New York Law Review

Tag: Criminal Contempt

  • People v. Inserra, 9 N.Y.3d 30 (2007): Knowledge of Order of Protection Inferred from Signature

    People v. Inserra, 9 N.Y.3d 30 (2007)

    A defendant’s signature on an order of protection is sufficient to infer knowledge of the order’s contents for the purposes of a criminal contempt charge.

    Summary

    Inserra was convicted of criminal contempt for violating an order of protection. The information alleged that his name appeared on the signature line of the order. The Appellate Term reversed, finding this insufficient to establish knowledge of the order’s contents. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a defendant’s signature on the signature line of an order of protection is sufficient to allege knowledge of its contents, fulfilling an essential element of criminal contempt. The Court reasoned that the signature implies awareness of the order’s terms, which are typically written clearly and concisely.

    Facts

    Inserra was subject to an order of protection directing him to stay away from his ex-girlfriend and her home, school, business, and place of employment and to refrain from assaulting, stalking, or harassing her. The People presented evidence that Inserra banged on the protected person’s apartment door, shouting and demanding to be admitted, violating the order. The sworn deposition of the police officer stated that he “examined a copy of [the] o[r]der of protection and that the defendant’s name appears on the line for the defendant’s signature.”

    Procedural History

    A Queens County Criminal Court jury found Inserra guilty of second-degree criminal contempt. Inserra appealed to the Appellate Term, arguing the information failed to allege he had knowledge of the order’s terms. The Appellate Term reversed the conviction and dismissed the information. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which reversed the Appellate Term’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s name on the signature line of an order of protection adequately supports an allegation that the defendant knew of the order’s contents for the purposes of a charge of criminal contempt.

    Holding

    Yes, because defendant’s name on the signature line sufficiently alleges that defendant received and read the terms of the order of protection, enabling an inference that he was aware of its contents.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the factual allegations must establish, if true, every element of the crime charged and the defendant’s commission of each. The Court distinguished this case from People v. McCowan, where the defendant was merely informed that “an order” had been issued against him. Here, Inserra’s signature on the order’s signature line suggests he received and read the terms of the order. The Court stated, “defendant’s name on the signature line of the order enables us to infer that he was aware of its contents, which are written on a single page in simple language and clear, legible type.”

    The Court emphasized the pleading standard, stating that, based on the officer’s deposition, the allegations, if true, were sufficient to establish that Inserra violated each element of the crime charged, including his knowledge of the order of protection’s contents. The Court also rejected Inserra’s argument that the information failed to allege a violation by omitting a statement that the protected person was at home when Inserra banged on the door, noting the order prohibited Inserra from going near the protected person’s home, whether or not she was present. The dissent is not discussed as there was none.

  • People v. Konieczny, 2 N.Y.3d 569 (2004): Guilty Plea Forfeits Challenge to Order of Protection Validity

    People v. Konieczny, 2 N.Y.3d 569 (2004)

    A defendant’s guilty plea to criminal contempt generally forfeits the right to challenge the underlying order of protection’s validity on appeal, unless the challenge implicates the court’s jurisdiction or a constitutional right.

    Summary

    Konieczny pleaded guilty to attempted criminal contempt for violating an order of protection. On appeal, he argued the order was invalid because the protected party wasn’t a victim or witness in the underlying bad check case, thus the order was improperly issued under CPL 530.13(4). The New York Court of Appeals held that his guilty plea forfeited this non-jurisdictional challenge. The Court emphasized that guilty pleas mark the end of litigation, and only jurisdictional defects or fundamental constitutional rights survive such a plea. While cautioning against misuse of protective orders, the Court affirmed the conviction, finding the accusatory instrument sufficient on its face.

    Facts

    Defendant pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct related to a bad check charge. Subsequently, an order of protection was issued directing him to stay away from Gary M. Although compliance with the order was a condition of his discharge, the order didn’t specify Gary M.’s connection to the bad check charge. One month later, police found Defendant at Gary M.’s residence, violating the order. He was charged with criminal contempt in the second degree. Defendant then pleaded guilty to attempted criminal contempt. Only on appeal did Defendant argue Gary M. wasn’t a victim or witness in the bad check case, rendering the protective order invalid.

