New York Law Review

Tag: CPL 30.30

  • People v. Carter, 91 N.Y.2d 792 (1998): Validity of Pre-Arraignment Readiness Statements

    91 N.Y.2d 792 (1998)

    A statement of readiness for trial, made before the defendant’s arraignment, is valid if the People have completed all required actions to bring the case to trial and the arraignment and trial can occur within the statutory speedy trial period.

    Summary

    The case addresses whether the People’s pre-arraignment statement of readiness for trial was valid under CPL 30.30. The Court of Appeals held that the statement of readiness, made when the People had done everything required to bring the case to trial, tolled the speedy trial clock, even though the defendants had not yet been arraigned. The Court emphasized that the responsibility for securing the defendant’s appearance rests with the court, not the prosecution. The Court reversed the lower court’s dismissal of the indictment.

    Facts

    A felony complaint was filed against the defendants on May 31, 1995. The People sent letters to the defendants on November 16, 1995, notifying them of their right to testify before the grand jury; however, these letters were returned undelivered. On November 22, 1995, the People filed an indictment and announced their readiness for trial in open court and again sent letters to the defendants, informing them of the indictment and their scheduled arraignment. The defendants failed to appear for arraignment, and bench warrants were issued. The defendants were eventually arraigned in December 1995 and January 1996.

    Procedural History

    The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the People’s readiness statement was premature because they were not present and had not been arraigned. The Judicial Hearing Officer recommended granting the motion, and the Supreme Court confirmed the recommendation. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People’s pre-arraignment statement of readiness on November 22, 1995, was effective to toll the speedy trial clock under CPL 30.30, given that the defendants had not yet been arraigned.

    Holding

    Yes, because the People had done everything required of them to bring the case to trial, and the arraignment and trial could occur within the six-month speedy trial period. The delay in arraignment is attributable to the court, not the People.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that, under CPL 30.30 (1)(a), the People must be ready for trial within six months of the commencement of a criminal action. A statement of readiness must be communicated on the record when the People are truly ready to proceed. The Court cited People v. Goss, noting that a pre-arraignment statement of readiness can be valid where it is possible for the defendant to be arraigned and the trial to go forward within the six-month period. The Court emphasized that there is no requirement that a defendant be present to establish readiness for trial.

    The Court found that the People made an effective statement of readiness by filing the indictment, announcing their readiness on the record, and attempting to notify the defendants. Absent proof that the readiness statement was inaccurate or made in bad faith, the People discharged their duty under CPL 30.30. The Court distinguished pre-readiness delay from post-readiness delay, stating that the responsibility for scheduling the arraignment and securing the defendant’s appearance lies with the court, not the People. The Court noted, “Responsibility for scheduling an arraignment date and securing a defendant’s appearance lies with the court, not the People.”

    The Court distinguished People v. Bolden, which the defendants cited for the proposition that the People were required to exercise due diligence in locating them, noting that Bolden relates to pre-readiness computation of time, while this case involved a valid declaration of readiness. The Court emphasized the importance of the People’s demonstrating readiness within the statutory time frame when they have diligently taken steps to ensure the defendant’s presence, but the ultimate responsibility for arraignment rests with the court. This distinction clarifies the prosecutor’s obligations and the court’s role in managing the arraignment process after the People declare readiness.

  • People v. Chavis, 91 N.Y.2d 500 (1998): Statement of Readiness for Trial Requires Actual Trial Preparation

    91 N.Y.2d 500 (1998)

    A statement of readiness for a pre-trial hearing, such as a Huntley hearing, does not equate to a statement of readiness for trial under CPL 30.30, and therefore, delays due to court congestion before a declaration of trial readiness are chargeable to the prosecution.

    Summary

    Defendants were arrested and charged with attempted murder. The People announced readiness for a Huntley hearing but never declared readiness for trial. After multiple adjournments, mostly due to court congestion, the defendants moved to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of speedy trial rules (CPL 30.30). The People argued that their readiness for the Huntley hearing should count as trial readiness. The Court of Appeals held that readiness for a pre-trial hearing does not satisfy the requirement of readiness for trial, and pre-readiness delays caused by court congestion are chargeable to the prosecution. Thus, the indictment was properly dismissed.

