New York Law Review

Tag: Criminal Mischief

  • People v. Defeo, 92 N.Y.2d 947 (1998): Criminal Mischief Requires Proof of Damage

    People v. Defeo, 92 N.Y.2d 947 (1998)

    To sustain a conviction for criminal mischief in the fourth degree under New York Penal Law § 145.00, the prosecution must prove that the defendant intentionally damaged tangible property.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of criminal mischief after she pulled a surveyor’s stake from the ground during a property dispute with her neighbor. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the criminal mischief conviction, holding that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence that the defendant’s actions caused any damage to tangible property, which is a necessary element of the crime under Penal Law § 145.00. While the extent of damage required is slight, some amount of damage must be proven.

    Facts

    During a dispute with her neighbor regarding the boundary line between their properties, the defendant removed a marker stake that a surveyor (hired by the neighbor) had placed on the property line. The defendant threw the stake several feet. The defendant was subsequently charged with criminal mischief in the fourth degree, disorderly conduct, and resisting arrest.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted by a Town Court jury of criminal mischief in the fourth degree and disorderly conduct. The County Court affirmed the Town Court’s judgment. A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted the defendant leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a conviction for criminal mischief in the fourth degree under New York Penal Law § 145.00 requires proof of damage to tangible property.

    Holding

    Yes, because Penal Law § 145.00 requires proof that the defendant intentionally damaged the property of another person without the right to do so or reasonable grounds to believe that she had such a right.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Penal Law § 145.00(1) requires proof of intentional damage to the property of another. While the extent of damage necessary to sustain a conviction for fourth-degree criminal mischief is slight, some amount of damage is required. The Court emphasized the absence of any evidence presented by the prosecution demonstrating damage to the property demarcated by the stake or to the stake itself. The Court stated, “In order for a defendant to be found guilty of criminal mischief in the fourth degree, the People must prove that defendant intentionally damaged the property of another person without the right to do so or reasonable grounds to believe that she had such a right (Penal Law § 145.00 [1]). While the extent of damage necessary to sustain a conviction for fourth degree criminal mischief is slight, some amount of damage is required…However, on this record, proof of damage is completely lacking.” The Court found the jury charge for disorderly conduct was proper. The Court modified the order by dismissing the criminal mischief charge and remitting to the Town Court for resentencing.

  • People v. Padgett, 60 N.Y.2d 142 (1983): Justification Defense and Unintentional Property Damage

    People v. Padgett, 60 N.Y.2d 142 (1983)

    A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on the justification defense even when they deny intending to cause the property damage that forms the basis of a criminal mischief charge, provided there’s a reasonable view of the evidence that the damage occurred as an emergency measure to avoid imminent injury.

    Summary

    Padgett was convicted of criminal mischief for breaking a bar’s emergency exit door. He argued he broke the door while trying to escape an altercation with the bar owner and requested a justification defense instruction, which the trial court denied. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a justification charge should be given if any reasonable view of the evidence supports it, even if the defendant claims the damage was unintentional. The Court reasoned that Padgett’s testimony, indicating he broke the door to avoid a perceived attack, warranted the instruction.

    Facts

    Defendant Padgett and his companions were in a bar. An incident occurred where the emergency exit door alarm was triggered. The bar owner testified that Padgett laughed and triggered the alarm again, then punched the door, shattering the glass. Padgett testified that after the alarm went off, the bar owner threatened him, and he, fearing an attack, pushed the emergency door hard to exit, unintentionally breaking the glass. An altercation ensued.

    Procedural History

    Padgett was convicted of criminal mischief in the trial court. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction. One Justice dissented, arguing that Padgett’s testimony supported a justification defense. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term’s order, ordering a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on the defense of justification for a criminal mischief charge when the defendant claims that the property damage was unintentional, but occurred while attempting to avoid an imminent private injury.

