New York Law Review

Tag: Criminal Law

  • People v. Coleman, 74 N.Y.2d 381 (1989): Factual Impossibility and Attempted Crimes

    People v. Coleman, 74 N.Y.2d 381 (1989)

    A defendant can be convicted of attempt even if the completed crime was factually impossible, provided the crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be.

    Summary

    Coleman was convicted of attempted promoting prostitution and grand larceny after soliciting an undercover officer he believed to be a 15-year-old runaway to become a prostitute and stealing her necklace. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that his mistaken belief about the officer’s age did not negate his culpability for attempted promoting prostitution in the second degree. The court reasoned that because he intended to commit the crime and performed acts towards its commission, the factual impossibility (the officer being 24, not 15) was not a defense under Penal Law § 110.10.

    Facts

    Coleman approached a 24-year-old undercover police officer, believing she was a 15-year-old runaway.

    He encouraged her to engage in prostitution and offered to be her pimp.

    Coleman asked the officer for her gold chain, and when she refused, he snatched it and later sold it for $30.

    Procedural History

    Coleman was convicted by a jury of attempted promoting prostitution in the second degree and grand larceny in the third degree.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Coleman’s mistaken belief about the undercover officer’s age negates his culpability for attempted promoting prostitution in the second degree, where the completed crime was factually impossible due to the officer’s actual age.

    Holding

    No, because under Penal Law § 110.10, factual impossibility is not a defense to a charge of attempt when the crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Penal Law § 110.10, which states that it is not a defense to a prosecution for attempt that the completed crime was factually impossible if the crime could have been committed had the attendant circumstances been as the person believed them to be.

    The court distinguished this case from People v. Campbell, 72 N.Y.2d 602 (1988), explaining that Campbell involved strict liability for an unintended result, while this case involves a mistake about an aggravating circumstance (the victim’s age) and not the core conduct (promoting prostitution).

    The court emphasized that Coleman knowingly acted to promote prostitution, which is the core conduct prohibited by the statute. His mistaken belief about the victim’s age related to an aggravating element of the offense, not the underlying criminal conduct.

    The court reasoned that because the defendant’s mistake related to an aggravating element of the offense, and not to the core conduct that is proscribed by the statute, such mistake does not affect the defendant’s ability to act with the mental culpability required to complete the underlying offense and thus is no obstacle to his conviction for an attempt of that offense.

    The court stated, “The defendant did all that was necessary to complete the crime of promoting prostitution in the second degree and would have been guilty of the completed crime if the attendant circumstances had been as he believed them to be, that is, if the officer had been 15 instead of 24. The defendant’s mistake in that respect should not block his conviction for the attempt where it is the sole obstacle to his conviction for the completed crime.”

  • People v. Feerick, 69 N.Y.2d 844 (1987): Preserving Objections Based on Sufficiency of Evidence

    People v. Feerick, 69 N.Y.2d 844 (1987)

    To properly preserve a claim of evidentiary insufficiency for appellate review, a defendant must specifically raise the alleged deficiency before the trial court, thereby alerting the court to the specific element the prosecution purportedly failed to prove.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for bribe receiving and official misconduct. The defendant, a former NYC detective, argued on appeal that the prosecution failed to establish a key element of official misconduct: a duty to arrest the drug dealer during the criminal transaction. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant failed to properly preserve this argument for appeal because his objection at trial only contested whether he received a benefit, not whether he had a duty to act. Therefore, the argument was not properly preserved for appellate review.

    Facts

    The defendant, a former New York City detective, introduced a known drug dealer to a fellow police officer. The defendant was present when the drug dealer bribed the officer to protect the dealer’s drug operations from police investigation. The defendant was subsequently convicted of bribe receiving and official misconduct.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of bribe receiving and official misconduct after a jury trial. He appealed, arguing that the prosecution failed to establish a necessary element of the crime of official misconduct. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant preserved for appellate review the claim that the People failed to establish the “duty element” of official misconduct under Penal Law § 195.00, given that the defendant’s objection at trial focused solely on the lack of evidence that he received a benefit.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant argued before the trial court only that there was no evidence that he had received a benefit, and this contention was inadequate to alert the trial court that the defendant was urging insufficiency based on the entirely distinct claim that he had no clearly inherent duty but only a discretionary responsibility to arrest the drug dealer during the criminal transaction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that, to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be specific enough to bring the alleged error to the trial court’s attention. The Court stated that the defendant’s argument before the trial court only addressed that there was no evidence that he had received a benefit. The Court reasoned that this argument was inadequate to alert the trial court that the defendant was urging insufficiency based on the entirely distinct claim that he had no clearly inherent duty but only a discretionary responsibility to arrest the drug dealer during the criminal transaction. The Court relied on the principle articulated in People v. Gomez, 67 NY2d 843. Because the defendant’s objection at trial was focused on a different element of the crime, the Court concluded that the argument concerning the “duty element” was unpreserved. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court ruling.

