People v. Mitchell, 77 N.Y.2d 624 (1991)

For criminal possession of stolen property, the prosecution must prove the defendant knew the property was stolen, but does not need to prove the defendant knew the specific nature of the stolen property (e.g., that a stolen wallet contained a credit card) to convict for the highest degree of the crime.

Summary

Mitchell was convicted of grand larceny and criminal possession of stolen property after participating in a pickpocketing scheme where a wallet containing a credit card was stolen. Mitchell argued that the prosecution failed to prove she knew the stolen wallet contained a credit card, a necessary element for conviction of criminal possession of stolen property. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the prosecution only needed to prove Mitchell knew the property was stolen, not that she was aware of the specific nature of the stolen property (i.e., the credit card). The court reasoned that the culpable mental state applied only to the possessory act and not to the aggravating factors that elevate the degree of the crime.

Facts

On July 5, 1987, Mitchell acted as a “stall” in a pickpocketing scheme on the steps of the Metropolitan Museum of Art. She feigned illness and grabbed the victim’s arm while an accomplice stole the victim’s wallet, which contained a credit card. The victim struggled with Mitchell and regained possession of the wallet. Mitchell then fled but was apprehended by bystanders and arrested by a nearby police officer.

Procedural History

Mitchell was convicted in the trial court of grand larceny in the fourth degree and criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree. She objected to the trial court’s instruction to the jury that she need not be aware of the precise nature of the stolen property. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

Whether the prosecution, to secure a conviction for criminal possession of stolen property consisting of a credit card, must prove the defendant knew the stolen property was a credit card.

Holding

No, because the statute requires only that the defendant knowingly possessed stolen property with the intent to benefit herself or impede the owner’s recovery, and the statute does not require the defendant to know the specific nature of the stolen property to be convicted of the higher degree of the crime.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals analyzed Penal Law § 165.45 (2), which defines criminal possession of stolen property. The statute requires the person to “knowingly possesses stolen property, with intent to benefit [herself]… and when: * * * 2. The property consists of a credit card.” The court stated that the word “knowingly” applies only to the possession of stolen property, not to the aggravating factor that the property is a credit card. The court reasoned that the legislature could have included a knowledge requirement for the aggravating factor but chose not to do so. "The unmistakable effect and location of the adverb ‘knowingly’ is to pinpoint the primary culpable mental state component only on the criminal possessory act. That culpable mental state does not also arc over to the particular aggravating characterization of the property stolen — here, a credit card."

The court noted that many offenses in the Penal Law contain aggravating factors that increase the severity of the crime without requiring proof of a culpable mental state related to those factors. To require the prosecution to prove the defendant knew the specific nature of the stolen property would undermine the statute’s intent to combat credit card theft and abuse. The court also rejected the argument that Penal Law § 165.55 (3), which creates a presumption of knowledge of theft when a person possesses two or more stolen credit cards, implies that knowledge of the credit card’s character is an element of Penal Law § 165.45 (2). “Knowledge of the existence of a specific article is not required if the defendant unlawfully acquires possession of a container [wallet] in which the article [credit card] is thereafter found.” The court refused to judicially create a culpable mental state element where the legislature chose not to include it, particularly given the legislative intent to address credit card abuse.