    Facts

    Defendants were arrested on March 14, 1994, and arraigned the following day. On April 7 and 8, 1994, the defendants were arraigned on an indictment charging them with attempted murder and related offenses. A Huntley hearing was set for October 17, 1994. The People stated they were ready for the hearing on that date, but it was adjourned to January 17, 1995, at the request of the defense. On January 17, the People were not ready due to an unavailable witness. The hearing was adjourned four times over 203 days. The People never stated they were ready for trial or filed a certificate of trial readiness.

    Procedural History

    In September 1995, defendants moved to dismiss the indictment under CPL 30.30 (1)(a), arguing that the People exceeded the 184-day speedy trial limit. The trial court granted the motion, rejecting the argument that readiness for a hearing equaled readiness for trial. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that the People were ready for trial before January 17. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the trial court’s dismissal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the People’s statement of readiness for a Huntley hearing is equivalent to a statement of readiness for trial under CPL 30.30?

    2. Whether delays caused by court congestion prior to a declaration of trial readiness are chargeable to the People for speedy trial purposes?

    Holding

    1. No, because a pretrial suppression hearing is not the equivalent of a trial, and readiness for one does not demonstrate readiness for the other.

    2. Yes, because in the absence of a statement of readiness to proceed to trial, any delay due to court congestion is chargeable to the People.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that CPL 30.30 (1)(a) requires the People to be ready for trial within six months. “‘Ready for trial’ comprises two elements: (i) ‘either a statement of readiness by the prosecutor in open court…or a written notice of readiness sent by the prosecutor to both defense counsel and the appropriate court clerk’ and (ii) the People must in fact be ready to proceed at the time they declare readiness” (quoting People v Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331, 337). The court stated that a Huntley hearing determines narrow issues of admissibility, not the same as a trial. A statement of readiness for a hearing is only “an expectation of future readiness,” not a present readiness. Because the People never declared readiness for trial, the 92-day delay from court congestion was chargeable to them, exceeding the 184-day limit. The Court reiterated that the People could have avoided the delay by filing a certificate of readiness, assuming actual readiness. The Court stated the People waived their right to argue certain periods should have been excluded because they conceded those points before the motion court. The Court concluded that the People failed to meet their speedy trial obligation.

  • People v. Anderson, 86 N.Y.2d 437 (1995): Commencement of Criminal Action for Speedy Trial Purposes After DAT Issuance

    People v. Anderson, 86 N.Y.2d 437 (1995)

    For speedy trial purposes under CPL 30.30, a criminal action commences when a defendant appears in court in response to a desk appearance ticket (DAT), regardless of whether an accusatory instrument has been filed; however, a subsequent statement of readiness can toll the speedy trial clock during an adjournment period, even if the initial adjournment was due to the People’s lack of readiness.

    Summary

    Anderson was arrested and issued a DAT. He appeared in court as directed, but no accusatory instrument had been filed. It was eventually filed months later. After delays, Anderson moved to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of speedy trial rules. The New York Court of Appeals held that the speedy trial clock begins to run when the defendant first appears in court in response to the DAT. However, the Court also clarified that a subsequent statement of readiness by the prosecution can halt the running of the speedy trial clock during an adjournment, even if the adjournment was initially caused by the prosecution’s unreadiness.

    Facts

    Anderson was arrested on December 23, 1992, for fraudulently endorsing a check and was issued a DAT directing him to appear in court on January 22, 1993.
    He appeared on January 22, 1993, but no accusatory instrument had been filed. He was instructed to return on March 4. Anderson returned on that date, and again on April 16, when the police detective signed the felony complaint. It was not filed until May 4, 1993, when Anderson was arraigned.