  • People v. Oliver, 1 NY2d 152 (1956): Retroactive Application of Ameliorative Criminal Statutes

    People v. Oliver, 1 NY2d 152 (1956)

    When the legislature reduces the punishment for a crime via an ameliorative amendment, the lesser penalty applies to cases decided after the amendment’s effective date, even if the underlying act occurred before the change.

    Summary

    Oliver, a 14-year-old, was charged with first-degree murder. While awaiting trial, a law was enacted that treated those under 15 as juvenile offenders rather than criminals. The Court of Appeals addressed whether this ameliorative amendment applied retroactively to Oliver, entitling him to treatment as a juvenile offender. The court held that the amendment was indeed ameliorative and should be applied retroactively, reasoning that the legislature’s reduction in punishment indicated its belief that a lesser penalty sufficiently serves the demands of criminal law. Imposing a harsher penalty would serve no penological purpose.

    Facts

    Oliver, a 14-year-old boy, was charged with first-degree murder for killing his two-year-old brother. At the time of the crime, this was punishable by death.

    While Oliver was awaiting trial, the New York legislature amended the Penal Law to treat children under 15 as juvenile offenders rather than criminals, subjecting them to a different, less severe system of corrective treatment.

    Procedural History

    The case reached the New York Court of Appeals, which considered whether the ameliorative amendment should apply to Oliver’s case, which was pending at the time of the amendment’s enactment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an ameliorative amendment to the Penal Law, which reduces the punishment for a particular crime, should be applied retroactively to cases pending but not yet decided at the time of the amendment’s effective date.

    Holding

    Yes, because when the legislature mitigates punishment, it is presumed to have determined that the lesser penalty sufficiently addresses the needs of criminal law, rendering a harsher penalty pointless.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged the general rule against retroactive application of non-procedural statutes unless explicitly stated. However, it emphasized the exception for ameliorative amendments that reduce punishment. The court stated, “the law is settled that the lesser penalty may be meted out in all cases decided after the effective date of the enactment, even though the underlying act may have been committed before that date.”

    The court reasoned that by lessening the punishment, the legislature implies that the lesser penalty adequately serves the aims of criminal law. Applying a harsher penalty in such cases would not serve any legitimate penological purpose.

    The court differentiated between altering the definition of a crime by decriminalizing conduct altogether and merely reducing the punishment. In the former situation, the state may retain the right to prosecute the previously committed act, but in the latter, the rationale for imposing the stricter penalty vanishes.

    The Court quoted: “[W]hen the legislature changes the punishment…the new statute applies to all cases tried thereafter. ” The court reasoned that to not apply the new, more lenient, statute would “result in a futility.”

    The case emphasizes the importance of considering the legislative intent behind changes in criminal law, especially when it comes to punishment. If the intent is to be more lenient, the courts should apply the new law to all cases where it is possible.

  • People v. Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1 (1989): Enforceability of a Defendant’s Waiver of Right to Appeal

    74 N.Y.2d 1 (1989)

    A defendant may waive the right to appeal as a condition of a sentence or plea bargain, provided the waiver is made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether criminal defendants can waive their right to appeal as part of a negotiated sentence or plea bargain. In two consolidated cases, People v. Smith and People v. Seaberg, the Court held that such waivers are valid and enforceable, provided they are made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The Court emphasized the importance of plea bargaining in the criminal justice system and found no public policy reason to prohibit the waiver of the right to appeal. This decision underscores the finality of negotiated settlements in criminal cases, reinforcing the principle that defendants should be held to the terms of agreements they willingly enter.

