New York Law Review

Tag: CPL 670.10

  • People v. Diaz, 97 N.Y.2d 109 (2001): Standard for Admitting Prior Trial Testimony When Witness is Unavailable

    97 N.Y.2d 109 (2001)

    When seeking to admit a witness’s prior trial testimony under CPL 670.10 because the witness is outside the state, the prosecution must demonstrate due diligence in attempting to secure the witness’s presence, including communicating with the witness in a language they understand.

    Summary

    Carlos Diaz was convicted of robbery after the trial court admitted the prior trial testimony of the victim, Oscar Leal, who had moved to Mexico. Leal, who testified with the aid of a Spanish interpreter in previous trials, was contacted by phone in English and asked to return for the fourth trial. He refused. The New York Court of Appeals reversed Diaz’s conviction, holding that the prosecution failed to exercise due diligence in securing Leal’s presence because they did not communicate with him in a language he fully understood, given his reliance on a Spanish interpreter at prior trials and the importance of his live testimony after two prior hung juries.

    Facts

    Oscar Leal was robbed. He identified Carlos Diaz as the robber. Diaz was arrested with Leal’s watch and $20. Leal testified against Diaz in three trials, all of which resulted in mistrials (two due to hung juries). Leal used a Spanish interpreter at these trials. Immediately after the third trial, Leal, a Mexican national, moved back to Mexico. The prosecution sought Leal’s presence for a fourth trial. They contacted him in Mexico via telephone and asked him to return to New York. The communications were conducted in English. Leal refused to return.

    Procedural History

    Following three mistrials, the People moved to admit Leal’s prior testimony at a fourth trial, arguing Leal was unavailable. The trial court granted the motion, finding due diligence. Diaz was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. One Appellate Division Justice dissented, granting leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution exercised due diligence, as required by CPL 670.10, in attempting to secure the presence of a witness who resided outside the state, when the communications to secure the witness’s attendance were conducted in a language the witness did not fully understand.

    Holding

    No, because under CPL 670.10, due diligence requires that the prosecution communicate with a witness in a language the witness fully understands when attempting to secure their presence at trial, especially when the witness has previously required an interpreter and their live testimony is crucial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that CPL 670.10 is a limited exception to the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. To prevent this exception from swallowing the rule, the prosecution must demonstrate genuine effort, not indifference, in securing the witness’s live testimony. The court highlighted the significance of Leal’s demeanor to the jury, especially given the prior hung juries. Because Leal had used a Spanish interpreter at previous trials, the Court reasoned that communicating with him in English was insufficient to demonstrate due diligence. The court noted that the ADA’s statement that Leal “appeared to understand me at some point” was insufficient to establish clear understanding. The court stated: “Using understandable language to get the witness to the trial is as important as using understandable language to question the witness at the trial.” The dissent argued that there was sufficient evidence that Leal had some proficiency in English, and thus the lower court’s finding of due diligence should not be disturbed. The majority countered that it is the *level* of Leal’s comprehension that matters. The Court concluded that a “trial on paper should be conducted only as a last resort” and the prosecution must take reasonable steps to ensure the witness’s presence.

  • People v. Ayala, 75 N.Y.2d 422 (1990): Admissibility of Prior Testimony and Harmless Error Analysis

    People v. Ayala, 75 N.Y.2d 422 (1990)

    Prior testimony from a Wade hearing is inadmissible at trial under CPL 670.10, but the erroneous admission of such testimony, along with inadmissible co-defendant statements, may be deemed harmless error if the properly admitted evidence of guilt is overwhelming and there is no significant probability that the jury would have acquitted without the errors.

    Summary

    Ayala was convicted of murder and attempted assault. The prosecution introduced a redacted transcript of a Wade hearing (testimony about a pre-trial identification) from an unavailable witness and redacted statements from separately prosecuted co-defendants. The Court of Appeals held that admitting the Wade hearing testimony violated CPL 670.10 and the co-defendant statements were inadmissible hearsay. However, the Court affirmed the conviction, finding these errors harmless due to the overwhelming eyewitness testimony establishing Ayala’s guilt in the stabbing death of the victim. The Court emphasized that harmless error analysis depends on the strength of the untainted evidence.

    Facts

    Defendant Ayala was involved in an initial fist fight with McKinley and Barrett. After this, Ayala and others sought out McKinley and Barrett. Ayala encountered McKinley and Barrett in a building lobby. Eyewitness Bunch saw Ayala “jump” McKinley and repeatedly punch him in the chest, resembling a stabbing motion. Gunshots were fired during the altercation. McKinley died from stab wounds to the heart and lungs.

    Procedural History

    Ayala was convicted of second-degree murder and attempted first-degree assault in the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, finding that the Wade hearing testimony and co-defendant statements were improperly admitted, but deemed the errors harmless. Ayala appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the prior testimony of an unavailable witness at a Wade hearing is admissible at trial under CPL 670.10.
    2. Whether the admission of the Wade hearing testimony and co-defendant statements, if erroneous, constitutes harmless error.

    Holding

    1. No, because a Wade hearing does not fall within the enumerated categories of prior proceedings for which testimony is admissible under CPL 670.10.
    2. Yes, because the properly admitted evidence of Ayala’s guilt was overwhelming and there is no reasonable possibility that the errors contributed to the conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that CPL 670.10 provides only three carefully worded exceptions to the rule against hearsay: testimony given at a trial, a felony hearing, or a conditional examination. A Wade hearing, a suppression hearing concerning pre-trial identification, does not fall under these exceptions. The court rejected the trial court’s expansive reading of the statute, emphasizing a narrow interpretation is appropriate in criminal matters.

    The Court distinguished felony hearings, which involve a mini-trial of the People’s prima facie case, from suppression hearings, which focus on the propriety of official conduct. Legislative intent suggested a narrow reading of CPL 670.10. The harmless error analysis hinged on the strength of the untainted evidence. Here, eyewitness testimony overwhelmingly established that Ayala stabbed McKinley. Even using the more stringent harmless error standard for constitutional violations (admission of co-defendant statements), the Court held there was no reasonable possibility the errors contributed to the verdict given the eyewitness accounts. The Court emphasized that the significance of the erroneously admitted co-defendant statements was marginal in light of the other evidence.

    The Court stated, “[E]ven this highly exacting harmless-error standard, however, does not demand that guilt be proven ‘indisputably’.”