    Procedural History

    The People announced readiness on July 19, but post-readiness delays occurred. Anderson moved to dismiss the indictment 15 months later, on October 31, 1994.
    Supreme Court granted the motion, finding 214 days chargeable to the People.
    The Appellate Division affirmed, finding 219 days chargeable to the People.
    The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether, under CPL 30.30 (5)(b), a criminal action commences for speedy trial purposes when a defendant appears in court in response to a DAT, even if an accusatory instrument has not been filed.
    2. Whether a subsequent statement of readiness by the People can stop the speedy trial clock from running during an adjournment period, even if the initial adjournment was due to the People’s lack of readiness.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because CPL 30.30(5)(b) specifically states that a criminal action is “deemed” to have commenced when the defendant appears in court in response to a DAT, regardless of the filing of an accusatory instrument.
    2. Yes, because a notice of readiness constitutes a commitment to proceed, satisfying the People’s duty and tolling the speedy trial clock, even if the adjournment was initially due to the People’s lack of readiness.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the commencement of the action, the Court reasoned that CPL 30.30(5)(b) creates an exception to the general rule that a criminal action commences upon the filing of the accusatory instrument. The legislative history of CPL 30.30(5)(b) demonstrates that the Legislature intended the speedy trial clock to begin running upon the defendant’s physical appearance in court in response to the DAT.

    The Court stated, “[T]he logical sanction for delay in filing a criminal complaint is simply to deem the criminal action commenced once the defendant has appeared in the local criminal court in compliance with the instructions contained in the DAT, solely for the purpose of calculating the time from which the prosecutor must become ready for trial.”

    Regarding the 48-day period of adjournment, the Court acknowledged that the People bear the burden of explaining adjournments. However, the Court found that the People’s notice of readiness, served during the adjournment, served to toll the speedy trial clock from running. The court distinguished between court congestion and delays caused by the People’s own laxity. Since the defendant did not contest the People’s actual readiness as reflected in the notice, only the time before the notice of readiness was chargeable to the People.

    The court emphasized that “a notice of readiness is the kind of record commitment to proceed which satisfies the People’s duty to be ready for trial, and serves to toll the ‘speedy trial clock’ from running for the remainder of that adjournment period.”

  • People v. Torres, 88 N.Y.2d 928 (1996): Exclusion of Delay for Defendant Avoiding Apprehension

    People v. Torres, 88 N.Y.2d 928 (1996)

    The prosecution is not required to demonstrate due diligence in locating a defendant to exclude periods of delay from speedy trial calculations when the defendant is actively attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution.

    Summary

    Defendant was arrested for drug possession, failed to appear for arraignment, and a bench warrant was issued. After his re-arrest, he moved to dismiss the charges on speedy trial grounds. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division erred in requiring the People to demonstrate due diligence in locating the defendant during the period he was a fugitive because the trial court had found he was actively avoiding apprehension. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division to review that finding and other relevant factual issues.

    Facts

    Defendant was arrested on March 27, 1989, and indicted for criminal possession of a controlled substance. He was released on his own recognizance but failed to appear for arraignment on the indictment on June 13, 1989, resulting in a bench warrant for his arrest. A detective was assigned to the warrant on July 5, 1989. The detective periodically checked the computer for information and received a photograph of the defendant on July 24, 1989. The detective investigated two addresses provided by the defendant and discovered that neither was valid. On June 27, 1990, defendant was arrested while assisting a co-conspirator attempting to smuggle cocaine. He later pleaded guilty to a federal indictment.

    Procedural History

    While incarcerated on federal charges, defendant moved to dismiss the state charges on speedy trial grounds; the Supreme Court denied the motion. A jury convicted defendant of criminal possession. The Appellate Division held the appeal in abeyance and remitted the matter to the Supreme Court for a de nova hearing on the speedy trial motion. On remand, the Supreme Court determined defendant’s speedy trial rights had not been violated, because he had been avoiding apprehension and the People had exercised due diligence in attempting to locate him. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the People had failed to exercise due diligence, and granted defendant’s motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the 73-day period from July 24, 1989, to October 6, 1989, should be charged to the People in calculating the speedy trial period, given that the People allegedly failed to exercise due diligence in locating the defendant.