    Procedural History

    Defendant pleaded guilty in City Court to attempted criminal contempt. On appeal to County Court, he argued the invalidity of the order of protection, which was rejected because the guilty plea forfeited the claim. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to determine if the challenge to the order survived the guilty plea.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s guilty plea to attempted criminal contempt forfeits the right to challenge the validity of the underlying order of protection on the grounds that the protected party was not a victim or witness in the underlying criminal action, when that challenge is raised for the first time on appeal.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s claim that the order of protection was invalid under CPL 530.13(4) is a statutory violation, not a jurisdictional defect or violation of a fundamental constitutional right, and therefore it did not survive his guilty plea. The information and supporting documents adequately pleaded that the defendant violated a court order.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that a guilty plea generally ends a criminal case, precluding further litigation on non-jurisdictional defects. Exceptions exist for jurisdictional matters or fundamental constitutional rights. The Court acknowledged concerns about misusing CPL 530.13 to issue protective orders for parties unrelated to the underlying prosecution. However, the Court determined that the defendant’s challenge to the order’s validity didn’t implicate the court’s jurisdiction. The misdemeanor information adequately alleged a violation of a court order, as the order of protection was facially valid and attached to the information. The Court cited People v. Casey, 95 N.Y.2d 354 (2000), stating that an accusatory instrument should be given a reasonable reading and external factors cannot be used to create jurisdictional defects not evident from the face of the document. The Court distinguished People v. Alejandro, 70 N.Y.2d 133 (1987), where the information failed to address an element of the offense. The Court noted that orders of protection are filed in a statewide registry and are enforced by a myriad of law enforcement agencies and courts throughout the state. For these reasons the court held, “Having pleaded guilty to attempted criminal contempt on a jurisdictionally valid accusatory instrument, defendant conceded every element of the offense, including the lawfulness of the order of protection, and forfeited his claim that the order violated CPL 530.13 (4).”

  • People v. Ray, 94 N.Y.2d 731 (2000): Sufficiency of Indictment When Referencing a Statute

    People v. Ray, 94 N.Y.2d 731 (2000)

    An indictment is jurisdictionally sufficient if it effectively charges the defendant with every material element of the crime by incorporating a specific reference to the statute, even if it doesn’t recite every clause of the statute.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of criminal contempt for violating an order of protection by leaving threatening messages. On appeal, he argued that the indictment was defective because it didn’t state that his actions didn’t arise from a labor dispute, a clause in the criminal contempt statute. The New York Court of Appeals held that the indictment was not jurisdictionally defective because it specifically referenced the statute, thus alleging all necessary elements of the crime. The court emphasized that absent a timely motion to dismiss, it would not consider whether more specific recitals were required beyond the jurisdictional minimum.

    Facts

    A temporary order of protection prohibited the defendant from contacting certain individuals who accused him of harassment.

    The defendant violated this order by leaving threatening messages on the voicemail of one of the protected individuals.

    As a result, the defendant was indicted on multiple counts of criminal contempt.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was indicted and convicted after a jury trial on one count of criminal contempt in the first degree and four counts of criminal contempt in the second degree.

    On appeal, the defendant argued for the first time that the indictment was jurisdictionally defective.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an indictment for criminal contempt is jurisdictionally defective if it incorporates the relevant statute by reference but does not explicitly state that the defendant’s actions did not arise from a labor dispute, as specified in the statute.

    Holding

    No, because the incorporation by specific reference to the statute operates to constitute allegations of all the elements of the crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on precedent (People v. Iannone, People v. Ray, People v. Motley, People v. Cohen) establishing that an indictment is only jurisdictionally defective if it fails to charge the defendant with every material element of the crime.

    The Court stated, “The incorporation by specific reference to the statute operates without more to constitute allegations of all the elements of the crime.” This means that by citing the statute in the indictment, the prosecution effectively alleged that all elements of the crime were met, including the absence of a labor dispute, even if it wasn’t explicitly stated.

    The Court rejected the defendant’s attempt to limit this rule to cases involving plea bargains or obvious/admitted elements, finding such distinctions unwarranted.

    The court emphasized that it would not consider arguments about whether more detailed recitals are required beyond the jurisdictional minimum in the absence of a timely motion to dismiss. The court noted it would not consider whether the labor dispute exemption is an exception or a proviso because that argument was not preserved.

