New York Law Review

Tag: Criminal Law

  • People v. Thompson, 21 N.Y.3d 557 (2013): Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Peremptory Challenges

    People v. Thompson, 21 N.Y.3d 557 (2013)

    A defense attorney’s failure to use a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror who had a long-standing friendship with the prosecuting attorney does not automatically constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, especially if the overall fairness of the trial was not demonstrably impaired.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of manslaughter after a trial where a juror was seated who had a 40-year friendship with the District Attorney. Defense counsel challenged the juror for cause, but the challenge was denied. Despite having peremptory challenges available, counsel did not use one to remove the juror. The New York Court of Appeals held that the defense counsel’s failure to use a peremptory challenge, while questionable, did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel because the defendant failed to show that the fairness of the trial was impaired. The Court emphasized that a single error by otherwise competent counsel must be egregious and prejudicial to warrant reversal.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with murder. During jury selection, a prospective juror, William Peters, disclosed that he had been friends with the District Attorney for over 40 years, knew his wife, and socialized with him occasionally. Peters stated that the friendship would not affect his ability to be a fair and impartial juror. Defense counsel questioned Peters, who stated he had known the District Attorney to be wrong before.

    Procedural History

    The defense challenged Peters for cause, which the trial court denied. The defense did not use a peremptory challenge to remove Peters, who then sat on the jury. The jury acquitted the defendant of second-degree murder but convicted him of manslaughter. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether defense counsel’s failure to exercise a peremptory challenge against a prospective juror who had a long-standing friendship with the prosecuting attorney constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, thus depriving the defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant failed to demonstrate that the fairness of the trial was impaired by the juror’s presence, and the attorney’s decision, while potentially questionable, did not constitute an egregious and prejudicial error that deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the defense counsel’s decision not to use a peremptory challenge was questionable, especially considering the potential for bias or the lost opportunity to preserve the for-cause challenge for appeal. However, the Court reasoned that defense counsel may have had strategic reasons for keeping Peters on the jury, such as believing Peters would be favorable to the defense or would bend over backwards to be fair. The Court emphasized that to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on a single error, the defendant must show that the error was so serious that it deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial. Citing People v. Turner, the Court stated that such error must be “a defense as clear-cut and completely dispositive as a statute of limitations.” Here, the Court held that the relationship between the juror and the prosecutor, while raising concerns, did not reach that level of egregiousness. While it might have been wiser for the trial judge to excuse Peters, the Court found it debatable whether the court committed reversible error. The Court highlighted the lack of evidence showing the juror’s presence prejudiced the defendant. Thus, the Court concluded that the defense counsel’s representation, taken as a whole, was not ineffective.

  • People v. Rudolph, 22 N.Y.3d 497 (2013): Court’s Duty to Determine Youthful Offender Status

    People v. Rudolph, 22 N.Y.3d 497 (2013)

    A sentencing court has a mandatory duty to determine whether an eligible youth should receive youthful offender status, regardless of whether the defendant requests it or waives the right to be considered for it.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a sentencing court “must” determine whether an eligible youth should be treated as a youthful offender (YO), even if the defendant doesn’t request it or attempts to waive the right. Defendant Rudolph, a 17-year-old, pleaded guilty to felony drug possession and purportedly waived his right to appeal. The prosecutor stated YO treatment was off the table due to the crime’s severity. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s affirmance, overruling its prior decision in People v. McGowen. The Court reasoned that the statute’s use of “must” reflects a policy choice that a YO determination is required in every eligible case, emphasizing the value of a judicial assessment of a young person’s potential for rehabilitation.

    Facts

    Defendant Rudolph, 17 years old at the time, was charged with felony drug possession. He pleaded guilty to third-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance. During the plea, the prosecutor stated that youthful offender treatment was not an option due to the crime’s seriousness, to which neither the defendant nor the court responded. At sentencing, the court did not address Rudolph’s eligibility for youthful offender status.

    Procedural History

    The County Court sentenced Rudolph to five years in prison plus two years of post-release supervision. On appeal, Rudolph argued that the sentencing court erred by not considering him for youthful offender treatment. The Appellate Division affirmed, stating Rudolph waived his right by failing to request YO consideration. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a sentencing court is required to determine if an eligible youth should receive youthful offender status, even if the defendant does not request it or attempts to waive the right.

