceive a substantial risk constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding the license suspension was relevant to the issue of criminal negligence, defined by Penal Law § 15.05 (4) as failing to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk, where the failure constitutes a gross deviation from reasonable care. The court stated: “Thus the jury in this case had to consider not only whether defendant failed to perceive ‘a substantial and unjustifiable risk’ that her careless driving would kill someone, but also whether that failure was ‘a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.’ In other words, the jury not only had to decide whether defendant was at fault, but also had to consider how much she was at fault.” The court reasoned that the license suspension could demonstrate that Caban was more negligent, because “a jury could find that the license suspension should, if it did not keep defendant off the road, at least have prompted her to pay more attention to safety while she was driving.”

    The Court distinguished this case from situations where the prejudicial effect of evidence outweighs its probative value, noting that the suspension was for conduct strikingly similar to the fatal incident. The court noted that the evidence was not merely offered to show criminal propensity, but to show the extent of defendant’s negligence. The Court also remitted the case to the Appellate Division to consider a claim under People v. O’Rama regarding jury notes that had not been preserved in the lower court.

  • People v. Conway, 6 N.Y.3d 869 (2006): Defining Criminal Negligence with a Deadly Weapon

    People v. Conway, 6 N.Y.3d 869 (2006)

    Criminal negligence requires a defendant to fail to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk, and this failure must be a gross deviation from the standard of care a reasonable person would observe in the situation.

    Summary

    This case examines the level of negligence required for a criminal conviction, specifically for assault in the third degree involving a deadly weapon. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that sufficient evidence existed for a rational trier of fact to find that a police officer acted with criminal negligence when his gun accidentally discharged while attempting to apprehend a fleeing suspect. The Court emphasized that criminal negligence demands a gross deviation from reasonable care, more than ordinary civil negligence.

    Facts

    A 16-year-old, Dantae Johnson, was walking with a friend when an unmarked police car approached. An officer voiced a suspicion that Johnson was carrying a gun. Johnson ignored the officers and fled when two officers exited the car. Defendant Officer Conway pursued Johnson in the car, drove onto the sidewalk, unholstered his gun, and reached out the window to grab Johnson. While struggling to control both the car and Johnson, the gun discharged, severely wounding Johnson. No gun was found on Johnson.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Officer Conway of criminally negligent assault in the third degree. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment on the law for legal insufficiency and dismissed the indictment. One Justice dissented and granted the People permission to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether sufficient evidence existed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Officer Conway acted with criminal negligence when his gun discharged, resulting in injury to Dantae Johnson.

    Holding

    Yes, because a rational trier of fact could conclude that Officer Conway’s conduct constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care expected of a reasonable police officer in that situation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that criminal negligence requires a greater degree of carelessness than ordinary civil negligence. “The carelessness required for criminal negligence is appreciably more serious than that for ordinary civil negligence, and that the carelessness must be such that its seriousness would be apparent to anyone who shares the community’s general sense of right and wrong.” The court found that Officer Conway’s actions—simultaneously manipulating a gun with his finger on the trigger and the steering wheel while reaching out of the car to grab the suspect—created a substantial and unjustifiable risk. This conduct was deemed a “blameworthy conduct creat[ing] or contribut[ing] to a substantial and unjustifiable risk.” The court reasoned that a jury could rationally conclude that this was a gross deviation from the standard of care expected of a reasonable police officer. The dissent argued that the Appellate Division’s decision rested on a factual determination beyond the Court of Appeals’ review and that the evidence was insufficient to prove criminal negligence, as Conway’s conduct did not demonstrate an insensitivity to the interests and claims of others in society. The dissent cited People v. Boutin, 75 N.Y.2d 692 (1990), emphasizing that even strong evidence of ordinary negligence is insufficient for criminal negligence. “[E]ven strong evidence of negligence in the ordinary sense is not sufficient to support a verdict of criminal negligence. The evidence must rationally support a finding of what we called in Boutin ‘criminally culpable risk-creating conduct’.”

