New York Law Review

Tag: CPL 710.30

  • People v. Henderson, 25 N.Y.3d 575 (2015): CPL 710.30 Notice Requirement for Pretrial Identification Testimony

    People v. Henderson, 25 N.Y.3d 575 (2015)

    Under CPL 710.30, the prosecution must provide notice to the defense within 15 days of arraignment if it intends to offer testimony regarding a witness’s pretrial identification of the defendant.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the prosecution’s failure to provide the defendant with a CPL 710.30 notice regarding a detective’s identification of the defendant required the exclusion of the detective’s testimony. The court held that notice was required because the detective’s observation of the defendant was not so clear that the identification could not be mistaken. Despite this error, the court found the error harmless because other evidence overwhelmingly established the defendant’s guilt. This case clarifies the application of CPL 710.30, particularly in scenarios involving multiple officers involved in an identification procedure.

    Facts

    Undercover police officers conducted a drug enforcement operation in Manhattan. An undercover officer purchased crack cocaine from a man, with a second detective, Detective Vanacore, observing the transaction from across the street. Vanacore described the seller to the backup unit. The backup unit arrested the defendant. Upon return, Vanacore identified the defendant as the seller. The prosecution provided CPL 710.30 notice related to the undercover officer’s identification. The defendant moved to suppress that identification. The motion was denied. At trial, the prosecutor mentioned both the undercover officer and Detective Vanacore’s identification. The defendant moved to preclude Vanacore’s testimony due to lack of notice. The trial court deemed Vanacore’s identification confirmatory and admissible. The defendant was convicted.

    Procedural History

    The trial court determined that Detective Vanacore’s identification was confirmatory, thus admissible without notice, and the defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed, agreeing that the identification was confirmatory. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the prosecution was required to provide the defendant with CPL 710.30 notice regarding Detective Vanacore’s identification of the defendant.

    2. If notice was required, whether the trial court’s error in admitting the testimony without notice was harmless.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the detective’s observation did not make the identification so clear as to eliminate the possibility of misidentification, thereby triggering the notice requirement.

    2. Yes, because the evidence, even without the detective’s testimony, overwhelmingly established the defendant’s guilt, making the error harmless.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reviewed the requirements of CPL 710.30. The statute mandates notice within 15 days after arraignment if the prosecution intends to offer testimony regarding a witness’s pretrial identification of the defendant. The court emphasized the purpose of the notice requirement: to allow the defense to investigate the circumstances of the identification and prepare its defense, and to permit pretrial resolution of the admissibility of identification testimony. The court distinguished this case from People v. Wharton, in which a trained undercover officer’s identification was considered confirmatory. In Henderson, the court found that Vanacore’s observation was not of the same quality as in Wharton. The court, therefore, concluded that the prosecution should have provided notice.

    Regarding the second issue, the court found that the error was harmless. The undercover officer had made a clear, face-to-face identification. Moreover, the defendant was arrested shortly after the transaction with the buy money on his person. The defendant’s flight from police further supported a finding of guilt.

    The court stated, “To conclude otherwise directly contravenes the simple procedure that has been mandated by the Legislature and would permit the People to avoid their statutory obligation.”

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the importance of strict compliance with CPL 710.30. It clarifies when an observation is sufficiently clear to be considered confirmatory, thus avoiding the notice requirement. Attorneys must carefully evaluate the nature of the identification procedure and the clarity of the witness’s observation. Prosecutors must ensure notice is provided whenever there is any doubt about the confirmatory nature of an identification. Defense attorneys can use this case to challenge identifications when proper notice was not provided. The court’s emphasis on the harmless error doctrine also reminds prosecutors that even if they fail to provide notice, the conviction may be upheld if the other evidence strongly supports a finding of guilt.

  • People v. Vasquez, 20 N.Y.3d 461 (2013): Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and CPL 710.30 Notice

    People v. Vasquez, 20 N.Y.3d 461 (2013)

    A defense counsel’s failure to object to the admission of identification testimony not included in a CPL 710.30 notice does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel unless the error was egregious, prejudicial, and resulted in a likelihood of a different outcome.

    Summary

    Vasquez was convicted of attempted robbery after a victim identified him to police both before and after his arrest. The prosecution’s CPL 710.30 notice only mentioned the pre-arrest identification. Vasquez argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the testimony regarding the post-arrest identification, claiming a violation of CPL 710.30. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that even if counsel erred, it was not egregious or prejudicial enough to constitute ineffective assistance, especially given the other strong evidence against Vasquez. The court emphasized that a showing of prejudice, while not indispensable under the state constitution, is significant in evaluating such claims.

