New York Law Review

Tag: CPL 60.22

  • People v. Moses, 63 N.Y.2d 296 (1984): Sufficiency of Corroborating Evidence for Accomplice Testimony

    People v. Moses, 63 N.Y.2d 296 (1984)

    A defendant’s false alibi, standing alone, is insufficient to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice when the accomplice provides the only direct evidence on which the defendant was convicted.

    Summary

    Moses was convicted of felony murder and robbery based largely on the testimony of an accomplice, Baker. The prosecution presented evidence of Moses’s false alibi, a visit to Alexander’s, and presence at the crime scene hours before the incident. The trial court dismissed the indictment due to insufficient corroboration of the accomplice’s testimony. The Appellate Division reversed, but the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that a false alibi alone, without a direct connection to the crime, is insufficient to corroborate accomplice testimony under CPL 60.22.

    Facts

    Arthur Watt was robbed, stabbed, and strangled in a vacant apartment after meeting people at a bar. Lynette Baker, an accomplice, testified that Moses was involved. Baker said that Moses was present at the apartment building with Alston and Watt. She claimed Moses choked Watt while others robbed him. Moses, in a videotaped statement, claimed he was at home in the Bronx the entire evening and had never been to the abandoned building. Margaret Jennings saw Moses leaving the apartment building hours before the crime. Alston cashed Watt’s stolen travelers checks at Alexander’s.

    Procedural History

    Moses was convicted of felony murder and third-degree robbery in the trial court. The trial court granted Moses’s motion to dismiss the indictment after the verdict, finding Baker’s testimony inadequately corroborated. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s order and reinstated the conviction, finding sufficient corroboration in Moses’s false alibi. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the trial court’s dismissal of the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a defendant’s false alibi, standing alone, is sufficient to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice under CPL 60.22.

    Holding

    1. No, because the bare evidence of consciousness of guilt, in the circumstances of this case, was so inherently weak that it did not satisfy the corroboration requirement of CPL 60.22.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that accomplice testimony is viewed with suspicion and requires corroboration under CPL 60.22. The corroborative evidence must come from an independent source and connect the defendant to the crime to reasonably satisfy the jury that the accomplice is telling the truth. The court rejected the prosecution’s argument that Moses’s visit to Alexander’s or his presence at the apartment hours before the crime provided sufficient corroboration. Regarding the Alexander’s visit, the court found that the evidence did not firmly establish Moses’s presence there on the day the checks were cashed or that he was with Alston. His presence at the apartment hours before the crime did not connect him to the criminal enterprise. The court acknowledged that a false alibi can indicate consciousness of guilt, but it is inherently weak evidence. “While such evidence may corroborate the testimony of an accomplice (People v Leyra, 1 NY2d 199, 208, supra), even in corroboration cases the court has found some nexus between the defendant and the criminal activity apart from the bare evidence of consciousness of guilt.” The court distinguished People v. Deitsch, where the defendant’s false denial was coupled with their presence at the scene moments before the crime. Here, there was no independent evidence linking Moses’s earlier presence at the apartment to the crime. The court concluded that the false alibi, without any direct connection to the crime itself, was insufficient corroboration.

  • People v. Pagan, 60 N.Y.2d 788 (1983): Determining Accomplice Status for Corroboration Requirements

    People v. Pagan, 60 N.Y.2d 788 (1983)

    A witness is an accomplice as a matter of law only if the jury could reasonably conclude, based on the evidence, that the witness participated in the charged offense or an offense based on the same facts or conduct.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a witness, Destino, was an accomplice as a matter of law in the intentional murder of James Amico, requiring corroboration of his testimony. The defendant argued Destino was an accomplice because of his involvement in the earlier assault and attempted robbery of Amico. The Court held that Destino was not an accomplice as a matter of law to the murder because the evidence did not conclusively link him to the intentional murder itself; his car loan was ostensibly for taking Amico to the hospital, and the intent to murder was formed later. Additionally, the murder was a separate crime from the initial robbery and assault, as the facts constituting the murder were distinct.

    Facts

    Destino was involved in the initial assault and attempted robbery of James Amico. Destino provided his car, purportedly to transport Amico to a hospital. Later, Destino learned that others had dumped Amico in the Barge Canal. There was a significant time interval between the assault and the murder. The agreement to use Destino’s car appeared to be for a different purpose than murder. Destino participated in removing bloodstains from his car after the murder.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of intentional murder. The defendant’s attorney moved for a trial order of dismissal at the close of the People’s case, arguing Destino was an accomplice as a matter of law, but the motion was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the witness, Destino, was an accomplice as a matter of law to the intentional murder of James Amico, thus requiring corroboration of his testimony under CPL 60.22.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence did not conclusively establish that Destino participated in the intentional murder or in an offense based on the same facts or conduct as the murder.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that under CPL 60.22, a witness is an accomplice requiring corroboration only if the evidence reasonably leads to the conclusion that the witness participated in the charged offense or an offense based on the same facts. The court found no direct connection between Destino and the intentional murder, other than the use of his car. The court emphasized that the car was provided under the pretense of taking Amico to the hospital, and the intent to murder was formed later. The court distinguished this case from People v. Cona, where there was an ongoing criminal enterprise. Here, the robbery and assault were separate incidents from the intentional murder. The court stated, “Nothing connects Destino to the intentional murder other than the use of his car. As to that, the only evidence adduced is that the car was provided so that Amico could be taken to a hospital, and that it was not until four hours later that Destino learned that the others…had dumped Amico in the Barge Canal instead of taking him to the hospital.” The court also cited Grunewald v. United States and the ALI Model Penal Code to support the argument that Destino’s act of cleaning bloodstains did not make him an accomplice. The court concluded that the facts and conduct involved in the robbery attempt and assault were distinct from those constituting the intentional murder, therefore Destino was not an accomplice as a matter of law.