  • People v. Grogan, 88 N.Y.2d 819 (1996): Jury Instructions on Criminal Negligence Must Accurately State Elements

    People v. Grogan, 88 N.Y.2d 819 (1996)

    Jury instructions in a criminally negligent homicide case must accurately convey that a series of careless acts, taken in combination, are required to establish the “serious blameworthiness” or gross deviation from reasonable care necessary for a conviction, and an instruction suggesting that any single act is sufficient is erroneous.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of criminally negligent homicide. The Court of Appeals reviewed whether the trial court’s jury instructions accurately conveyed the elements of criminally negligent homicide, particularly regarding the defendant’s actions leading to the victim’s death. The court found that the trial court’s disjunctive charge, which suggested that the jury could convict if the defendant committed any one of several alleged acts, was erroneous. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. The dissent argued the jury charge was prejudicial and lowered the burden of proof.

    Facts

    The defendant was driving a motor vehicle and was involved in a collision that resulted in the death of Floyd Shepard. The prosecution alleged that the defendant was operating the vehicle after consuming alcohol, operating without sufficient rest, and/or operating without due regard to adverse weather conditions. The trial court instructed the jury that they could find the defendant guilty if she was operating a motor vehicle after consuming alcohol and/or operating without sufficient rest, and/or without due regard to adverse weather conditions.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of criminally negligent homicide in the trial court. The defendant appealed. The appellate division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court’s jury instructions accurately conveyed the elements of criminally negligent homicide, specifically whether the disjunctive charge suggesting that any single act by the defendant was sufficient for conviction was erroneous.

    Holding

    No, because the charge as a whole fairly instructed the jury on the correct principles of law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the disjunctive charge should have been avoided, the charge as a whole fairly instructed the jury on the correct principles of law. The court emphasized that criminal negligence requires a high degree of culpability, more than ordinary civil negligence. It cited People v. Boutin, 75 N.Y.2d 692 (1990), stating that “criminal liability cannot be predicated on every act of carelessness resulting in death [T]he carelessness required for criminal negligence is appreciably more serious than that for ordinary civil negligence.” The dissent argued that the instruction was prejudicial because it allowed the jury to convict if it found that the defendant committed any one of the alleged acts, which, standing alone, might not have been sufficient to establish criminal negligence. The dissent believed the jury charge lowered the burden of proof on the prosecution.

  • People v. Montalvo, 86 N.Y.2d 826 (1995): Duty to Charge Lesser Included Offense

    People v. Montalvo, 86 N.Y.2d 826 (1995)

    A defendant is entitled to a jury charge on a lesser included offense if (1) the additional offense is a lesser included offense and (2) there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser included offense but not the greater offense.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on criminally negligent homicide as a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree. The court reasoned that while the defendant intentionally stabbed the victim, a reasonable view of the evidence could suggest he was unaware that the stabbing would result in death, thus supporting a finding of criminal negligence rather than intentional manslaughter. The court also held that the defendant’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct during summation was unpreserved for review.

    Facts

    The defendant, Montalvo, stabbed the victim, Golofit. He was charged with manslaughter in the second degree. At trial, Montalvo requested that the judge also instruct the jury on criminally negligent homicide as a lesser included offense.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Montalvo’s request for a jury instruction on criminally negligent homicide. Montalvo was convicted of manslaughter in the second degree. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the lesser included offense. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether criminally negligent homicide is a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree.
    2. Whether there was a reasonable view of the evidence to support a finding that the defendant committed criminally negligent homicide but not manslaughter in the second degree.
    3. Whether the prosecutor’s remarks during summation were so prejudicial as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because it is undisputed that criminally negligent homicide is a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree.
    2. Yes, because a reasonable view of the record evidence supports a finding that defendant was not aware that stabbing Golofit would result in his death.
    3. No, because the issue was not properly preserved for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, agreeing that Montalvo was entitled to a jury instruction on criminally negligent homicide. The court reiterated the two-pronged test for entitlement to a lesser included offense charge: (1) the additional offense must be a lesser included offense, and (2) there must be a reasonable view of the evidence to support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser included offense but not the greater offense. The court found that both prongs were satisfied. First, it was undisputed that criminally negligent homicide is a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree (citing People v. Stanfield, 36 NY2d 467). Second, the court emphasized that the intentional nature of the stabbing did not preclude a finding of criminal negligence. The court stated, “In criminal negligence, a person acts with the requisite culpable mental state when such person fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the act in question will cause the statutorily described result (Penal Law § 15.05 [4]).” The court further clarified that “criminal negligence analysis focuses on the actor’s awareness of the risk that death will result from the act, not whether the underlying act is intentional.” Because a reasonable view of the evidence could suggest that Montalvo was unaware that stabbing Golofit would result in death, the instruction should have been given. Finally, the court held that Montalvo’s claim regarding the prosecutor’s summation was unpreserved because defense counsel did not object further or request a mistrial after the trial judge issued curative instructions. The court cited People v. Williams, 46 NY2d 1070, 1071, stating that under these circumstances, “the curative instructions must be deemed to have corrected the error to the defendant’s satisfaction”.

