New York Law Review

Tag: Criminal Law

  • People v. Spears, 24 N.Y.3d 1030 (2014): Trial Court Discretion on Adjournment Requests at Sentencing

    24 N.Y.3d 1030 (2014)

    A trial court has discretion to deny a defendant’s request for an adjournment at sentencing, especially when the defendant has had ample time to confer with counsel and fails to articulate a valid ground for withdrawing a guilty plea.

    Summary

    Kelvin Spears pleaded guilty to sexual abuse in the second degree and requested an adjournment at sentencing to explore withdrawing his plea. The trial court denied the request, finding he had sufficient time to consult with counsel. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because Spears had ample opportunity to confer with counsel and failed to articulate a ground for plea withdrawal. The dissent argued the trial court’s refusal was an abuse of discretion given the circumstances of the case.

    Facts

    Kelvin Spears was indicted for first-degree sexual abuse. He pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of second-degree sexual abuse and was released on his own recognizance. Over two months later, at sentencing, Spears requested an adjournment to discuss potentially withdrawing his plea. He stated he hadn’t been able to reach his counsel to address certain issues. His counsel had spoken with him the morning of the sentencing and also requested an adjournment.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the adjournment and sentenced Spears per the plea agreement. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the adjournment. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Supreme Court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s request for an adjournment at sentencing to discuss a potential motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant had more than a fair amount of time to speak with counsel regarding withdrawing his plea and failed to articulate a ground upon which the plea could be withdrawn.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that granting an adjournment is within the Supreme Court’s discretion. The court emphasized that Spears had ample time to consult with counsel after being released and before sentencing. Although he contacted his lawyer the day before sentencing, counsel spoke with him the morning of sentencing. Crucially, neither Spears nor his counsel articulated any specific grounds for withdrawing the plea. The court indicated it would have considered an adjournment if such grounds had been presented. The court found that “absent any indication that defendant had grounds to support a plea withdrawal, Supreme Court refusal to grant the adjournment was not an abuse of discretion.”

    The dissent argued that the court should consider the series of events leading up to the request, including the defendant’s pretrial detention and what the dissent characterized as a one-sided process. The dissent pointed to People v. Nixon, 21 N.Y.2d 338 (1967), arguing that a sound discretion exercised on an individual basis is better than mandating a uniform procedure. The dissent concluded that a simple adjournment would have harmed no one and demonstrated a more balanced approach.

  • People v. Allen, 25 N.Y.3d 444 (2015): Preservation Required for Duplicity Arguments Based on Trial Evidence

    People v. Allen, 25 N.Y.3d 444 (2015)

    A duplicity argument based on trial evidence, where the count is not duplicitous on the face of the indictment, must be preserved for appeal by timely objection.

    Summary

    Allen was convicted of murder and attempted murder. The attempted murder charge became potentially duplicitous at trial when evidence of two separate incidents involving the defendant pointing a gun at the victim emerged. The New York Court of Appeals held that a duplicity argument based on trial evidence, as opposed to a facially duplicitous indictment, must be preserved with a timely objection to be raised on appeal. Allen’s failure to object during the trial to the potential duplicity of the attempted murder charge waived his right to raise the issue on appeal. The Court also found that the lineup identification, even if improperly admitted, was harmless error given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

    Facts

    On June 22, 2008, Allen attempted to shoot the victim but the gun misfired. Approximately ten minutes later, Allen shot the victim, resulting in his death. The victim’s wife witnessed some of the events and identified Allen in a police lineup. Ballistics evidence linked the bullet recovered from the scene to the bullet recovered from the victim’s body. Allen was charged with murder and attempted murder. During the trial, evidence of both the initial misfire and the later shooting was presented.

    Procedural History

    Allen was convicted on all counts in Supreme Court. The Appellate Division modified the judgment by directing that all terms of imprisonment run concurrently, and affirmed the conviction as modified, holding that the duplicity argument was unpreserved and that any error in denying the motion to suppress the lineup identification was harmless. Allen appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a duplicity argument based on trial evidence must be preserved for appeal where the count is not duplicitous on the face of the indictment.