    Holding

    Yes, because CPL 720.20(1) mandates that the court “must” determine whether an eligible youth is a youthful offender, reflecting a policy choice that this determination be made in every eligible case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals interpreted CPL 720.20(1), which states that upon conviction of an eligible youth, the court “must” determine whether the youth is a youthful offender. The Court found this mandatory language reflects a deliberate policy choice by the legislature. The Court reasoned that while defendants can typically waive rights, the opportunity for a fresh start without a criminal record, based on a judge’s assessment of rehabilitation potential, is too valuable to be sacrificed in plea bargaining. The court acknowledged potential concerns about prosecutors being less willing to offer plea bargains but noted that prosecutors can still oppose YO treatment and, in unusual situations, bargain for the right to withdraw consent to the plea if YO treatment is granted. The court explicitly overruled People v. McGowen, which had held that a defendant waives the right to YO status by not requesting it. The court limited the holding’s impact to cases still on direct review, preventing collateral attacks on already final sentences. The court clarified that the decision does not allow defendants to withdraw their guilty pleas, as the plea was not rendered unknowing or involuntary by the court’s interpretation of the statute.

  • People v. Ippolito, 20 N.Y.3d 607 (2013): Agent’s Authority and Criminal Possession of a Forged Instrument

    People v. Ippolito, 20 N.Y.3d 607 (2013)

    An instrument is not forged when an agent, acting under a valid power of attorney, signs the principal’s name, even without indicating the principal-agent relationship, because the agent is authorized to execute the instrument.

    Summary

    Gerard Ippolito, an accountant with power of attorney for Katherine M. L., was convicted of grand larceny and criminal possession of a forged instrument (CPFI) for allegedly stealing from her. The prosecution argued that Ippolito committed forgery by signing Katherine M. L.’s name on checks without indicating he was acting as her agent under a power of attorney (POA). The New York Court of Appeals reversed the CPFI convictions related to the checks, holding that because Ippolito had the authority to sign Katherine M. L.’s name, the checks were not forged. The court affirmed the remaining convictions, finding the defendant failed to preserve his objection to the judge’s response to a juror question.

    Facts

    Katherine M. L. granted Gerard Ippolito a durable general power of attorney, giving him broad authority over her financial affairs. Ippolito opened an escrow account into which Katherine M. L.’s income was deposited. He then allegedly stole over $696,000 by writing checks to Katherine M. L., endorsing them in her name, and depositing the funds into his own accounts. Ippolito did not indicate on the checks that he was signing as an agent under the POA.

    Procedural History

    Ippolito was indicted on multiple counts of grand larceny and CPFI. He was convicted by a jury on most counts. The Appellate Division reversed the CPFI convictions related to the checks, vacated the restitution order, and otherwise affirmed. The dissenting Justice granted the People leave to appeal, and a Judge of the Court of Appeals granted Ippolito permission to appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an agent with power of attorney commits forgery when signing the principal’s name on a check without indicating the principal-agent relationship.
    2. Whether the trial judge committed reversible error by answering a juror’s question without first consulting with counsel.

    Holding

    1. No, because the agent was authorized to sign the principal’s name by virtue of the power of attorney.
    2. No, because Ippolito’s counsel failed to object to the judge’s action at trial, thus failing to preserve the issue for appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a person is guilty of CPFI when they utter or possess a forged instrument with knowledge that it is forged and with intent to defraud. An instrument is “forged” when it is “falsely made, completed, or altered.” A written instrument is “falsely made” if it purports to be an authentic creation of its ostensible maker, but the ostensible maker, if real, did not authorize the making or drawing of the instrument. The court distinguished this case from People v. Shanley, where an attorney falsely acknowledged that his client had personally signed a mortgage satisfaction. Here, Ippolito had the power to sign Katherine M. L.’s name, and the checks were not forgeries because Ippolito’s actions were authorized by the POA. The court cited precedent stating that the writing of the principal’s name alone is sufficient to bind the principal, even if the agent doesn’t add their own name as agent. Addressing the juror question, the court found that Ippolito’s attorney failed to object when the judge answered the question without consulting the parties, thereby failing to preserve the issue for appellate review. The court noted, “Counsel must be afforded an opportunity to suggest a meaningful response to any jury question arising during deliberations.” However, because the objection was not timely, the court declined to reverse the remaining convictions.