    Facts

    In People v. Smith, the defendant pleaded guilty to robbery and attempted criminal possession of a weapon in exchange for a specific sentence and a waiver of his right to appeal. Despite the waiver, Smith appealed, arguing his sentence was excessive.

    In People v. Seaberg, the defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. He agreed to a sentence of a $500 fine and a conditional discharge, contingent on completing a rehabilitation program, in exchange for waiving his right to appeal. Seaberg later appealed, alleging trial errors.

    Procedural History

    In People v. Smith, the Appellate Division dismissed the appeal based on the waiver.

    In People v. Seaberg, the Appellate Division also dismissed the appeal, upholding the validity of the waiver.

    Both cases were consolidated on appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a criminal defendant may validly waive the right to appeal as part of a negotiated sentence or plea bargain?

    2. Whether Seaberg’s waiver was knowing, voluntary and intelligent and therefore enforceable?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the right to appeal, while important, is not more fundamental than other rights that defendants routinely waive, such as the right to a jury trial or the privilege against self-incrimination.

    2. Yes, because despite Seaberg not personally entering into the court’s colloquy, there was ample evidence in the record supporting that the defendant agreed to the bargain and did so voluntarily with a full appreciation of the consequences.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that plea bargaining is a vital part of the criminal justice system, enabling efficient resolution of cases and tailored sentences. Waivers of the right to appeal contribute to the finality of judgments, a crucial goal in both criminal and civil litigation. The Court emphasized that trial courts have a responsibility to ensure the reasonableness of plea bargains and sentences.

    The Court distinguished the right to appeal from rights that cannot be waived, such as the right to a speedy trial or the right to challenge the legality of a sentence, because those rights implicate society’s interest in the integrity of the criminal process. The Court stated that “the final and prompt conclusion of litigation is an important goal of public policy in criminal as well as civil litigation, provided always that the settlement is fair, free from oppressiveness, and sensitive to the interests of both the accused and the People.”

    Addressing Seaberg’s argument that his waiver was different because he maintained his innocence throughout the trial, the Court found no basis for distinguishing between pre-trial plea waivers and post-trial sentence agreements. The court stated that “the courts commonly enforce the waiver of rights, even though the defendant has not admitted guilt.”

    The Court stated the analysis for determining the enforceability of a waiver as follows, “A waiver, to be enforceable, must not only be voluntary but also knowing and intelligent. The trial court determines that it meets those requirements by considering all the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the waiver, including the nature and terms of the agreement and the age, experience and background of the accused.”

  • People v. Watts, 579 N.E.2d 210 (N.Y. 1991): Duty to Instruct Jury on Alibi Defense

    People v. Watts, 579 N.E.2d 210 (N.Y. 1991)

    A trial court errs in refusing a request to instruct the jury on alibi if the alibi testimony, viewed with all other evidence, could create a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s presence at the crime scene.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on alibi. The defendant and his sister testified, presenting an alibi defense. The Court of Appeals determined that the alibi testimony, when considered with all other evidence, could have created a reasonable doubt regarding the defendant’s presence at the location where the crime allegedly occurred. Therefore, a jury instruction on alibi was warranted, and the failure to provide it was not harmless error. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Facts

    The defendant was accused of selling drugs in the stairwell of an apartment building. At trial, the defendant and his sister testified, presenting an alibi. The alibi testimony sought to establish that the defendant was in his sister’s apartment, which was located within the same building as the stairwell where the drug sale allegedly took place, at the time of the alleged sale.

    Procedural History

    The trial court refused the defense counsel’s request to instruct the jury on alibi. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing defense counsel’s request to instruct the jury on alibi, when the alibi testimony, viewed together with all the other evidence, could have created a reasonable doubt concerning the defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime.

    Holding

    Yes, because the alibi testimony, when viewed together with all the other evidence, could have created a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s presence in the stairwell when the drugs were allegedly sold.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the alibi testimony did not need to establish impossibility or cover the entire transaction time. Quoting People v. Holt, the court stated that the alibi need not “establish that it would have been impossible for the defendant to have committed the crime and need not have covered the whole time of the transaction in question.” Instead, the evidence needed to raise a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s presence at the specific location where the crime occurred. The court reasoned that because the testimony, viewed together with all other evidence, could have created a reasonable doubt, a jury instruction on this defense was warranted. The failure to provide the instruction was deemed not harmless error. The court explicitly cited People v. Barbato, emphasizing that the alibi evidence should be considered in the context of all evidence presented. The court’s decision hinged on the potential impact of the alibi evidence on the jury’s assessment of reasonable doubt, emphasizing that a defendant is entitled to an alibi instruction when the evidence, if believed, could lead the jury to question the defendant’s presence at the crime scene.