    Facts

    The victim was approached by Vasquez, who asked for money and pointed a knife at him. The victim fled into a store and called 911. Officer Herbert responded and the victim pointed out Vasquez as the perpetrator. After arresting Vasquez but before taking him to the station, Herbert asked the victim if he was sure Vasquez was the man, and the victim confirmed. At trial, the victim could not identify Vasquez in court but testified he had pointed out the robber to the police. The victim also testified that the robber threw a knife near a tree. Herbert recovered a knife from that location. Vasquez admitted to asking the victim for change just before the arrest.

    Procedural History

    Vasquez was convicted of attempted robbery. He appealed, arguing a CPL 710.30 violation and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding the CPL 710.30 issue unpreserved and any error harmless, also holding that defense counsel provided meaningful representation. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether defense counsel’s failure to object to testimony regarding a post-arrest identification, not included in the CPL 710.30 notice, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.

    Holding

    No, because even assuming the failure to object was an error, it was not so egregious and prejudicial as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, considering the other evidence presented against him.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that even if the CPL 710.30 notice was deficient, and even if a successful motion to preclude the post-arrest identification testimony could have been made, the failure to make such a motion did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The court emphasized that counsel’s performance should not be second-guessed with hindsight. Additionally, the court noted the presence of other substantial evidence against Vasquez, including the victim’s initial identification, the recovery of the knife from the described location, and Vasquez’s admission to asking the victim for money. The court stated, “[A]n argument [for preclusion] could have been made, but not an argument ‘so compelling that a failure to make it amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel’” (People v Carter, 7 N.Y.3d 875, 877 [2006]). While prejudice is not indispensable under the state constitution for an ineffective assistance claim, its absence is significant here, where the alleged error was a single, non-egregious mistake. The court also pointed out that the trial court could have allowed a late notice and suppression hearing under CPL 710.30(2) if “good cause” was shown, which might have mitigated any initial error. The court noted the People’s argument that the point-out and post-arrest conversation were part of the same continuum, lessening the impact of the omission from the CPL 710.30 notice.

  • People v. Gee, 8 N.Y.3d 861 (2007): Notice Requirements for Pretrial Identifications

    People v. Gee, 8 N.Y.3d 861 (2007)

    Under CPL 710.30(1)(b), the prosecution is only required to provide notice of pretrial identification evidence that it intends to offer at trial; because photographic identifications are generally inadmissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief, notice of such identifications is not required.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that the prosecution was not required to provide notice of a pretrial photographic identification of the defendant because such evidence is generally inadmissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief. The victim identified the defendant from a photographic array and later in a street point-out. The prosecution only provided notice of the street point-out. The Court reasoned that CPL 710.30(1)(b) only mandates notice of pretrial identification evidence “intended to be offered” at trial. Because photographic identifications are generally inadmissible as direct evidence, the prosecution had no intention to offer it and thus, no notice was required.

    Facts

    On February 4, 2003, the victim was robbed at gunpoint in a coffee shop in Brooklyn. Later that day, the police showed the victim two photographic arrays, one of which contained a picture of the defendant taken after a prior arrest. The victim identified the defendant as the robber with the gun. One week later, on February 11, 2003, the victim saw the defendant on the street and called the police, identifying him as one of the robbers. The defendant was immediately arrested.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was arraigned on March 26, 2003. The People served notice of the February 11, 2003 street point-out. The defense learned of the photographic identification during pretrial discovery and moved to preclude the in- and out-of-court identifications due to lack of notice. Supreme Court denied the motion. The defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree on March 2, 2004, and sentenced on May 27, 2004. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, finding the prosecution discharged its statutory obligation to provide notice. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CPL 710.30(1)(b) requires the prosecution to provide notice of a pretrial photographic identification of the defendant when the prosecution only intends to offer evidence of a subsequent in-person identification at trial.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 710.30(1)(b) only mandates preclusion in the absence of timely notice “specifying” the pretrial identification evidence “intended to be offered” at trial, and evidence of a witness’s pretrial photographic identification of an accused is not admissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 710.30(1)(b) requires notice only of pretrial identification evidence that the prosecution intends to offer at trial. The court noted that evidence of a witness’s pretrial photographic identification is generally inadmissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief, citing People v Cioffi, 1 NY2d 70 (1956) and People v Caserta, 19 NY2d 18 (1966). Therefore, since the People could not intend to offer the photographic identification at trial, the notice provided was adequate.