  • People v. Handy, 20 N.Y.3d 663 (2013): Entitlement to Adverse Inference Charge for Destroyed Evidence

    People v. Handy, 20 N.Y.3d 663 (2013)

    When a defendant in a criminal case, acting with due diligence, demands evidence that is reasonably likely to be of material importance, and that evidence has been destroyed by the State, the defendant is entitled to an adverse inference charge.

    Summary

    Handy, a jail inmate, was convicted of assaulting a deputy sheriff. A video camera recorded part of the initial altercation leading to the assault, but the video was destroyed before trial pursuant to jail policy. Handy requested an adverse inference charge, arguing the video’s destruction prejudiced his defense. The trial court denied the request for the counts related to the initial altercation, but granted it for a later count. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Handy was entitled to an adverse inference charge because he requested potentially material evidence with reasonable diligence, and the State destroyed it. This decision emphasizes the State’s responsibility to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence and provides a remedy when that duty is breached.

    Facts

    Handy, an inmate, was involved in an altercation with Deputy Saeva after refusing to hand over non-regulation sandals and boxer shorts. Saeva claimed Handy initiated the fight, injuring Saeva’s hand. Deputy Schliff intervened to escort Handy away, and Schliff alleges that Handy kicked him, resulting in a thumb injury. A video camera recorded a portion of the initial altercation with Saeva. The video was destroyed per jail policy after 30 days, before Handy was indicted. Handy requested the video’s preservation, but the request was not specifically focused on video of the November incidents until trial.

    Procedural History

    Handy was charged with three counts of assault. He was acquitted of assaulting Saeva but convicted of assaulting Schliff. The trial court granted an adverse inference charge for one count, but not for the counts related to the initial altercation with Saeva. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, stating Handy’s claim that the video was exculpatory was speculative. The Court of Appeals reversed, ordering a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant is entitled to an adverse inference charge when they requested evidence reasonably likely to be material, and that evidence was destroyed by the State?

    Holding

    Yes, because under New York law of evidence, a permissive adverse inference charge should be given where a defendant, using reasonable diligence, has requested evidence reasonably likely to be material, and where that evidence has been destroyed by agents of the State.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals declined to address the constitutional issues or align itself directly with Arizona v. Youngblood, focusing instead on the evidentiary question of whether an adverse inference charge was warranted. The court adopted the approach taken in Cost v. State, emphasizing that such a charge is appropriate when the defendant diligently requests material evidence that the State destroys. The court reasoned that an adverse inference charge mitigates the harm to the defendant caused by the loss of evidence, without necessarily terminating the prosecution. Moreover, the rule incentivizes the State to preserve evidence. The court stated, “[A]t least as important, the rule gives the State an incentive to avoid the destruction of evidence. It is surely desirable to raise the consciousness of State employees on this subject.” The Court analogized the adverse inference charge to a “missing witness” instruction. The Court found that the video, though directly relevant to the assault on Saeva (count one), was also relevant to the subsequent assault on Schliff (count two) because it would shed light on whether Handy was a violent aggressor. Therefore, the court concluded that Handy was entitled to the adverse inference charge for all counts. The dissent is not noted because there was none.

  • People v. McGee, 20 N.Y.3d 513 (2013): Sufficiency of Evidence and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

    People v. McGee, 20 N.Y.3d 513 (2013)

    A defendant is not entitled to reversal of a conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise sufficiency arguments that are not clear-cut and dispositive.

    Summary

    McGee was convicted as an accomplice of reckless endangerment and attempted murder. The prosecution argued McGee drove the getaway car while his codefendant fired shots at civilians and a police officer. McGee appealed, arguing the evidence was insufficient and his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise certain arguments. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding there was sufficient evidence to corroborate McGee’s admission and that his counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise arguments that were not clearly dispositive in his favor. The court emphasized that the defense counsel mounted a vigorous defense and that strategic reasons existed for the challenged omissions.

