New York Law Review

Tag: Criminal Law

  • People v. Gallagher, 69 N.Y.2d 525 (1987): Inconsistent Murder Counts Must Be Charged in the Alternative

    People v. Gallagher, 69 N.Y.2d 525 (1987)

    When a defendant is charged with both intentional murder and depraved mind murder for a single homicide, the counts are inconsistent and must be submitted to the jury in the alternative, preventing convictions for both.

    Summary

    A police officer, after heavy drinking, shot and killed a fellow officer. He was charged with both intentional murder and depraved mind murder. The trial court instructed the jury on both counts, resulting in convictions for intentional murder and reckless manslaughter (as a lesser included offense of depraved mind murder). The Appellate Division modified the judgment by reversing the manslaughter conviction. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the murder counts were inconsistent and should have been charged in the alternative. The Court reasoned that the jury’s failure to determine the defendant’s mental state required a new trial, as the intentional and reckless mental states are mutually exclusive in this context.

    Facts

    Defendant, a New York City police officer, consumed large quantities of alcohol during an all-night St. Patrick’s Day celebration.

    Following the celebration, the defendant shot and killed a fellow police officer.

    The defendant was charged with two counts of murder in the second degree: intentional murder and depraved mind murder.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of intentional murder and reckless manslaughter in the trial court.

    The Appellate Division upheld the intentional murder conviction but reversed the reckless manslaughter conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the intentional murder conviction and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in a single homicide case, it is permissible to submit both intentional murder and depraved mind murder counts to the jury without instructing them to consider the counts in the alternative.

    Holding

    No, because the counts are inconsistent. The court must instruct the jury to consider the counts in the alternative, directing that a guilty verdict on one count necessitates a not guilty verdict on the other.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that intentional murder and depraved mind murder are inconsistent counts when based on the same act and result. “One who acts intentionally in shooting a person to death— that is, with the conscious objective of bringing about that result (Penal Law § 15.05 [1]) — cannot at the same time act recklessly — that is, with conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such a result will occur (Penal Law § 15.05 [3]).” The act cannot be simultaneously intended and not intended.

    The Court relied on CPL 300.40 (5), which mandates that inconsistent counts be submitted in the alternative, directing the jury to convict on only one. The trial court’s failure to do so allowed the jury to sidestep determining the defendant’s mental state.

    The Court rejected the People’s argument that the Appellate Division’s reversal of the manslaughter conviction cured the error. The Court stated, “It is not for the Appellate Division in the first instance to determine whether defendant acted intentionally or recklessly at the time of the crime. That is the jury’s function.”

    The Court distinguished the case from the law relating to lesser included offenses, where charging in the alternative benefits both the accused and the state by allowing for a less drastic choice than acquittal and preventing an empty prosecution. In this case, allowing two convictions for the same act confers an unintended advantage on the prosecution and allows the jury to avoid determining mens rea.

  • People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490 (1987): Appellate Division Must Conduct Weight of Evidence Review

    People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490 (1987)

    An intermediate appellate court in New York must conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence in criminal cases, and failure to do so constitutes reversible error.

    Summary

    Defendants Bleakley and Anesi were convicted of rape, sodomy, and sexual abuse. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed and remitted, holding that the Appellate Division failed to properly conduct a review of the weight of the evidence, a power exclusively granted to intermediate appellate courts in New York. The Court of Appeals emphasized that while the Appellate Division is not required to write an opinion in every criminal case demonstrating that it conducted such a review, its explicit declination to do so warrants reversal.

