New York Law Review

Tag: credibility of witnesses

  • People v. D’Antuono, 22 N.Y.3d 564 (2013): Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Child Sexual Abuse and Prior False Allegations

    People v. D’Antuono, 22 N.Y.3d 564 (2013)

    Expert testimony on child sexual abuse is admissible to help jurors understand victims’ unusual behavior, but a complainant’s prior false allegations of sexual abuse are admissible if they suggest a pattern casting substantial doubt on the validity of the charges.

    Summary

    D’Antuono was convicted of sexual misconduct against a child. The Appellate Division reversed, citing errors in admitting expert testimony and precluding testimony of a witness regarding prior false allegations made by the complainant. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while general expert testimony on child sexual abuse is permissible, precluding the testimony of a witness regarding the complainant’s prior false allegations of sexual abuse was reversible error, especially given the lack of corroborating evidence. The court reasoned that such testimony was relevant to the complainant’s credibility and the defense’s claim of false accusation.

    Facts

    The defendant was accused of sexually abusing his step-granddaughter in 2006 and 2007. The complainant testified that the abuse began in fourth grade while her mother was at work. The mother testified that she discovered the abuse after finding the complainant crying. Sex toys and pornographic videos were found in the defendant’s room. A doctor testified that the complainant’s hymen was intact. The People presented expert testimony on child sexual abuse. Four witnesses testified that the complainant had a poor reputation for honesty. The defense sought to introduce testimony from Martinez, who the complainant had previously accused of sexual abuse, but the trial court disallowed it.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial court erred in precluding Martinez’s testimony and in permitting the prosecutor to adduce testimony from the People’s child abuse expert. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the expert to testify about how an adult sexual abuser may act to gain the compliance of a child victim without using threats or force.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in precluding Martinez’s testimony regarding the complainant’s prior allegations of sexual abuse against him.

    Holding

    1. No, because expert testimony regarding the behavior of sexual abusers is permissible as helpful for the jury to understand victims’ unusual behavior, so long as the expert speaks in general terms and does not refer to the specific facts of the case.

    2. Yes, because evidence of a complainant’s prior false allegations of sexual abuse is admissible if the prior allegations “suggest a pattern casting substantial doubt on the validity of the charges” (People v Mandel, 48 NY2d 952, 953 [1979]).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that expert testimony is admissible if it helps to “clarify an issue calling for professional or technical knowledge, possessed by the expert and beyond the ken of the typical juror” (De Long v County of Erie, 60 NY2d 296, 307 [1983]). Expert testimony on child sexual abuse is admissible to help jurors understand victims’ unusual behavior. However, the Court agreed with the Appellate Division that the proffered testimony of Martinez should have been permitted. Evidence of a complainant’s prior false allegations of sexual abuse is admissible if the prior allegations “suggest a pattern casting substantial doubt on the validity of the charges” (People v Mandel, 48 NY2d 952, 953 [1979]). The Court noted the lack of corroborating evidence and the acquittal on the top count, indicating the jury’s potential skepticism. Thus, precluding Martinez’s testimony was not harmless error. The Court stated, “These statements opened the door to Martinez’s rebuttal, which, if believed, suggested that the testimony of the complainant and her mother were not credible.”

  • People v. Henderson, 17 N.Y.3d 835 (2011): Permissible Scope of Cross-Examination Regarding Witness Intimidation

    People v. Henderson, 17 N.Y.3d 835 (2011)

    A prosecutor may permissibly cross-examine a witness regarding potential motives for their testimony, including intimidation or fear of reprisal, where a reasonable basis exists to explore such motives.

    Summary

    Brian Henderson was convicted of attempted assault after a fight in Rikers Island jail. At trial, a key witness, the inmate-victim, testified that Henderson was not involved, contradicting earlier statements. The prosecutor questioned the inmate-victim about potential intimidation, given his recent contact with Henderson. The defense argued this was improper. The Court of Appeals held that the prosecutor’s cross-examination and summation were permissible because they reasonably attacked the inmate-victim’s credibility and explored potential motives for his testimony, including fear of reprisal, especially given the circumstances of his changed testimony and contact with the defendant.

