Weicker v. Weicker, 22 N.Y.2d 8 (1968)

Strong policy considerations prevent courts from applying the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress to disputes arising out of matrimonial differences, as it would revive issues similar to those addressed by the abolition of alienation of affections and criminal conversation actions.

Summary

Plaintiff sued her former spouse and another woman, seeking damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress and injunctive relief to prevent the defendants from holding themselves out as husband and wife. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of these claims, holding that public policy considerations prevent the application of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress to disputes arising out of matrimonial differences. Allowing such claims would undermine the legislative intent behind the abolition of actions for alienation of affections and criminal conversation.

Facts

Plaintiff brought an action against her former husband and another woman. The claims included a request for damages based on the intentional or reckless infliction of mental suffering. She also sought an injunction to restrain the defendants from holding themselves out as husband and wife and to prevent the defendant woman from using the former husband’s name.

Procedural History

The Appellate Division dismissed the portions of the plaintiff’s second amended complaint seeking damages for intentional infliction of mental suffering and injunctive relief. The plaintiff appealed this decision to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether a claim for damages based on the intentional infliction of emotional distress can be sustained in the context of a dispute arising out of matrimonial differences.

2. Whether injunctive relief is available to restrain defendants from holding themselves out as husband and wife in a dispute arising out of matrimonial differences.

Holding

1. No, because strong policy considerations militate against applying the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress to the factual context of disputes arising out of matrimonial differences.

2. No, because the same policy reasons barring damages also bar injunctive relief, and because courts of equity should not administer paternal relief in domestic affairs as such decrees are practically unenforceable.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that allowing a claim for damages in this context would effectively revive the evils that prompted the Legislature to abolish actions for alienation of affections and criminal conversation. These abolished causes of action historically allowed a spouse to sue a third party for interfering with the marital relationship. The court noted the legislature’s clear intent to eliminate causes of action based on marital discord. The court held that claims for emotional distress stemming from matrimonial disputes should also be barred to prevent an end-run around the legislative intent. The court quoted Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N.Y. 382, 389 stating that “ [i]t is not the province of courts of equity to administer paternal relief in domestic affairs. As a matter of practical fact, such decrees cannot be enforced ”. Therefore injunctive relief was deemed inappropriate.