    The court stated, “Absent a timely motion to dismiss, we have no occasion to consider whether statutory mandates beyond the jurisdictional minimum required the indictment to recite that defendant’s calls did not arise in a case ‘involving or growing out of labor disputes’.”

  • People v. Alfaro, 99 N.Y.2d 469 (2003): Factual Basis Required for Guilty Plea Despite Alford Plea

    People v. Alfaro, 99 N.Y.2d 469 (2003)

    Even with an Alford plea, where a defendant does not admit to the acts constituting the crime, there must be some factual basis presented to the court, either by the defendant or the prosecution, to support the acceptance of the guilty plea.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a guilty plea, specifically an Alford plea, could be accepted without any factual basis presented on the record. The defendant entered an Alford plea to criminal contempt but did not admit to the underlying facts. The prosecution also failed to proffer any evidence demonstrating the defendant’s guilt. The Court of Appeals held that it was improper for the trial court to accept the plea without some factual basis articulated on the record, even when it is an Alford plea where the defendant maintains their innocence but acknowledges the evidence against them is substantial.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted on multiple counts related to alleged criminal conduct against his former girlfriend. These charges included assault and aggravated criminal contempt for violating an order of protection. He pleaded guilty to criminal contempt in the first degree, specifically violating Penal Law § 215.51(b) by subjecting his girlfriend to physical contact with intent to harass, annoy, threaten, or alarm her. Critically, the defendant entered an Alford plea, meaning he pleaded guilty but did not admit to the factual basis of the crime. The prosecutor also did not provide any factual basis for the plea.

    Procedural History

    Following the guilty plea, the defendant obtained new counsel who moved to vacate the plea, arguing the defendant was not taking his medication for a mental illness at the time of the plea. The trial court ordered a psychiatric examination, which indicated the defendant was competent at sentencing but did not address his competency at the time of the plea. The defendant appealed, arguing his plea was not knowing or voluntary and violated due process. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order, with a dissenting opinion arguing that the trial court erred by not ensuring a factual basis for the plea was established.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a trial court can accept an Alford plea to a criminal charge when neither the defendant nor the prosecution proffers a factual basis for the plea on the record.

    Holding

    1. No, because a guilty plea, even an Alford plea, requires some indication on the record that there is a factual basis for the conviction; otherwise, it undermines fundamental principles of criminal procedure.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals, in the dissenting opinion, emphasized that fundamental principles of law mandate a factual basis for a guilty plea. The dissent cited precedent establishing that certain procedural errors are so fundamental that they invalidate the entire proceeding, even without a contemporaneous objection. The dissent argued that accepting an Alford plea without any factual basis presented by either the defendant or the prosecution violates this principle. Specifically, because Penal Law § 215.51(b)(v) requires actual physical contact or the threat of physical contact, the absence of any evidence supporting that element rendered the plea invalid. The dissent argued that the court had an obligation to ensure the defendant’s competency at the time of the plea and that the Alford plea needed some factual support from the prosecution. The dissent cited Matter of Silmon v Travis, noting that, at the time of the Alford plea in that case, there was record evidence that the defendant had committed the crime. The lack of any such evidence in Alfaro was the critical distinction. The dissent quoted from prior cases, such as Cancemi v People, to highlight the principle that some legal errors are so fundamental that they cannot be waived, even with the defendant’s consent. The dissent stated, “a conviction in this case violates the principle of law that a person should not be convicted, even on an Alford plea, without some indication on the record that there is a factual basis for the conviction.”

  • People v. Wood, 95 N.Y.2d 509 (2000): Double Jeopardy in Successive Contempt Prosecutions

    People v. Wood, 95 N.Y.2d 509 (2000)

    A criminal prosecution for first-degree criminal contempt is barred by double jeopardy when the defendant was previously prosecuted for contempt in Family Court based on the same underlying conduct of violating an order of protection.

    Summary

    Timothy Wood’s ex-wife obtained two orders of protection: one from City Court and another from Family Court, both ordering him to have no contact with her. Wood made a series of prank phone calls to his ex-wife, which were traced to his residence. He was then held in contempt in Family Court for violating the Family Court order and sentenced to incarceration. Subsequently, he was indicted on criminal contempt charges for violating the City Court order based on the same phone calls. The New York Court of Appeals held that the subsequent criminal prosecution was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause because the Family Court contempt proceeding and the criminal contempt charges were based on the same conduct.

