New York Law Review

Tag: CPLR Article 78

  • Kickertz v. New York University, 25 N.Y.3d 943 (2015): Due Process in Student Disciplinary Proceedings at Private Universities

    25 N.Y.3d 943 (2015)

    Private universities, when disciplining students, must substantially adhere to their published rules, but are not required to provide the full due process rights afforded in a governmental setting.

    Summary

    This case concerns a student, Katie Kickertz, who was expelled from New York University (NYU) following a finding of academic misconduct. Kickertz sought reinstatement, a degree, and attorneys’ fees through an Article 78 proceeding. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the Appellate Division erred by failing to remand the case to allow NYU to file an answer, as required by CPLR 7804(f). The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division should have remanded the case because the facts presented did not preclude the existence of triable issues, and NYU should be permitted to answer the petition. The Court emphasized that private educational institutions must substantially observe their published rules when disciplining students, but are not held to the same due process standards as governmental entities.

    Facts

    Katie Kickertz, a student at New York University’s College of Dentistry, was expelled due to academic misconduct. Kickertz initiated a CPLR Article 78 proceeding seeking reinstatement, a degree, and attorneys’ fees. The Supreme Court dismissed Kickertz’s petition, but the Appellate Division reversed, granted the petition, and ordered NYU to reinstate Kickertz. NYU appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Procedural History

    1. Supreme Court: Dismissed Kickertz’s petition.

    2. Appellate Division: Reversed the Supreme Court decision, reinstated the petition, and granted Kickertz’s requests.

    3. Court of Appeals: Modified the Appellate Division’s order, remitting the case back to the Supreme Court.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Appellate Division erred by failing to remand the case to Supreme Court to allow NYU to file an answer under CPLR 7804(f).

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Appellate Division should have remanded the case as triable issues of fact existed that warranted NYU being able to file an answer.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the interpretation and application of CPLR 7804(f), which requires a court to permit a respondent to answer a petition in an Article 78 proceeding if a motion to dismiss is denied. The Court cited precedent indicating an exception if the facts are fully presented, and no dispute of facts or prejudice would result from the failure to require an answer. In this case, the court found that the facts were not so clear, as “triable issues of fact exist with regard to whether NYU substantially complied with its established disciplinary procedures.” The Court reiterated that a private educational institution, such as NYU, is not required to adhere to the full panoply of due process rights afforded in a governmental setting, but must substantially observe its published rules.

    The Court’s decision emphasizes the procedural rights available to a private university in defending against a student’s challenge to disciplinary actions. It underscores the balance between protecting student rights and allowing educational institutions to maintain their standards and enforce their rules. The ruling clarifies the scope of judicial review in student discipline cases, emphasizing deference to institutional procedures as long as they are substantially followed.

    The Court also declined to address other issues raised by the parties and decided by the lower courts, due to its disposition of the appeal.

  • Kahn v. New York City Department of Education, 20 N.Y.3d 461 (2013): Statute of Limitations for Challenging Probationary Teacher Termination

    Kahn v. New York City Department of Education, 20 N.Y.3d 461 (2013)

    A decision by the New York City Department of Education (DOE) to terminate a probationary teacher is considered a final and binding determination on the date the probationary service ends, triggering the four-month statute of limitations for challenging the termination, regardless of any pending internal review procedures.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether probationary teachers, Kahn and Nash, were required to exhaust an internal appeal process before challenging their termination from the NYC Department of Education. The Court of Appeals held that the DOE’s termination decisions were final when their probationary service ended. The internal review process, stemming from a collective bargaining agreement, is an optional procedure and does not extend the statute of limitations for filing a lawsuit. Consequently, the teachers’ lawsuits, filed more than four months after their termination dates, were deemed time-barred.