    Facts

    The victim, Bleakley, and Anesi spent an evening drinking at various bars. The victim and the two defendants then planned to “do some coke” together, which they did. The victim testified that a horrible and forcible double rape and sodomy occurred. The defendants testified to one consensual sexual incident. Circumstantial evidence related to sexual conduct and possible forcible circumstances was presented. Serious credibility issues and discrepancies existed among the key witnesses’ testimonies.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted by a jury in a joint trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgments of conviction by a divided court. The dissenting justices believed the guilty verdicts were contrary to the weight of the evidence. The defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred by failing to exercise its statutory authority to review the weight of the evidence when affirming the defendants’ convictions.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Appellate Division manifestly avoided its exclusive statutory authority to review the weight of the evidence, depriving the defendants of their right to such review. The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for further consideration.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the unique role of intermediate appellate courts in New York, which are empowered to review both questions of law and questions of fact. This factual review power is a crucial part of the appellate process, ensuring each litigant at least one review of the facts. The Court distinguished between legal sufficiency review and weight of evidence review.
    For legal sufficiency, a court must determine “whether there is any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence at trial.” Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 493, 499 (1978).
    For weight of evidence, the court must “weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony” People ex rel. MacCracken v Miller, 291 NY 55, 62. If it appears the jury failed to give the evidence the weight it should be accorded, the appellate court may set aside the verdict. The Court acknowledged that intermediate appellate courts should not substitute themselves for the jury and should give deference to the fact-finder’s opportunity to view witnesses and hear testimony. However, because the Appellate Division, based on the majority and dissenting opinions, failed to conduct the required weight of evidence review, the Court of Appeals reversed and remitted. The Court clarified that it was not requiring the Appellate Division to write in all criminal cases, but that where the order and writings manifest a lack of application of that review power, reversal and remittal is required.

  • People v. Acevedo, 69 N.Y.2d 478 (1987): Collateral Estoppel Extends to Evidentiary Facts in Criminal Cases

    People v. Acevedo, 69 N.Y.2d 478 (1987)

    Collateral estoppel in criminal cases can bar the relitigation of evidentiary facts, as well as ultimate facts, necessarily decided in a defendant’s favor at a prior trial.

    Summary

    Acevedo was tried for two robberies. He was acquitted in the first trial (Jakiela robbery). At the second trial (Nello robbery), the prosecution introduced evidence related to the first robbery, which Acevedo argued was barred by collateral estoppel. The New York Court of Appeals held that collateral estoppel can apply to evidentiary facts, not just ultimate facts, and that the jury in the first trial necessarily decided key factual issues in Acevedo’s favor, precluding their relitigation in the second trial. The court reversed Acevedo’s conviction, finding that the introduction of Jakiela’s testimony was prejudicial error.

    Facts

    Acevedo was charged with robbing Mark Jakiela and William Nello in separate incidents occurring on the same day and within a few blocks of each other. At the Jakiela trial, Jakiela testified that Acevedo robbed him at a gas station. Acevedo testified that he encountered Jakiela in a park and rejected his sexual advance. Acevedo was acquitted of the Jakiela robbery. At the Nello trial, the prosecution called Jakiela to testify that he saw Acevedo driving near Nello’s house shortly before the Nello robbery. Acevedo argued that this testimony was barred by collateral estoppel.

    Procedural History

    Acevedo was acquitted of the Jakiela robbery in the first trial. He was convicted of the Nello robbery in the second trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel can be applied to issues of “evidentiary” fact in a criminal prosecution?

    2. Whether, on the present record, such fact issues were necessarily established in defendant’s favor at his first trial, so as to preclude their further litigation in defendant’s second trial?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because collateral estoppel is not limited to ultimate facts; it can also apply to evidentiary facts.

    2. Yes, because the jury’s verdict in the first trial necessarily decided that Acevedo’s encounter with Jakiela occurred in the park, not at the gas station, precluding relitigation of that issue.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that collateral estoppel prevents the relitigation of issues already decided in a defendant’s favor to conserve judicial resources and ensure fairness. While previous cases like Ashe v. Swenson discussed collateral estoppel in terms of “ultimate facts,” they did not explicitly restrict the doctrine to only those facts. The court found no meaningful difference in the unfairness to a defendant when the state relitigates a settled fact issue, whether it is an ultimate or evidentiary fact. The court emphasized that a defendant faces the burden of defending against charges or factual allegations they overcame in an earlier trial, regardless of whether the fact is ultimate or evidentiary. In this case, the court determined that the first jury necessarily decided that Acevedo’s encounter with Jakiela occurred in the park, not at the gas station. The court pointed to the all-or-nothing nature of the case presented at the first trial, where the jury had to choose between Jakiela’s version of the events and Acevedo’s version. The prosecution argued, “if Mr. Jakiela’s testimony is to be believed, the Defendant is guilty, [his counsel] makes no bones about that”. The court reasoned that by acquitting Acevedo, the jury must have found Jakiela’s testimony incredible. Therefore, collateral estoppel foreclosed relitigation of those issues of evidentiary fact at Acevedo’s second trial, and it was prejudicial error to allow Jakiela’s testimony.