  • People v. Roe, 74 N.Y.2d 20 (1989): Defining “Depraved Indifference” in Homicide

    People v. Roe, 74 N.Y.2d 20 (1989)

    “Depraved indifference to human life,” as an element of murder, requires conduct that is so wanton, deficient in a moral sense of concern, and devoid of regard for the life or lives of others as to equal in blameworthiness intentional murder.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of a 15-year-old juvenile offender for depraved indifference murder. The defendant, while playing a game of “Polish roulette,” shot and killed his best friend’s 13-year-old brother with a shotgun he loaded, despite knowing some shells were live ammunition. The court found sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the defendant’s reckless conduct evinced a depraved indifference to human life, meeting the standard for murder under New York Penal Law § 125.25(2). The dissent argued that the evidence only supported a conviction for manslaughter, as the defendant’s actions, while reckless, did not demonstrate the extreme callousness required for depraved indifference murder.

    Facts

    The 15-year-old defendant invited two younger boys, including the 13-year-old brother of his best friend, to his home. The boys examined the defendant’s weapons collection. The defendant then retrieved a 12-gauge shotgun and asked the victim to retrieve shells, some live and some dummy rounds, from his bedroom. The defendant loaded the shotgun with four shells, knowing that two were live. Standing 10 feet away from the other boys, the defendant exclaimed, “Let’s play Polish roulette. Who’s first?” He pointed the shotgun, pulled the trigger, and shot the victim in the chest, killing him. Immediately after the shooting, the defendant expressed remorse and directed one of the boys to call an ambulance.

    Procedural History

    The District Attorney presented the evidence to a Grand Jury, seeking a depraved indifference murder charge. The Grand Jury complied, and the defendant was tried without a jury, convicted of depraved indifference murder as a juvenile offender. The defendant appealed the conviction arguing insufficient evidence to support the depraved indifference element.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s conduct in playing “Polish roulette” with a loaded shotgun, resulting in the death of the victim, constituted conduct “evincing a depraved indifference to human life” sufficient to support a conviction for murder under New York Penal Law § 125.25(2)?

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant’s reckless actions, in the context of the circumstances, demonstrated a sufficiently wanton disregard for human life to be considered equal in blameworthiness to intentional murder and, thus, constituted depraved indifference murder.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that to satisfy the element of “depraved indifference to human life”, the defendant’s conduct must be “so wanton, so deficient in a moral sense of concern, so devoid of regard for the life or lives of others, and so blameworthy as to render him as culpable as one whose conscious objective is to kill.” The court emphasized that the focus should be on the objective circumstances of the act, not the defendant’s subjective intent. The court cited prior cases where depraved indifference was found, such as firing a gun multiple times in a crowded bar or continuously beating a young child. The court distinguished this case from simple recklessness, stating that it involved a higher level of culpability. The fact that the defendant loaded a shotgun with live ammunition, pointed it at another person, and pulled the trigger during a game of “Polish roulette” demonstrated the required depraved indifference. The Court dismissed the dissent’s argument that the defendant’s post-shooting remorse negated depraved indifference, stating that the focus must remain on the defendant’s actions immediately surrounding the shooting. The court found no reason to disturb the trial court’s findings. The dissent argued that the defendant’s conduct, while reckless, did not demonstrate the extreme callousness required for depraved indifference murder, especially considering his age and immediate remorse following the shooting. The dissent further criticized the admission of evidence regarding the defendant’s prior handling of firearms, arguing that its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

  • People v. Foster, 73 N.Y.2d 596 (1989): Larceny and Enforcement of Default Judgments

    People v. Foster, 73 N.Y.2d 596 (1989)

    Taking money pursuant to a default judgment, even if the judgment is later found to be jurisdictionally defective due to improper service, does not constitute larceny unless the defendants misrepresented the facts to the court.