  • People v. Cabrera, 78 N.Y.2d 705 (1991): Criminal Negligence Requires Gross Deviation from Reasonable Care

    People v. Cabrera, 78 N.Y.2d 705 (1991)

    To be convicted of criminally negligent homicide, a defendant’s conduct must constitute a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation, demonstrating a failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for criminally negligent homicide and vehicular manslaughter. The court held that driving while intoxicated, off a public highway, into an unfamiliar field at high speed, without headlights, and crashing through a hedgerow constituted a gross deviation from reasonable care, sufficient to establish criminal negligence. The court further clarified that the vehicular manslaughter statute applies to driving under the influence regardless of location, even if the conduct wouldn’t violate the Vehicle and Traffic Law.

    Facts

    The defendant, Cabrera, while legally intoxicated, drove his motor vehicle at night off a public highway and into a farmer’s field he was unfamiliar with. He accelerated to approximately 50 miles per hour, intermittently operated the vehicle without headlights, and then forcefully drove through a hedgerow of small trees and shrubs. A passenger in the vehicle died as a result of the incident.

    Procedural History

    Cabrera was convicted of criminally negligent homicide and vehicular manslaughter in the second degree. He appealed, arguing that his conduct did not constitute criminal negligence and that the vehicular manslaughter statute did not apply to his actions because he was not driving on a public highway. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and Cabrera appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s actions constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe, thus establishing criminal negligence for the purposes of criminally negligent homicide.

    2. Whether the vehicular manslaughter statute applies to driving under the influence of alcohol regardless of whether the driving occurred on a public highway or other areas defined in the Vehicle and Traffic Law.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because driving while intoxicated, off a public highway, into an unfamiliar field at high speed, without headlights, and crashing through a hedgerow constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care a reasonable person would have observed.

    2. Yes, because the Penal Law does not incorporate the Vehicle and Traffic Law’s limitation to public roads and areas when defining vehicular manslaughter, thus applying the statute to driving under the influence regardless of location.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that criminal negligence requires a failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk, constituting a gross deviation from reasonable care. The court found that Cabrera’s actions met this standard, stating, “A rational juror could certainly have found that this conduct grossly deviated from the standard of care a reasonable person would have observed in a similar situation. Accordingly, the conduct was sufficiently blameworthy to sustain defendant’s conviction for criminally negligent homicide.”

    Regarding vehicular manslaughter, the court acknowledged that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 prohibits driving under the influence on public highways. However, Penal Law § 125.12, defining vehicular manslaughter, only references subdivisions (2), (3), and (4) of § 1192, which prohibit driving while intoxicated or under the influence of drugs, but does not incorporate subdivision (5) (now subd [7]), which limits the prohibition to public roads. The court reasoned that the Penal Law and Vehicle and Traffic Law serve different purposes, and the vehicular manslaughter statute applies to anyone causing a death by driving under the influence, regardless of location. The court emphasized, “With the understanding that penal laws have different purposes than vehicle and traffic laws, we conclude the vehicular manslaughter statute applies to any person causing a death by driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, regardless of location, even though there could be no separate punishment for such driving under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 where the driving did not occur on public roads or other areas defined in that section.”