    Holding

    No, because pursuant to CPL 30.30(4)(c), the People need not exercise due diligence in attempting to locate a defendant who is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on CPL 30.30 (4)(c), which addresses excluding periods of delay from the time chargeable to the People when a defendant’s location is unknown and the defendant is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution. The Court stated, “The People need not exercise due diligence in attempting to locate a defendant who is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution” (People v. Luperon, 85 N.Y.2d 71, 80, n. 3). The Court found that the Appellate Division erred in imposing a due diligence requirement on the prosecution. The Court remitted the case to the Appellate Division, instructing it to review the Supreme Court’s finding that the defendant had attempted to avoid apprehension or prosecution, along with any other relevant factual issues.

  • People v. Goss, 87 N.Y.2d 792 (1996): Validity of Pre-Arraignment Readiness Declarations

    People v. Goss, 87 N.Y.2d 792 (1996)

    A pre-arraignment statement of readiness for trial is valid under CPL 30.30 if it was possible for the defendant to be arraigned and the trial to proceed within the statutory speedy trial period, and the delay is not solely attributable to the People’s conduct.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the validity of a pre-arraignment declaration of readiness for trial under CPL 30.30. The Court held that such a declaration is valid if the defendant could have been arraigned and the trial commenced within the six-month statutory period, distinguishing People v. England where the People’s actions made timely arraignment impossible. The Court clarified that the responsibility for scheduling arraignments rests with the court, not the prosecution, and post-readiness delays caused by the court are not charged against the People. The indictments were improperly dismissed because the People had declared readiness within the statutory period.

    Facts

    In People v. Goss, a felony complaint was filed against Goss on July 19, 1993. An indictment was filed on January 14, 1994, and the People declared readiness, notifying Goss of a January 24, 1994 arraignment. Goss failed to appear, and was arraigned on February 7, 1994. In People v. Avery, Gaymon, and Cole, a felony complaint was filed on October 19, 1993, and an indictment was filed on April 14, 1994, with the People declaring readiness and setting arraignments for April 22, 1994. Gaymon was arraigned on April 25, 1994.

    Procedural History

    In Goss, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment based on CPL 30.30, and the Appellate Division affirmed. In Avery, Gaymon, and Cole, the trial court also granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss, which was affirmed by the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a pre-arraignment declaration of readiness for trial is valid under CPL 30.30 when it was possible for the defendant to be arraigned within the six-month statutory period.

    Holding

    Yes, because the critical factor is whether arraignment and trial could have occurred within the statutory period, and delays caused by the court in scheduling arraignments are not attributable to the People.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished its holding in People v. England, where the People’s delay in securing an indictment until the last day of the statutory period made a timely arraignment impossible. The Court emphasized that England created a narrow exception applicable only when the People’s actions make timely arraignment impossible. The Court reaffirmed the principle that delays between indictment and arraignment, by themselves, do not prevent the People from being ready for trial, quoting People v. Correa, 77 NY2d 930, 931, noting that “[d]elays between indictment and the arraignment * * * do not prevent the People from being ready for trial”.

    The Court emphasized that arraigning a defendant is exclusively a court function, citing CPL 210.10. The court has a “nondelegable duty on the trial court to arraign the defendant.” Therefore, any delay in arraignment is attributable to the court, not the prosecution. The Court stated, “Where, as in these cases, a felony complaint was previously filed in local criminal court, the Criminal Procedure Law imposes a nondelegable duty on the trial court to arraign the defendant. Neither local practice violative of CPL 210.10 (2) nor consent of the parties can divest the court of this responsibility.” Because the People declared readiness before the expiration of the six-month period and the delay in arraignment was attributable to the court, the dismissals were in error.

  • People v. Matthews, 88 N.Y.2d 1047 (1996): Preservation of Speedy Trial Claims

    People v. Matthews, 88 N.Y.2d 1047 (1996)

    A defendant must specifically identify legal or factual impediments to the People’s reliance on statutory exclusions under CPL 30.30 to preserve a challenge to a speedy trial claim for appellate review.