    Facts

    A fight occurred at the Anna M. Kross Center at Rikers Island Jail. Two correction officers testified that they saw Brian Henderson attack another inmate (the inmate-victim), including using a metallic object. The officers activated alarms and later found a shank in a nearby drain. The inmate-victim initially gave a statement that he didn’t know who attacked him. At trial, the inmate-victim testified that Henderson was not involved and that another inmate was the assailant. This testimony came after the inmate-victim had been incarcerated in a holding cell with Henderson and then spoke with the defense counsel. The inmate-victim claimed he fought with a “Spanish brother” and that Henderson only entered the day room after the fight.

    Procedural History

    Henderson was convicted of attempted assault in the first degree. He unsuccessfully moved to set aside the verdict and was sentenced as a persistent violent felony offender. He then moved to vacate the judgment of conviction, which was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed both the judgment and the order denying the motion to vacate. A dissenting justice granted Henderson leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecutor’s cross-examination of the inmate-victim and remarks during summation improperly suggested that he was lying because he had been intimidated by the defendant.

    Holding

    No, because the prosecutor’s questions on cross-examination reasonably attacked the inmate-victim’s truthfulness and explored motives for his testimony, including intimidation or fear of reprisal. The prosecutor’s summation comments were a fair response to defense counsel’s closing argument.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the prosecutor’s line of questioning was a permissible attack on the inmate-victim’s credibility. The court emphasized the relevance of the inmate-victim’s contact with Henderson before changing his testimony. This contact created a reasonable basis to explore potential intimidation. The court also noted that the prosecutor’s summation comments were a fair response to the defense’s argument that no other inmates came forward to implicate Henderson. The prosecutor legitimately suggested alternative explanations for this lack of testimony, such as fear of retaliation or adherence to a code of silence. The court referenced common knowledge of prison culture by alluding to the idea that “[s]nitches get stitches.” The court determined the prosecutor was not trying to inflame the jury but rather providing an alternative theory for why no other inmates came forward. Because the defense opened the door, the prosecution was allowed to explore the possibilities of witness intimidation.

  • People v. Drake, 7 N.Y.3d 28 (2006): Limits on Expert Testimony Regarding Eyewitness Identification

    People v. Drake, 7 N.Y.3d 28 (2006)

    While expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification is admissible under certain circumstances, a trial court’s jury instruction stating that such testimony cannot be used to discredit or accredit eyewitness testimony is erroneous when read in isolation, but may not require reversal if the charge as a whole conveys the correct standard.

    Summary

    Drake was convicted of assault after an eyewitness identified him as the perpetrator of a brick attack. The trial court allowed expert testimony regarding factors affecting eyewitness identification but instructed the jury that this testimony could not be used to either discredit or accredit eyewitness testimony. The New York Court of Appeals held that this specific instruction, taken by itself, was erroneous, but that, viewing the jury charge in its entirety, the jury was properly instructed on how to consider expert testimony. Thus, the conviction was upheld.

    Facts

    Nicole Barrett was seriously injured when struck in the head with a brick in Manhattan. Several eyewitnesses were present. Defendant Drake was arrested and charged with the assault after an investigation. At trial, the key issue was identification. Some eyewitnesses identified Drake as the attacker, while others did not, or were uncertain.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted defendant’s pretrial motion to admit expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification, subject to limitations. At the conclusion of the trial, the court instructed the jury that the expert testimony could not be used to discredit or accredit eyewitness testimony, to which the defendant objected. Drake was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a jury instruction stating that expert testimony on eyewitness identification cannot be used to discredit or accredit eyewitness testimony constitutes reversible error.

