New York Law Review

Tag: CPL 40.20

  • Matter of Bruno v. Cerasulo, 6 N.Y.3d 684 (2006): Double Jeopardy and Dual Sovereignty in New York

    Matter of Bruno v. Cerasulo, 6 N.Y.3d 684 (2006)

    New York’s statutory double jeopardy protection under CPL 40.20(1) does not provide greater protection than the constitutional double jeopardy clauses; it prohibits only prosecuting the same person twice under the same statute for the same act.

    Summary

    Petitioners, previously acquitted in federal court on a charge of murder in aid of racketeering (VCAR) due to insufficient evidence of the “aid of racketeering” element, sought to prohibit a subsequent state prosecution for murder based on New York’s double jeopardy statute, CPL 40.20(1). The New York Court of Appeals held that CPL 40.20(1) does not bar the state prosecution because the federal VCAR prosecution and the state murder prosecution are not “for the same offense” within the meaning of the statute. The Court clarified that CPL 40.20(1) provides, at most, the same double jeopardy protection as the federal and state constitutions, and New York’s broader protections are found in CPL 40.20(2).

    Facts

    Petitioners were federally indicted for murder in aid of racketeering (VCAR) under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a), alleging they murdered Sabatino Lombardi to gain position in the Genovese family. They were convicted in federal district court, but the Second Circuit reversed, finding insufficient evidence that the murder was intended to enhance their position in the Genovese family. Subsequently, a New York grand jury indicted petitioners for Lombardi’s murder.

    Procedural History

    1. Federal District Court: Petitioners convicted of murder in aid of racketeering.
    2. Second Circuit Court of Appeals: Reversed the conviction and dismissed the VCAR charge due to insufficient evidence.
    3. New York State Grand Jury: Indicted petitioners for Lombardi’s murder.
    4. Appellate Division: Denied petitioners’ request for a writ of prohibition against the state prosecution.
    5. New York Court of Appeals: Affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CPL 40.20(1) bars a state prosecution for murder after the defendant was previously prosecuted in federal court for murder in aid of racketeering (VCAR) based on the same conduct, but acquitted due to insufficient evidence on the “aid of racketeering” element.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 40.20(1) provides, at most, the same double jeopardy protection as the federal and state constitutions, and New York’s broader statutory protections against double jeopardy, which might bar the prosecution, are found in CPL 40.20(2), which contains an exception applicable to these facts.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that CPL 40.20(1), which states “A person may not be twice prosecuted for the same offense,” must be read in conjunction with CPL 40.10(1), which defines “offense” narrowly. According to CPL 40.10(1), “An ‘offense’ is committed whenever any conduct is performed which violates a statutory provision defining an offense; and when the same conduct or criminal transaction violates two or more such statutory provisions each such violation constitutes a separate and distinct offense.” Thus, the Court interpreted CPL 40.20(1) as prohibiting only prosecuting the same person twice under the same statute for the same act. The Court distinguished its prior holding in Matter of Klein v. Murtagh, which held that CPL 40.10(1)’s narrow definition of “offense” applies to CPL 40.20(1)’s double jeopardy provision. The Court acknowledged arguments that CPL 40.20(1) should incorporate the constitutional definition of “same offense” as reflected in Blockburger v. United States. However, it ultimately concluded that CPL 40.20(1) provides, at most, no more double jeopardy protection than the Constitutions do, and that New York’s broader protections are to be found in CPL 40.20(2), not CPL 40.20(1). The Court clarified prior comments in cases like Matter of Abraham v. Justices of N.Y. Supreme Ct. of Bronx County and Matter of Booth v. Clary, stating that those remarks required “clarification, if not correction.”

  • People v. Bryant, 92 N.Y.2d 216 (1998): Double Jeopardy Exception for Differing Harms

    People v. Bryant, 92 N.Y.2d 216 (1998)

    Under New York’s statutory double jeopardy provision, a subsequent state prosecution is not barred if the state and federal offenses each contain a distinct element and are designed to prevent very different kinds of harm or evil.

    Summary

    Defendants were involved in an armed bank robbery, leading to a high-speed chase and shootout with police. They were initially prosecuted and convicted on federal charges. Subsequently, the state brought charges stemming from the same incident. The New York Court of Appeals considered whether the state charges were barred by statutory double jeopardy. The Court held that the state prosecution was permissible under an exception to New York’s double jeopardy statute (CPL 40.20[2][b]) because the state and federal offenses each contained distinct elements and were designed to prevent different kinds of harm.