    Holding

    No, because issues of non-facial duplicity, like those of facial duplicity, must be preserved for appellate review to prevent unnecessary surprise after the conduct of a complete trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that to allow an unpreserved claim of duplicitousness to be raised on appeal would open the door to abuse. Defendants could strategically choose not to object at trial and then raise the issue on appeal if convicted. Quoting People v. Becoats, 17 N.Y.3d 643, 651 (2011), the Court stated, “To expand the definition of ‘mode of proceedings’ error too freely would create many such anomalous results.” The Court emphasized that any uncertainty regarding the basis of the attempted murder count could have been easily remedied with an objection during opening statements, witness testimony, or to the jury charge. The Court also held that the admission of the lineup identification, even if erroneous, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because of the “overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt,” including three eyewitnesses, ballistics evidence, a confession, and Allen’s attempts to avoid arrest. Regarding the limitation on cross-examination, the Court noted that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the police reports were inadmissible extrinsic evidence on a collateral matter, because the reports were based on secondhand information and the source of the information was not directly from the victim’s wife. Citing People v. Owens, 74 N.Y.2d 677, 678 (1989), the court stated that the lineup idenfitication must be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when considered in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt.

  • People v. Turner, 24 N.Y.3d 237 (2014): When Post-Release Supervision Must Be Disclosed Before Plea

    24 N.Y.3d 237 (2014)

    A defendant must be notified of a post-release supervision (PRS) term sufficiently in advance of its imposition to allow the defendant an opportunity to object to the deficiency in the plea proceeding; otherwise, preservation of the issue for appeal is unnecessary.

    Summary

    Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted murder, and the court did not mention post-release supervision (PRS) at the plea hearing. At sentencing, the prosecutor raised the issue of PRS, and the court stated its intention to impose a five-year PRS term. The prosecutor asked the defendant if she had discussed PRS with her attorney and if she understood it was part of her plea, to which the defendant replied affirmatively. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the defendant did not have sufficient knowledge of the terms of the plea at the plea allocution, and when later advised, did not have sufficient opportunity to move to withdraw her plea. Thus, preservation was unnecessary.

    Facts

    Defendant assaulted her friend with a knife and fled. A police officer found her nearby, and without questioning, handcuffed her and placed her in the patrol car. Defendant offered to show the officer where she hid the knife. After recovering the knife, the officer conducted a show-up identification where the victim identified the defendant. Later, after waiving her Miranda rights, defendant confessed to the crime, stating she committed it to be killed in prison.

    Procedural History

    The County Court suppressed evidence found during the arrest because it lacked probable cause, but it did not suppress the interrogation statements, deeming them attenuated from the illegal arrest. Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted murder with a promised sentence of 15 years. The court failed to mention PRS at the plea hearing, but imposed a five-year PRS term at sentencing. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding the defendant’s claim unpreserved because she had the opportunity to object. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether defendant was required to preserve her claim that her plea was not knowing and voluntarily entered where she first received notice of the imposition of a term of postrelease supervision (PRS) at sentencing, and submitted to sentencing with the PRS addition.

    Holding

    Yes, in part. The court must notify the defendant of a term of PRS sufficiently in advance of its imposition so that the defendant has the opportunity to object to the deficiency in the plea proceeding. In the absence of such an opportunity, preservation is unnecessary because a defendant cannot be expected to object to a constitutional deprivation of which she is unaware.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the constitutional duty of a trial court to ensure a defendant fully understands the plea and its consequences before pleading guilty, citing People v. Catu, 4 N.Y.3d 242, 244-245 (2005). The Court distinguished this case from People v. Murray, 15 N.Y.3d 725 (2010), where the defendant knew that PRS would be part of the sentence when accepting the plea. In Turner, the defendant was only notified of the PRS term in the middle of sentencing and therefore, did not have sufficient knowledge of the plea terms at the plea allocution, nor sufficient opportunity to withdraw the plea later.