  • People v. Domermuth, 76 N.Y.2d 512 (1990): Foreseeability and Causation in Criminal Negligence

    People v. Domermuth, 76 N.Y.2d 512 (1990)

    In criminal negligence cases, foreseeability of the specific manner in which an injury occurs is required to establish liability for manslaughter or criminally negligent homicide; however, for reckless endangerment, only awareness of a substantial risk of serious injury is required, regardless of the specific manner in which the injury occurs.

    Summary

    This case involves a criminal prosecution following the death of an employee at a petroleum transportation company. The employee died in an explosion while cleaning a tank trailer. The prosecution argued that unsafe conditions and improper practices at the facility caused the explosion. The Court of Appeals held that while there was sufficient evidence to establish the cause of the explosion, the prosecution failed to prove that the specific manner in which the explosion occurred was foreseeable for manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide charges. However, the Court reinstated the reckless endangerment charge, finding that the defendants’ awareness of the substantial risk of serious injury was sufficient, regardless of the unforeseeable sequence of events leading to the injury.

    Facts

    Domermuth Petroleum Equipment and Maintenance Corp. transported petroleum products. An employee was killed by an explosion of petroleum vapors while cleaning a tank trailer. The prosecution alleged multiple unsafe conditions at the facility. The fire investigator determined the explosion was caused by a spark from a nonexplosion-proof trouble light that was struck by water from a high-pressure washer.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were indicted on multiple charges, including manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, reckless endangerment, and environmental violations. The County Court dismissed most counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of homicide, reckless endangerment and environmental charges, relying on People v. Warner-Lambert Co. The Court of Appeals modified by reinstating the reckless endangerment charge.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence presented to the grand jury was sufficient to establish the foreseeability of the specific manner in which the explosion occurred, for the charges of reckless manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide.
    2. Whether the defendants’ conduct fell within an exemption to charges of endangering public health, safety, or the environment because they possessed a valid permit.
    3. Whether the evidence presented to the grand jury was sufficient to establish reckless endangerment, given that the specific manner of injury was not foreseeable.

    Holding

    1. No, because the prosecution did not demonstrate that the defendants should have foreseen the specific sequence of events leading to the explosion (the employee placing the trouble light in the path of the high-pressure washer). Therefore the counts of manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide were dismissed.

    2. Yes, because the defendants possessed a valid permit to transport petroleum wastes, and the release of vapors occurred during an activity (tank cleaning) that fell within the scope of their permit.

    3. Yes, because reckless endangerment only requires awareness of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of serious physical injury, regardless of whether the specific manner of injury was foreseeable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized the need for a higher standard of proof for criminal liability than for civil liability, citing People v. Warner-Lambert Co. To prove manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide, the prosecution needed to show that the defendants should have foreseen the specific manner in which the explosion occurred. The Court found that the evidence did not support the conclusion that the defendants should have foreseen their employee placing the unprotected trouble light in the path of the high-pressure washer. As to the environmental charge, the court noted that ECL 71-2720(1) exempts those with valid permits whose conduct complies with said permit. Regarding reckless endangerment, the Court distinguished it from the homicide charges. Reckless endangerment, under Penal Law § 120.20, only requires proof that the defendant “recklessly engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another person.” The Court reasoned that “[s]ince the occurrence of an injury is immaterial, the fact that the defendants could not have foreseen the manner in which this injury occurred does not negate their liability under the statute.” The Court concluded that the evidence of unsafe conditions, such as inadequate ventilation and numerous ignition sources, was sufficient to establish reckless endangerment.

  • People v. Kenny, 76 N.Y.2d 1026 (1990): Establishing Causation and Criminal Negligence in Drug Overdose Cases

    People v. Kenny, 76 N.Y.2d 1026 (1990)

    A defendant can be convicted of criminally negligent homicide for administering drugs to a person who subsequently dies from a drug overdose, if the defendant’s actions are a sufficiently direct cause of death and constitute a gross deviation from reasonable care.