    The court acknowledged that while providing notice of photographic arrays would be good policy, it was unwilling to read the statute more broadly than the Legislature had written it, especially when the remedy is preclusion. The court emphasized that it had never before been asked this specific question, belying any notion that it was upending the common understanding of the law.

  • People v. Gee, 99 N.Y.2d 421 (2003): Limits of “Confirmatory Identification” Exception for Police Officers

    People v. Gee, 99 N.Y.2d 421 (2003)

    The “confirmatory identification” exception to the requirement of CPL 710.30 notice (for pretrial identifications) does not apply when a police officer’s initial observation of a suspect is fleeting, unreliable, and susceptible of misidentification, even if the initial encounter and subsequent identification are temporally related.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of attempted burglary based on an officer’s identification. The officer initially saw the suspect briefly at night on a fire escape from 40-50 feet away and later identified the defendant on the street. The prosecution failed to provide CPL 710.30 notice of the identification. The Court of Appeals held that the identification was not a “confirmatory identification” exempt from the notice requirement because the initial viewing was not sufficiently clear to eliminate the risk of misidentification. Therefore, the defendant was entitled to a Wade hearing to determine whether the identification was unduly suggestive, and failure to provide notice was reversible error.

    Facts

    Michael Todd observed someone on a fire escape attempting to open windows and called 911. Police officers responded, and Officer Cremin saw a person on the fire escape for a few seconds from 40-50 feet away at night before the person fled. Officer Cremin described the suspect over the radio. Another officer apprehended the defendant nearby, and Officer Cremin identified him as the person he saw on the fire escape approximately 30 minutes after the initial 911 call. The prosecution did not provide notice of this pretrial identification.

    Procedural History

    The trial court permitted Officer Cremin to testify about the out-of-court identification and to identify the defendant at trial, finding that no CPL 710.30 notice was required. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, deeming the identification a “confirmatory identification.” The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the identification was not exempt from the notice requirement and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a police officer’s identification of a suspect is exempt from the CPL 710.30 notice requirement as a “confirmatory identification” when the officer’s initial observation of the suspect was brief, at night, and from a distance.

    Holding

    No, because the circumstances of Officer Cremin’s initial viewing were not such that, as a matter of law, the subsequent identification could not have been the product of undue suggestiveness. Therefore CPL 710.30 (1)(b) notice was required.

    Court’s Reasoning

    CPL 710.30 requires the prosecution to provide notice of pretrial identifications to allow the defendant to challenge their reliability at a Wade hearing. The “confirmatory identification” exception, established in People v. Wharton, applies only when there is no risk of misidentification. This exception is limited to situations where the identifying witness knows the defendant so well that police suggestiveness could not taint the identification or where a trained undercover officer identifies a suspect immediately after a planned buy-and-bust operation, ensuring that an innocent person is not mistakenly arrested.

    The Court emphasized that “[c]omprehensive analysis, not superficial categorization, ultimately governs.” People v. Gordon, 76 N.Y.2d 595, 601 (1990). The quality of the initial viewing is critical. Because Officer Cremin’s initial observation was brief, at night, and from a distance, it was not sufficiently clear to eliminate the risk of misidentification. The Court reasoned that extending the “confirmatory identification” exception to fleeting and unreliable observations would eliminate the protections offered by a Wade hearing and contravene the procedure mandated by the Legislature. “Misidentifications should be carefully guarded against lest innocent persons be swept into unlawful arrests and convictions.” Id. at 601.

  • People v. Gee, 99 N.Y.2d 158 (2002): CPL 710.30 Notice Not Required for Witness Viewing Video of Crime

    People v. Gee, 99 N.Y.2d 158 (2002)

    A witness’s viewing of a surveillance videotape depicting the actual crime, as opposed to a lineup, showup, or photo array, does not constitute a “previous identification” requiring notice under CPL 710.30(1) because it doesn’t present the risk of undue suggestiveness that the statute aims to prevent.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a convenience store clerk’s viewing of a surveillance video of the robbery shortly after it occurred did not trigger the notice requirements of CPL 710.30. The court reasoned that showing the clerk the video of the robbery she witnessed was not an identification procedure because the clerk was simply ratifying the events as revealed in the videotape, and no issue or inquiry as to the defendant’s identity was made. The purpose of CPL 710.30 is to protect against suggestive pretrial identification procedures that could lead to misidentification; because the video depicted the actual crime, there was no risk of such suggestiveness. This ruling clarifies the scope of CPL 710.30 and its application to situations where a witness views a recording of the crime itself.