    The court stated, “Here, the court did not advise defendant at the time of her plea that her sentence would include any PRS, and only notified her of her PRS term in the middle of sentencing. The same reasoning that applied in Catu and Louree applies here: the defendant did not have sufficient knowledge of the terms of the plea at the plea allocution and, when later advised, did not have sufficient opportunity to move to withdraw her plea.”

    Regarding the confession, the Court found record support for the attenuation from the illegal arrest and declined to disturb the lower court’s ruling.

    The dissent argued the Catu argument required preservation similar to challenges to a guilty plea’s voluntariness and that, similar to People v. Murray, preservation is required where the defendant has a sufficient opportunity to object to PRS or withdraw the plea.

  • People v. Tankleff, 49 A.D.3d 160 (2d Dep’t 2007): Admissibility of Expert Testimony on False Confessions

    People v. Tankleff, 49 A.D.3d 160 (2d Dep’t 2007)

    Expert testimony on the reliability of confessions, including factors that can lead to false confessions, is admissible when it is relevant to the specific circumstances of the case and the expert is qualified.

    Summary

    This case addresses the admissibility of expert testimony regarding false confessions. Martin Tankleff was convicted of murdering his parents, largely based on his confession to police. On appeal, Tankleff argued the trial court erred in precluding expert testimony on factors influencing the reliability of confessions. The Appellate Division held that the trial court erred in precluding the expert testimony because Tankleff’s confession had inconsistencies that made the testimony relevant. This ruling highlights the importance of allowing expert testimony to assist juries in evaluating the validity of confessions, particularly when there are indicia of unreliability or coercion.

    Facts

    Martin Tankleff was convicted of the murders of his parents, based primarily on a confession he made to detectives during interrogation. Tankleff initially denied any involvement but, after being told he failed a polygraph test (which was inadmissible), he confessed to the crime. He later recanted the confession, claiming it was coerced and false. Prior to trial, Tankleff sought to introduce expert testimony on factors that can lead to false confessions, aiming to cast doubt on the reliability of his statement to the police. The trial court denied this request, deeming the expert testimony inadmissible.

    Procedural History

    Tankleff was convicted in the trial court. He appealed to the Appellate Division, Second Department, arguing that the trial court erred in precluding expert testimony on false confessions. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, finding that the exclusion of the expert testimony was an abuse of discretion.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in precluding expert testimony regarding factors that could have influenced the reliability of the defendant’s confession.

    Holding

    Yes, because the expert testimony on factors associated with false confessions was relevant to the particular circumstances of the defendant’s confession and would have aided the jury in evaluating the confession’s reliability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Appellate Division emphasized that expert testimony is admissible if it would help to clarify issues calling for professional or technical knowledge, possessed by the expert and beyond the ken of the typical juror. The court noted that while jurors may generally understand that a person can falsely confess, they may lack an understanding of the specific psychological factors and interrogation techniques that can contribute to false confessions. Citing inconsistencies within Tankleff’s confession, along with the interrogation tactics used by the detectives, the court found that expert testimony was especially relevant in this case. The court distinguished cases where expert testimony on eyewitness identification was deemed inadmissible because unlike eyewitness testimony, the dynamics of police interrogations and their potential to induce false confessions are not within the common knowledge of jurors. The court also noted that the exclusion of the expert testimony prejudiced Tankleff, as his confession was a critical piece of evidence presented by the prosecution. The court referenced People v. Lee, 96 N.Y.2d 157 (2001), as a guiding precedent for determining the admissibility of expert testimony in such cases, reiterating that the testimony must be directly relevant to the circumstances of the confession at issue. The court stated: “Under the circumstances presented here, expert testimony regarding false confessions should have been admitted to aid the jury in reaching a determination as to the reliability of the defendant’s confession.”