    Summary

    Defendants, attorneys, obtained a default judgment against Prior for unpaid legal fees. Prior’s bank account was levied to satisfy the judgment. Prior had been part of a communal group and had lived at a group-owned apartment. She moved out, allegedly without informing the group of her new address and attempting to conceal it. The defendants served the summons at the group address, although service may have been improper. The People charged the attorneys with larceny, arguing they knew service was defective and the judgment was invalid. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s reinstatement of the guilty verdict, holding that enforcing a default judgment, even if jurisdictionally flawed, does not automatically constitute larceny absent misrepresentation to the court.

    Facts

    Mia Prior was a member of a communal group for 10 years, during which time she received benefits, including legal assistance. Defendant Foster, also a member and an attorney, assisted her with legal issues related to her father. After her father’s death in 1984, Prior inherited a trust and decided to leave the group. A dispute arose over Foster’s legal fees. Prior moved out of the group’s apartment at 415 East 12th Street and allegedly concealed her new address. Foster, represented by codefendant Paolo, sued Prior for unpaid fees and served a summons at the East 12th Street address, claiming it was Prior’s “last known residence”. The service arguably violated CPLR 308(2). A default judgment was entered, and Prior’s bank account was levied for over $7,000.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were charged with grand larceny in the second degree. The trial court initially denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment. A jury found the defendants guilty, but the trial court set aside the verdict, reasoning that the judgment was valid when executed. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the conviction, holding that obtaining a judgment with knowledge of improper service and intent to deprive property constitutes larceny. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether obtaining money pursuant to a default judgment, even if jurisdictionally defective due to improper service and the defendant’s knowledge of the defect, constitutes larceny.

    Holding

    No, because the defendants did not misrepresent the facts of service to the court when applying for the default judgment. The Court reasoned that merely obtaining a judgment known to be defective is not sufficient for a larceny conviction; there must be evidence of fraud or misrepresentation to the court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that the defendants did not misrepresent the facts of service to the court. While the affidavit of service contained the legal conclusion that service was “duly made,” the affidavits also disclosed that service was made at Prior’s “last known residence” and mailed to the same address, which, on its face, reveals a potential defect under CPLR 308(2). The court distinguished the case from others where defendants obtained court orders through forgery, perjury, or other factual misrepresentations. The Court acknowledged the People’s argument that taking money under a void order constitutes larceny under Penal Law § 155.05(1). However, the Court stated this section is not a “catchall” for acts not specifically prohibited by the Legislature. The Court cited the reluctance to elevate civil wrongs to criminal larceny, especially in business activities where intent is unclear. The Court noted the need for specific legislative action to criminalize such conduct, including safeguards against abuse. “Conduct which is wrongful in the civil context is not necessarily ‘wrongful’ within the meaning of the larceny statutes”. The Court emphasized that the Legislature has generally identified prohibited conduct quite specifically and provided some additional safeguard, such as the corroboration requirement for perjury. The Court concluded that the defendant’s conduct was not larceny as defined by the Legislature and reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

  • People v. Bartley, 75 N.Y.2d 447 (1990): Limits on a Court’s Inherent Power to Vacate a Plea

    People v. Bartley, 75 N.Y.2d 447 (1990)

    A court’s inherent power to vacate a plea and sentence is limited, especially after judgment has been entered, and cannot be exercised over the defendant’s objection when the error goes beyond a mere clerical error on the record’s face.

    Summary

    Bartley pleaded guilty to attempted grand larceny, with all parties mistakenly believing it was a felony. After sentencing and incarceration began, the mistake was discovered: the crime was a misdemeanor at the time of the offense. The trial court sought to correct the error by offering a plea to a different felony, but Bartley refused. The court then vacated the original plea. Bartley sought prohibition, arguing double jeopardy. The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court lacked the power to vacate the plea after sentencing, absent fraud or misrepresentation, and reinstated the original plea for misdemeanor resentencing.

    Facts

    Bartley and a co-defendant were indicted for robbery, assault, and grand larceny.

    Pursuant to a plea bargain, Bartley pleaded guilty to attempted grand larceny in the third degree, with a promised sentence of 1 1/2 to 3 years.

    At the time of the plea, all parties incorrectly believed attempted grand larceny in the third degree was a Class E felony, justifying the agreed-upon sentence given Bartley’s status as a predicate felon.

    In reality, the crime was a Class A misdemeanor at the time the crimes were committed, and the felony reclassification did not take effect until later.

