New York Law Review

Tag: CPLR 302(a)(3)

  • Paterno v. Laser Spine Institute, 24 N.Y.3d 370 (2014): Jurisdiction Over Out-of-State Medical Providers

    Paterno v. Laser Spine Institute, 24 N.Y.3d 370 (2014)

    A non-domiciliary medical provider is not subject to personal jurisdiction in New York under CPLR 302(a)(1) based solely on responsive communications with a New York resident who sought out the provider’s services in another state, or under CPLR 302(a)(3) where the injury occurred outside of New York.

    Summary

    Frank Paterno, a New York resident, sought medical treatment from Laser Spine Institute (LSI) in Florida after seeing their advertisement online. Following surgeries in Florida, Paterno sued LSI in New York, alleging medical malpractice. The New York Court of Appeals held that New York courts lacked personal jurisdiction over LSI under CPLR 302(a)(1) because LSI’s contacts with New York were primarily responsive to Paterno’s initial contact and did not constitute transacting business in New York. The court further held that CPLR 302(a)(3) was inapplicable because the injury occurred in Florida, not New York. The decision emphasizes that merely responding to a patient’s inquiries does not equate to purposefully availing oneself of the privilege of conducting business in New York.

    Facts

    Frank Paterno, a New York resident, saw an online advertisement for LSI, a Florida-based surgical facility, and contacted them about his back pain. He sent MRI films to LSI in Florida for evaluation. LSI sent Paterno a letter outlining preliminary treatment recommendations. Paterno scheduled surgery at LSI in Florida after being offered a discounted rate. He exchanged emails with LSI regarding registration, payment, and travel arrangements. Paterno had blood work done in New York and attempted to arrange a conference call between his New York doctor and an LSI doctor. Following surgeries in Florida, Paterno experienced pain and contacted LSI physicians, who called in prescriptions to New York pharmacies. After further issues, he eventually had another surgery in New York with a different doctor.

    Procedural History

    Paterno sued LSI and its doctors in New York, alleging medical malpractice. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under CPLR 3211(a)(8). The Supreme Court granted the motion, dismissing the case. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that LSI was not transacting business in New York under CPLR 302(a)(1) and that CPLR 302(a)(3) was inapplicable because the injury did not occur in New York. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether LSI’s contacts with New York constituted transacting business within the state under CPLR 302(a)(1), thus conferring personal jurisdiction over the defendants.

    2. Whether LSI committed a tortious act outside New York causing injury within the state under CPLR 302(a)(3), thus conferring personal jurisdiction over the defendants.

    Holding

    1. No, because LSI’s activities were primarily responsive to the plaintiff’s initial contact and did not demonstrate a purposeful availment of conducting business in New York.

    2. No, because the injury occurred in Florida where the surgeries took place, not in New York where the plaintiff experienced the consequences of the injury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that under CPLR 302(a)(1), a non-domiciliary transacts business when they purposefully avail themselves of conducting activities within New York, establishing a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim. The court emphasized that the "overriding criterion" is whether the non-domiciliary "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within [New York]." Paterno initiated contact with LSI after seeing their online advertisement, which the court deemed a passive website. The court stated, "[i]t is not the quantity but the quality of the contacts that matters under our long-arm jurisdiction analysis." LSI’s subsequent communications were responsive to Paterno’s inquiries and facilitated his decision to undergo surgery in Florida. Contacts after the surgeries cannot form the basis of jurisdiction because "there [must be] a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted." Citing Etra v. Matta, the court noted that even sending an experimental drug to New York and acting as a consultant to a New York doctor was insufficient to constitute a transaction of business. Extending jurisdiction in this case would set a precedent for almost limitless jurisdiction over out-of-state medical providers. Regarding CPLR 302(a)(3), the court determined that the injury occurred in Florida, where the surgeries were performed, not in New York, where Paterno experienced the pain and consequences of the alleged malpractice. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction.

  • Ingraham v. Carroll, 90 N.Y.2d 592 (1997): New York’s Long-Arm Statute and Out-of-State Torts

    Ingraham v. Carroll, 90 N.Y.2d 592 (1997)

    Under New York’s long-arm statute, CPLR 302(a)(3), jurisdiction cannot be asserted over a non-domiciliary defendant for a tort committed outside of New York unless the injury occurred within the state, and the defendant either engages in substantial in-state business or expects their actions to have consequences within the state while deriving substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.

    Summary

    A New York resident sued a Pennsylvania doctor in New York for alleged medical malpractice occurring in Pennsylvania. The plaintiff argued that because he suffered financial consequences and continued pain in New York, the injury occurred in New York, thus satisfying the requirements for long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(3). The New York Court of Appeals held that the statute requires the actual injury to occur in New York, not merely consequential damages. Since the medical malpractice occurred in Pennsylvania, and the direct injury occurred there, New York lacked personal jurisdiction over the Pennsylvania doctor.

    Facts

    Plaintiff, a New York resident, underwent elective surgery performed by Dr. Carroll, a Pennsylvania physician, in Pennsylvania. Following the surgery, the plaintiff claimed to experience pain and complications. The plaintiff commenced a medical malpractice action against Dr. Carroll in New York, alleging negligence in the surgery performed in Pennsylvania.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court, Special Term, denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that New York courts lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the “injury” contemplated by CPLR 302(a)(3) requires the actual injury to occur within New York, or if consequential damages, such as pain and financial loss suffered in New York, are sufficient to establish jurisdiction.

    Holding

    1. No, because CPLR 302(a)(3) requires that the actual injury occur within New York for jurisdiction to be proper; the subsequent pain and financial consequences experienced by a New York resident in New York as a result of an out-of-state tort are insufficient to confer jurisdiction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals strictly interpreted the language of CPLR 302(a)(3), emphasizing the requirement that the tortious act committed outside the state must cause “injury to person or property within the state.” The court reasoned that the “place of the injury” is where the event producing the injury occurred, not where the resultant damages are felt. The court distinguished between the initial injury (the malpractice in Pennsylvania) and the subsequent consequences of that injury (pain, suffering, and financial loss in New York). The court stated that to interpret the statute otherwise would broaden its scope beyond what the legislature intended, potentially subjecting non-domiciliary defendants to jurisdiction in New York based solely on the plaintiff’s residency. The court acknowledged the remedial purpose of the statute but declined to expand its reach beyond its explicit terms, noting that the statute was intended to reach tortfeasors who purposefully conduct activities that have direct, in-state consequences. The court quoted Fantis Foods, Inc. v Standard Importing Co., 49 N.Y.2d 317, 326 (1980), stating residence of the injured party in New York is not sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement of an “injury within the state.”