    Facts

    On June 18, 1993, Michael Jones, Dennis Sims, and John Bryant committed an armed robbery at a Marine Midland Bank in Pearl River, New York. During their escape, they engaged in a shootout with police, including Officer Steven Gentile, and a high-speed chase ensued. The defendants were eventually apprehended.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were initially charged and convicted in federal court on charges including bank robbery, assault with a dangerous weapon, and firearms offenses. Subsequently, a Rockland County Grand Jury indicted the defendants on state charges, including attempted murder of Officer Gentile and weapons possession. The County Court dismissed some of the state charges but allowed the attempted murder and weapons possession charges to proceed. Following a trial, Jones and Sims were convicted on weapons possession charges, and Bryant was convicted of attempted assault and weapons possession. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, and the defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the subsequent state prosecution for attempted murder and weapons possession was barred by statutory double jeopardy under CPL 40.20(2) because of the prior federal prosecution arising from the same criminal transaction.

    2. Whether the sentences imposed on the state weapons possession convictions should run consecutively to each other and to the federal sentences.

    Holding

    1. No, because the state and federal offenses each contain a distinct element, and the statutory provisions defining those offenses are designed to prevent very different kinds of harm or evil.

    2. No, because the acts of possessing the defaced weapons were distinct, and neither act was a material element of the other offense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals analyzed New York’s statutory double jeopardy provision, CPL 40.20, which generally prohibits successive prosecutions for offenses based on the same criminal transaction. However, the Court emphasized the exception in CPL 40.20(2)(b), which permits subsequent prosecutions if each offense contains a distinct element and the statutes are designed to prevent very different kinds of harm. The Court found that the federal bank robbery charges required proof of elements such as forceful taking from a federally insured institution, which were not elements of the state charges. Conversely, the state weapons possession charges required proof that the weapons were defaced, an element not present in the federal charges. The attempted murder charge also required proof that the intended victim was a police officer engaged in official duties. The Court also found that the federal statutes aimed to protect financial institutions, while the state statutes aimed to curtail the availability of defaced firearms and prevent the killing of police officers. "[T]he kinds of harm or evil sought to be regulated under the Federal and State statutes are ‘very different’" (CPL 40.20[2][b]). Regarding consecutive sentencing, the Court relied on People v. Laureano, clarifying that consecutive sentences are permissible where separate acts have occurred, and neither act is a material element of the other. Possessing one defaced weapon and aiding in possessing another were distinct acts.

  • People v. Prescott, 66 N.Y.2d 216 (1985): Forfeiture of Statutory Double Jeopardy Claim After Guilty Plea

    66 N.Y.2d 216 (1985)

    A defendant forfeits the right to challenge a statutory previous prosecution claim under CPL 40.20 by pleading guilty, even if the claim was raised before the plea, but a constitutional double jeopardy claim survives a guilty plea if the charge, on its face, is one that the State may not constitutionally prosecute.

    Summary

    Veronica Prescott pleaded guilty to attempted robbery after her motion to dismiss the indictment based on a prior prosecution for criminal possession of stolen property was partially denied. The New York Court of Appeals held that Prescott forfeited her statutory double jeopardy claim under CPL 40.20 by pleading guilty. While a constitutional double jeopardy claim survives a guilty plea, the court found that Prescott’s constitutional rights were not violated because robbery and criminal possession of stolen property are distinct offenses requiring proof of different elements. The court emphasized the importance of finality in criminal cases and preventing defendants from benefiting from plea bargains while avoiding admission of guilt.

    Facts

    Lillian Hasten and another woman were robbed in a shopping mall parking lot on July 30, 1979. Later that day, Prescott attempted to use Hasten’s stolen credit card at a department store. Store security detained Prescott, and Hasten’s husband, a police officer, found stolen property in Prescott’s car.

    Procedural History

    1. July 3, 1979: Prescott was charged with fraud, larceny, criminal possession of stolen property, forgery, and criminal impersonation based on the department store incident.
    2. September 6, 1979: Prescott pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct in satisfaction of the store charges.
    3. November 2, 1979: Prescott was indicted for robbery and criminal possession of stolen property related to the mall robbery.
    4. Prescott moved to dismiss the indictment under CPL 40.20; the motion was granted in part for the criminal possession counts but denied for the robbery count.
    5. Prescott pleaded guilty to attempted robbery in the second degree.
    6. The Appellate Division affirmed the robbery conviction, holding that Prescott waived her CPL 40.20 claim by pleading guilty.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a defendant forfeits a statutory claim under CPL 40.20 to be free from further prosecution by pleading guilty, even if the claim was presented to the court prior to the plea.
    2. Whether a prosecution for robbery in the second degree, following a conviction for criminal possession of stolen property, violates the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a guilty plea represents a compromise meant to end a criminal case, and allowing the statutory claim to survive would undermine the finality of the plea bargain.
    2. No, because robbery and criminal possession of stolen property are distinct offenses, each requiring proof of an element that the other does not.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that a guilty plea is a bargain that should bring finality to a criminal case. Allowing a statutory double jeopardy claim to survive the plea would undermine this principle. The court stated that “the plea both waives certain rights attendant to trial and forfeits rights to renew arguments made before a plea is accepted.” It distinguished constitutional rights, which can survive a guilty plea under Menna v. New York, from statutory rights, which are forfeited “when the statute would confer on the defendant greater rights than the Constitution demands.”