  • People v. Pignataro, 22 N.Y.3d 381 (2013): Constitutionality of Resentencing Statutes After Catu Violation

    People v. Pignataro, 22 N.Y.3d 381 (2013)

    Penal Law § 70.85, which allows resentencing to the original determinate sentence without post-release supervision (PRS) after a Catu violation, is a constitutional legislative remedy that does not violate a defendant’s right to vacate an involuntary plea.

    Summary

    Defendant Pignataro pleaded guilty to attempted assault but was not informed of the mandatory PRS. After People v. Catu established this as a constitutional defect, the legislature enacted Penal Law § 70.85, allowing resentencing to the original term without PRS. Pignataro challenged his resentencing under this statute, arguing it unconstitutionally deprived him of his right to withdraw his plea. The New York Court of Appeals held that the statute is constitutional because it addresses the Catu violation by ensuring the defendant receives the sentence contemplated during the plea, making the plea knowing and voluntary.

    Facts

    In 2000, Anthony Pignataro pleaded guilty to attempted first-degree assault. The trial court stated he would receive a 5-to-15-year determinate sentence but did not mention the mandatory PRS term. In 2001, Pignataro was sentenced to 15 years without PRS. Following the 2005 decision in People v. Catu, which found that failure to inform a defendant of mandatory PRS renders a plea involuntary, Pignataro challenged his plea in state and federal courts. In 2010, the prosecution sought resentencing under Penal Law § 70.85, which permitted reimposing the original sentence without PRS. Pignataro argued the new statute was unconstitutional, but the court resentenced him to 15 years without PRS.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court resentenced Pignataro under Penal Law § 70.85. The Appellate Division affirmed. Pignataro appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that Penal Law § 70.85 was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Penal Law § 70.85 is unconstitutional because it denies a defendant the right to vacate a guilty plea that was defective under People v. Catu.

    Holding

    No, because Penal Law § 70.85 is a constitutionally permissible legislative remedy that ensures a defendant, no longer subject to PRS, pleaded guilty with awareness of the direct consequences of the plea.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that under People v. Catu, a guilty plea made without informing the defendant of a mandatory PRS term violates the State Constitution. The Court distinguished the case from its prior holdings rejecting resentencing schemes. Previously, courts lacked statutory authority to impose a determinate sentence without PRS, leading to unauthorized creative sentencing. Penal Law § 70.85 provides this authority.

    The Court reasoned that the legislature has the power to amend sentencing laws. Because the legislature changed the sentencing laws, Pignataro’s plea became knowing and voluntary. Section 70.85 ensures a defendant whose plea is vulnerable to a Catu challenge is sentenced without PRS, consistent with the initial plea agreement and the defendant’s understanding. The Court stated, “Section 70.85 ensures that defendant, who is no longer subject to PRS, pleaded guilty with the requisite awareness of the direct consequences of his plea.”

    The Court explicitly rejected the argument that section 70.85 was merely a statutory version of previously rejected remedies. Instead, it found the statute was a valid legislative response addressing the constitutional defect identified in Catu.

  • People v. Jones, 23 N.Y.3d 55 (2014): Prior Conviction Eliminates Home Exception for Weapon Possession

    People v. Jones, 23 N.Y.3d 55 (2014)

    A prior criminal conviction eliminates the “home or business” exception to the crime of second-degree criminal possession of a weapon under New York Penal Law § 265.03(3).

    Summary

    The defendant, previously convicted of a crime, was charged with second-degree criminal possession of a weapon after a loaded firearm was found in his home. He argued that the “home or business” exception in Penal Law § 265.03(3) should apply, reducing the charge. The Court of Appeals held that the exception does not apply to individuals with prior convictions, affirming the Appellate Division’s reinstatement of the second-degree charge. The Court interpreted the statute’s language and legislative history to conclude that the “except as provided” clause excludes individuals with prior convictions from the home exception. The Court also held that the indictment did not need to allege the prior conviction, as it was not an element of the offense in this specific context.

