New York Law Review

Tag: criminal investigation

  • City of New York v. Uniformed Fire Officers Association, 95 N.Y.2d 278 (2000): Arbitrability of Employee Rights in Criminal Investigations

    City of New York v. Uniformed Fire Officers Association, 95 N.Y.2d 278 (2000)

    Public policy bars arbitration of disputes concerning the procedures used by the New York City Department of Investigation (DOI) in conducting criminal investigations, as allowing arbitration would impermissibly delegate the City’s broad authority to investigate its internal affairs.

    Summary

    The City of New York sought to prevent arbitration of a dispute with the Uniformed Fire Officers Association (UFOA) regarding whether the employee rights provisions of their collective bargaining agreement (CBA) applied to criminal investigations conducted by the DOI. The DOI had excluded a union representative from interviews with firefighters during a criminal investigation. The Court of Appeals held that public policy, as reflected in the New York City Charter and decisional law, prohibits arbitration that would interfere with the DOI’s authority to conduct criminal investigations, affirming the lower courts’ decisions to enjoin arbitration.

    Facts

    In February 1996, the DOI subpoenaed several firefighters, including members of the UFOA, as part of criminal investigations. One investigation involved a firefighter fraudulently claiming a disabling injury to obtain higher pension benefits. During DOI interviews, a fire officer’s union representative was excluded, and the union counsel questioned the adequacy of the notice given to the firefighters under Article XVII of the CBA, which contains provisions for employee rights during interrogations, interviews, trials, and hearings.

    Procedural History

    The UFOA filed a request for arbitration, claiming the City violated Article XVII of the CBA. The City challenged the arbitrability of the request before the New York City Board of Collective Bargaining (BCB), which determined the dispute was arbitrable. The City then commenced a special proceeding in Supreme Court to annul the BCB’s determination and enjoin arbitration. The Supreme Court set aside the BCB’s determination and enjoined arbitration. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether public policy bars arbitration of a dispute over whether the employee rights provisions of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) can be invoked to limit or restrict the procedures of criminal investigations commenced by the New York City Department of Investigation (DOI).

    Holding

    No, because allowing an arbitrator to restrict the DOI’s investigatory procedures by invoking the employee rights provisions of a CBA would be an impermissible delegation of the City’s broad authority to investigate its internal affairs.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that a two-pronged inquiry is required to assess arbitrability: (1) whether arbitration claims are authorized for the subject matter of the dispute, and (2) whether the parties consented to refer disputes in this specific area to arbitration. Applying the first prong, the Court found that public policy prohibits arbitration of the DOI’s criminal investigation procedures. The Court emphasized the importance of the DOI’s role in investigating corruption and criminal activity within the City, as outlined in the New York City Charter and relevant case law. According to the court, allowing an arbitrator to dictate investigation procedures would hinder the DOI’s role and contravene the City Charter’s prohibition against interference with investigations. The Court further reasoned that judicial intervention to stay arbitration is warranted when granting any relief would violate public policy. The procedural protections afforded to a City employee under the CBA cannot be separated from their impact on a DOI criminal investigation. The Court also stated that the BCB’s determination that the dispute is arbitrable is not entitled to due deference, as arbitration is prohibited by public policy here. Chief Judge Kaye dissented, arguing that the stay of arbitration was premature because the arbitrator could fashion a remedy consistent with public policy and because factual questions remained about the nature of the DOI investigation.

  • People v. Sinski, 88 N.Y.2d 487 (1996): Physician-Patient Privilege and Statutory Exceptions in Criminal Cases

    People v. Sinski, 88 N.Y.2d 487 (1996)

    The physician-patient privilege protects confidential communications between a patient and their healthcare provider, and exceptions to this privilege are narrowly construed, particularly in the context of criminal investigations.

    Summary

    Defendant, a police officer, was convicted of crimes based on evidence that he unlawfully obtained drug prescriptions. The prosecution argued that Public Health Law § 3373 eliminated the physician-patient privilege, allowing the admission of the evidence. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that § 3373 does not permit the release of confidential medical information to law enforcement for criminal proceedings absent judicial process. The court emphasized the importance of patient confidentiality to encourage open communication with doctors and narrowly interpreted the statutory exception.

