New York Law Review

Tag: Criminal Facilitation

  • People v. Watson, 19 N.Y.3d 252 (2012): Agency Defense Does Not Apply to Criminal Facilitation

    People v. Watson, 19 N.Y.3d 252 (2012)

    The agency defense, which can negate the “sale” element in a drug sale charge, does not extend to a charge of criminal facilitation because the facilitation statute focuses on aiding the commission of a crime, irrespective of whether the defendant acted as an agent of the buyer.

    Summary

    Tyrone Watson was charged with selling cocaine, facilitating the sale, and possessing narcotics after he assisted an undercover officer in purchasing drugs. At trial, Watson claimed he was acting as the agent of the buyer. The trial court acquitted him of the sale charge based on the agency defense but convicted him of facilitation and possession. The New York Court of Appeals held that the agency defense does not apply to criminal facilitation, emphasizing that facilitation focuses on aiding the commission of a crime and that the agency defense is only relevant to the element of “sale.” The court affirmed the conviction for criminal facilitation.

    Facts

    An undercover narcotics sergeant asked Tyrone Watson where he could find some “rock.” Watson made phone calls to locate cocaine. He then suggested they go to a specific location. The officer gave Watson $40. Watson introduced the officer to “JD Blue,” stating his companion wanted two bags of crack. Watson handed the money to Blue. Blue gave Watson the drugs, which Watson then passed to the officer. Watson was arrested and found to be in possession of cocaine and a crack pipe.

    Procedural History

    Watson was indicted for felony sale of a controlled substance, misdemeanor criminal possession of a controlled substance, and misdemeanor criminal facilitation. The trial court acquitted Watson of the sale count, applying the agency defense, but convicted him of criminal facilitation and possession. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the agency defense, successful in negating a charge of criminal sale of a controlled substance, also applies to a charge of criminal facilitation.

    Holding

    1. No, because the agency defense is specific to the “sale” element of a drug sale charge, whereas criminal facilitation focuses on aiding the commission of a crime, irrespective of the defendant’s role as an agent of the buyer.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that criminal facilitation occurs when a person, believing they are aiding someone intending to commit a crime, engages in conduct that provides the means or opportunity for the commission of that crime. This statute assigns culpability to someone who knowingly aids a crime but lacks the mental culpability required for accomplice liability. The court emphasized the plain language of the statute, noting Watson brought the officer to the dealer and provided the dealer the opportunity to sell cocaine. The court stated, “the facilitation statute plainly was intended to cover the type of conduct engaged in by defendant: he brought the undercover officer to JD Blue and provided the dealer with the opportunity to intentionally sell cocaine, thereby aiding the commission of that felony.”

    The court distinguished criminal facilitation from the sale of controlled substances, noting that the agency defense is “a well-established interpretation of the statutory definition of the term ‘sell.’” Since “sale” is not an element of facilitation, the agency defense is inapplicable. Penal Law § 115.10 (3) specifically states the fact that defendant was neither an accomplice to the sale nor guilty of that crime does not provide a defense to facilitation.

    Furthermore, the Court highlighted the original purpose of the agency defense—to mitigate the harsh penalties of the Rockefeller Drug Laws by reducing a defendant’s culpability from a serious felony to a possessory offense. In Watson’s case, both facilitation and possession are misdemeanors, indicating a legislative calibration of punishment that does not necessitate the agency defense. The court added that “It would be incongruous to allow a facilitator, who clearly acts as the buyer’s conduit to the drug seller and actively participates in the consummation of the transaction, to escape all criminal liability as long as that person never touches the drugs.”

  • People v. Llanos, 77 N.Y.2d 866 (1991): Criminal Facilitation Requires Actual Aid in Committing the Underlying Crime

    People v. Llanos, 77 N.Y.2d 866 (1991)

    To be guilty of criminal facilitation, a defendant must provide the means or opportunity for the commission of a felony and, in fact, aid another person in committing that felony.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the reversal of the defendant’s conviction for criminal facilitation in the fourth degree. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove that the defendant’s actions provided the means or opportunity for the commission of the underlying crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance. The defendant, upon seeing police officers, yelled “Police, Police” and knocked on the door of an apartment where drugs were subsequently found. The court reasoned that the defendant’s conduct did not enable the apartment’s occupants to possess the contraband for any longer than they would have without her actions, and therefore, she did not facilitate the crime.

    Facts

    Police officers arrived at an apartment building to execute a search warrant. As the officers walked up the stairs, the defendant saw them and yelled “Police, Police,” while also knocking on the door of apartment 14. The officers immediately arrested the defendant. After entering apartment 14, police found a large quantity of cocaine, a gun, and drug paraphernalia. The occupants of the apartment were then arrested and charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of criminal facilitation in the fourth degree after a bench trial. The Appellate Division unanimously reversed the conviction, finding that the prosecution failed to establish any of the elements of criminal facilitation as a matter of law. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s act of yelling “Police, Police” and knocking on a door provided the means or opportunity for others to commit the crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance, thus constituting criminal facilitation.

    Holding

    No, because there was no evidence that the defendant’s conduct enabled the occupants of the apartment to possess the contraband for any longer than they would have if she had done nothing. Thus, she did not provide the “means or opportunity” for the commission of the crime, nor did she in fact aid the occupants in committing the crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court focused on the elements of Penal Law § 115.00 (1), which defines criminal facilitation in the fourth degree. The statute requires that the defendant renders aid that provides the means or opportunity to commit the crime and, in fact, aids a person in committing a felony. The court distinguished the facts from cases where the defendant’s actions directly furthered the underlying crime. The court stated, “Here, there is no evidence that defendant’s conduct enabled the occupants of apartment 14 to possess the contraband for any period longer than they would have had defendant done nothing. Thus, it cannot be said that defendant provided the ‘means or opportunity’ for commission of the object felony.” The court cited examples of criminal facilitation such as receiving currency which initiated a drug transaction (People v. Streeter) and transporting “buy” money (People v. Schoen) to illustrate how a defendant must actively assist in the commission of the underlying crime.