    Facts

    A loaded gun was found in the bathroom of the defendant’s home. The defendant had a prior conviction for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree. The indictment charged the defendant with criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, in violation of Penal Law § 265.03(3). The People filed a special information alleging the prior conviction.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court reduced the charge from second-degree to third-degree possession, concluding that possession in the defendant’s home did not constitute second-degree possession. The Appellate Division reversed this decision and reinstated the second-degree charge. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the People’s appeal to the Appellate Division was untimely, thus depriving the Appellate Division of jurisdiction.

    2. Whether the “home or business” exception in Penal Law § 265.03(3) applies to a person previously convicted of a crime.

    3. Whether the indictment was insufficient because it did not allege the defendant’s prior criminal conviction.

    Holding

    1. No, because the 30-day time to appeal begins when the prevailing party serves notice, which did not occur here.

    2. No, because the “except as provided” clause of Penal Law § 265.03(3) excludes individuals with prior convictions from the home or business exception.

    3. No, because when a defendant has a previous conviction, the inapplicability of the exception is not an element of the offense, and the indictment need not allude to it.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court found the appeal to the Appellate Division was timely because the defendant, as the prevailing party at Supreme Court, never served the order on the People, which is required to commence the time for filing a notice of appeal.

    Regarding the “home or business” exception, the Court interpreted the language of Penal Law § 265.03(3) which states that possession of a loaded firearm does not constitute a violation of the statute if it takes place in the person’s home or business, “except as provided in subdivision one … of section 265.02.” Since § 265.02(1) applies to persons previously convicted of any crime, the Court reasoned that the exception to the exception applies, thus removing the home or business exception for convicted felons.

    The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the “except as provided” phrase merely acknowledges that such cases are covered by the third-degree statute. The Court stated that this reading would “alter[] the plain meaning of the statutory words” and would render the statute nonsensical.

    The Court also addressed the defendant’s argument based on legislative history, finding that the legislature intentionally retained the “except as provided” phrase to increase the penalty for criminal possession of a loaded firearm by a person with a prior conviction, even in their home or place of business. The court cited a Senate Introducer Memorandum stating that the new subdivision was, “intended to increase the penalty for criminal possession of a loaded firearm under the circumstances where … [a] person possesses a loaded firearm in his home or place of business and has previously been convicted of a crime.”

    Finally, the Court held that the indictment was sufficient, even without alleging the prior conviction. The Court distinguished the case from typical second-degree possession cases where the inapplicability of the home or business exception must be alleged. Here, the exception never came into play due to the prior conviction, so its inapplicability was not an element of the offense.

  • People v. Peque, 22 N.Y.3d 168 (2013): Duty to Advise on Deportation Consequences

    People v. Peque, 22 N.Y.3d 168 (2013)

    Due process requires a trial court to inform a defendant, prior to accepting a guilty plea to a felony, that if the defendant is not a U.S. citizen, they may be deported as a consequence of the plea.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court must inform a defendant that a guilty plea to a felony could result in deportation if the defendant is not a U.S. citizen. The court held that due process compels such advisement because deportation is a plea consequence of tremendous importance. However, the court also ruled that a defendant seeking to withdraw a plea based on the lack of such advice must show a reasonable probability that they would have rejected the plea and gone to trial had they been properly warned. The court overruled part of People v. Ford, holding that failure to advise a defendant of potential deportation can affect the validity of a plea, but reaffirmed the distinction between direct and collateral consequences.