    The error was discovered after Bartley began serving his sentence.

    The trial court offered Bartley the opportunity to plead guilty to grand larceny in the fourth degree (a felony) to match the agreed-upon sentence, but Bartley refused.

    The trial court then vacated the original plea and set the matter down for trial.

    Procedural History

    Bartley commenced an Article 78 proceeding to prohibit further prosecution on the felony charges, reinstate his original plea, and be resentenced as a misdemeanor offender.

    The Appellate Division granted the petition, prohibiting further felony prosecution, reinstating the original conviction, and remanding for resentencing.

    The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a court has the inherent power to vacate an illegally imposed plea and sentence, based on a mutual mistake of fact, after the criminal proceeding has terminated by the entry of judgment, and against the defendant’s wishes, where the mistake is that the underlying crime was actually a misdemeanor, not a felony, at the time of commission?

    Holding

    No, because after a sentence is imposed and a judgment is entered, a plea cannot be disturbed based upon the parties’ mutual mistake when there is no statutory basis for setting aside such a plea, and because courts lack inherent power to vacate a plea and sentence over the defendant’s objection where the error goes beyond a mere clerical error apparent on the face of the record.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged its prior holdings that courts have inherent power to vacate orders and judgments obtained by fraud or misrepresentation but emphasized that this power is not unlimited.

    The Court distinguished cases where clerical errors were corrected or where fraud was involved, noting that the error here went beyond a simple clerical mistake and there was no allegation of fraud. Citing Matter of Campbell v. Pesce, 60 NY2d 165, the court reiterated that there is no inherent power to vacate a plea and sentence over the defendant’s objection after the proceeding has terminated, unless the error is a mere clerical one.

    The Court explained that while the sentence was illegal (felony time for a misdemeanor plea), the proper remedy was to impose a new sentence consistent with the misdemeanor plea, not to vacate the plea itself. The court stated: “Once defendant’s sentence was imposed and judgment was entered, however, his plea could not be disturbed based upon the parties’ mutual mistake since no statutory basis existed for setting aside such a plea”.

    The court explicitly rejected the People’s argument that the mutual mistake rendered the plea bargain voidable under contract law principles. Further prosecution on the original felony charges was barred by double jeopardy.

  • People v. DeGina, 72 N.Y.2d 768 (1988): Improper Entrapment Charge When Defendant Denies the Crime

    People v. DeGina, 72 N.Y.2d 768 (1988)

    A trial court commits reversible error by instructing the jury on the affirmative defense of entrapment when the defendant explicitly denies raising that defense and instead asserts a defense inconsistent with entrapment.

    Summary

    DeGina was convicted of drug sales. At trial, he argued he sold talcum powder, not drugs, to an undercover officer. The prosecution requested an entrapment instruction, which the court gave over DeGina’s objection. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that giving the entrapment instruction was error because DeGina did not raise that defense. Entrapment requires admitting the crime and claiming inducement, which DeGina didn’t do. This error prejudiced DeGina by undermining his chosen defense and imposing an unassumed burden of proof. The court emphasized that a defendant has the right to chart his own defense, and the entrapment charge contradicted DeGina’s claim that he did not sell drugs.

    Facts

    John DiDomenico, an undercover agent, met DeGina seeking to buy cocaine. After several unsuccessful attempts, DeGina sold DiDomenico an envelope of talcum powder for $125. DiDomenico insisted on restitution, after which DeGina and a friend, Sanzo, sold him opium and amphetamines. At trial, DeGina’s mother testified about numerous calls from “Frank” (DiDomenico) and a meeting between Frank and Sanzo.

    Procedural History

    DeGina was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding the entrapment charge harmless error due to “overwhelming evidence” of intent. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, ordering a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether it is reversible error for a trial court to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of entrapment over the defendant’s objection, when the defendant maintains a defense inconsistent with entrapment.