    Facts

    Timothy Wood’s ex-wife obtained two “no contact” orders of protection against him. One was issued by Rochester City Court, and the other was issued by Monroe County Family Court. On December 25, 1996, Wood’s ex-wife received eleven prank phone calls, which were traced to Wood’s residence. The ex-wife then initiated a contempt proceeding in Family Court. The criminal charges stemmed from the same phone calls that formed the basis of the Family Court action.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court found Wood guilty of willfully violating the Family Court order of protection and sentenced him to six months incarceration. Subsequently, Wood was indicted on multiple counts of criminal contempt and aggravated harassment based on the same phone calls that led to the Family Court contempt finding. The Supreme Court denied Wood’s motion to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds. Wood was convicted after a jury trial. The Appellate Division reversed the criminal contempt convictions, holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the criminal prosecution. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a criminal prosecution for first-degree criminal contempt is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause when the defendant has already been prosecuted for contempt in Family Court based on the same conduct of violating an order of protection.

    Holding

    Yes, because the contempt provision of the Family Court Act is a lesser included offense of criminal contempt in the first degree, and the Double Jeopardy Clause bars successive prosecution and cumulative punishment for a greater offense after conviction for a lesser included offense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the Blockburger test, which asks whether each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not. If each offense contains an element the other does not, they are not the “same offense” for double jeopardy purposes. The court found that the Family Court contempt provision did not contain an element different from Penal Law § 215.51(c) and that the statutory elements of the Family Court provision were subsumed by those of Penal Law § 215.51(c). Because the same acts violated both orders, Wood could not be guilty of first-degree criminal contempt for violating the City Court order without also being guilty of contempt for violating the Family Court order. The court emphasized that the Family Court contempt provision is a lesser included offense of criminal contempt in the first degree. The court stated, “Comparing the elements, we conclude that the contempt provision of the Family Court Act article 8 is clearly a lesser included offense of criminal contempt in the first degree. That the People sought to prove a violation of a City Court order and not a Family Court order does not, under these circumstances, alter the double jeopardy analysis under Blockburger.” The court further reasoned that allowing the People to circumvent the double jeopardy bar by prosecuting a criminal action for violation of another court order based on the same conduct would eviscerate the constitutional prohibition. The court recognized that although the Legislature allows parallel court proceedings in different venues in domestic violence cases, the orders of protection in this case had the same purpose.

  • People v. Demczuk, 88 N.Y.2d 771 (1996): Admissibility of Evidence to Prove Notice of Order of Protection

    People v. Demczuk, 88 N.Y.2d 771 (1996)

    Notice of an order of protection, sufficient to support a criminal contempt charge, can be established through a combination of written documentation and oral communication, and testimony regarding the oral communication is admissible to prove that notice was given, not for the truth of the matter asserted.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the reinstatement of a criminal contempt charge against the defendant, holding that sufficient evidence existed to establish that the defendant had notice of the contents of an order of protection. The evidence included a written order and a State Trooper’s testimony that the judge informed the defendant about the order’s issuance for his wife’s protection. The court found that the trooper’s testimony was admissible to prove the defendant received notice, not to prove the truth of the judge’s statement. This combination of evidence sufficiently established the elements of criminal contempt.

    Facts

    An order of protection was issued for the temporary protection of the defendant’s wife. The defendant was present when the judge issued the order. A State Trooper testified that the judge informed the defendant about the order’s issuance and its purpose. The defendant was later charged with violating the order of protection, leading to a criminal contempt charge.

    Procedural History

    The County Court order was modified by the Appellate Division, which reinstated the first count of the indictment. A dissenting Justice at the Appellate Division granted the defendant leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, effectively reinstating the criminal contempt charge.

    Issue(s)

    Whether notice of the contents of an order of protection, required to prove criminal contempt, can be established through a combination of the written order and oral communication from the judge, as testified to by a State Trooper.