    Summary

    Defendant Kenny was convicted of criminally negligent homicide and criminal injection of a narcotic drug after his girlfriend died of a cocaine overdose. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence was sufficient to prove that Kenny’s act of injecting the victim with cocaine was a direct cause of her death. The court reasoned that Kenny knew the victim intended to continue using cocaine, and his actions created a substantial and unjustifiable risk that grossly deviated from the standard of care a reasonable person would observe.

    Facts

    On the night of her death, Kenny injected his girlfriend with her first two doses of cocaine. Kenny knew that she planned to continue taking injections until their supply was exhausted. Although the girlfriend later administered her own injections, including the one immediately preceding her death, the prosecution’s expert witness testified that each injection, including those given by Kenny, contributed to her death.

    Procedural History

    Kenny was convicted in the trial court of criminally negligent homicide and criminal injection of a narcotic drug. He appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the guilty verdict. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and Kenny appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s actions were a sufficiently direct cause of the victim’s death to subject him to criminal liability for criminally negligent homicide.

    2. Whether the People proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with criminal negligence.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the jury could have reasonably found that defendant’s actions were a “sufficiently direct cause” of death, as the ultimate harm was foreseeable.

    2. Yes, because the jury could have rationally found that the defendant created “a substantial and unjustifiable risk” that his actions would contribute to the victim’s death, and that this risk constituted “a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a jury could reasonably conclude that Kenny’s actions were a “sufficiently direct cause” of his girlfriend’s death. The court cited People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 51 N.Y.2d 295, 307, and People v. Kibbe, 35 N.Y.2d 407, 412, emphasizing that the ultimate harm should have been foreseen as reasonably related to Kenny’s acts.

    Regarding criminal negligence, the court referenced Penal Law § 15.05 (4) and § 125.10, stating that the jury could have found Kenny created a substantial and unjustifiable risk by injecting the victim with cocaine when he knew she intended to continue taking injections. The court noted that this risk was of such nature and degree that Kenny’s failure to perceive it constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care a reasonable person would observe. The court reasoned that the defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s intent to continue drug use throughout the night made his actions a gross deviation from reasonable care, leading to criminal negligence.

    The court found no merit in the defendant’s remaining contentions and affirmed the order of the Appellate Division.

  • People v. Reyes, 75 N.Y.2d 590 (1990): Landlord’s Liability for Illegal Building Alterations Leading to Fatality

    People v. Reyes, 75 N.Y.2d 590 (1990)

    A landlord who participates in creating dangerous conditions on a property, retains control over the property, and has a continuing statutory duty to maintain the property safely, can be held criminally liable for injuries or death resulting from those conditions.

    Summary

    Defendant Reyes, the owner of a building, was indicted on multiple felonies after a fire in his building, illegally converted into a single-room occupancy (SRO) dwelling without permits, resulted in a tenant’s death and another’s injury. The illegal conversion created numerous Building Code violations, including electrical deficiencies causing the fire. The Court of Appeals held that the Grand Jury had legally sufficient evidence to indict Reyes because he participated in creating the fire-producing conditions and retained control of the premises despite a triple net lease that delegated operational responsibility to another party. Reyes’ actions and omissions, combined with his continuing statutory duty as the building’s legal owner, established a basis for criminal liability.

    Facts

    Reyes owned a building from March 1983 until the fire in December 1985. He illegally converted the commercial office space into an SRO dwelling without proper permits, leading to electrical deficiencies. From July 1983 to October 1985, Velez managed the building under a net lease, collecting rents and covering repairs, maintenance, taxes, and utilities. Velez sublet the building to Arias, who allowed Troncoso and Dume to manage a grocery store on the ground floor and collect residential rents for Velez. The fire originated in a second-floor kitchen due to overloaded electrical wiring, causing one death and one injury.