    Facts

    Defendant Gee and an accomplice robbed a convenience store. The robbery was recorded by the store’s surveillance camera. The clerk, shortly after the robbery, viewed the surveillance videotape and confirmed its authenticity to Officer Buduson. The People provided notice under CPL 710.30 regarding a lineup and photographic identification, but not the videotape viewing.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was indicted for robbery. At trial, the defense learned of the clerk’s videotape viewing and moved to preclude the clerk’s identification testimony due to lack of CPL 710.30 notice. The trial court denied the motion, allowing cross-examination on the viewing. The jury convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the convenience store clerk’s viewing of the surveillance videotape, depicting the robbery she witnessed, constituted a “previous identification” of the defendant as contemplated by CPL 710.30(1), thus requiring the prosecution to provide notice to the defense.

    Holding

    No, because the clerk’s viewing of the videotape depicting the actual robbery did not constitute a “previous identification” within the meaning of CPL 710.30(1), as it did not present the risk of undue suggestiveness that the statute is designed to prevent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that CPL 710.30 aims to protect against suggestive pretrial identification procedures that could lead to misidentification. The statute requires notice when a witness will testify about observing the defendant “either at the time or place of the commission of the offense or upon some other occasion relevant to the case, to be given by a witness who has previously identified him as such” (CPL 710.30 [1]). The court emphasized that in viewing the videotape, the clerk did not “previously identify the defendant as such,” meaning as the defendant in the case. Because the videotape depicted the actual robbery and the only people shown were the clerk and the robbers, there was no selection process or risk of suggestiveness. The clerk was simply ratifying the events on the tape. The court distinguished this from lineups, showups, and photo arrays, where the defendant’s identity is at issue and suggestiveness is a concern. As the Court stated, “In cases in which the defendant’s identity is not in issue, * * * ‘suggestiveness’ is not a concern and, hence, [CPL 710.30] does not come into play” (citing People v. Gissendanner, 48 N.Y.2d 543, 552 (1979)). The Court also noted that a Wade hearing would have been “all but purposeless” because the only way to argue suggestibility would be to call the clerk as a witness, which a defendant does not have an absolute right to do. The Court also cited Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), contrasting that viewing a clear image of the robber on video shortly after the robbery does not constitute an “undue” or improper suggestion of what he looked like.

  • People v. Merrill, 87 N.Y.2d 948 (1996): Sufficiency of CPL 710.30 Notice After Defendant Moves to Suppress Identification

    People v. Merrill, 87 N.Y.2d 948 (1996)

    When a defendant moves to suppress identification testimony and receives a full hearing on the fairness of the identification procedure, any alleged deficiency in the CPL 710.30 notice provided by the People is irrelevant.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of grand larceny and petit larceny. Prior to trial, Defendant moved to preclude identification evidence, arguing the People’s CPL 710.30 notice was insufficient. The trial court denied preclusion, and after a Wade hearing, denied suppression. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, holding the CPL 710.30 notice was deficient. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because Defendant moved to suppress the identification testimony and received a full hearing, any deficiency in the notice was irrelevant. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division for consideration of the facts.

    Facts

    Defendant was charged with grand larceny and petit larceny. The People intended to offer identification testimony at trial.

    Procedural History

    Prior to trial, Defendant moved to preclude the identification evidence, arguing the People’s CPL 710.30 notice was insufficient. The trial court denied the motion to preclude. Defendant then made an oral motion to suppress the identification testimony, and the court scheduled a Wade hearing. After the hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress, finding that the identification procedure was not suggestive. Defendant was convicted after a jury trial. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the CPL 710.30 notice deficient. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an alleged deficiency in the People’s CPL 710.30 notice is relevant when the defendant moves to suppress the identification testimony and receives a full hearing on the fairness of the identification procedure.