  • People v. Sailor, 65 N.Y.2d 224 (1985): Collateral Estoppel and the Use of Prohibition in Criminal Cases

    65 N.Y.2d 224 (1985)

    The extraordinary remedy of prohibition is inappropriate to prevent a criminal trial based on a collateral estoppel claim when the claim can be reviewed through the regular appellate process.

    Summary

    Sailor sought a writ of prohibition to prevent his robbery and assault trial, arguing that a prior probation revocation proceeding, where it was found the Department of Probation failed to prove he committed the acts underlying the charges, barred the trial under collateral estoppel. The New York Court of Appeals held that prohibition was inappropriate because the collateral estoppel claim did not challenge the legality of the entire proceeding and could be reviewed through the standard appellate process. The Court emphasized that prohibition is reserved for instances where a court acts without jurisdiction or exceeds its authorized powers, and it should not be used for premature review of issues reviewable on appeal.

    Facts

    Sailor was charged with robbery and assault.

    Prior to the criminal trial, a probation revocation proceeding was held concerning Sailor.

    In the probation revocation proceeding, the court found that the Department of Probation did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Sailor committed the acts underlying the robbery and assault charges.

    Sailor then sought to prevent the criminal trial from proceeding, based on collateral estoppel grounds.

    Procedural History

    Sailor petitioned for a writ of prohibition under CPLR Article 78 to prevent the robbery and assault trial.

    The Appellate Division dismissed the petition.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s dismissal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the extraordinary remedy of prohibition is appropriate to prevent a criminal trial from proceeding based on a collateral estoppel claim, when that claim can be reviewed through the regular appellate process.

    Holding

    No, because prohibition is reserved for instances where a court acts without jurisdiction or exceeds its authorized powers, and should not be used for premature review of issues properly reviewable on appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the limited nature of the remedy of prohibition, stating that it “lies only where there is a clear legal right, and only when a court * * * acts or threatens to act either without jurisdiction or in excess of its authorized powers in a proceeding over which it has jurisdiction.” The court reasoned that Sailor’s collateral estoppel claim did not implicate the legality of the entire criminal proceeding, and the issue could be adequately addressed through the regular appellate process if he were convicted. Allowing prohibition in this case would “frustrate the speedy resolution of disputes and to undermine the statutory and constitutional schemes of ordinary appellate review.” The court distinguished this case from situations where prohibition might be appropriate, noting that Sailor’s claim was the type of claimed error that could be properly reviewed during the regular appellate process, citing People v. Fagan, 66 N.Y.2d 815, 816.

  • Matter of Cruz v. Sheriff of New York County, 69 N.Y.2d 866 (1987): Double Jeopardy and Continuing Offenses for Weapon Possession

    Matter of Cruz v. Sheriff of New York County, 69 N.Y.2d 866 (1987)

    The Double Jeopardy Clause precludes successive prosecutions for criminal possession of a weapon when the possession constitutes a single, continuing offense, even if the possession occurs in different locations over a short period.

    Summary

    Cruz was arrested in New York County for possessing a handgun six days after allegedly firing it in the Bronx. He pleaded guilty in the Bronx to a weapons charge. He then sought to dismiss the New York County indictment on double jeopardy grounds, arguing the possession was a single, continuous offense. The Court of Appeals held that unlawful possession is a continuing offense, and successive prosecutions for the same continuous possession violate double jeopardy. The court emphasized that the state cannot divide a single crime into multiple offenses based on time or location.