  • People v. Glover, 57 N.Y.2d 61 (1982): Establishing Lesser Included Offenses in New York

    People v. Glover, 57 N.Y.2d 61 (1982)

    A defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense charge only if (1) it is theoretically impossible to commit the greater crime without also committing the lesser crime, and (2) a reasonable view of the evidence supports a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals clarified the two-pronged test for determining when a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a lesser included offense. The Court emphasized that the first prong requires a theoretical, abstract comparison of the statutory definitions of the crimes, not an examination of the specific facts of the case. The second prong requires that there be a reasonable view of the evidence in the particular case that would support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater. In this case, the court found that it is theoretically possible to sell drugs without the intent to aid another person in committing a Class A felony. Therefore, the defendant was not entitled to a charge of criminal facilitation as a lesser included offense of criminal sale of a controlled substance.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree. At trial, the defendant requested that the court also charge the jury on criminal facilitation in the second degree as a lesser included offense.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s request to charge the jury on criminal facilitation. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to consider whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the lesser included offense.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request to charge the jury on criminal facilitation in the second degree as a lesser included offense of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree.

    Holding

    No, because it is theoretically possible to commit the greater crime of criminal sale of a controlled substance without also committing the lesser crime of criminal facilitation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals articulated a two-pronged test for determining when a defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense charge. The first prong, derived from CPL 1.20(37), requires that it be “impossible to commit the greater crime without concomitantly, by the same conduct, committing the lesser offense.” This is determined by comparing the statutes in the abstract, without reference to the specific facts of the case. The second prong, prescribed by CPL 300.50(1), requires “an assessment of the evidence of the particular criminal transaction in the individual case and a determination that there is a reasonable view of such evidence which would support a finding that, while the defendant did commit the lesser offense, he did not commit the greater.”

    The Court found that the defendant failed to satisfy the first prong. The Court reasoned that “it would be theoretically possible for a defendant illegally to sell a drug without intending to aid anyone else in the commission of a class A felony (as, for instance, when the criminal transaction involved only the defendant and an undercover police buyer).” Because the defendant could not satisfy the first prong of the test, the Court held that the trial court did not err in refusing to charge the jury on criminal facilitation.

    The Court explicitly overruled prior cases like People v. Johnson, People v. Cionek, and People v. Hayes, “to the extent that our decisions…may be read as at variance with this application, they are no longer to be followed.” These cases had resolved the first inquiry by examining only the criminal transaction on which the particular prosecution was predicated.

  • People v. Teitelbaum, 450 N.Y.S.2d 983 (1982): Criminal Facilitation Requires Aid Concurrent with the Underlying Crime

    People v. Teitelbaum, 450 N.Y.S.2d 983 (1982)

    Criminal facilitation requires that the facilitator’s aid be rendered while the underlying crime is still in progress; assistance provided after the principal crime is complete does not constitute criminal facilitation.

    Summary

    This case addresses the temporal relationship between the commission of a crime and the act of criminal facilitation. The New York Court of Appeals held that a lawyer could not be convicted of criminal facilitation for assisting an Assistant District Attorney in a bribery scheme because the assistance occurred after the ADA had already accepted the bribe. The court reasoned that the crime of bribe receiving was complete upon acceptance of the bribe, and any subsequent assistance could not have facilitated the commission of that crime. The dissent argued that the bribery scheme was ongoing and that the lawyer’s actions did, in fact, facilitate the overall criminal enterprise.

    Facts

    An Assistant District Attorney (ADA) solicited a bribe in exchange for influencing the outcome of a burglary prosecution. The ADA received $6,500 and later an additional $1,500 to pay a more compliant defense attorney, the defendant Teitelbaum, whom the ADA suggested be substituted as counsel. The ADA guaranteed a refund if the burglary defendant wasn’t kept out of jail. Teitelbaum was engaged by the ADA and did not disclose the amount he was paid. Teitelbaum was later convicted of criminal facilitation.

    Procedural History

    Teitelbaum was convicted of criminal facilitation in the trial court. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment of conviction, finding that Teitelbaum’s actions did not constitute criminal facilitation. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a person can be convicted of criminal facilitation when the assistance rendered occurred after the principal actor had already committed the underlying crime.

    Holding

    No, because criminal facilitation requires that the facilitator provide assistance during the commission of the underlying felony. Once the felony is complete, any subsequent assistance cannot be considered facilitation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the crime of bribe receiving, as defined in Penal Law § 200.10, is complete when a public servant “solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit…upon an agreement or understanding that his vote, opinion, judgment, action, decision or exercise of discretion as a public servant will thereby be influenced.” Since the ADA had already accepted the bribe before Teitelbaum was engaged, the court concluded that Teitelbaum’s actions could not have facilitated the commission of the crime of bribe receiving. The court emphasized the importance of the temporal relationship, stating that the facilitator’s actions must aid the principal actor in committing the felony. The court distinguished between aiding the commission of a crime and aiding a person who has already committed a crime. The dissent argued that the bribery scheme was an ongoing enterprise and that Teitelbaum’s assistance was integral to the overall plan, even if it occurred after the initial acceptance of the bribe. The dissent emphasized the language of the indictment, which spanned the connected events running from the crime’s inception through the date of the arrest. However, the majority adhered to a strict interpretation of the statute, focusing on the specific elements of the crime of bribe receiving and the timing of Teitelbaum’s involvement.