New York Law Review

Tag: CPLR 3212(a)

  • Brill v. City of New York, 2 N.Y.3d 648 (2004): Enforcing Statutory Deadlines for Summary Judgment Motions

    2 N.Y.3d 648 (2004)

    CPLR 3212(a)’s “good cause” exception for late summary judgment motions requires a showing of good cause for the delay in making the motion, not simply that the motion is meritorious and non-prejudicial.

    Summary

    Ona and Maurice Brill sued the City of New York for injuries Ona suffered from a sidewalk trip and fall. The City moved for summary judgment nearly a year after plaintiffs filed their note of issue, beyond the 120-day limit in CPLR 3212(a), arguing lack of prior written notice of the defect. Supreme Court, citing judicial economy and no prejudice to Mrs. Brill, granted the motion. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that “good cause” for late motions requires a satisfactory explanation for the delay itself, reinforcing statutory deadlines and preventing eleventh-hour motions.

    Facts

    • On February 15, 1998, Ona Brill allegedly tripped and fell on a public sidewalk in Brooklyn, sustaining injuries.
    • On June 4, 1998, the Brills sued the City of New York and others.
    • After discovery, on June 28, 2001, plaintiffs filed their note of issue and certificate of readiness.
    • On June 18, 2002, almost a year after the note of issue filing, the City moved for summary judgment, claiming lack of prior written notice of the defect. The City did not explain its delay in filing the motion.

    Procedural History

    • Supreme Court granted the City’s summary judgment motion, finding no proof of prior written notice and citing judicial economy.
    • The Appellate Division affirmed.
    • The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether “good cause,” as used in CPLR 3212(a) to excuse the late filing of a summary judgment motion, is shown merely by demonstrating that the motion has merit and causes no prejudice, or whether it requires a specific explanation for the delay in filing the motion.

    Holding

    No, because “good cause” in CPLR 3212 (a) requires a showing of good cause for the delay in making the motion—a satisfactory explanation for the untimeliness—rather than simply permitting meritorious, nonprejudicial filings, however tardy.

    Court’s Reasoning

    • The Court emphasized that summary judgment is a valuable tool for resolving cases involving only questions of law, avoiding needless cost and delay.
    • CPLR 3212(a) was amended to address the problem of eleventh-hour summary judgment motions, setting a 120-day limit after the note of issue filing, unless the court grants leave on a showing of “good cause.”
    • The Court rejected the argument that “good cause” is satisfied by showing the motion’s merit and lack of prejudice to the opposing party. Instead, the Court stated that “good cause” requires a satisfactory explanation for the delay itself. As the Court noted, “That reading is supported by the language of the statute—only the movant can show good cause—as well as by the purpose of the amendment, to end the practice of eleventh-hour summary judgment motions. No excuse at all, or a perfunctory excuse, cannot be ‘good cause.’”
    • The Court referenced Kihl v. Pfeffer, emphasizing the importance of maintaining the integrity of the judicial system by adhering to deadlines.
    • The Court acknowledged the potential anomaly of denying a meritorious motion, but reasoned that consistent enforcement of the statute will encourage compliance. As the Court stated, “If this practice is tolerated and condoned, the ameliorative statute is, for all intents and purposes, obliterated.”
    • In dissent, Judge G.B. Smith argued that the merits of the case constituted “good cause” and that the trial court should have the discretion to entertain the motion to avoid wasting judicial resources on a meritless case, stating the trial court did not abuse its discretion because “[t]he good cause shown was the merits of the action.”

  • Gonzalez v. 98 Mag Leasing Corp., 95 N.Y.2d 124 (2000): Untimely Summary Judgment Motions and Expert Testimony

    95 N.Y.2d 124 (2000)

    A trial court has discretion to consider a summary judgment motion made more than 120 days after the filing of a note of issue upon a showing of good cause; conclusory assertions by an expert are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.

    Summary

    Gonzalez, a pedestrian, was struck by a truck. He sued the truck owner and driver, alleging negligence. After the note of issue was filed, the defendants cross-moved for summary judgment more than 120 days later, relying on a witness deposition. The plaintiff opposed, arguing the motion was untimely and submitting an expert affidavit. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the late motion due to ongoing discovery, and the plaintiff’s expert affidavit was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. This case clarifies the “good cause” exception to the 120-day rule for summary judgment motions and underscores the need for experts to provide factual bases for their opinions to withstand summary judgment.

    Facts

    Plaintiff Gonzalez was struck by a truck owned by 98 Mag Leasing and driven by Hateau, an employee of Center Island Banana, while Gonzalez was delivering food. Gonzalez had no memory of the accident. Hateau testified he was driving within the speed limit. A witness, Moore, testified that Gonzalez ran into the street between parked cars without looking.

    Procedural History

    Gonzalez sued 98 Mag Leasing, Center Island Banana, and Hateau. The defendants brought a third-party action against the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) and Golden Nut. Gonzalez filed a note of issue. The defendants moved to vacate the note of issue due to outstanding discovery, specifically the deposition of a bus driver and Ruth Moore. The court allowed discovery to continue. NYCTA moved for summary judgment, and subsequently, the defendants cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing Gonzalez’s complaint more than 120 days after the note of issue was filed. The Supreme Court granted both motions. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by entertaining the defendants’ cross motion for summary judgment made more than 120 days after the filing of the note of issue without formal leave of court?

    2. Whether summary judgment was properly granted to the defendants as a matter of law, considering the plaintiff’s expert affidavit?

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court had good cause to entertain the motion, considering the outstanding discovery issues at the time the note of issue was filed and the subsequent deposition of a key witness.

    2. Yes, because the plaintiff’s expert’s affidavit contained only conclusory assertions and failed to demonstrate the existence of material issues of fact.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that CPLR 3212(a) grants the trial court discretion to consider late summary judgment motions when “good cause” is shown. The court found good cause here because the defendants had outstanding discovery requests when the note of issue was filed, and the court had previously allowed further discovery. The court noted the legislative history of CPLR 3212(a) aimed to prevent eleventh-hour summary judgment motions but emphasized the importance of resolving cases on their merits. The court determined that defendants promptly moved for summary judgment after deposing Moore, a key witness, and before the same judge who permitted further discovery.

    Regarding the merits of the summary judgment motion, the court reiterated the standard that once the moving party establishes a prima facie entitlement to judgment, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence demonstrating a material issue of fact. The court found that the plaintiff’s expert’s affidavit, which asserted that Hateau failed to keep a proper lookout and exercise reasonable control of his vehicle, was insufficient to defeat summary judgment because it consisted of conclusory assertions without a factual basis. The court cited Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320 (1986), emphasizing the need for more than mere speculation to defeat a properly supported summary judgment motion. The court effectively stated that expert opinions require a basis in fact, not just conjecture.