    Facts

    Peque, a Guatemalan national, was arrested for rape. At arraignment, it was noted he lacked a Social Security number. He pleaded guilty to first-degree rape, but the court did not advise him that this conviction could lead to deportation. At sentencing, defense counsel mentioned Peque was subject to deportation and wished the sentence to stand. Diaz, a legal permanent resident from the Dominican Republic, was arrested for drug possession. The court warned him that felony pleas could adversely affect immigration status, but did not specifically mention deportation. Thomas, a legal permanent resident from Jamaica, pleaded guilty to attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance in 1992. The court knew he wasn’t a citizen, but didn’t warn about deportation. He absconded, faked his death, and later returned to the US, seeking admission as a returning resident.

    Procedural History

    Peque: The Appellate Division affirmed Peque’s conviction, citing Ford that failure to advise on deportation doesn’t invalidate a plea. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Diaz: The Appellate Division affirmed Diaz’s conviction, finding his challenge unpreserved and citing Ford. The Court of Appeals conditionally modified and remitted. Thomas: The Appellate Division affirmed Thomas’s conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether due process requires a trial court to advise a defendant that a guilty plea may result in deportation if the defendant is not a U.S. citizen?

    2. Whether, if such advisement is required and not given, the defendant is entitled to automatic withdrawal or vacatur of the plea?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because deportation is a plea consequence of such tremendous importance, grave impact and frequent occurrence that a defendant is entitled to notice that it may ensue from a plea.

    2. No, because the defendant must establish a reasonable probability that they would have rejected the plea and opted for trial had the court warned of the possibility of deportation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that due process requires a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea. While courts need not advise on every possible repercussion, they must advise on direct consequences. Ford classified deportation as a collateral consequence. However, changes in immigration law since Ford have made deportation a near-automatic result for many noncitizen offenders. Quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, the Court noted that “deportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.” The Court overruled the portion of Ford stating that a court’s failure to warn about potential deportation never affects a plea’s validity. However, the Court also held that to withdraw a plea, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that they would not have pleaded guilty had they been informed of potential deportation. Factors to consider include the plea’s favorability, potential consequences after trial, strength of the prosecution’s case, defendant’s ties to the U.S., and counsel’s advice. The Court emphasized that trial courts aren’t required to engage in any particular litany during an allocution in order to obtain a valid guilty plea. The defendant in Diaz was entitled to a remittal to Supreme Court to allow him to move to vacate his plea and develop a record relevant to the issue of prejudice. Thomas was not entitled to relief because deportation was less certain at the time of his plea.

  • People v. Brown, Harris, and Carter, 22 N.Y.3d 744 (2014): Consecutive Sentences for Weapon Possession

    People v. Brown, 22 N.Y.3d 744 (2014)

    A defendant’s sentence for unlawful weapon possession can run consecutively to the sentence for a crime committed with the same weapon if the act of possessing the weapon was completed before the commission of the other crime.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether sentences for unlawful weapon possession should run consecutively or concurrently with sentences for other crimes committed using the same weapon. The New York Court of Appeals held that consecutive sentences are permissible if the act of possessing the weapon was completed before the defendant formed the intent to commit, or committed, the other crime. The Court reasoned that the crime of weapon possession is complete when the defendant knowingly and unlawfully possesses a loaded firearm, independent of any later use of the weapon. The court affirmed the consecutive sentences in People v. Brown and People v. Harris, and reversed the appellate division’s order in People v. Carter, finding consecutive sentencing was permissible in all three cases.

    Facts

    Thomas Brown: Brown argued with Bradford at a club, retrieved a gun from his van, followed Bradford to a McDonald’s, and shot him. Brown was convicted of second-degree murder and third-degree criminal possession of a weapon.
    Joseph Harris: Harris spoke with a group of people, including Lewis, for about 20 minutes before approaching Lewis and shooting him. He was convicted of attempted murder, assault, and criminal possession of a weapon.
    Darnell Carter: Carter was given a gun before entering a convenience store, where he spoke with acquaintances. He and others then chased and murdered Briggs. Carter was convicted of murder, robbery, criminal possession of a weapon, and criminal use of a firearm. He initially told police he went along for a robbery in case there was a fight.