    Facts

    On February 5, 1985, Cruz fired a handgun at his sister in a Bronx apartment. Six days later, on February 11, 1985, he was arrested in New York County and found to be in possession of the same handgun. Both Bronx and New York Counties indicted him for criminal possession of a weapon. The Bronx indictment covered the February 5th possession, and the New York County indictment covered the February 11th possession.

    Procedural History

    Cruz pleaded guilty to attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the Bronx. He then moved to dismiss the New York County indictment based on double jeopardy. The motion was denied. Cruz then filed an Article 78 proceeding seeking to prohibit the New York County prosecution. The Appellate Division dismissed the petition. Cruz appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the New York County indictment for criminal possession of a weapon on February 11, 1985, violates the Double Jeopardy Clause, given Cruz’s prior conviction in the Bronx for possessing the same weapon on February 5, 1985.

    Holding

    Yes, because unlawful possession of a weapon is a continuing offense, and the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits successive prosecutions for the same continuous possession.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Brown v. Ohio, which held that the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents prosecutors from dividing a single crime into multiple offenses based on temporal or spatial units. The court reasoned that Cruz’s possession of the handgun for six days constituted a single, continuous offense. Even if Cruz possessed the weapon at his home (which would be a lesser included offense), it would still constitute the “same crime” for double jeopardy purposes under Brown v. Ohio.

    The court distinguished cases where a defendant abandons and then recovers a weapon, noting that continuous possession is essential to Cruz’s double jeopardy claim. Quoting Blockburger v. United States, the court stated that possession is “an offense continuous in its character”. The court further quoted United States v. Jones, stating that “(p)ossession is a course of conduct, not an act.”

    The court emphasized that the legislature had not defined criminal possession in terms of specific “temporal units.” Instead, it is defined by “dominion” and “control.” Therefore, Cruz could only be prosecuted once for the continuous possession of the handgun, and the New York County indictment was barred by double jeopardy.

  • People v. Neale, 77 N.Y.2d 488 (1991): Defining Custody for Escape Charges After Acquittal by Reason of Insanity

    People v. Neale, 77 N.Y.2d 488 (1991)

    An individual acquitted by reason of mental disease or defect and subsequently escaping from a non-secure mental health facility is not considered to be escaping from “custody” as defined in the second-degree escape statute, but may be considered in custody for a third-degree escape charge.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant, acquitted of a crime by reason of mental disease or defect and placed in a non-secure facility, could be charged with escape in the second degree after leaving the facility without authorization. The court held that escape in the second degree requires escape from custody, which in this context, requires more than mere supervision in a non-secure environment. However, the court also considered the possibility of a charge of escape in the third degree. This case highlights the nuances of defining “custody” within the framework of mental health law and penal law related to escape.

    Facts

    The defendant, Neale, was acquitted of criminal charges due to mental disease or defect under CPL 330.20. Following the acquittal, the court ordered Neale to be placed in the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Health. Initially, Neale was confined in a secure psychiatric facility. Later, the court granted permission for Neale to be transferred to a non-secure facility. Neale subsequently left the non-secure facility without permission and was charged with escape in the second degree.

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed the second-degree escape charge, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The prosecution appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that Neale’s unauthorized departure from the non-secure facility constituted escape in the second degree because he was still in the “custody” of the Commissioner of Mental Health.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant who has been acquitted of a crime by reason of mental disease or defect and who elopes from a non-secure mental health facility is considered to have escaped from “custody” within the meaning of Penal Law § 205.10, thus justifying a charge of escape in the second degree.

    Holding

    No, because the “custody” required for escape in the second degree necessitates a level of restriction greater than that present in a non-secure facility. However, the court suggested the possibility of a charge for escape in the third degree.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the term “custody,” as used in the escape statute, implies a significant restraint on liberty. The court acknowledged that CPL 330.20 places individuals acquitted by reason of mental disease or defect under the supervision of the Commissioner of Mental Health. However, it distinguished between secure and non-secure facilities. The court found that the level of supervision and freedom afforded in a non-secure facility did not constitute the type of “custody” contemplated by the second-degree escape statute. The court emphasized the difference between the restriction of liberty in a secure facility versus the relative freedom in a non-secure facility. A dissenting opinion argued that escape from a non-secure facility still constituted escape from the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Health and should be considered escape in the third degree, pointing to the language of CPL 330.20 which refers to acquittees, whether in secure or non-secure facilities, as being in the “custody” of the Commissioner. The dissent cited People v Walter, 115 AD2d 52, 55-56 and People v Buthy, 85 AD2d 890 in its reasoning.