    Holding

    No, because while the instruction was erroneous when read in isolation, the court’s charge, taken as a whole, conveyed to the jury the correct standard as to the proper use of expert testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the challenged jury instruction was “improper and should not have been used” (People v. Fields, 87 NY2d 821, 823 [1995]). The court reasoned that the instruction could have been taken to mean that the expert testimony could not be considered for any purpose. The court emphasized that jurors are always free to accept or reject expert evidence. It clarified that jurors must be permitted to apply the identified psychological factors to the facts of the case in deciding whether they are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of the identifications if they accept the expert’s testimony. The court then focused on the charge as a whole. It noted that the charge expressly instructed the jury that the expert testimony was admitted to provide factors relevant to a person’s ability to perceive and remember, and that the jury was the sole judge of the reliability and credibility of the eyewitness testimony. The court concluded that no reasonable juror could have concluded that the expert’s testimony had been effectively stricken from the case. The court cited People v. Russell, 266 NY 147, 153 (1934) for the proposition that “[t]he test is always whether the jury, hearing the whole charge, would gather from its language the correct rules which should be applied in arriving at decision”.

  • Commissioner of Social Services v. Philip De G., 59 N.Y.2d 137 (1983): Credibility and Paternity Inferences

    59 N.Y.2d 137 (1983)

    In paternity proceedings, the trial judge’s assessment of witness credibility is given great weight, and a respondent’s refusal to testify allows the strongest inferences against him, provided those inferences are supported by the opposing evidence.

    Summary

    This case concerns a paternity dispute. The Commissioner of Social Services, on behalf of the petitioner, initiated proceedings to establish the respondent as the father of her child. Conflicting evidence existed regarding the date of conception. The petitioner had intercourse with the respondent on November 14, 1981, but also admitted to intercourse with another man on October 9, 1981. She testified to a normal menstrual period between November 1-5, 1981. Medical testimony indicated the child was born prematurely, approximately four weeks early. The respondent did not testify. The Family Court found the respondent to be the father. The Appellate Division reversed, but the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the Family Court order. The Court emphasized the trial judge’s role in assessing credibility and the negative inference drawn from the respondent’s silence in the face of opposing evidence.

    Facts

    On July 9, 1982, the petitioner gave birth to a child out of wedlock. The attending physician testified the child was born approximately four weeks prematurely, setting the expected birth date around August 4, 1982. Hospital records supported the premature birth. The petitioner testified she first had intercourse with the respondent on November 14, 1981. She also admitted to having intercourse with another individual on October 9, 1981. She testified that her last normal menstrual period occurred between November 1 and November 5, 1981. The respondent chose not to testify at trial.

    Procedural History

    The Commissioner of Social Services initiated the paternity proceeding in Family Court. The Family Court adjudicated the respondent as the father. The Appellate Division reversed the Family Court’s decision. The Commissioner of Social Services appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the Family Court’s original determination.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Family Court’s determination that the respondent was the father of the child was supported by clear and convincing evidence, considering the conflicting dates of possible conception and the respondent’s refusal to testify.

    Holding

    Yes, because the trial judge’s assessment of the petitioner’s credibility, along with the medical testimony regarding prematurity and the negative inference drawn from the respondent’s refusal to testify, provided clear and convincing evidence to support the Family Court’s finding.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the significant weight given to the trial judge’s assessment of witness credibility. The Court noted the rule that a respondent’s refusal to testify in a paternity proceeding allows the strongest inferences against him, provided that the opposing evidence permits such inferences. The court cited Noce v. Kaufman, 2 N.Y.2d 347 and Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. [Patricia A.] v. Philip De G., 59 NY2d 137 in support. The court reasoned that the combination of the petitioner’s testimony regarding her menstrual cycle, the medical testimony confirming the child’s premature birth, and the respondent’s silence, supported the Family Court’s conclusion. The court highlighted that the medical testimony placed the date of intercourse with the respondent within an accepted gestational period. Because the respondent did not testify to offer an alternative explanation or to contradict the petitioner’s testimony, the court found that the Family Court’s conclusion was supported by the evidence. The court implicitly applied a ‘totality of the circumstances’ test to determine whether clear and convincing evidence existed, giving substantial deference to the lower court’s findings. The Court’s reasoning underscores the importance of a party’s decision to testify or remain silent, particularly when faced with adverse evidence. It also clarifies that while negative inferences are permissible, they must be grounded in and supported by the other evidence presented.