    Holding

    Yes, because notice of an order of protection may be given either orally or in writing, or a combination of both, and testimony regarding the oral notice is admissible to evidence the fact that the statement was made, not for the truth of its content.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the array of evidence presented to the Grand Jury was sufficient to support all elements of the criminal contempt charge. The written order of protection, coupled with the State Trooper’s testimony, established that the defendant had sufficient notice of the prohibited conduct and the person to whom it related (his wife). The court clarified that the State Trooper’s testimony regarding the judge’s statements was admissible because it was offered to prove that the statement was made, thereby establishing notice, and not to prove the truth of the statement itself. The court cited People v. Davis, 58 NY2d 1102, 1103, emphasizing that the evidence was “not for the truth of its content but to evidence the fact that the statement was made.” The court found that this evidence, in conjunction with the written order, satisfied the requirements for establishing notice for a criminal contempt charge. By allowing this combination of evidence, the court emphasizes the importance of ensuring defendants are fully aware of the terms of protective orders. This ruling helps to facilitate prosecutions for violations of such orders, thus enhancing the protection afforded to potential victims. The decision underscores that proving notice does not require strict adherence to formalistic rules of evidence when other reliable means exist to demonstrate actual knowledge of the order’s contents.

  • Department of Environmental Protection v. Department of Environmental Conservation, 70 N.Y.2d 233 (1987): Criminal Contempt Requires Willful Disobedience of a Clear Court Order

    Department of Environmental Protection v. Department of Environmental Conservation, 70 N.Y.2d 233 (1987)

    A party may be held in criminal contempt for willfully disobeying a clear and unequivocal court order, thereby demonstrating an offense against judicial authority and disrespect for the judicial process.

    Summary

    The City of New York sought to hold Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corporation in criminal and civil contempt for violating a partial stay order issued by the Court of Appeals. The dispute arose from Central Hudson’s continued burning of coal at its Danskammer facility despite an Appellate Division ruling and a subsequent partial stay order from the Court of Appeals that, according to the City, prohibited such burning. The Court of Appeals found Central Hudson in criminal contempt, holding that the company willfully disobeyed the court’s order by continuing to burn coal despite clear indications that it was not authorized to do so under the terms of the partial stay. The court emphasized that Central Hudson’s actions demonstrated a disregard for the judicial process, warranting a finding of criminal contempt and a fine.

    Facts

    Central Hudson sought to convert its Danskammer facility from oil to coal. The State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) initially approved the conversion. The City of New York, concerned about acid deposition affecting its water supply, challenged the DEC’s approval. The Appellate Division annulled the DEC’s approval. Subsequently, the DEC issued a “Certificate of Operation” allowing coal burning, predicated on the annulled approval. The City sought to vacate an automatic stay triggered by the DEC’s intention to appeal, while Central Hudson sought an independent stay. The Court of Appeals granted a partial stay allowing plant conversion construction, but explicitly stated it did not authorize coal burning.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division annulled the State Commissioner’s determination. The City sought to vacate the automatic stay resulting from the State’s intention to appeal. The Court of Appeals issued a partial stay. The City then moved to hold Central Hudson and its officers in civil and criminal contempt. The Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal and referred the contempt allegations to Justice Gagliardi for a hearing and report. Justice Gagliardi found that Central Hudson was not acting in good faith and that the City suffered no damages. The Court of Appeals then reviewed Justice Gagliardi’s report.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Central Hudson’s continued burning of coal after the issuance of the partial stay order constituted a willful violation of a lawful court order, warranting a finding of criminal contempt.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Central Hudson continued to burn coal despite a court order that explicitly permitted only plant conversion construction and did not authorize the burning of coal, demonstrating a willful disobedience of the court’s mandate.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized the distinction between civil and criminal contempt. Civil contempt aims to compensate or coerce compliance, requiring a showing of prejudiced rights, while criminal contempt punishes disobedience to protect the integrity of the judicial process. The Court found that the City’s concession of no calculable monetary damages effectively disposed of the civil contempt allegations. However, the Court rejected the parties’ attempt to settle the criminal contempt charge, emphasizing the public interest in upholding respect for judicial orders. The Court determined that the partial stay order clearly permitted only plant conversion construction, explicitly stating that it did not authorize the burning of coal. The court stated, “[W]here the order alleged to have been disobeyed is capable of a construction consistent with the innocence of the party, there likewise should be no adjudication of contempt.” Nevertheless, Central Hudson’s argument that it relied on its counsel’s interpretation of the order was unavailing, as the court found that Central Hudson, in effect, sought more relief than it was granted and then took the rest through a calculated misinterpretation of the order. The court concluded that Central Hudson acted with the requisite willfulness to sustain a criminal contempt charge, emphasizing that “[g]uilt arises only where the authority of the court is flouted”. Because of Central Hudson’s willful action, the Court held Central Hudson in criminal contempt and imposed the maximum statutory fine of $250.