    Regarding the constitutional double jeopardy claim, the court applied the Blockburger test, which asks whether each offense requires proof of a fact that the other does not. The court explained, “The test for determining whether two offenses are the same within the meaning of the double jeopardy clause is whether two distinct statutory provisions each requires proof of a fact that the other does not.” It found that robbery requires proof of forcible stealing, while criminal possession requires proof of possession of stolen property with intent to benefit or impede recovery by the owner. Because each offense has a distinct element, the court held that Prescott’s constitutional right against double jeopardy was not violated.

    The court contrasted this case with situations where a specific statutory offense is always a necessary element of a separately charged offense, which would violate double jeopardy principles, citing Illinois v. Vitale. The court observed that this was not the case here. It was noted that concerns about statutory and constitutional double jeopardy violations could be addressed prior to trial by means of an Article 78 proceeding.

  • People v. Rivera, 60 N.Y.2d 110 (1983): Delayed Death Exception to Double Jeopardy

    People v. Rivera, 60 N.Y.2d 110 (1983)

    A subsequent prosecution for homicide is permissible, despite double jeopardy concerns, when the victim dies after the initial prosecution for assault or another offense resulting in physical injury, provided the death results from the same physical injury.

    Summary

    Rivera was initially convicted of reckless endangerment and criminal possession of a weapon for beating Fonseca. Fonseca died nearly four years later, and Rivera was then charged with depraved mind murder. Rivera argued the second prosecution was barred by double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals held that the delayed death exception to double jeopardy, as codified in CPL 40.20(2)(d), permitted the murder prosecution. The court reasoned that the death, a supervening fact, created a new offense not chargeable originally. The initial prosecution and the subsequent murder prosecution are for different crimes because death is an essential element of murder not present in the earlier charges.

    Facts

    Rivera and a codefendant beat Felix Fonseca with pipes, causing Fonseca to lapse into a coma.

    Rivera was indicted for attempted murder, assault, reckless endangerment, and criminal possession of a weapon.

    The attempted murder charge was dismissed, and Rivera was acquitted of intentional assault but convicted of reckless endangerment and criminal possession of a weapon.

    Nearly four years later, Fonseca died as a result of the injuries sustained in the beating.

    Rivera was then indicted for depraved mind murder.

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed the murder indictment, finding the crimes were substantially the same offense and that mandatory joinder provisions were violated.

    The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s order and reinstated the indictment.

    The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a subsequent prosecution for murder is permissible when the victim dies after the initial prosecution for assault or another offense resulting in physical injury, based on the delayed death exception to double jeopardy?

    Holding

    Yes, because the delayed death exception to double jeopardy, as codified in CPL 40.20(2)(d), permits a subsequent prosecution for homicide when the victim dies after the initial prosecution for assault or another offense resulting in physical injury, provided the death results from the same physical injury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 40.20(2)(d) provides an exception to the general rule against double jeopardy for cases of delayed death. The court stated, “It is impossible to prosecute anyone for homicide until the victim is dead and death which occurs subsequent to trial of one of the offenses within the reach of the statute is a supervening fact which creates a new offense which was not chargeable originally.”

    The court rejected Rivera’s argument that the exception only applies when the earlier prosecution results in a conviction for assault, stating that the statute applies to “assault or some other offense resulting in physical injury.” The court emphasized that the rationale is the two prosecutions are for different crimes, since death is a necessary element of homicide. As the court stated, “the principal element of death distinguished them. Indeed, the homicide offense was not consummated and subject to prosecution until the moment of death.”

    The court also rejected Rivera’s collateral estoppel argument, stating that the jury’s acquittal on the intentional assault charge could have been based on the different mens rea requirements, not on a finding that Rivera did not cause physical injury. Finally, the court dismissed Rivera’s argument regarding mandatory joinder, noting that he was charged with murder, not reckless assault, and that the murder charge was not possible at the time of the initial prosecution because the victim had not yet died.

    The court concluded, “Thus, the only factor distinguishing the depraved mind murder prosecution from the prior charge of reckless endangerment, was the delayed death. The statutory exception was designed to encompass that event, and it applies here.”