  • People v. White, 73 N.Y.2d 469 (1989): Extreme Emotional Disturbance Defense and Attempted Murder

    People v. White, 73 N.Y.2d 469 (1989)

    A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on the defense of extreme emotional disturbance when sufficient evidence is presented, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, that would allow a jury to find the defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance with a reasonable explanation or excuse.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The Court reasoned that, under the specific circumstances and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, there was sufficient evidence presented to create a jury question as to whether the defendant was acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance. The Court also held that the Appellate Division did not abuse its discretion in failing to remit the case for resentencing.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with attempted murder and raised the defense of extreme emotional disturbance. At trial, the defendant presented evidence concerning his subjective state and the external circumstances as he perceived them. The specific facts contributing to the claim of extreme emotional disturbance are not detailed in this memorandum opinion.

    Procedural History

    The defendant requested a jury charge on extreme emotional disturbance, which the trial court denied. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision, finding that the charge should have been given. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing the defense was inapplicable to attempted murder. The defendant cross-appealed the Appellate Division’s failure to remit the case for resentencing.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the People preserved the argument that the defense of extreme emotional disturbance is inapplicable to attempted murder for appellate review.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the defense of extreme emotional disturbance.
    3. Whether the Appellate Division abused its discretion in failing to remit the case for resentencing.

    Holding

    1. No, because the People did not argue against the charge on extreme emotional disturbance based on its inapplicability to attempted murder at the trial level.
    2. Yes, because under the circumstances and viewing the evidence favorably to the defendant, there was enough evidence to present a jury question on whether the defendant was acting under extreme emotional disturbance.
    3. No, because under the circumstances of this case, the Appellate Division’s decision not to remit for resentencing was not an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals first addressed the People’s argument that the defense of extreme emotional disturbance is inapplicable to attempted murder, finding that this argument was not preserved for appellate review because it was not raised at trial. Citing People v. Villani, the Court reiterated that issues not raised at the trial level are generally waived on appeal.

    Regarding the trial court’s refusal to charge the jury on extreme emotional disturbance, the Court emphasized the standard for determining the sufficiency of the evidence. It cited People v. Casassa, stating that the assessment requires consideration of “the subjective, internal situation in which defendant found himself and the external circumstances as he perceived them at the time.” The Court, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant (as required by People v. Moye), concluded that the evidence presented a jury question on the defense.

    Finally, the Court addressed the defendant’s cross-appeal concerning resentencing, holding that the Appellate Division did not abuse its discretion. The Court cited People v. Cohen, indicating that the decision to remit for resentencing is generally discretionary.

  • People v. Gonzalez, 68 N.Y.2d 424 (1986): The Missing Witness Rule and Control of Witnesses

    People v. Gonzalez, 68 N.Y.2d 424 (1986)

    A party is entitled to a missing witness charge if they demonstrate that an uncalled witness has knowledge of a material issue, would be expected to testify favorably to the opposing party, and is under that party’s control, such that an unfavorable inference may be drawn from the failure to call the witness.

    Summary

    Gonzalez was convicted of robbery and petit larceny. At trial, he requested a missing witness charge because the prosecution failed to call the complainant’s husband, who allegedly witnessed the defendant fleeing the scene. The trial court denied the request. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Gonzalez had established a prima facie case for the missing witness charge. The court clarified that “control” of a witness extends beyond physical availability and encompasses witnesses who, due to their relationship with a party, would naturally be expected to testify favorably to that party. The failure to give the charge and precluding comment on it was reversible error.