    Facts

    Defendant, a police officer, experienced dental and back problems requiring pain medication. The Internal Affairs Bureau suspected excessive drug use based on insurance claims filed by the defendant and initiated an investigation. Investigators interviewed the defendant’s physicians and dentists, obtaining written statements and reviewing patient records. The Grand Jury subsequently charged the defendant with criminal possession of a forged instrument, falsifying a business record, and violating Public Health Law provisions related to obtaining prescriptions.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant on all four counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding the evidence admissible under Public Health Law § 3373. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the physician-patient privilege had been violated.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the exception to the physician-patient privilege contained in section 3373 of the Public Health Law extends to the investigation and criminal prosecution of the defendant in this case, allowing the admission of confidential medical information obtained from his physicians and dentists.

    Holding

    No, because Section 3373 of the Public Health Law does not authorize treating physicians to release confidential information to police authorities for criminal proceedings absent judicial process; the legislative intent is to maintain patient confidentiality, and the exception to the privilege is narrowly tailored to the specific duties arising under Article 33 of the Public Health Law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that the physician-patient privilege, codified in CPLR 4504(a), promotes open communication between patients and physicians. While the privilege has exceptions, it is to be broadly construed. Public Health Law § 3373, enacted to prevent drug diversion, was not intended to generally abrogate the privilege for criminal prosecution. The statute’s language and legislative history reveal a concern for patient confidentiality, limiting disclosure to reports required by the statute. The court distinguished Matter of Camperlengo v. Blum, noting that case involved Medicaid billing requirements that implied an exception to the privilege. The court rejected the argument that a crime-fraud exception should apply, finding that the prosecution had not argued that the defendant visited doctors solely to obtain drugs. As the court noted, “The People’s suggestion that the Legislature intended section 3373 to generally abrogate the physician-patient privilege for the purpose of criminal prosecution is not only contrary to the rationale behind the physician-patient privilege — to encourage complete candor in order to secure appropriate treatment — but it is also contradicted by the language of the statute and the Legislature’s demonstrated concern over confidentiality in this area.”

  • Matter of Alphonso C. and Matter of District Attorney of Kings County v. Angelo G., 38 N.Y.2d 923 (1976): Appealability of Orders Issued During Criminal Investigations

    Matter of Alphonso C., 38 N.Y.2d 923 (1976)

    Orders compelling a suspect to appear in a lineup or provide a handwriting exemplar, issued during a criminal investigation but before the commencement of a criminal action, are considered criminal proceedings and are not subject to direct appellate review absent statutory authorization.

    Summary

    These cases address the appealability of orders compelling individuals to participate in lineups or provide handwriting exemplars during criminal investigations, before any formal charges have been filed. The District Attorneys of New York and Kings Counties sought these orders to aid in investigations of an attempted homicide and forgery/larceny, respectively. The Court of Appeals held that because these orders were issued in the context of criminal investigations, the proceedings were criminal in nature. Since no statute authorized direct appellate review of such orders, they were not appealable, and the appeals were dismissed.

    Facts

    In Alphonso C., the District Attorney of New York County applied for a court order directing Alphonso C. to appear in a lineup as part of an attempted homicide investigation. In Angelo G., the District Attorney of Kings County sought an order compelling Angelo G. to provide a handwriting exemplar in connection with a forgery, grand larceny, and falsifying business records investigation. In both cases, no criminal action had been initiated against the individuals, and the requests were not related to any pending criminal action or grand jury proceedings.

    Procedural History

    In Alphonso C., the Supreme Court granted the District Attorney’s application, but the Appellate Division, First Department, reversed. In Angelo G., the Supreme Court granted the District Attorney’s application, and the Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed. Both cases were then appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an order directing a suspect to appear in a lineup or provide a handwriting exemplar, issued during a criminal investigation before the commencement of a criminal action, is directly appealable.

    Holding

    No, because such an order is part of a criminal proceeding, and there is no statutory authorization for direct appellate review of these types of orders.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the orders obtained by the District Attorneys were part of criminal proceedings because they were issued in the context of criminal investigations. The court relied on CPL 1.20, subd 18, par [b] and Matter of Santangello v People, 38 NY2d 536 to support this determination. The Court emphasized the absence of statutory authority for direct appellate review. Therefore, the Court concluded that the orders of the Supreme Court were not appealable under CPL 1.10 and Matter of Santangello v People. The court stated, “There being no statutory authorization for direct appellate review, the orders of Supreme Court are not appealable and the appeals taken therefrom should have been dismissed.”