New York Law Review

Tag: Crawford v. Washington

  • People v. Leon, 10 N.Y.3d 122 (2008): Crawford v. Washington Does Not Apply at Sentencing

    10 N.Y.3d 122 (2008)

    The Confrontation Clause as interpreted in Crawford v. Washington does not apply at sentencing proceedings; thus, testimonial hearsay is admissible.

    Summary

    Jose Leon was convicted of sexual abuse. The Supreme Court adjudicated him a persistent violent felony offender based on two prior manslaughter convictions. Leon argued that the admission of a fingerprint report without the opportunity to confront the author violated his Sixth Amendment rights under Crawford v. Washington and CPL 400.15(7)(a). He also argued that the court made an impermissible finding of fact regarding his identity, violating Apprendi v. New Jersey. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Crawford does not apply at sentencing and rejecting the Apprendi challenge.

    Facts

    Defendant Jose Leon was convicted of sexual abuse. The prosecution sought to have Leon adjudicated a persistent violent felony offender based on two prior manslaughter convictions from 1976 and 1983. A report was introduced certifying that fingerprint cards of a “Jose Leon” matched the prints associated with the prior convictions. Leon admitted he was the same “Jose Leon” in the 1976 conviction but contested being the same person in the 1983 conviction.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court adjudicated Leon a persistent violent felony offender. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. Leon appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Crawford v. Washington applies at a predicate sentencing hearing, thus barring the admission of testimonial hearsay.
    2. Whether the sentencing court made a finding of fact beyond the permissible fact of prior convictions in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey.

    Holding

    1. No, because sentencing proceedings are not trial prosecutions, and therefore the Confrontation Clause as articulated in Crawford does not apply.
    2. No, because a sentencing judge’s ability to determine whether a defendant has a prior conviction extends to the “who, what, when, and where” of a prior conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that sentencing proceedings are distinct from trials, and the rights afforded at trial do not fully apply at sentencing. The Court cited Barber v. Page, stating, “The right [of] confrontation is basically a trial right.” The Court interpreted Crawford as addressing testimonial hearsay specifically at trial, citing federal circuit court cases that have considered the question. Regarding CPL 400.15(7)(a), the Court noted that the statute requiring evidence to be subject to “the rules applicable to a trial of the issue of guilt” predates Crawford, and fingerprint comparison reports were admissible at sentencing hearings before Crawford. The court was unwilling to presume the legislature intended to incorporate trial rights into sentencing hearings, as that would yield unworkable results. Regarding the Apprendi challenge, the Court cited People v. Rivera and federal cases, holding that determining whether a defendant has a prior conviction necessarily includes establishing the basic facts of that conviction, such as “the ‘who, what, when, and where’ of a prior conviction.”

  • People v. Hardy, 4 N.Y.3d 192 (2005): Confrontation Clause Bars Admission of Codefendant’s Plea Allocution

    4 N.Y.3d 192 (2005)

    Under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause as interpreted in Crawford v. Washington, a codefendant’s plea allocution is testimonial evidence, and its admission violates a defendant’s right to confrontation unless the codefendant testifies and is subject to cross-examination.

    Summary

    Hardy was convicted of attempted murder and robbery. A key piece of evidence was the plea allocution of his brother and codefendant, Janerio, who did not testify at Hardy’s trial. The New York Court of Appeals reversed Hardy’s conviction, holding that the admission of Janerio’s plea allocution violated Hardy’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him. The Court explicitly overruled its prior holding in People v. Thomas, determining that Crawford v. Washington requires a new standard for admitting such statements. Because the error was not harmless, a new trial was ordered.

    Facts

    Jeanne and Joseph Garcia were picnicking in their car when two men robbed them; one shot Jeanne in the face. Police investigation yielded no physical evidence. Nine months later, Robert Quarles told police that Hardy and his brother, Janerio, committed the robbery and that Hardy admitted to shooting a woman for $25. Janerio pleaded guilty. At Hardy’s trial, Mrs. Garcia could not identify Hardy. Over objection, Janerio’s plea allocution was read into evidence. Quarles testified that Hardy admitted to the shooting. The prosecutor emphasized the allocution in summation, arguing that it corroborated the evidence and “pulls it all together.”

    Procedural History

    Hardy was convicted of attempted murder, robbery, and assault. The Appellate Division modified the sentence but otherwise affirmed the conviction. A judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal. The Court of Appeals then reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the admission of a non-testifying codefendant’s plea allocution violates the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, and whether such a violation constitutes harmless error.

    Holding

    Yes, because under Crawford v. Washington, a plea allocution is a testimonial statement, and admitting it without the opportunity for cross-examination violates the Confrontation Clause. No, because the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, given the importance of the allocution to the prosecution’s case and the weakness of other evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that pre-Crawford, Janerio’s plea allocution may have been admissible under state evidentiary rules as a statement against penal interest per People v. Thomas. However, Crawford explicitly rejected the Ohio v. Roberts test, which allowed admission of hearsay statements if deemed reliable. The Crawford court held that “the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.” Plea allocutions are “plainly testimonial” statements, making Janerio’s allocution inadmissible without cross-examination. The Court determined the error was not harmless, because the allocution was used to “stitch all the evidence together” and corroborate Quarles’ testimony. The prosecutor’s summation emphasized its importance. The jury’s requests to have the allocution read back also demonstrated its significance. The court explicitly overruled People v. Thomas.