    Holding

    No, because the purpose of CPL 710.30 is satisfied when a defendant receives a hearing on the identification procedure after moving to suppress the identification testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 710.30 requires the People to serve a notice of intent to offer identification testimony to the defendant. However, CPL 710.30(3) excuses the notice requirement when a defendant moves to suppress the identification testimony. The Court stated, “Since the defendant here moved to suppress the identification testimony and received a full hearing on the fairness of the identification procedure, any alleged deficiency in the notice provided by the People was irrelevant.” The Court emphasized that the purpose of the notice requirement is to allow a defendant to test the admissibility of identification testimony. When a defendant is afforded a suppression hearing, the purpose of the notice requirement is satisfied, regardless of the sufficiency of the notice itself. This prevents a defendant from exploiting a technical deficiency in the notice when they have already received the benefit of a full hearing on the identification procedure. The Court cited People v. Lopez, 84 NY2d 425, 428, in support of its holding. By moving to suppress, the defendant demonstrates knowledge of the potential identification testimony and has the opportunity to challenge its admissibility. The actual content of the 710.30 notice becomes moot because the defendant actively pursued a hearing on the identification’s validity.

  • People v. Herner, 85 N.Y.2d 877 (1995): Admissibility of Prior Lineup Photo for Trial Preparation

    85 N.Y.2d 877 (1995)

    Showing a witness a photograph of a prior lineup identification to prepare them for trial testimony does not constitute a new identification procedure requiring notice under CPL 710.30.

    Summary

    William Herner was convicted of robbery. Before trial, the victim identified him in a lineup, and the prosecution properly notified the defense. However, the prosecutor showed the victim a photograph of the lineup prior to her testimony as trial preparation. The defendant argued this violated CPL 710.30 because no notice was given for this subsequent viewing. The Court of Appeals held that showing the victim a photo of the lineup for trial preparation wasn’t an identification procedure that triggered the notice requirement under CPL 710.30, thus affirming the lower court’s decision to admit the identification testimony.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with robbery. The victim identified the defendant in a pre-trial lineup. The prosecutor disclosed the lineup identification to the defense as required. Prior to trial testimony, the prosecutor showed the victim a photograph of the lineup she had previously identified the defendant in to prepare her testimony. The victim viewed the photograph again on the morning of her trial testimony. During the trial, it was revealed that the victim had been shown the lineup photo the night before her testimony. The defendant moved to suppress the identification testimony.

    Procedural History

    The County Court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the identification testimony. The defendant was subsequently convicted of robbery in the first and second degrees after a jury trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that showing the photograph was merely trial preparation. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether showing a witness a photograph of a prior lineup identification, for the purpose of preparing the witness’s testimony, constitutes an “identification procedure” requiring notice to the defendant under CPL 710.30.

    Holding

    No, because the prosecutor’s action of showing the victim a photograph of the lineup was clearly preparation for trial and not a new identification procedure under CPL 710.30.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the prosecutor’s showing the victim a photo of the lineup was merely trial preparation. The court emphasized that the initial lineup identification, for which proper notice was given, was the actual identification procedure. Showing the photograph was intended to refresh the witness’s memory and prepare them for trial, not to elicit a new identification. The Court held that CPL 710.30 is designed to provide notice of actual identification procedures, not preparatory steps taken by the prosecution. To require notice for every instance a witness is shown a photo of a prior identification would unduly burden trial preparation without providing additional protection against suggestive identification procedures. The court thus distinguished between an identification procedure and legitimate trial preparation, finding the latter does not trigger the notice requirement of CPL 710.30.

  • People v. Lopez, 84 N.Y.2d 425 (1994): Sufficiency of Notice for Statements and Identification Evidence

    People v. Lopez, 84 N.Y.2d 425 (1994)

    CPL 710.30 requires the prosecution to provide specific notice of intent to offer statements and identification evidence, including the time, place, and sum and substance of the statements, and the time, place, and manner of the identification, to afford the defendant a meaningful opportunity to challenge such evidence, and this requirement is not satisfied by mere general notice or cured by subsequent discovery.

    Summary

    Lopez was convicted of attempted murder, assault, and burglary. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the People’s notice under CPL 710.30(1) regarding his statements and identification was insufficient. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the notice was inadequate because it failed to specify the evidence the People intended to offer. The notice merely indicated the intention to offer oral and written statements and identification evidence without detailing the substance, time, or place of the statements or the circumstances of the identification. The Court emphasized that CPL 710.30 aims to facilitate pretrial challenges, and insufficient notice cannot be cured by discovery.

