People v. Epton, 19 N.Y.2d 496 (1967)

A state’s criminal anarchy statute, prohibiting advocacy of violent overthrow of the government, must be construed to require not only intent to accomplish the overthrow but also a clear and present danger that the advocated overthrow may be attempted or accomplished, aligning with contemporary First Amendment standards.

Summary

William Epton, a leader of a Marxist organization, was convicted of conspiracy to riot, conspiracy to commit criminal anarchy, and criminal anarchy based on his actions and speeches during the 1964 Harlem riots. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, but redefined the state’s criminal anarchy statute. The court held that to be constitutional under modern First Amendment standards, the statute must require not only advocacy of violent overthrow, but also intent to incite such overthrow and a clear and present danger that the overthrow would occur. The court found sufficient evidence of such intent and danger in Epton’s actions and speech during the riots.

Facts

William Epton, president of the Harlem chapter of the Progressive Labor Movement, was active in Harlem before the 1964 riots. Following the killing of a Black teenager by a police officer, Epton seized on the unrest, using it as an opportunity to expand his following. On July 18, 1964, just before the riots began, Epton gave a speech calling for violent resistance to the police. In the days following, he exhorted followers to organize, and produced inflammatory leaflets. He planned a mass demonstration for July 25th, intending to trigger further violence.

Procedural History

Epton was indicted on four counts, including riot, conspiracy to riot, conspiracy to commit the crime of advocacy of criminal anarchy, and advocacy of criminal anarchy. The trial court dismissed the riot count due to lack of direct causation. Epton was convicted on the remaining three counts in the Supreme Court, New York County. The Appellate Division affirmed his conviction. Epton appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether convictions for criminal anarchy and conspiracy to commit criminal anarchy can stand given that the statute, as previously interpreted, may be an unconstitutional restraint on free speech.

2. Whether the Smith Act of 1940 supersedes the enforceability of the state’s criminal anarchy statute.

3. Whether a conviction for conspiracy to riot can stand when much of the evidence consists of speech.

4. Whether the crime of conspiracy to riot merges into the substantive charge of riot when that charge was dismissed.

Holding

1. No, the convictions can stand because the statute is reinterpreted to conform with modern First Amendment standards requiring intent and a clear and present danger.

2. No, because the state can prosecute seditious activity directed against state or local government.

3. Yes, because the gravamen of the charge is the unlawful agreement, not the speech itself, and the speech created a clear and present danger of riot.

4. No, because conspiracy is an independent crime, separate from the substantive crime.

Court’s Reasoning

The court acknowledged that its prior interpretation of the criminal anarchy statute in People v. Gitlow was inconsistent with modern First Amendment jurisprudence, which requires a “clear and present danger” before speech can be restricted. Citing Dollar Co. v. Canadian Car & Foundry Co., the court stated it has an obligation to construe statutes in accordance with sound constitutional principles. The court held that the statute must be interpreted to require not only advocacy of violent overthrow but also intent to accomplish the overthrow and a “clear and present danger” that the overthrow may be attempted or accomplished. The court found sufficient evidence of intent and danger in Epton’s actions, particularly his inflammatory speeches and organizing efforts during the Harlem riots. The court also rejected Epton’s argument that the Smith Act preempted the state law, relying on Uphaus v. Wyman and DeGregory v. New Hampshire Atty. Gen., stating that states could prosecute seditious activity directed against state or local governments. The court further reasoned that the conspiracy to riot conviction was valid because the agreement to incite the riot was separate from the riot itself, and the speech involved created a clear and present danger, quoting Dennis v. United States: “Where an offense is specified by a statute in nonspeech or nonpress terms, a conviction relying upon speech or press as evidence of violation may be sustained only when the speech or publication created a ‘clear and present danger’ of attempting or accomplishing the prohibited crime.” The court also stated: “A conspiracy to riot is quite separable from the riot itself. The essence of a conspiracy is an agreement or plan among two or more persons to commit a crime in the future.”