New York Law Review

Tag: Criminal Impersonation

  • People v. Golb, 23 N.Y.3d 455 (2014): Defines ‘Injury’ and ‘Benefit’ in Criminal Impersonation

    People v. Golb, 23 N.Y.3d 455 (2014)

    The terms “injure” and “benefit” in New York’s criminal impersonation statute (Penal Law § 190.25[1]) are not limitless but include tangible pecuniary injury, interference with governmental operations, and harm to reputation; however, the statute prohibiting aggravated harassment via communication is unconstitutionally broad.

    Summary

    Raphael Golb conducted an internet campaign to discredit scholars who disagreed with his father’s theories on the Dead Sea Scrolls, using pseudonyms and impersonating others to send disparaging emails and blog posts. He was convicted of multiple counts, including identity theft, criminal impersonation, forgery, aggravated harassment, and unauthorized use of a computer. The New York Court of Appeals upheld some convictions (criminal impersonation and forgery) but vacated others (identity theft, aggravated harassment, and unauthorized computer use), clarifying the scope of the criminal impersonation and aggravated harassment statutes and defining the terms “injure” and “benefit”.

    Facts

    Norman Golb, defendant’s father, is a scholar of the Dead Sea Scrolls, holding a minority view. Raphael Golb, the defendant, engaged in a campaign to discredit scholars who supported the dominant theory, including Robert Cargill, Stephen Goranson, Lawrence Schiffman, Frank Cross, and Jonathan Seidel. Golb used pseudonyms and impersonated these scholars to send emails and publish blog posts that were critical of their work and promoted his father’s views. For example, he impersonated Schiffman, an NYU professor, and sent emails to Schiffman’s students and superiors admitting to plagiarism. He also created email accounts in the names of others to send disparaging messages.

    Procedural History

    A New York County grand jury indicted Golb on 51 counts. The jury convicted him on 30 counts. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, vacating one count of identity theft but otherwise affirming the convictions. Golb appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the terms “benefit” and “injure” in Penal Law § 190.25(1) (criminal impersonation) are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and whether reputational harm constitutes an “injury” under the statute.
    2. Whether Penal Law § 240.30(1)(a) (aggravated harassment) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
    3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support convictions for unauthorized use of a computer and identity theft.

    Holding

    1. Yes, the terms “injure” and “benefit” cannot be construed to apply to any injury or benefit, no matter how slight, but injury to reputation is within the “injury” contemplated by Penal Law § 190.25. However, the mere creation of email accounts does not constitute criminal impersonation.
    2. Yes, Penal Law § 240.30(1)(a) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it criminalizes communications with the intent to annoy, which is not sufficiently limited.
    3. No, the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions for unauthorized use of a computer and identity theft because the prosecution failed to prove that Golb’s computer access was unauthorized or that he falsified business records.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while “injure” and “benefit” in the criminal impersonation statute cannot encompass every minor harm or advantage, they do extend to reputational harm. The Court stated, “Many people, particularly with a career in academia, as relevant to this case, value their reputations at least as much as their property, and we believe the legislature intended that the scope of the statute be broad enough to capture acts intended to cause injury to reputation.” However, the mere creation of email accounts without use does not cause substantial harm.

    Regarding aggravated harassment, the Court found Penal Law § 240.30(1)(a) unconstitutional because it criminalizes communications intended to “annoy,” which is too broad and lacks necessary limitations on its scope, infringing on protected speech. The Court cited People v. Dietze, noting that “any proscription of pure speech must be sharply limited to words which, by their utterance alone, inflict injury or tend naturally to evoke immediate violence.”

    Finally, the Court determined that the prosecution failed to prove that Golb’s use of NYU computers was “unauthorized” as required by Penal Law § 156.05, given his alumni status and library access. Moreover, the Court found insufficient evidence that Golb falsified any NYU business records, a necessary element of the identity theft charge. The Court noted, “[I]f two constructions of a criminal statute are plausible, the one more favorable to the defendant should be adopted in accordance with the rule of lenity”.

  • People v. Blair, 19 N.Y.3d 343 (2012): Admissibility of ‘Familiarity and Access’ Evidence Under Molineux

    People v. Blair, 19 N.Y.3d 343 (2012)

    Evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts is admissible only if it is probative of some fact at issue other than the defendant’s criminal propensity; however, even if improperly admitted, a conviction will stand if the error is harmless.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of robbery, grand larceny, and criminal impersonation for two incidents where he impersonated a police officer. The prosecution introduced evidence that the defendant possessed a handcuff key while incarcerated awaiting trial, arguing it showed his “access to handcuffs.” The Court of Appeals held that admitting the handcuff key evidence was error because it was not sufficiently relevant and was prejudicial. However, the Court affirmed the conviction, finding the error harmless due to the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt, including eyewitness testimony and corroborating evidence.

    Facts

    In the first incident, the defendant displayed a badge, claimed to be a police officer, and demanded money from the victim. He pushed the victim and threatened him with handcuffs, ultimately obtaining money from an ATM. In the second incident, the defendant, while driving, impersonated an officer during a traffic stop of a cab driver. Police officers arrived, discovered the ruse, and found fake badges and toy handcuffs in the defendant’s car. Several weeks after the incidents, a corrections officer found a handcuff key on the defendant while he was incarcerated at Riker’s Island awaiting trial.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted the People’s Molineux application, allowing testimony about the handcuff key. The defendant was convicted. His motion to set aside the verdict was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding the evidence of the handcuff key properly admitted. The Court of Appeals reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the handcuff key to show “familiarity and access” to the tools of the crime, and if so, whether this error requires reversal of the conviction.

    Holding

    No, although the trial court erred in admitting the handcuff key evidence because its probative value was outweighed by its potential for prejudice, the error was harmless because the proof of the defendant’s guilt was overwhelming and there was no significant probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant had the evidence been excluded.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals cited People v. Molineux, stating that evidence of uncharged crimes is admissible only if probative of a fact at issue other than the defendant’s criminal propensity. Such evidence may be admitted to establish motive, intent, absence of mistake, a common scheme, or identity. The Court acknowledged that the Molineux list is not exhaustive, but stressed that the evidence must be more probative than prejudicial. The Court found the handcuff key evidence had little relevance, noting the handcuffs were never used in the first incident and not directly involved in the second. Quoting People v. Richardson, the court stated the evidence’s “limited probative value when compared to its potential for prejudice and the unacceptable danger that the jury might condemn defendant because of his past criminal behavior…makes this evidence inadmissible.” However, the Court found the error harmless, citing People v. Crimmins. The Court noted the overwhelming evidence of guilt regarding both incidents, including the victim’s account, the ATM surveillance video, and the arresting officer’s testimony. Because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming, the Court concluded there was no significant probability that the verdict would have been different had the handcuff key evidence been excluded. The Court also found a single improper statement during the prosecutor’s summation was cured by a curative instruction.