    Facts

    McGee drove a Chevy Equinox while Carr fired shots at civilians and homes. During a high-speed chase, McGee swerved the car, allowing Carr to shoot at Officer Clark. Carr fired two or three shots at Clark, with one bullet hitting the patrol car. McGee and Carr abandoned the vehicle and were apprehended while fleeing on foot. A handgun was found nearby with Carr’s DNA on it.

    Procedural History

    McGee and Carr were jointly tried and convicted of reckless endangerment and attempted murder. McGee appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing insufficient evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. McGee then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to support McGee’s conviction.
    2. Whether McGee was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to move to dismiss the indictment based on certain sufficiency of evidence claims and other strategic decisions.

    Holding

    1. No, because there was ample independent evidence that a crime was committed, and McGee’s statement was not the only evidence connecting him to the crime.
    2. No, because the arguments not raised by defense counsel were not clear-cut and dispositive in McGee’s favor, and there may have been strategic reasons for counsel’s actions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 60.50 only requires “some proof, of whatever weight, that a crime was committed by someone” to corroborate a confession. Here, eyewitness testimony and police accounts provided ample independent evidence of the crimes. The court emphasized that a failure to make a significant argument can only lead to a finding of ineffective assistance “when the error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial as to compromise a defendant’s right to a fair trial” (People v. Caban, 5 N.Y.3d 143, 152 [2005]).

    The court found that the sufficiency arguments McGee claimed his attorney should have raised were not clear-cut and dispositive. The court referenced People v. Cabassa, 79 N.Y.2d 722 (1992) to show precedent existed that undermined the argument that there was insufficient evidence of intent to kill or a shared purpose. The court also noted that the attempt to distance McGee from Carr’s actions may have been a strategic decision, even though it ultimately failed. The court noted, “a reviewing court must avoid confusing true ineffectiveness with mere losing tactics and according undue significance to retrospective analysis” (People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708, 712 [1998]).

  • People v. Martinez, 22 N.Y.3d 972 (2013): Depraved Indifference Murder Requires Proof of Culpable Mental State

    People v. Martinez, 22 N.Y.3d 972 (2013)

    A conviction for depraved indifference murder requires proof of a culpable mental state, and is not established where the evidence points to an intentional killing.

    Summary

    Martinez was convicted of depraved indifference murder for fatally shooting Lee after an altercation. The New York Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, vacating the depraved indifference murder conviction and dismissing that count of the indictment. The Court held that the evidence presented, which indicated Martinez obtained a gun and fired multiple shots at close range after chasing Lee, was inconsistent with depraved indifference murder, which requires a culpable mental state distinct from intent to kill. The court remitted for resentencing and granted the People leave to present a charge of manslaughter to a new grand jury.

    Facts

    Defendant Martinez, a drug dealer, argued with Lee, a prospective drug buyer. The argument escalated into a physical fight. Martinez retrieved a gun, chased Lee into a building, and fired four or five shots at him. Lee died from a gunshot wound to the chest, and a bystander was also wounded when Lee attempted to use him as a shield.

    Procedural History

    Martinez was indicted on charges of intentional murder, depraved indifference murder, assault, and weapons offenses in 1991. He was a fugitive until 1995, was tried, and the trial court denied Martinez’s motion to dismiss the depraved indifference murder count. The jury acquitted Martinez of intentional murder but convicted him of depraved indifference murder, assault, and criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. A dissenting Appellate Division Justice granted Martinez leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to establish Martinez’s guilt of depraved indifference murder.
    2. Whether the defendant adequately preserved the argument that a blatantly intentional killing cannot constitute depraved indifference murder.

    Holding

    1. Yes, the evidence was insufficient.
    2. Yes, the defendant adequately preserved his argument.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that its jurisprudence on depraved indifference murder had evolved, shifting from an objective degree-of-risk standard to requiring a culpable mental state. The court noted its prior holding in People v. Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d 288 (2006), which explicitly overruled People v. Register, 60 N.Y.2d 270 (1983) and People v. Sanchez, 98 N.Y.2d 373 (2002), clarifying that “depraved indifference to human life” is a culpable mental state. The court emphasized that intent to kill and depraved indifference are incompatible states of mind. A point-blank shooting, the court stated, is ordinarily not considered depraved indifference murder. The court found Martinez’s actions inconsistent with depraved indifference, which requires indifference to the result. The court also found that Martinez adequately preserved his argument by moving to dismiss the depraved indifference murder count at trial, arguing that the evidence pointed to intentional conduct rather than reckless disregard.