    Facts

    On September 17, 1989, Lopez entered Tammis Groft’s home intending to steal a television. Groft saw him, and Lopez stabbed her with a kitchen knife. Groft managed to stab Lopez in the back during the altercation, and Lopez fled.

    On September 21, 1989, police learned Lopez had a stab wound and arrested him on an unrelated warrant. After being taken into custody, Lopez gave oral and written statements admitting to attacking Groft. Groft later identified Lopez in a police lineup.

    At arraignment, Lopez received a CPL 710.30 notice, but it only indicated the People intended to offer oral and written statements and identification evidence without further details.

    Procedural History

    Lopez moved to preclude the statements and identification, arguing the notice was insufficient. The County Court denied the motion, deeming the notice adequate in conjunction with CPL 240.20 discovery. Lopez preserved his claim for appeal without seeking suppression hearings. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the notice inadequate, leading to the People’s appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the CPL 710.30 notice provided to Lopez was sufficient to inform him of the People’s intent to offer his statements and identification evidence at trial, given that the notice merely indicated the type of evidence without specifying its substance, time, or place.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 710.30 requires the People to provide specific details regarding the evidence they intend to offer, including the time, place, and sum and substance of any statements, and the time, place, and manner of any identification, so that the defendant has a meaningful opportunity to challenge the evidence before trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that CPL 710.30 is designed to allow defendants to challenge the voluntariness of statements and the reliability of identifications before trial. The statute mandates that the notice must “[specify] the evidence intended to be offered” (CPL 710.30 [1]). The notice in this case was deficient because it only stated the intention to offer oral and written statements and identification evidence without providing any specifics.

    The Court emphasized that the People must inform the defendant of the time and place the statements were made and the substance of those statements. Similarly, they must inform the defendant of the time, place, and manner in which the identification was made. The court stated, “Manifestly, a defendant cannot challenge that of which he lacks knowledge”.

    The Court explicitly rejected the argument that the lack of prejudice to the defendant was relevant, stating, “The statutory remedy for the People’s failure to comply with the statute is preclusion; prejudice plays no part in the analysis”. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that discovery could cure the inadequate notice, noting the Legislature purposefully distinguishes between pretrial motion practice and discovery.

    The Court distinguished People v. White, 73 N.Y.2d 468 (1989) noting that in White, the defendant had notice and an opportunity to attack the earlier identification; here, the notice was deficient from the outset.

  • People v. Clark, 84 N.Y.2d 943 (1994): Sufficiency of Notice for Oral Statements Under CPL 710.30

    People v. Clark, 84 N.Y.2d 943 (1994)

    A CPL 710.30 notice is sufficient when it refers to oral statements described in a police report furnished to the defendant, even if the testifying officer omits part of the statement during a suppression hearing but includes it at trial.

    Summary

    Clark was convicted of assault. The People provided notice under CPL 710.30 of their intent to offer a written statement and verbal statements referenced in a police report. The report detailed Clark’s claim of stabbing the victim in self-defense during a robbery. At the suppression hearing, the investigator omitted part of the statement regarding Clark’s attempt to stab other assailants. At trial, the investigator included this detail. The Court of Appeals held that the notice was sufficient because the police report, which was provided to the defendant, contained the full statement. The Court also held that the defendant’s argument regarding the suppression court’s failure to rule on the voluntariness of the omitted portion of the statement was not preserved for appeal.

    Facts

    Clark was indicted for first-degree assault for stabbing Reginald Thomas. Clark claimed he stabbed Thomas to prevent being robbed by Thomas and two others. Clark told Investigator Clark that he was accosted by Thomas, who demanded a cigarette and then struck him. Two other men held him down and removed his wallet. Clark stated he then stabbed Thomas and attempted to stab the other two assailants before fleeing.

    Procedural History

    After Clark’s arraignment, the People served notice of intent to offer a written statement and verbal statements referenced in Investigator Clark’s report. At the suppression hearing, Investigator Clark testified about Clark’s oral statement but omitted the portion about attempting to stab the other two robbers. At trial, Clark included this omitted portion in his testimony. The defense objected based on lack of notice, but the trial court overruled the objection, and Clark was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and Clark appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the People’s CPL 710.30 notice was sufficient when it referred to oral statements described in an investigative report furnished to the defendant, even though the testifying officer omitted part of the statement during the suppression hearing but included it at trial.