    Facts

    Leslie Kahn, a probationary social worker, received an unsatisfactory performance review and was informed on December 21, 2007, that her probationary service would end on January 25, 2008. Doreen Nash, a probationary secretary, received an unsatisfactory performance review in May 2005, and was notified on June 15, 2005, that her services would be discontinued on July 15, 2005. Both Kahn and Nash initiated internal review procedures under the DOE’s bylaws and the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Kahn’s probationary service ended January 25, 2008 and she commenced an Article 78 proceeding September 9, 2008. Nash’s probationary service ended July 15, 2005, and she commenced an Article 78 proceeding September 10, 2008.

    Procedural History

    Kahn: Supreme Court initially denied DOE’s motion to dismiss, but the Appellate Division reversed, granting the motion. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal. Nash: Supreme Court dismissed Nash’s petition as time-barred, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the internal review process provided by the DOE and the CBA must be exhausted before a probationary employee can bring a CPLR Article 78 proceeding to challenge their termination, thereby tolling the statute of limitations.

    Holding

    No, because the DOE’s decision to terminate a probationary employee is final and binding on the date the probationary service ends, and the internal review procedure is an optional process that does not affect the finality of the termination decision.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on its prior decision in Matter of Frasier v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y., 71 NY2d 763 (1988), which held that a probationary teacher’s termination is final when made, fully terminating employment under Education Law § 2573 (1) (a). The court emphasized that probationary teachers have no constitutional or statutory right to a review of the Chancellor’s decisions to discontinue their services. The right to a review stems solely from the CBA. The internal review procedure, established in the bylaws, is “an optional procedure under which a teacher may ask the Chancellor to reconsider and reverse his initial decision, a decision which is final and which, when made, in all respects terminates the employment of a probationer” (id. at 767). Therefore, the four-month statute of limitations under CPLR 217(1) begins to run from the date the probationary service ends. The Court rejected the argument that requiring immediate legal action would harm probationary teachers, stating that potentially meritorious claims would be delayed while awaiting the internal review’s outcome without pay or a right to back pay if reinstated. The Court noted that overturning a DOE decision to terminate a probationary employee during the probationary period is rare.

  • Waters v. City of New York, 96 N.Y.2d 843 (2001): Timeliness of Jail Time Credit Recalculation

    Waters v. City of New York, 96 N.Y.2d 843 (2001)

    The calculation of jail time credit is a continuing, non-discretionary, ministerial obligation, and a proceeding to compel its performance is timely if commenced within four months of the respondent’s refusal to perform its duty upon demand.

    Summary

    Waters sought a recalculation of his jail time credit, arguing that he was not credited for time spent in custody awaiting trial between 1972 and 1975. The Court of Appeals held that the four-month statute of limitations for bringing a CPLR article 78 proceeding did not begin to run when Waters was initially given jail time credit in 1977. Instead, the obligation to calculate jail time credit is a continuing ministerial duty, and the proceeding was timely because it was commenced within four months of the City Commissioner’s failure to respond to Waters’s 1998 request for recalculation. This case clarifies the ongoing nature of the duty to calculate jail time credit accurately.

    Facts

    Waters was sentenced in California in 1972 to one year to life. He was extradited to New York in December 1972, convicted of murder, and sentenced to 25 years to life. Waters remained in New York custody until May 19, 1975, when he was returned to California. He was paroled from his California sentence on September 19, 1977, and transferred back to New York custody. The City Department of Correction initially calculated 58 days of jail time credit for Waters.

    Procedural History

    In 1998, Waters requested a recalculation of his jail time credit from the City Commissioner of Correction to account for the two and one-half years he spent in New York awaiting trial. When the Commissioner did not respond, Waters filed a CPLR article 78 petition in February 1999 against the City and State Commissioners, seeking a recalculation. The Appellate Division dismissed the petition as untimely, reasoning that the four-month statute of limitations began to run in 1977. The Court of Appeals reversed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the four-month statute of limitations for commencing a CPLR article 78 proceeding to compel the recalculation of jail time credit began to run when the prisoner was initially given jail time credit, or whether the calculation of jail time credit is a continuing ministerial duty such that the statute of limitations begins to run from the refusal to recalculate upon demand.