  • People v. Solomon, 20 N.Y.3d 91 (2012): Disqualification Due to Concurrent Representation of Witness

    People v. Solomon, 20 N.Y.3d 91 (2012)

    A criminal defendant is deprived of effective assistance of counsel when their attorney concurrently represents a prosecution witness with conflicting interests, absent a valid waiver, regardless of the attorney’s apparent performance.

    Summary

    Solomon was convicted of sex offenses against his daughter. His attorney also represented a police officer, Kuebler, who testified against him regarding a confession. Although Solomon purportedly waived the conflict, the waiver was deemed invalid due to an inadequate inquiry. The New York Court of Appeals reversed Solomon’s conviction, holding that the concurrent representation of Solomon and a key prosecution witness with conflicting interests constituted a denial of effective assistance of counsel, irrespective of the attorney’s apparent competence during cross-examination. The Court emphasized the inherent conflict in such a situation and the defendant’s right to an attorney with undivided loyalty.

    Facts

    Solomon was charged with multiple sex offenses against his daughter. During the investigation, he made a partial confession to Detectives Smith and Kuebler. Before the Huntley hearing regarding the confession’s voluntariness, Solomon’s attorney disclosed that she also represented Detective Kuebler in an unrelated civil matter. Solomon stated he waived any conflict. Kuebler testified at the hearing and trial, recounting Solomon’s confession to having sex with his daughter. The motion to suppress the statement was denied.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Solomon. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding the waiver inadequate but concluding that the conflict did not affect the defense. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel when his attorney simultaneously represented a prosecution witness whose interests conflicted with those of the defendant, and whether the defendant validly waived that conflict.

    Holding

    Yes, because the attorney’s concurrent representation of the defendant and a prosecution witness with adverse interests, without a valid waiver, constitutes a denial of effective assistance of counsel, regardless of the attorney’s apparent performance. The waiver was invalid because the trial court’s inquiry was insufficient to ensure the defendant understood the risks.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found the trial court’s inquiry into the conflict of interest inadequate to establish a valid waiver, as it did not fully inform Solomon of the potential risks. The Court distinguished between potential and actual conflicts of interest. While a mere potential conflict may not always require reversal, an actual conflict, where the attorney simultaneously represents clients with opposing interests, does. Here, an actual conflict existed because Kuebler’s testimony about Solomon’s confession directly opposed Solomon’s interest in discrediting that testimony. The court stated, “[a] defendant is denied the right to effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment when, absent inquiry by the court and the informed consent of defendant, defense counsel represents interests which are actually in conflict with those of defendant.” The Court emphasized that when an actual conflict exists and is not waived, prejudice is presumed; the defendant need not show that the attorney’s performance was deficient. The court noted the “very awkward position” of an attorney subject to conflicting loyalties and reaffirmed a defendant’s right to an attorney whose paramount responsibility is to that defendant alone. Prior cases finding no ineffective assistance involved only potential, not actual, conflicts, or successive, not concurrent, representation. The court concluded that the simultaneous representation of adverse interests, absent a valid waiver, inherently deprives the defendant of effective assistance of counsel.

  • People v. Colville, 17 N.Y.3d 20 (2011): Allocating Decision-Making Authority on Lesser Included Offenses

    17 N.Y.3d 20 (2011)

    The decision of whether to request a jury charge on lesser-included offenses is a matter of strategy and tactics that ultimately rests with defense counsel, not the defendant.

    Summary

    Delroy Colville was convicted of second-degree murder. At trial, his attorney requested that the judge submit lesser-included offenses of first- and second-degree manslaughter to the jury, believing it was a sound trial strategy. However, Colville objected, and the judge deferred to Colville’s wishes and did not include the lesser-included offenses. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the decision to request a jury charge on lesser-included offenses is a strategic one that falls within the purview of defense counsel, not the defendant. This decision emphasizes the attorney’s role as the guiding hand in trial strategy, ensuring defendants receive the benefit of counsel’s expertise.