    Facts

    Miriam Jiminez testified that she was robbed in her apartment building lobby by two men, one of whom she identified as Gonzalez, whom she knew from the neighborhood. She stated that Gonzalez held a knife to her neck while his accomplice brandished a gun, demanding money. Jiminez testified that Gonzalez grabbed her shoe, removed $800, and fled. Jiminez told her husband about the incident, and he looked out the window and saw Gonzalez running away. The husband was not called to testify.

    Procedural History

    Gonzalez was convicted in Supreme Court, Kings County, of robbery in the first degree and petit larceny. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that they could draw an unfavorable inference from the prosecution’s failure to call the complainant’s husband as a witness, and in precluding defense counsel from commenting on this failure during summation.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant established a prima facie case for a missing witness charge, demonstrating that the uncalled witness had knowledge of a material issue, would be expected to testify favorably to the opposing party (the prosecution), and was under that party’s control.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the “missing witness” rule, which states that “the nonproduction of evidence that would naturally have been produced by an honest and therefore fearless claimant permits the inference that its tenor is unfavorable to the party’s cause”. The Court outlined the requirements for a missing witness charge: (1) the uncalled witness is knowledgeable about a material issue; (2) the witness would naturally be expected to provide noncumulative testimony favorable to the party who has not called him; and (3) the witness is available to such party.

    The Court emphasized that “control” is a relative concept that does not concern physical availability but rather the relationship between the witness and the parties. A witness can be considered under the control of a party if, due to their relationship (e.g., spouse, close relative), they would naturally be expected to testify favorably to that party. The court stated, “if a witness, although theoretically ‘available’ to both sides, is favorable to or under the influence of one party and hostile to the other, the witness is said to be in the ‘control’ of the party to whom he is favorably disposed, and an unfavorable inference may be drawn from the failure to call the witness.”

    In this case, the complainant’s husband’s testimony was material because it concerned the identity of the defendant as one of the assailants, which was the crux of the prosecution’s case. Given the husband’s relationship with the complainant (common-law spouse), he would naturally be expected to testify favorably to the prosecution. The Court found the husband’s potential testimony was not cumulative, as the record did not support that claim. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying the missing witness charge and in precluding defense counsel from commenting on the prosecution’s failure to call the husband as a witness.

  • People v. Smalls, 68 N.Y.2d 553 (1986): Prosecution’s Duty to Disclose Brady Material and Concurrent Convictions

    People v. Smalls, 68 N.Y.2d 553 (1986)

    A defendant cannot claim a due process violation for failure to disclose exculpatory material (Brady violation) when they had the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses about the evidence at trial; convictions for both robbery in the first degree and criminal use of a firearm cannot stand when the firearm elevates the robbery to a class B felony, and the same firearm is used to sustain the conviction for criminal possession of a firearm.

    Summary

    The case concerns a robbery conviction where the prosecution failed to produce photo arrays requested by the defense (alleged Brady violation) and the propriety of convicting the defendant of both robbery in the first degree and criminal use of a firearm. The Court of Appeals held that because the defense knew of the photo arrays during the trial and could have cross-examined the witness about them, there was no due process violation. Additionally, the Court found it was an abuse of discretion to convict the defendant of both robbery and criminal use of a firearm when the firearm was the basis for both charges.

    Facts

    Several masked men committed a gunpoint robbery at a tavern. A special police officer, Merrel Sanford, identified the defendant from a photo array as one of the robbers. The defendant requested production of the photos used in the identification. Initially, the prosecution claimed a first photo array no longer existed. At trial, Sanford testified he viewed two photo arrays: one immediately after the crime (where the defendant’s picture was absent) and another five days later (containing multiple pictures of the defendant). The prosecution assured the defense the photos were available, yet failed to produce them.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was indicted for robbery, criminal use of a firearm, and unlawful imprisonment. After a Wade hearing, the motion to suppress identification evidence was denied. Following a bench trial, the defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reversing the weapons counts but otherwise affirming. Both the defendant and the People appealed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the People’s failure to produce the photo arrays in response to the defendant’s request constituted a Brady violation requiring a new trial or reopening of the Wade hearing?
    2. Whether expert medical testimony regarding scars on the defendant’s body was improperly admitted as speculative?
    3. Whether convictions for both robbery in the first degree and criminal use of a firearm in the first degree were proper when the same firearm was the basis for both charges?