  • County of Rockland v. Civil Service Employees Association, 62 N.Y.2d 11 (1984): Establishing Criminal Contempt for Union Strike Participation

    County of Rockland v. Civil Service Employees Association, 62 N.Y.2d 11 (1984)

    To establish criminal contempt against a union for violating an injunction against striking, evidence must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the union itself participated in or orchestrated the illegal strike activity.

    Summary

    This case concerns Rockland County’s attempt to hold the Civil Service Employees Association (CSEA) in criminal contempt for violating restraining orders against a strike by county employees. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s finding of criminal contempt, holding that the evidence demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that CSEA directly participated in the strike, providing financial support, organizational assistance, and strategic guidance. The court emphasized the high standard of proof required in criminal contempt cases involving labor injunctions.

    Facts

    Rockland County employees, represented by the Rockland County Unit of the Rockland County Local of CSEA, went on strike after unsuccessful contract negotiations. Prior to the strike, the court issued temporary restraining orders enjoining CSEA from engaging in, causing, instigating, encouraging, or condoning a strike. Despite these orders, the strike commenced and continued for several days. The county then sought to punish CSEA for criminal contempt for disobeying the restraining orders.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court found CSEA and its local unit in criminal contempt, fining them accordingly. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding CSEA liable for the actions of its local unit on an agency theory. The Appellate Division granted CSEA leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, certifying a question of law. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but on the grounds that the evidence was sufficient to prove CSEA’s direct participation in the strike, not solely on an agency theory.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented by Rockland County was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that CSEA itself participated in the strike, thereby supporting a finding of criminal contempt.

    Holding

    Yes, because the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that CSEA actively participated in the strike by providing financial support, organizational assistance, and strategic guidance.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that in criminal contempt cases arising from labor injunctions, the standard of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. The court reviewed the evidence presented, including testimony that a CSEA employee urged a strike vote, that CSEA coordinated strike activities with law enforcement, that CSEA provided financial support for striking employees, and that CSEA employees actively monitored and supported the picket lines. The court cited specific examples, such as CSEA paying for a newspaper advertisement explaining “Why CSEA Is On Strike.” The court concluded that this evidence, taken together, was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that CSEA itself participated in the strike. The court stated that the evidence clearly established that CSEA was the moving force behind the strike, provided all of the financial support for the strike, assisted in the organization and managing of the strike and without its support and assistance, the defendant unit could not have carried out the work stoppage.” The Court explicitly declined to address the Appellate Division’s agency theory, basing its decision solely on CSEA’s direct involvement. The court’s holding underscores the importance of direct evidence linking the parent union to the illegal strike activity to sustain a criminal contempt charge.

  • People v. Fischer, 53 N.Y.2d 614 (1981): Criminal Contempt Based on Evasive Testimony

    People v. Fischer, 53 N.Y.2d 614 (1981)

    A witness can be found guilty of criminal contempt for providing false and evasive answers, even if they do not outright refuse to answer questions.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s convictions for criminal contempt and perjury. The Court held that the defendant’s repeated professions of memory loss and denials regarding payments, in light of entries in his “black book” and testimony from his bookkeeper, constituted evasive and perjurious testimony. The Court found sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the defendant’s testimony before the grand jury was intentionally false and evasive, thereby obstructing the investigation and warranting a contempt conviction. The court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to prove both criminal contempt and perjury.

