New York Law Review

Tag: CPLR 2005

  • Raphael v. Cohen, 62 N.Y.2d 700 (1984): Excusing Law Office Failure in New York Civil Practice

    62 N.Y.2d 700 (1984)

    CPLR 2005 permits courts, in their discretion, to excuse delays or defaults caused by law office failure, requiring consideration of both the reason for the delay and the merit of the underlying claim.

    Summary

    In this case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether law office failure could excuse a delay in serving a bill of particulars. The Supreme Court had granted the plaintiff’s motion deeming the service timely in the interest of justice. The Appellate Division reversed, finding law office failure an insufficient excuse and granting summary judgment to the defendants. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that CPLR 2005 now allows courts to excuse delays due to law office failure at their discretion, requiring consideration of the delay’s cause and the claim’s merit.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs failed to timely serve a bill of particulars. The only excuse offered for the delay was law office failure. Plaintiffs cross-moved to have the bill of particulars deemed timely served.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs’ cross-motion. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision, denied the plaintiffs’ motion, and granted the defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment, holding that law office failure was an insufficient excuse for the delay. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred in holding that law office failure could never be a sufficient excuse for a delay in serving a bill of particulars, precluding the exercise of discretion under CPLR 2005?

    Holding

    Yes, because CPLR 2005 now allows delay or default due to law office failure to be excused in the exercise of discretion, requiring the Appellate Division to consider both the reason for the delay and whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated a meritorious cause of action.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Appellate Division’s per se rule against excusing delays due to law office failure was incorrect in light of CPLR 2005. The statute grants discretion to the courts to excuse such delays. The Court emphasized that the Appellate Division should have considered whether to exercise its discretion to excuse the plaintiffs’ delay. Furthermore, the Appellate Division should have also considered whether the plaintiffs demonstrated a meritorious cause of action. The Court of Appeals stated that CPLR 2005 now allows delay or default due to law office failure to be excused in the exercise of discretion, requiring the court to consider “whether in the exercise of this discretion plaintiffs’ delay in serving their bill of particulars should be excused, as well as whether plaintiffs have demonstrated that they have a meritorious cause of action.” The Court of Appeals remitted the case to the Appellate Division for the exercise of its discretion consistent with this interpretation of CPLR 2005.

  • Weissblum v. Mostafzafan Foundation, 59 N.Y.2d 917 (1983): Law Office Failure and Vacating Default Judgments

    59 N.Y.2d 917 (1983)

    CPLR 2005, enacted after the initial appeal, mandates that courts exercise discretion to excuse defaults resulting from law office failure in pending cases, requiring consideration of CPLR 3012(d) and 5015(a) requirements.

    Summary

    This case concerns the defendant’s attempt to vacate a default judgment due to law office failure. The Court of Appeals initially decided against the defendant, applying precedent that disfavored vacating defaults for such reasons. However, after the initial decision, the New York Legislature enacted CPLR 2005, allowing courts discretion to excuse defaults caused by law office failure in pending cases. Because the damages portion of the trial was still pending, the Court of Appeals granted reargument, vacated its prior order, and remitted the case to the Appellate Division to reconsider under the new statute, taking into account the requirements of CPLR 3012(d) and 5015(a).

    Facts

    The defendant failed to timely file an answer in the case, leading to a default judgment against them. The reason for the failure was attributed to law office failure. The defendant sought to vacate the default judgment. The lower courts initially found the default excusable, but the Court of Appeals reversed, citing existing precedent. Subsequently, CPLR 2005 was enacted, impacting the case’s status.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially ruled on the motion to vacate the default. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals initially reversed the Appellate Division. Following the enactment of CPLR 2005, the Court of Appeals granted a motion for reargument, vacated its prior decision, reversed the Appellate Division’s order, and remitted the case to the Appellate Division to reconsider its decision in light of the new legislation.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CPLR 2005, allowing courts discretion to excuse delay or default resulting from law office failure, applies to cases pending before a court after the statute’s enactment, even if liability has already been determined but damages remain to be resolved.

    Holding

    Yes, because the action was still pending before a court as the issue of damages was yet to be resolved at trial, CPLR 2005 must be applied.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the plain language of CPLR 2005 states it applies to every action or proceeding still pending before a court. Because the issue of damages was yet to be resolved at trial, the action was considered pending. The court emphasized that while the liability question had been decided, the entire case was not fully resolved until damages were determined. Therefore, the statute’s applicability was triggered. The court noted that both courts below decided the default was excusable but without considering the requirements of CPLR 3012 (subd [d]) and 5015 (subd [a]) as mandated by CPLR 2005. The court stated: “That statute, by its terms, was made applicable to every action or proceeding still pending before a court. Although we previously disposed of the liability question in this matter, the issue of damages is yet to be resolved at trial. Consequently, the “action * * * still is pending before a court” and CPLR 2005 must, therefore, be applied.”