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant had the information regarding the photo arrays during the trial and an opportunity to cross-examine the witness.
    2. No, because the expert testimony demonstrated sufficient confidence to satisfy accepted standards of reliability, and the weight of the testimony was for the trier of fact.
    3. No, because convictions of both crimes under these circumstances constituted an abuse of discretion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the Brady violation, the Court acknowledged the prosecution’s duty to disclose exculpatory material. However, the Court emphasized that the defense knew of the information and had the chance to use it during cross-examination. The Court stated: “Defendant cannot claim that he was deprived of due process when he had the opportunity during the bench trial to cross-examine the identifying witness using the allegedly exculpatory evidence.” Because the defendant failed to challenge the identification based on the availability of photos until after being found guilty, no due process violation occurred.

    Regarding the expert testimony, the Court noted that expert opinions need not be asserted with absolute certainty, so long as the expert demonstrates sufficient confidence in their conclusions. The Court deferred to the trial court’s discretion in determining that the testimony had probative value. “While the doctor could not fix the dates of defendant’s wounds with any certainty, he was able to identify a scar on defendant’s left hand as an untreated bullet wound at least four months old.”

    Regarding the convictions for both robbery and criminal use of a firearm, the Court found that while technically proper under CPL 300.40(3)(a), convicting the defendant of both crimes constituted an abuse of discretion because neither crime contains an element which is not also an element of the other crime. The court explained, “When use of or display of a firearm is an element of a class B felony, the use or display of that same firearm cannot also be the predicate for criminal display of a firearm in the first degree.”

  • People v. McManus, 67 N.Y.2d 541 (1986): Justification as a Defense to Depraved Indifference Murder

    People v. McManus, 67 N.Y.2d 541 (1986)

    Justification is a defense to depraved indifference murder, and when evidence supports the defense, the prosecution must disprove justification beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Summary

    McManus was convicted of depraved indifference murder for firing a rifle into a group, fatally wounding one. He argued he shot to scare them off as they were robbing his companion. At trial, he requested a justification charge for the depraved indifference murder count, but the court refused, stating justification requires intent, incompatible with depraved indifference. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding justification is a valid defense to depraved indifference murder, and the prosecution must disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt when the defense is raised.

    Facts

    McManus and a friend were approached by five males, one of whom put a gun to the friend’s stomach. McManus ran, and upon looking back, saw his friend being robbed and beaten. The group chased McManus to his home where he retrieved a rifle. The group then began assaulting McManus’ friend again. McManus fired the rifle, hitting one of the group members.

    Procedural History

    McManus was indicted for intentional murder and depraved indifference murder. At trial, he requested a jury instruction on justification for both counts. The court instructed on justification for intentional murder but refused for depraved indifference murder. The jury acquitted McManus of intentional murder but convicted him of depraved indifference murder. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, vacated the conviction, and remitted the case for a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether justification is a legally cognizable defense to the charge of depraved indifference murder, and whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on justification with respect to the depraved indifference murder count.

    Holding

    Yes, because justification does not make a criminal act lawful, but rather, renders the use of force lawful under certain circumstances, negating criminality altogether. The People have the burden of disproving justification beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that justification, under Penal Law Article 35, affirmatively permits the use of force under certain circumstances, rendering the conduct lawful, not merely excusing it. The defense applies to any offense involving the use of force, regardless of the defendant’s mental state. The court stated, “[i]n any prosecution for an offense, justification is available” (Penal Law § 35.00). The court rejected the argument that depraved indifference murder, by definition, cannot be justified, stating that this begs the question by assuming the criminality of the use of force. If the conduct is justified, it cannot be the basis of any crime. The court noted that “[i]f the conduct is justified, it simply cannot be the basis of depraved indifference murder or any other crime.” The court emphasized that if any reasonable view of the evidence would permit a fact finder to decide the conduct was justified, an instruction on the defense must be given. “Under such circumstances, refusal to charge that the People must disprove the alleged justification is reversible error.”