    Holding

    Yes, because imposing the burden of proving entrapment on DeGina, who had not raised it, constituted an abuse of the affirmative defense that violated his right to have the State bear the entire burden of proof. Furthermore, the instruction undermined the defense chosen by DeGina.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the entrapment defense was improperly applied. DeGina’s defense was that he did not commit the crime charged (selling drugs), but rather sold talcum powder. He claimed the officer fabricated the drug sales story. The court emphasized that a defendant has the right to chart his own defense. “[A] defendant unquestionably has the right to chart his own defense.” The court highlighted the prejudice to DeGina: the entrapment charge undermined his chosen defense, placed him in the midst of contradictory defenses (admitting and denying the sale of drugs), and imposed an affirmative burden of proof he had not undertaken. The court stated, “[T]he court’s charge imposed upon defendant an affirmative burden that the jury was bound to conclude he had failed to sustain.” The Court rejected the argument that the error was harmless, noting that overwhelming evidence of intent was irrelevant when the defense was that the sales never occurred. “Overwhelming evidence of intent would be relevant to the question whether the defense of entrapment had been made out, but was not proof whether the sales took place at all.”

  • People v. Grega, 72 N.Y.2d 489 (1988): Variance Between Indictment and Proof at Trial

    People v. Grega, 72 N.Y.2d 489 (1988)

    A conviction will be reversed if the proof at trial varies so significantly from the indictment as to deprive the defendant of fair notice of the charges or usurp the Grand Jury’s power.

    Summary

    This case addresses when a variance between the indictment and the proof presented at trial warrants reversal of a conviction. The Court of Appeals held that in People v. Grega, there was no impermissible variance because the complainant’s testimony aligned with the indictment’s allegation of physical force. However, in People v. Roberts, the prosecution’s theory of strangulation at trial differed so significantly from the indictment’s claim that the victim was struck, thus warranting a new trial.

    Facts

    In Grega, the defendant was indicted for rape, sodomy, sexual abuse, and unlawful imprisonment, alleging forcible compulsion through physical force. At trial, the complainant testified about being physically restrained, handcuffed, and bound before the sexual offenses occurred. The defendant claimed consent. In Roberts, the defendant was indicted for manslaughter for striking the victim, causing her death. At trial, medical testimony suggested the victim died from strangulation, not a blow. The indictment specified the defendant struck the victim in the neck area.

    Procedural History

    In Grega, the County Court convicted the defendant on all counts. The Appellate Division reversed, citing an impermissible change in the theory of prosecution based on jury instructions regarding ‘express or implied threats.’ In Roberts, the defendant was convicted of manslaughter and grand larceny. The Appellate Division reversed the manslaughter conviction, finding the trial theory of strangulation inconsistent with the Grand Jury’s finding.

    Issue(s)

    1. In Grega, whether the trial court’s instruction on both statutory definitions of forcible compulsion (physical force and express or implied threats), when the indictment only charged physical force, constituted an impermissible change in the theory of prosecution requiring reversal.

    2. In Roberts, whether the People’s presentation of proof at trial, contradicting the factual allegations of the manslaughter count of the indictment as to the cause of death, violated the defendant’s right to fair notice and the Grand Jury’s authority.

    Holding

    1. In Grega, No, because the jury’s verdict could only have been based on evidence of actual physical force as charged in the indictment.

    2. In Roberts, Yes, because the variance between the indictment’s allegation of striking the victim and the trial evidence suggesting strangulation deprived the defendant of fair notice and usurped the Grand Jury’s authority.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that an indictment serves three key purposes: providing notice to the defendant, preventing prosecutorial overreach, and avoiding double jeopardy. In Grega, the proof at trial aligned with the indictment’s allegations, so the defendant was not deprived of notice. While the trial court erred by instructing the jury on both definitions of forcible compulsion, the error was harmless because the evidence supported only the theory of physical force. The court stated, “While the trial court should not have charged both statutory definitions of forcible compulsion, but instead should have tailored its instructions to the case before it, on this record we conclude that the additional portion of the charge had no potential for prejudicing defendant, and thus was harmless error.” In Roberts, however, the People’s evidence of strangulation directly contradicted the indictment’s claim that the victim was struck, violating the defendant’s right to prepare a defense. “Having specified in the indictment, and later in their answer to discovery, that defendant struck the victim, thereby causing her death, the People were not then free to present proof at trial that virtually ruled out that theory as the cause of death and substituted another one.” The court emphasized that the factual allegations related to the cause of death were not extraneous and that the defendant was prejudiced because he was unprepared to defend against a charge of strangulation. Further, the evidence of strangulation was evidence of murder, the crime for which the Grand Jury had refused to indict.