    Holding

    Yes, because if there is any reasonable view of the evidence under which the fact finder might have decided that the defendant’s actions were justified, the failure to charge the defense constitutes reversible error.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on Penal Law § 35.05(2), which states that conduct that would otherwise be an offense is justifiable when it “is necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent * * * private injury which is about to occur by reason of a situation occasioned or developed through no fault of the actor.” The court emphasized that the record must be viewed most favorably to the defendant when considering the adequacy of the jury charge, citing People v. Watts, 57 N.Y.2d 299, 301. Even though Padgett claimed he didn’t intend to break the glass, his testimony suggested he broke it while trying to avoid an attack by the bar owner. The court cited People v. Huntley, 87 A.D.2d 488, which held that a defendant’s claim of thwarting an attempted armed robbery was sufficient to require presenting the justification issue to the jury, even if the defendant never admitted intending to stab the victim. The court reasoned that the inconsistency between claiming unintentional damage and a justification defense shouldn’t deprive the defendant of the requested charge. The court stated, “Defendant’s explanation indicates that he engaged in conduct in avoidance of the perceived attack. That conduct forms the basis for a charge of criminal mischief. The fact that defendant never admitted that he intended to cause the resulting property damage should not disentitle him to a charge that his conduct might not have been criminal under the circumstances.”

  • People v. Washington, 18 N.Y.2d 366 (1966): Intent Requirement for Criminal Mischief

    People v. Washington, 18 N.Y.2d 366 (1966)

    To be guilty of criminal mischief under Penal Law § 1433, a defendant must have intended to damage the property, or at least intended to damage property, not merely committed an intentional act that resulted in unintended damage.

    Summary

    Washington was adjudged a youthful offender for malicious mischief after a trash can thrown by his codefendant, Cannon, damaged a parked car. The evidence suggested Cannon intended to hit the car’s occupants, not the car itself. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Penal Law § 1433, concerning willful property damage, requires intent to damage property, not merely an intentional act resulting in unintended damage. The court also found insufficient evidence to establish Washington as an accomplice.

    Facts

    The complaining witness, Williams, stopped his car to let a passenger out. Washington, Cannon, and another man were nearby. Washington shouted an epithet at Williams and swung at Williams’ companion. Williams exited the car on the other side. Cannon threw a litter basket at Williams, but it hit Williams’ car, causing damage. Washington then threw a pipe at Williams, striking him, but nothing thrown by Washington struck the car.

    Procedural History

    The Criminal Court of the City of New York found Washington guilty of malicious mischief. The Appellate Term affirmed by a 2-1 vote. A dissenting Justice cited People v. Hackley, arguing that intent to injure a person is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Penal Law § 1433. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Penal Law § 1433, which penalizes a person who “unlawfully and wilfully destroys or injures any real or personal property of another,” requires proof that the defendant intended to damage the property, or whether it is sufficient to show that the defendant willed the act that caused the damage, even if the damage was not intended.
    2. Whether, given that Cannon threw the litter basket that damaged the car, there was sufficient evidence to find Washington an accomplice to the crime of damaging the automobile.

    Holding

    1. No, because in the context of § 1433, “wilfully” includes and requires the element of intent to do the damage complained of, or at least an intent to damage property.
    2. No, because the proof was insufficient to establish the charged offense as to either Cannon or Washington.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the term “wilfully” in § 1433 requires intent to cause the damage, or at least an intent to damage property. The court noted the severe penalties associated with the statute, including a long term of imprisonment for damages exceeding $250 and liability for treble damages in a civil action. The court found it unlikely that the legislature intended such severe penalties for unintentional acts where the perpetrator intended to assault someone but missed and damaged property. The court stated, “In its context in section 1433 the word ‘wilfully’ would seem to include and require the element of intent to do the damage complained of, or at least an intent to damage property.” The court suggested that the appropriate remedy for unintentional damage in such a situation is a civil action for damages.

    Regarding Washington’s potential liability as an accomplice, the court stated that Washington could only be criminally liable if there was enough proof to justify finding him an accomplice. The court referenced People v. Kupperschmidt, 237 N.Y. 463, 465, stating that accomplice liability requires showing that the defendant has taken a guilty part in the commission of the crime. However, because the proof was insufficient to establish the charged offense as to either Cannon or Washington, the court declined to definitively rule on the accomplice issue.

    Judges Scileppi and Keating concurred in the reversal, but solely on the ground that Cannon alone caused the damage and there was insufficient evidence to prove that Washington was Cannon’s accomplice. They explicitly stated their disapproval of the holding in People v. Hackley, indicating that if there had been sufficient proof of accomplice liability, they would have voted for affirmance, notwithstanding the Hackley decision.