77 N.Y.2d 713 (1991)

A statute that restricts a criminal’s ability to profit from recounting their crime is content-based, but constitutional if it serves a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.

Summary

Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis addresses the constitutionality of New York’s “Son of Sam” law, which requires royalties earned by criminals from works describing their crimes to be held in escrow for victims. The Court of Appeals found the law to be content-based and impacting free speech but upheld it because the statute served a compelling state interest in compensating victims and preventing criminals from profiting from their crimes and was narrowly tailored to achieve those interests. The Court determined that the law struck a balance between compensating victims and respecting the free speech rights of criminals and publishers.

Facts

Jean Harris, convicted of second-degree murder, wrote a book titled “Stranger in Two Worlds” and assigned the royalties to Children of Bedford, Inc. The book recounted her life, including the events surrounding the murder. The New York Crime Victims Board ordered the royalties to be placed in escrow under Executive Law § 632-a, the “Son of Sam” law, designed to compensate victims of crimes from profits criminals make by selling their stories.

Procedural History

Children of Bedford, Inc., and MacMillan, Harris’s publisher, initiated a CPLR Article 78 proceeding challenging the Board’s decision. The Supreme Court converted the proceeding into a declaratory judgment action and upheld the statute’s application and constitutionality (143 Misc 2d 999). The Appellate Division affirmed based on the Supreme Court’s opinion. The case then proceeded to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether Executive Law § 632-a, New York’s “Son of Sam” law, violates the First Amendment and the New York Constitution’s free speech provisions by restricting a criminal’s ability to profit from recounting their crime.

Holding

No, because the statute is content-based, and impacts free speech, but serves a compelling state interest in compensating victims and preventing criminals from profiting from their crimes. It is narrowly tailored to achieve those interests.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals recognized that the statute is content-based because it singles out speech about a specific subject matter (crimes) and imposes a financial burden. However, the Court determined that the statute serves compelling state interests, including ensuring victim compensation and preventing criminals from profiting from their crimes. The court emphasized the state’s interest in having criminals, rather than taxpayers, bear the burden of compensating their victims.

The Court stated, “[t]o the extent that the law manifests those standards, respect for it is maintained. To that end, our statutes impose punishment and disabilities on those convicted of crime which reflect the nature and extent of the community’s denunciation of particular conduct.”

The Court also found the statute to be narrowly tailored. It creates a unique and identifiable resource for victims, gives them priority over the criminal’s other creditors, and extends the time within which a claim to the proceeds may be asserted. The law regulates the criminal’s receipt of money, not the right to speak about the crime, and it does not impose a forfeiture of all profits, but merely delays payment. Additionally, the statute provides an incentive to speak about the crime by granting the criminal first priority to the funds for legal fees and production expenses.

The Court distinguished the law from an overly broad restriction on speech, noting that the law does not prohibit anyone else from telling or publishing the criminal’s story, further illustrating that the statute’s reach is limited to its purpose. The Court also rejected the argument that the law was vague, finding that it provides fair warning to those within its scope and clear standards for enforcement.

Finally, the Court found no violation of the New York Constitution’s free speech provision, stating that even if a “genuinely close fit” between the statute and its purpose were required, the statute satisfies this test because it is narrowly tailored to meet its objectives.