New York Law Review

Tag: Criminal Acts of Third Parties

  • Maheshwari v. City of New York, 2 N.Y.3d 291 (2004): Duty to Protect Against Unforeseeable Criminal Acts

    2 N.Y.3d 291 (2004)

    Landowners and permittees have a duty to maintain their property in a reasonably safe condition, including minimizing foreseeable dangers such as criminal acts of third parties, but they are not insurers of visitor safety against random, unforeseeable criminal acts.

    Summary

    The plaintiff was randomly attacked in a parking lot at a Lollapalooza concert held at Downing Stadium, owned by New York City and produced by Delsener/Slater. He sued the City and Delsener, alleging inadequate security. The New York Court of Appeals held that the City and Delsener were not liable because the attack was an unforeseeable, independent criminal act. The court emphasized that while landowners have a duty to minimize foreseeable dangers, they are not insurers against random acts of violence. The court found that the security measures in place were reasonable and that the attack was an extraordinary event, breaking the causal link between any alleged security lapse and the plaintiff’s injuries.

    Facts

    On July 10, 1996, the plaintiff was distributing pamphlets at a Lollapalooza concert at Downing Stadium on Randall’s Island. The City of New York owned the stadium, and Delsener/Slater produced the concert, agreeing to provide security in the parking areas. While in the Sunken Meadow parking area, the plaintiff was attacked without provocation by four intoxicated young men. Although police and Parks Enforcement Police (PEP) patrolled the parking areas, no officers were specifically assigned to the Sunken Meadow area. The plaintiff sustained serious injuries. He saw people in uniform directing traffic, but no police officers in the specific area he was attacked.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued Delsener and the City for inadequate security. The Supreme Court denied Delsener’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to Delsener and the City, relying on a similar case, Florman v. City of New York. Two justices dissented, arguing that there were triable issues of fact regarding the foreseeability of criminal assaults at a Lollapalooza concert. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the City and Delsener owed a duty to the plaintiff to protect him from a random criminal assault in the parking lot of a concert venue.

    2. Whether the attack on the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of any alleged negligence in providing security.

    3. Whether any alleged lapse in security was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.

    Holding

    1. No, because landowners are not insurers of safety against unforeseeable and random criminal acts.

    2. No, because the criminal assault was an extraordinary event, not a foreseeable result of any alleged security breach.

    3. No, because the criminal assault was an independent act that broke the causal nexus between any potential negligence and the plaintiff’s injuries.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that while landowners owe a duty of reasonable care to maintain their property in a safe condition, this duty does not extend to guaranteeing protection from random, unforeseeable criminal acts. The court emphasized the distinction between foreseeability as it relates to duty versus proximate cause. Foreseeability defines the scope of the duty, but the duty itself must first exist. The court found that the attack was not a foreseeable result of any security breach, stating, “The types of crimes committed at past Lollapalooza concerts are of a lesser degree than a criminal assault, and would not lead defendants to predict that such an attack would occur or could be prevented.” The court distinguished this case from cases involving crowd control issues, such as Rotz v. City of New York. The court further reasoned that even assuming a lapse in security, the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by an independent, intervening criminal act. Quoting Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., the court stated, “Where the acts of a third person intervene between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury, the causal connection is not automatically severed. In such a case, liability turns upon whether the intervening act is a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the defendant’s negligence.” The court concluded that the attack was “extraordinary” and “not foreseeable or preventable in the normal course of events,” thus breaking the causal link. The court effectively states that security officers cannot be everywhere at once and that expecting them to prevent a random criminal act is an unreasonable burden, echoing the sentiment of the Appellate Division in Florman: “It is difficult to understand what measures could have been undertaken to prevent plaintiffs injury except presumably to have had a security officer posted at the precise location where the incident took place or wherever pedestrians were gathered, surely an unreasonable burden.”

  • Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 50 N.Y.2d 507 (1980): Landowner’s Duty to Protect Invitees from Foreseeable Criminal Acts

    Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 50 N.Y.2d 507 (1980)

    A landowner has a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect visitors from foreseeable criminal acts by third parties when the landowner knows or has reason to know of prior criminal activity on the premises.

    Summary

    William Nallan was shot in the lobby of an office building owned by Helmsley-Spear. Nallan sued, alleging negligence in failing to provide adequate security given the history of crime in the building. The jury initially found the owner negligent but also found Nallan contributorily negligent, leading to a judgment for the owner. The Appellate Division reversed on the contributory negligence issue but affirmed the judgment for the owner, finding a failure of proof on foreseeability and proximate cause. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence of prior crimes was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of negligence, requiring a new trial.

    Facts

    William Nallan, a union officer investigating corruption, was shot in the back while signing a guest register in the lobby of the Fisk Building, owned and managed by Helmsley-Spear, Inc. The shooting occurred after business hours when the regular lobby attendant was away from his post performing janitorial duties. Nallan had previously received threats related to his union activities, which he reported to the police.

    Procedural History

    Nallan sued Helmsley-Spear, alleging negligence. The trial court submitted the case to the jury with interrogatories, including a question on Nallan’s contributory negligence. The jury found the owner negligent but also found Nallan contributorily negligent, resulting in judgment for the owner. The Appellate Division reversed the finding of contributory negligence but affirmed the judgment for the owner, holding that Nallan failed to prove foreseeability and proximate cause. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the history of criminal activities in the Fisk Building gave rise to a duty on the part of the building owner and manager to take reasonable steps to minimize the foreseeable danger to those entering the premises.

    2. Whether the absence of a lobby attendant was the proximate cause of Nallan’s injuries.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a landowner has a duty to maintain safe conditions in the common areas of their building and to take reasonable steps to prevent or minimize the risk of harm from foreseeable criminal activities.

    2. Yes, because expert testimony suggested that the presence of an attendant would have deterred the assailant, making the absence of an attendant a substantial causative factor in Nallan’s injury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the Appellate Division erred in holding that Nallan failed to establish a prima facie case of negligence. The court cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344, which states that a landowner open to the public is subject to liability for harm caused by the intentional acts of third persons if the landowner fails to exercise reasonable care to discover such acts are likely to be done or fails to provide a warning. The court noted the plaintiffs presented evidence of 107 reported crimes in the building in the 21 months preceding the shooting, including 10 crimes against persons. "[A] rational jury could have found from the history of criminal activity in the other parts of the building that a criminal incident in the lobby was a significant, foreseeable possibility."

    The court also addressed the issue of proximate cause, stating, "[I]t was plaintiffs’ burden to show that defendants’ conduct was a substantial causative factor in the sequence of events that led to Nallan’s injury." Expert testimony indicated that the presence of an attendant would have deterred criminal activity. The court found that "the jury in this case might well have inferred from the available evidence that the absence of an attendant in the lobby at the moment plaintiff Nallan arrived was a ‘proximate’ cause of Nallan’s injury."

    Regarding the “assumed duty” theory, the court stated that for Helmsley-Spear to be liable for negligently performing an assumed obligation to provide a lobby attendant, it would have to be shown that its conduct in undertaking the service placed Nallan in a more vulnerable position than he would have been in had Helmsley-Spear never taken any action. "[D]efendant Helmsley-Spear could be held liable under an ‘assumed duty’ theory only if it was reasonably foreseeable that members of the public, such as Nallan, would rely upon the continued presence of a building attendant in the lobby of the Fisk Building and would tailor their own conduct accordingly." The court reversed the order of the Appellate Division and remanded the case for a new trial.