    Procedural History

    The Grand Jury indicted Reyes and Velez for manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, assault, and reckless endangerment. The trial court dismissed the indictment against both, citing a lack of evidence that either defendant created the illegal conditions or had control over the premises when the conditions were created. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the indictment. Only Reyes appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Grand Jury had legally sufficient evidence to indict Reyes for crimes related to the fire, given his participation in creating the dangerous conditions and his retained control over the building.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Grand Jury had enough evidence to conclude that Reyes participated in creating the fire-producing conditions and failed in his continuing duty as the legal owner to eliminate those conditions. The creation and continuance of the dangerous conditions presented a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death or injury in a fire.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the Grand Jury had sufficient evidence to indict Reyes based on his direct involvement in creating the dangerous conditions and his failure to fulfill his ongoing statutory duty as the building’s owner. The evidence showed numerous electrical hazards, including overloaded extension cords, exposed wires, and improperly grounded equipment. The court highlighted Reyes’ personal supervision of the illegal conversion of the building into an SRO, which violated multiple building codes and created a fire hazard. The Court cited Multiple Dwelling Law § 78, which states that “[e]very multiple dwelling * * * shall be kept in good repair” and “[t]he owner shall be responsible for compliance with the provisions of this section”. The Court found that even though Reyes leased the building, he retained control through the lease agreement, which required his consent for any alterations. Further, Reyes continued to receive rent, respond to tenant complaints, and carry insurance for the building. The Court also noted that Reyes received notice of electrical violations months before the fire and failed to address them. Taken together, these factors provided legally sufficient evidence for the Grand Jury to indict Reyes. The Court emphasized that the events leading to the fire were a “sufficiently direct cause” to justify holding Reyes criminally responsible, distinguishing this case from situations where the causal link is more attenuated (citing People v. Kibbe, 35 NY2d 407, 412-413). The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order reinstating the indictment.

  • People v. Haney, 75 N.Y.2d 944 (1990): Establishing Criminal Negligence in Vehicular Homicide

    People v. Haney, 75 N.Y.2d 944 (1990)

    To be found guilty of criminally negligent homicide, a driver’s failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death from operating a motor vehicle must be a gross deviation from the ordinary standard of care.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for criminally negligent homicide, holding that sufficient evidence existed to prove the defendant failed to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk when operating his vehicle, constituting a gross deviation from the standard of care. The defendant was driving at an excessive speed, ignored warnings to slow down, and struck a State Trooper. Unlike a related case decided the same day, *People v. Boutin*, the court found ample evidence of criminally culpable, risk-creating conduct by the defendant.

    Facts

    The defendant was driving at least 90 miles per hour in a 55 miles per hour zone. He was aware that he was traveling through a police radar area. The defendant observed a line of traffic backed up ahead on the Thruway, with cars halted on the side of the road. Despite a warning from his passenger to reduce speed, the defendant accelerated his vehicle. Subsequently, the defendant struck and killed a State Trooper.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was tried and convicted of criminally negligent homicide. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether sufficient evidence existed to support the jury’s verdict finding the defendant guilty of criminally negligent homicide based on his operation of a motor vehicle.

    Holding

    Yes, because the evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, sufficiently demonstrated that the defendant failed to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death would result from his operation of the motor vehicle and that this failure was a gross deviation from the ordinary standard of care.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied Penal Law §§ 125.10 and 15.05 (4), referencing the standard for criminally negligent homicide, which requires a failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk, constituting a gross deviation from the standard of care. The court distinguished this case from *People v. Boutin*, a case decided the same day, where the evidence of risk-creating conduct was insufficient. In *Haney*, the court found ample evidence of “criminally culpable risk-creating conduct.” The court emphasized the defendant’s excessive speed, awareness of the radar area, observation of stopped traffic, disregard for passenger warnings, and ultimate striking of the State Trooper as factors supporting the jury’s verdict. The court stated that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the People (see, People v Malizia, 62 NY2d 755, cert denied 469 US 932), is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict finding defendant guilty of criminally negligent homicide for failing to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death would result from his operation of a motor vehicle when that failure was a gross deviation from the ordinary standard of care (see, Penal Law §§ 125.10, 15.05 [4]; People v Ricardo B., 73 NY2d 228, 236).