    Procedural History

    Brown: Convicted in Supreme Court, consecutive sentences imposed. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
    Harris: Convicted in Supreme Court, consecutive sentences imposed. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
    Carter: Convicted in County Court, consecutive sentences imposed. The Appellate Division initially modified the sentence to run concurrently. On reargument, the Appellate Division affirmed the original sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendants’ sentences for “simple” knowing, unlawful possession of a loaded weapon should run consecutively to the sentences for other crimes committed with the same weapon, where the possession was not with the intent to use the weapon unlawfully against another.

    Holding

    Yes, because each defendant completed the crime of unlawful possession of a loaded weapon independently of their commission of the later crimes. The act of possession was separate and distinct from the act of using the weapon during the commission of the other crimes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Penal Law § 70.25 (2), which prohibits consecutive sentences when a single act constitutes two offenses, or when a single act constitutes one offense and a material element of another. The Court distinguished between cases involving “intent to use” weapon possession and “simple” possession. In “intent to use” cases, like People v. Wright, the focus is on when the defendant formed the intent to use the weapon unlawfully. In “simple” possession cases, the focus is on the separateness of acts. The Court explained that for “simple” possession, the mens rea is knowing unlawful possession of a loaded firearm. “So long as a defendant knowingly unlawfully possesses a loaded firearm before forming the intent to cause a crime with that weapon, the possessory crime has already been completed, and consecutive sentencing is permissible.”
    The court found that in Brown, Harris and Carter, the defendants possessed the guns before the commission of the other crimes. Brown had the gun in his van. Harris possessed the gun for at least 20 minutes before shooting Lewis. Carter was handed the gun before entering the convenience store. The Court emphasized the Legislature’s intent in creating the “simple” weapon possession crime was to toughen punishment for gun crimes, in order to address the problem of illegal guns on the streets. The Court distinguished People v. Sturkey, where the defendant seized a police officer’s gun during a scuffle; there, the subsequent robbery and possession charges arose from the same single act.

  • People v. Wright, 21 N.Y.3d 932 (2013): Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Suppression Hearing

    People v. Wright, 21 N.Y.3d 932 (2013)

    A defendant is deprived of meaningful representation when his attorney fails to adequately present a suppression motion, including a failure to marshal facts, make legal arguments, or correct significant factual errors in the court’s decision, especially when counsel has expressed an inability to competently represent the defendant.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel at his suppression hearing. The defendant’s assigned counsel sought to be relieved due to being overwhelmed, but was ordered to proceed with the hearing. Counsel then failed to properly argue for suppression, misstated facts in the motion, made no legal argument, and failed to correct factual errors in the court’s decision. Given counsel’s expressed inability to competently represent the defendant and the accumulation of errors, the Court of Appeals remitted the case for a new suppression hearing, finding that the defendant was not afforded meaningful representation at a critical stage of the prosecution.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested and charged with weapon possession offenses after a street encounter with the police. Three days before the suppression hearing, the defendant’s assigned counsel requested to be relieved, citing an overwhelming workload and inability to competently represent the defendant. The court denied the request until after the hearing. In his written motion for a hearing, counsel misstated the facts, claiming a motor vehicle stop occurred rather than a street encounter. At the hearing, counsel did not effectively present the facts or make any legal argument. After the hearing, the court issued a decision containing factual errors, but defense counsel failed to move for reargument or correction.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the suppression motion. New counsel was appointed, and the defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. A dissenting judge at the Appellate Division granted the defendant leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel based on his attorney’s performance during the suppression hearing.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defense counsel’s representation regarding the suppression application was deficient in numerous respects, including failing to marshal the facts, present legal arguments, and correct factual errors in the court’s decision, undermining confidence in the fairness of the proceeding.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division dissent, holding that the defendant was entitled to relief. The court emphasized counsel’s misstatement of facts in the motion, failure to marshal facts or make legal arguments at the hearing, and failure to correct factual errors in the court’s decision. The Court noted that these errors could not be explained as strategic decisions, especially given the attorney’s expressed inability to competently represent the defendant. The Court stated: “Thus, although the attorney secured a hearing, his representation in relation to the application as a whole was deficient in so many respects—both before, during and after the proceeding—that defendant was not afforded meaningful representation at a critical stage of this prosecution.” Even without a strict showing of prejudice, the accumulation of errors substantially undermined confidence in the fairness of the proceeding. The court found relief appropriate under the state’s meaningful representation standard (People v Stultz, 2 NY3d 277, 284 [2004]), which does not always require a strict showing of prejudice. The Court conditionally modified the judgment, remitting the matter for further proceedings on the suppression application, including legal argument and the potential reopening of the hearing.