    Facts

    The defendant, Fischer, was convicted of criminal contempt and perjury based on his testimony before a grand jury. Key evidence included cryptic entries in Fischer’s “black book” and testimony from his bookkeeper regarding overheard conversations about payments to a union official. Fischer repeatedly responded with “I don’t remember,” “I don’t recall,” and “I don’t know” when questioned about the entries and denied making specific payments.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in a trial court where Fischer was convicted of criminal contempt and perjury. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision, upholding the convictions. Fischer then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Fischer’s repeated professions of memory loss and denials of knowledge constituted evasive testimony sufficient to support a conviction for criminal contempt.
    2. Whether there was sufficient evidence, including the black book entries and the bookkeeper’s testimony, to support the perjury conviction.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the jury was warranted in finding that the cryptic entries in the defendant’s black book were made in circumstances so memorable as to render his protestations of no recollection incredible and thus evasive.
    2. Yes, because the entries in the defendant’s black book, combined with his testimony and the bookkeeper’s testimony, provided sufficient evidence that the defendant committed perjury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Fischer’s repeated claims of memory loss, when considered in the context of the entries in his black book, were so implausible as to be evasive and obstructive, supporting the criminal contempt conviction. The court cited People v. Ianniello, 36 NY2d 137, 142, stating, “To be guilty of contempt the witness need not flatly refuse to answer the questions put to him; false and evasive profession of an inability to recall, which amounts to no answer at all, is punishable as criminal contempt.” The Court found that the defendant’s repeated responses of “I don’t remember”, “I don’t recall”, and “I don’t know”, together with his reiterated statements that the moneys went to no one specifically, were sufficient to sustain the finding of contemptuous evasion.

    Regarding the perjury conviction, the Court found that the entries in the black book, Fischer’s testimony regarding them, and the bookkeeper’s testimony about overheard conversations collectively established that Fischer lied under oath about making payments to a union official. Each piece of evidence corroborated the others, satisfying the corroboration requirement for perjury convictions under Penal Law § 210.50.

    The court also addressed the admissibility of extended portions of Fischer’s grand jury testimony, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence, even after the dismissal of one count of criminal contempt. The court referenced People v McGrath, 46 NY2d 12, 32.

  • People v. Marin, 51 N.Y.2d 750 (1980): Criminal Contempt for Evasive Grand Jury Testimony

    People v. Marin, 51 N.Y.2d 750 (1980)

    A witness commits criminal contempt when, during grand jury testimony, they offer general denials followed by professions of an inability to recall events which would have left an impression, amounting to an evasive refusal to answer.

    Summary

    Marin, Superintendent of a State Department of Correctional Services facility, was convicted of criminal contempt for evasive testimony before a grand jury investigating the misuse of state employees. The grand jury questioned Marin about allegations that he used state employees to repair his roof during work hours, using state materials. Although Marin gave some seemingly direct answers, his testimony, taken as a whole, was evasive and demonstrated an inability to recall significant events. The New York Court of Appeals held that Marin’s testimony amounted to a refusal to answer, thus upholding the contempt conviction.

    Facts

    The Queens County Grand Jury investigated misconduct allegations against employees of the New York State Department of Correctional Services’ Centralized Services Facility. Marin, the Superintendent, testified under a waiver of immunity regarding claims he used state employees to repair his home roof during work hours in 1977, with state materials. Marin initially stated he had not seen any men on his roof during the work week. However, his subsequent testimony revealed uncertainty and a professed inability to recall specific events, despite acknowledging the significance of the allegations.

    Procedural History

    Marin was charged with contempt, perjury, rewarding official misconduct, and conspiracy. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of two counts of contempt and acquitted of perjury. He pleaded guilty to rewarding official misconduct. The Appellate Division reversed the contempt convictions and vacated the plea. The People appealed, conceding insufficient evidence for the second contempt count but seeking reinstatement of the first.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Marin’s grand jury testimony, characterized by general denials and professed inability to recall significant events, constituted a refusal to answer legal and proper interrogatories, thereby supporting a conviction for criminal contempt in the first degree.

    Holding

    Yes, because Marin’s testimony, when viewed in its totality, was evasive and demonstrated a calculated inability to recall events that he would have remembered, which is equivalent to a refusal to answer.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished between explicit, credible testimony and evasive responses. While a straightforward denial might not constitute contempt, “the false and evasive profession of an inability to recall events or details which were significant and therefore memorable is punishable as criminal contempt.” The court emphasized that Marin’s initial denial was undermined by his subsequent hedging and professed lack of memory. The court highlighted Marin’s concern about the legality of using state workers and his testimony that he would have remembered them working on his house during work hours. The court noted: “[A] general denial followed by professions of an inability to recall particular events which would have left an impression on the defendant had they occurred is the equivalent of a failure to answer.” The court found Marin’s testimony was “equivocal, couched as they were in terms of his inability to remember the events and details which were the subject of the Grand Jury’s questions.” Because Marin’s testimony was evasive and demonstrated an unwillingness to provide clear answers about memorable events, the court found sufficient evidence to support the criminal contempt conviction.