    2. Whether the defendant’s argument that the trial court erred by admitting a portion of his statement because the suppression court never ruled on its voluntariness was preserved for appeal.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the People’s notice specifically referred to oral statements described in Investigator Clark’s report, which was furnished to the defendant and clearly set forth the sum and substance of the defendant’s oral statements, including the portion omitted at the suppression hearing.

    2. No, because the defendant’s sole ground for objecting at trial to the admissibility of that portion of his statement was the absence of notice, and not the suppression court’s failure to rule on voluntariness.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the CPL 710.30 notice requirements were met because the notice referred to oral statements described in Investigator Clark’s report, and the report was furnished to the defendant. The report contained the full statement, including the portion omitted during the suppression hearing. The court cited People v. Lopez, 84 N.Y.2d 425, in support of this conclusion. The court emphasized that the purpose of CPL 710.30 is to provide a defendant with adequate notice of the evidence the prosecution intends to use so they can prepare their defense. The Court found the notice here satisfied that purpose. Further, the Court stated that the defendant’s argument regarding the suppression court’s failure to rule on the voluntariness of the omitted portion of the statement was not preserved because the defendant only objected at trial on the basis of lack of notice. “Defendant’s sole ground for objecting at the trial to the admissibility of that portion of his statement was the absence of notice.” Because the defendant failed to raise the voluntariness issue at trial, it could not be considered on appeal.

  • People v. Green, 78 N.Y.2d 1029 (1991): Admissibility of Identification Testimony After Improper Photo Identification

    People v. Green, 78 N.Y.2d 1029 (1991)

    When the prosecution fails to provide timely notice of a photographic identification, resulting in suppression of in-court identification, subsequent testimony about observing the defendant being chased near the crime scene is inadmissible if it relies on the tainted identification.

    Summary

    In this case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of identification testimony after the prosecution failed to provide timely notice of a photographic identification. A grocery store was robbed, and the clerk, Saleh, identified the defendant in a photo array. Due to the lack of timely notice, the in-court identification was suppressed. However, the trial court allowed Saleh to testify that the person he saw being chased by police near the store was the same person who committed the robbery. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that this testimony was also inadmissible because it was tainted by the improper photo identification, and without this testimony, the case rested solely on the store owner’s testimony, which was insufficient, as shown by the defendant’s acquittal on a related charge where only the owner testified.

    Facts

    A Brooklyn grocery store was robbed on July 8, 1988. The owner and clerk, Nasser Saleh, provided a description of the robber to the police. Four days later, the owner saw the defendant on the street and alerted a nearby officer. Saleh, inside the store, saw police chasing the defendant just before his arrest. The day after the arrest, police showed Saleh a photograph of the defendant, and Saleh identified him as the robber.

    Procedural History

    The People failed to provide timely notice of the photographic identification, leading the trial court to suppress Saleh’s in-court identification. However, the court allowed Saleh to testify that the person he observed being chased on July 12 was the person who committed the July 8 robbery. The defendant appealed, arguing that this testimony was also inadmissible. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the testimony of a witness, identifying the defendant as the person he saw being chased near the crime scene, is admissible when the witness’s prior photographic identification of the defendant was suppressed due to the prosecution’s failure to provide timely notice.

    Holding

    No, because the testimony was tainted by the prior improper photo identification, and there was no independent basis to demonstrate the perception testimony was untainted.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that allowing Saleh to testify that the person he saw being chased was the same person who committed the robbery was reversible error. The court emphasized that without the improper identification testimony, the case relied entirely on the store owner’s testimony. The court pointed to the defendant’s acquittal on a second related robbery charge, where only the owner testified, to highlight the weakness of the owner’s testimony alone. The court distinguished the present case from situations where a witness had communicated their perception of the defendant to the police prior to the tainted identification procedure. The Court cited People v. Myrick, 66 NY2d 903 and People v. Sanders, 66 NY2d 906. Here, there was no evidence that Saleh communicated to the police that the person he saw being arrested on July 12 was the same person he saw commit the robbery on July 8 *before* the improper photo identification. The court stated that “there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that the perception testimony was untainted by the improper photo identification procedure.” Thus, the court reversed the order and ordered a new trial, emphasizing the need to exclude testimony influenced by inadmissible identification procedures. This case underscores the importance of proper notice and the exclusion of tainted evidence to ensure a fair trial.