  • People v. Beaty, 19 N.Y.3d 918 (2012): Entitlement to Intoxication Charge in Criminal Cases

    People v. Beaty, 19 N.Y.3d 918 (2012)

    A defendant is entitled to an intoxication charge only when there is sufficient evidence in the record for a reasonable person to doubt whether the defendant formed the required intent due to intoxication; self-serving statements and the mere smell of alcohol are typically insufficient.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of rape and burglary. He argued that the trial court erred in denying his request for an intoxication charge, claiming he was too drunk to form the necessary intent. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence presented by the defendant—his own self-serving statements and the victim’s testimony that she smelled alcohol on his breath—was insufficient to warrant an intoxication charge. The Court emphasized that the defendant’s actions, such as cutting a screen, instructing the victim to be quiet, and stealing her phone, indicated purposeful behavior inconsistent with a lack of intent due to intoxication.

    Facts

    The victim returned home, charged her cell phone, and fell asleep. She was awakened by the defendant, who was lying next to her and smelled of alcohol. The defendant choked and raped her, threw a blanket over her head, and fled. The victim’s cell phone was missing. Police found cuts in the porch screen of the victim’s apartment. Ten days later, during questioning about another incident, the defendant was asked about the rape. A search warrant of defendant’s apartment revealed the victim’s cell phone hidden in the ceiling. Defendant gave a written statement claiming he had an alcohol problem and remembered knocking on the victim’s window but did not admit to the rape, claiming he fell asleep on the couch and fled when the woman screamed.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s request for an intoxication charge. The jury convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the defendant failed to establish his entitlement to an intoxication charge. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request for an intoxication charge based on the evidence presented at trial.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s self-serving statements about his intoxication and the victim’s testimony that she smelled alcohol on his breath were insufficient to warrant an intoxication charge, especially in light of the evidence showing the defendant’s purposeful actions during the crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that while intoxication is not a defense, evidence of intoxication is admissible to negate an element of the crime. An intoxication charge is required when “there is sufficient evidence of intoxication in the record for a reasonable person to entertain a doubt as to [an] element … on that basis” (People v. Perry, 61 N.Y.2d 849, 850 (1984). To meet this threshold, the defendant must present corroborating evidence beyond bare assertions, such as the number of drinks, the time frame of consumption, the lapse of time, whether alcohol was consumed on an empty stomach, the alcohol content of the drinks, and the specific impact of the alcohol on behavior or mental state (People v. Gaines, 83 N.Y.2d 925, 927 (1994).

    The Court found the defendant’s statements about his intoxication were insufficient. The Court also noted that the defendant’s actions showed a purposeful intention. "[H]e cut a hole in a screen to gain entry, instructed the victim to be quiet, threw a blanket over her head, and stole her cell phone so she could not call the police. Given this evidence, the court correctly ruled an intoxication charge was not warranted." Thus, the evidence did not allow a reasonable juror to doubt the element of intent based on intoxication. The Court cited People v. Sirico, 17 N.Y.3d 744, 745 (2011), for the proposition that bare assertions of intoxication are insufficient to warrant the charge.