    Facts

    On October 28, 2004, Colville stabbed and killed Gregory Gardner, and injured Carl Jones in a shared residence. Colville claimed self-defense, alleging Gardner attacked him first. Witnesses presented conflicting accounts, some suggesting Colville was the aggressor. After the incident, Colville hid the knife and was later arrested.

    Procedural History

    Colville was indicted for second-degree murder and second-degree assault. At trial, the defense requested a justification charge and submission of lesser-included offenses of manslaughter. The trial judge initially hesitated but agreed, then ultimately deferred to Colville’s objection to including the lesser offenses. The jury convicted Colville of murder and acquitted him of assault. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the decision to request a jury charge on lesser-included offenses is a strategic decision entrusted to the attorney, or a fundamental decision reserved to the accused?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the decision is one of trial strategy, best left to the expertise of counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reviewed conflicting authorities and commentary on the allocation of decision-making authority between attorney and client. It noted that while the American Bar Association (ABA) initially suggested the defendant should decide on lesser-included offenses, it later revised its stance. The court observed that most jurisdictions now consider this a strategic decision for the attorney. The court emphasized that CPL 300.50 allows either party to request a lesser-included offense instruction when a reasonable view of the evidence supports it. The court reasoned that this decision is unlike pleading guilty or asserting an extreme emotional distress defense, which are exclusively the defendant’s prerogative. The Court stated, “[I]t makes little sense to hold that the defendant personally has the last say about an issue when the defense as a whole does not.” The court found the trial judge erred by deferring solely to Colville’s wishes, denying him the benefit of his counsel’s judgment. “By deferring to defendant, the judge denied him the expert judgment of counsel to which the Sixth Amendment entitles him.” The court concluded that this error was not harmless, as the jury might have convicted Colville of manslaughter instead of murder had the lesser-included offenses been submitted. The conviction was reversed and a new trial was ordered.

  • Dombrowski v. Bulson, 19 N.Y.3d 347 (2012): Recovery of Nonpecuniary Damages in Criminal Legal Malpractice

    Dombrowski v. Bulson, 19 N.Y.3d 347 (2012)

    In legal malpractice actions, even those arising from criminal proceedings, recovery is limited to pecuniary damages; nonpecuniary damages, such as those for loss of liberty, are not recoverable.

    Summary

    Dombrowski sued his former criminal defense attorney, Bulson, for legal malpractice after his conviction for attempted rape and related charges was vacated on habeas corpus due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Dombrowski sought nonpecuniary damages for the loss of liberty during his incarceration. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that nonpecuniary damages are not recoverable in legal malpractice actions, even when the malpractice arises from a criminal case and results in imprisonment. The Court emphasized that allowing such recovery would negatively impact the defense bar and the criminal justice system.

    Facts

    Dombrowski was convicted of attempted rape, sexual abuse, and endangering the welfare of a child in 2000. He was incarcerated from January 17, 2001, until July 19, 2006, and then served a period of post-release supervision. Dombrowski filed a motion to vacate his conviction, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel by Bulson, his trial attorney, which was denied. He subsequently sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, which was conditionally granted based on errors by defense counsel that affected the victim’s credibility. The indictment was eventually dismissed, and Dombrowski was not re-prosecuted.

    Procedural History

    Dombrowski sued Bulson for legal malpractice in Supreme Court, which granted summary judgment to Bulson, dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court’s order, reinstating the portion of the complaint seeking nonpecuniary damages. The Appellate Division granted Bulson leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, certifying the question of whether its order was properly made.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a plaintiff, suing his former criminal defense attorney for legal malpractice, can recover nonpecuniary damages for loss of liberty resulting from wrongful conviction and incarceration.