    Holding

    No, because the calculation of jail time credit is a continuing, non-discretionary, ministerial obligation, and the proceeding was timely commenced within four months after the City Commissioner’s refusal to recalculate the jail time credit upon Waters’s demand.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Correction Law § 600-a and Penal Law § 70.30(3) impose a continuing, non-discretionary, ministerial duty on the City Commissioner to accurately calculate jail time credit. Penal Law § 70.30(3) states that “the maximum term of an indeterminate sentence imposed on a person shall be credited with and diminished by the amount of time the person spent in custody prior to the commencement of such sentence as a result of the charge that culminated in the sentence.” Citing Matter of Harper v Angiolillo, 89 NY2d 761, 765, the court noted that when a person seeks to compel the performance of a purely ministerial act, relief may be sought through mandamus. The court emphasized that CPLR 217(1) requires such a proceeding to be commenced within four months “after the respondent’s refusal, upon the demand of the petitioner * * * to perform its duty.” Because Waters’s proceeding was commenced within four months of the City Commissioner’s failure to respond to his request for recalculation, it was deemed timely. The court distinguished this situation from cases involving discretionary actions, where the statute of limitations would run from the initial determination. The key point is that the duty to calculate jail time credit is ongoing and can be re-triggered by a demand for recalculation.

  • Matter of Winston v. Angiolillo, 90 N.Y.2d 980 (1997): Limits on Sanctions for Attorney Unpreparedness

    Matter of Winston v. Angiolillo, 90 N.Y.2d 980 (1997)

    A court may only impose sanctions on an attorney when explicitly authorized by legislation or court rule, and unpreparedness for a hearing does not equate to a failure to appear for the purposes of imposing sanctions under rules addressing failures to appear.

    Summary

    This case concerns an attorney, Winston, who was sanctioned by Judge Angiolillo for being unprepared for a hearing in a criminal matter. Winston sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the enforcement of the sanction. The New York Court of Appeals held that because no legislation or court rule specifically authorized sanctions for unpreparedness, the sanction was improper. The court clarified that unpreparedness is distinct from a failure to appear, for which sanctions are authorized under specific rules. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and granted the petition for prohibition.

    Facts

    Winston’s law firm was retained on October 19, 1995, to represent a defendant in a criminal case involving serious sex offenses. On October 30, 1995, Winston was informed of a hearing scheduled for November 2, 1995. Winston requested an adjournment the day before, believing he would be contacted if the hearing remained scheduled. The adjournment was denied. Despite stating he hadn’t sufficient time to prepare, Winston appeared for the hearing. The Judge deemed Winston unprepared, adjourned the case, and imposed a $250 sanction.

    Procedural History

    Winston initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding in the Appellate Division, seeking to prohibit Judge Angiolillo from imposing the sanction. The Appellate Division’s decision is not specified in this opinion. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment, granting Winston’s petition for prohibition.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a court may impose sanctions on an attorney for being unprepared for a hearing when no statute or court rule authorizes such a sanction for unpreparedness.

    Holding

    No, because an attorney is only subject to sanction if there is legislation or a court rule authorizing the sanction, and unpreparedness for a hearing is not equivalent to a failure to appear under rules allowing sanctions for the latter.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the principle that sanctions must be explicitly authorized by law. It cited Matter of A. G. Ship Maintenance Corp. v Lezak, 69 NY2d 1 to reinforce this point. The court acknowledged that 22 NYCRR 130-2.1 permits sanctions for an attorney’s failure to appear in scheduled matters. However, it explicitly stated, “While 22 NYCRR 130-2.1 allows sanctions for a failure of an attorney to appear in certain scheduled matters, the rule does not include a sanction for unpreparedness. We do not equate unpreparedness with a failure to appear.” The court also addressed the appropriateness of prohibition in this case, stating that “Prohibition is appropriate here where the Judge clearly exceeded his authority, there is a clear legal right to the relief and the harm in imposing the sanction is great (Matter of Pirro v Angiolillo, 89 NY2d 351).” This highlights that the judge’s action was a clear overreach of authority, justifying the remedy of prohibition.