New York Law Review

Tag: CPL 460.30

  • People v. Syville, 15 N.Y.3d 381 (2010): Coram Nobis Relief for Missed Appeal Deadlines Due to Attorney Error

    People v. Syville, 15 N.Y.3d 381 (2010)

    A defendant whose direct appeal is lost due to the unconstitutionally deficient performance of counsel in failing to file a timely notice of appeal may seek relief via a writ of error coram nobis, even after the statutory CPL 460.30 deadline has passed, if the defendant could not reasonably have discovered the error within the one-year grace period.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether coram nobis is available to defendants who missed the CPL 460.30 deadline for filing a late notice of appeal because they were unaware their attorneys failed to file a notice of appeal as requested. The Court held that coram nobis is an appropriate remedy when an attorney fails to file a timely notice of appeal and the defendant could not reasonably have discovered this error within the statutory one-year grace period. This decision recognizes a due process exception to the strict CPL 460.30 time limit, ensuring defendants are not penalized for attorney errors they could not have reasonably detected.

    Facts

    In Syville, the defendant requested his attorney file a notice of appeal after a weapons conviction in November 2004. The attorney mistakenly believed it was premature to file the notice while other charges were pending. The attorney filed a late notice of appeal in March 2006. Syville discovered the error in July 2006, after the one-year CPL 460.30 grace period had passed. In Council, the defendant asked his attorney to file a notice of appeal after his February 2007 conviction and even paid the attorney $2,000 for this service. The attorney neglected to file the notice due to “law office failure.” Council discovered the error more than two years later.

    Procedural History

    In Syville, the Appellate Division denied Syville’s applications for relief under CPL 460.30 and coram nobis. A judge of the Court of Appeals granted Syville leave to appeal. In Council, the Appellate Division denied Council’s coram nobis application, even though the People did not oppose the request. A judge of the Court of Appeals granted Council leave to appeal. Both cases were consolidated for appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, who discovers after the expiration of the CPL 460.30 grace period that a notice of appeal was not timely filed due to ineffective assistance of counsel, has recourse through a coram nobis application.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Due Process Clause requires that some avenue for relief be provided when the right to appeal has been lost due solely to the unconstitutionally deficient performance of counsel in failing to file a timely notice of appeal, and coram nobis is the appropriate procedural vehicle in New York.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court recognized that while states are not constitutionally required to grant criminal defendants an appeal as of right, when a state does provide such a right, it must ensure that the appeal is more than a meaningless ritual by affording a right to counsel. “[A] first appeal as of right…is not adjudicated in accord with due process of law if the appellant does not have the effective assistance of an attorney.” When defense counsel disregards a client’s timely request to file a notice of appeal, the attorney acts in a professionally unreasonable manner, and the defendant’s appellate rights are extinguished. The Court explained that CPL 460.30 eliminated the need for resentencing as a basis to extend the time for timely filing a notice of appeal but also imposed a one-year limit for the filing of a motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal. Coram nobis remains available to alleviate a constitutional wrong when a defendant has no other procedural recourse, especially when the alleged constitutional errors do not appear on the trial record, and the defendant could not have brought these errors to the attention of the trial courts. The Court held that, in these specific circumstances, the defendants could pursue their appeals, and remitted both cases to the Appellate Division for further proceedings.

  • People v. Montgomery, 24 N.Y.2d 130 (1969): Defendant’s Right to Know About Appeal

    People v. Montgomery, 24 N.Y.2d 130 (1969)

    A defendant has the right to be advised of their right to appeal, and failure to do so may warrant resentencing for the purpose of taking an appeal, provided a genuine appealable issue exists.

    Summary

    The Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant, convicted via guilty plea, is entitled to a hearing on a claim of not being advised of the right to appeal. The Court held that to warrant a hearing, the defendant must dispute the conviction’s validity and show a genuine appealable issue they might have raised but for ignorance of their rights. A mere claim of excessive sentencing, where the sentence is less than the maximum, is insufficient. Further, the Court clarified that applications for Montgomery relief are encompassed by CPL 460.30, requiring application to the intermediate appellate court.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree after pleading guilty. As a second felony offender, he faced a maximum sentence of 30 to 60 years. He received a sentence of 15 to 25 years. The defendant later claimed he was not advised of his right to appeal and that the District Attorney breached a promise of a lighter sentence. He sought resentencing to pursue an appeal.

    Procedural History

    The defendant previously litigated, unsuccessfully, the claim that the District Attorney breached a promise of a lighter sentence in prior coram nobis proceedings. He then sought a hearing based on the claim he was not advised of his right to appeal. The Appellate Division’s order was appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a defendant, convicted via guilty plea, is entitled to a hearing on a claim of not being advised of the right to appeal, based solely on a claim of excessive sentence where the sentence was less than the maximum permissible sentence?
    2. Whether applications seeking Montgomery relief are encompassed by CPL 460.30?

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant must demonstrate a genuine appealable issue, and a mere claim of excessive sentencing, where the sentence is less than the maximum, is insufficient.
    2. Yes, because CPL 460.30 directly applies to applications for extension of time for taking an appeal, encompassing the relief sought in a Montgomery claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that to be entitled to a Montgomery hearing, a defendant must dispute the validity of the conviction and demonstrate a genuine appealable issue. It cited People v. Melton, stating that an unsupported claim of excessiveness of sentence, where the defendant received less than the maximum, is not a tenable basis for relief. The Court emphasized that the defendant, facing a potential 30 to 60-year sentence, received 15 to 25 years, thus failing to establish a claim upon which Montgomery relief could be granted. The Court also noted the defendant’s claim of a breached promise had been unsuccessfully litigated previously.

    The Court further clarified the procedural mechanism for Montgomery relief. While acknowledging the traditional use of coram nobis, the Court stated that the enactment of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) sought to codify grounds for such relief. However, CPL 440.10, designed for vacating judgments, doesn’t address Montgomery claims which seek an extension of appeal time, not vacatur.

    Turning to CPL 460.30, the Court found it directly applicable to applications for extending appeal time. It stated that this statute eliminates the need for resentencing for taking a timely appeal. The application must be made to the intermediate appellate court, which may extend the appeal time if the failure to appeal was due to “improper conduct of a public servant or from improper conduct * * * of the defendant’s attorney.” The Court concluded that failing to advise a defendant of their right to appeal constitutes “improper conduct.” The Court also noted that CPL 460.30 provides for a hearing to resolve factual issues. Finally, the Court emphasized that CPL 460.30 motions must be made with due diligence and within one year of the appeal deadline and, regarding convictions prior to CPL 460.30’s enactment, within one year of the statute’s effective date.