    Holding

    No, because New York law limits recovery in legal malpractice actions to pecuniary damages, and policy considerations weigh against expanding recovery to include nonpecuniary damages in criminal legal malpractice cases.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that to recover damages in a legal malpractice action, a plaintiff must establish that the attorney failed to exercise reasonable skill and knowledge, and that this breach proximately caused actual and ascertainable pecuniary damages. For criminal legal malpractice, the plaintiff must have a colorable claim of actual innocence. New York courts have generally rejected claims for nonpecuniary damages in legal malpractice actions arising from civil proceedings. The Court acknowledged the argument that limiting recovery to pecuniary damages in criminal malpractice cases would deny meaningful relief but found this to be a policy decision. The Court distinguished criminal legal malpractice from intentional torts like false arrest and malicious prosecution, where nonpecuniary damages are recoverable because those torts involve deliberate conduct, whereas legal malpractice is based on a failure to exercise skill or care. The Court emphasized policy considerations, stating that allowing nonpecuniary damages would have “negative and, at worst, devastating consequences for the criminal justice system,” potentially chilling the willingness of the defense bar to represent indigent defendants and incentivizing attorneys not to participate in post-conviction efforts to overturn wrongful convictions. The court stated “as a matter of settled law, tort liability is predicated on the nature of the act of the tort-feasor, not simply the injury of the victim”.

  • People v. Jackson, 18 N.Y.3d 738 (2012): Defines ‘Public Place’ for Marijuana Possession

    People v. Jackson, 18 N.Y.3d 738 (2012)

    A person is in a “public place” for the purposes of criminal possession of marijuana in the fifth degree (Penal Law § 221.10[1]) when they are located on a highway, even if they are inside a private vehicle.

    Summary

    Samuel Jackson was arrested for marijuana possession after a traffic stop. He pleaded guilty but appealed, arguing the accusatory instrument was jurisdictionally deficient because it didn’t adequately allege he was in a “public place” or that the marijuana was “open to public view,” elements of the crime. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that a person is in a public place when on a highway, regardless of being in a vehicle. The Court also found the allegation that the marijuana was “open to public view” was sufficiently pled. The Court reasoned that a highway is explicitly defined as a public place and that the “open to public view” element was satisfied by the officer’s observation of the defendant holding a bag of marijuana in his hand.

    Facts

    A police officer observed Jackson commit a traffic infraction while driving in Brooklyn. During the traffic stop, the officer smelled marijuana and saw Jackson holding a ziplock bag of marijuana in his hand. Further search revealed more bags of marijuana. Jackson was charged with criminal possession of marijuana in the fifth degree, among other offenses, and pleaded guilty to the fifth-degree possession charge.

    Procedural History

    Jackson appealed his conviction to the Appellate Term, arguing the accusatory instrument was jurisdictionally deficient. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction. A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a person is in a “public place” within the meaning of Penal Law § 221.10(1) when they are inside a vehicle on a public street (highway)?

    2. Whether the allegation that the marijuana was “open to public view” was sufficiently pled in the accusatory instrument?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Penal Law § 240.00(1) defines a “public place” as a place to which the public has access, including highways, and the location of the vehicle on a highway qualifies as a public place regardless of whether the individual is inside the vehicle.

    2. Yes, because the accusatory instrument alleged that the officer saw the defendant holding a bag of marijuana in his hand, which supports a reasonable inference that the marijuana was unconcealed and visible to the public.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Penal Law § 240.00(1) defines a “public place” as “a place to which the public or a substantial group of persons has access, and includes, but is not limited to, highways.” The Court stated that the legislature made possession in a “public place” an element of criminal possession of marijuana in the fifth degree and incorporated a preexisting definition of the phrase from article 240. Jackson was on a highway, which is a location the legislature specifically designated as a public place. The fact that Jackson was in a car does not alter that he was on a highway and thus in a public place.

    The Court rejected the argument that personal automobiles should be excluded from the definition of “public place.” A person driving in a personal automobile will be in a public place only when the vehicle is in a location that qualifies under the statute as a public place.

    Regarding the “open to public view” element, the Court reasoned that the requirement ensures that a person carrying a small amount of concealed marijuana is not subject to misdemeanor prosecution. The Court stated that although not a model of specificity, the allegations were jurisdictionally sufficient to provide reasonable cause to believe that the marijuana was open to public view. The Court found that because the officer was standing outside the vehicle when she saw the substance in the ziplock bag, these allegations support the inference that any other member of the public could also have seen the marijuana from the same vantage point.