    Summary

    Matthews was indicted on August 20, 1991, but not arraigned until April 2, 1992, when the People declared readiness. He moved to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds, arguing the delay was chargeable to the People. The People argued a 35-day medical quarantine of Matthews was excludable under CPL 30.30 (4)(c) and (g). The Supreme Court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Matthews failed to preserve his argument that the People needed to establish a causal relationship between his quarantine and their delay in declaring readiness. The Court emphasized the importance of providing the lower court with an opportunity to address and remedy any potential errors.

    Facts

    Matthews was indicted on August 20, 1991, for unauthorized use of a vehicle and criminal possession of stolen property.
    He was arraigned on April 2, 1992, at which time the People declared their readiness for trial.
    During the period between February 27, 1992, and April 2, 1992, Matthews was under medical quarantine.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of speedy trial rules.
    The Supreme Court denied the motion.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision, citing CPL 30.30 (4)(c) and (g).
    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant preserves a challenge to the People’s reliance on CPL 30.30 (4)(c) and (g) exclusions by merely arguing general causation principles, without specifically arguing that the exclusions are unavailable absent a causal link between the defendant’s condition and the People’s delayed readiness.

    Holding

    No, because once the People identify statutory exclusions, the defendant must specifically identify legal or factual impediments to the use of those exclusions to preserve the issue for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that to preserve a speedy trial claim for appellate review, a defendant must do more than simply allege a failure to declare readiness within the statutory period. According to the court, once the People identify the statutory exclusions they intend to rely on, the defendant must specifically identify any legal or factual impediments to the use of those exclusions. The Court stated that “[t]he purpose of adhering to strict rules of preservation in this context is to provide the court with an ‘opportunity to remedy the problem and thereby avert reversible error.’” The Court found that Matthews’ argument focused on general causation principles and did not specifically argue that the medical quarantine exclusions required a causal link between the quarantine and the People’s delay. Because he did not raise this specific argument before the motion court, he failed to preserve the issue for appellate review. The Court referenced People v. Luperon, stating that the defendant must alert the court to the claim that lack of causation was an impediment to the People’s reliance on CPL 30.30(4)(c) and (g).

  • People v. Cortes, 88 N.Y.2d 1049 (1996): Post-Readiness Delay and People’s Burden to Clarify Adjournments

    People v. Cortes, 88 N.Y.2d 1049 (1996)

    When the People declare readiness for trial but a post-readiness delay occurs, the People bear the burden of clarifying the reason for the adjournment on the record; failure to do so results in the delay being charged to the People for speedy trial purposes.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of an indictment against Cortes because the People failed to be ready for trial within the statutorily prescribed six-month period. The court included a 49-day post-readiness adjournment against the prosecution. The People did not clarify on the record the basis for this lengthy adjournment. Because the People failed to clarify, on the record, the basis for this adjournment, the period was properly charged to them. The Court held that the People’s failure to clarify the reason for the post-readiness adjournment on the record meant the delay was attributable to them, thus violating the defendant’s speedy trial rights.

    Facts

    The defendant, Cortes, was indicted. The People declared readiness for trial at some point. However, a 49-day adjournment occurred from August 7 to September 25, 1992. On August 7, 1992, the Supreme Court dismissed three counts of the indictment and suggested that the People might choose to re-present those counts, and adjourned the case to September 25, 1992. At the September 25 appearance, the prosecutor did not assert the People’s readiness for trial or ask the court for an explanation for the lengthy adjournment.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court dismissed the indictment against the defendant, Cortes, pursuant to CPL 30.30 because the People were not ready for trial within the statutory six-month period. The Appellate Division affirmed this dismissal. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a post-readiness adjournment should be charged to the People when they fail to clarify on the record the basis for the adjournment.

    Holding

    Yes, because the People bear the burden of clarifying the reason for a post-readiness adjournment on the record; failure to do so results in the delay being charged to them for speedy trial purposes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holdings in People v. Liotta, 79 N.Y.2d 841 (1992) and People v. Collins, 82 N.Y.2d 177 (1993), which established the principle that the People must clarify the basis for an adjournment on the record. Because the prosecutor did not assert readiness or seek clarification for the adjournment on September 25, the court found the delay was properly charged to the People. The People’s argument that a statement of readiness filed four days after the August 7 adjournment cut off their responsibility for the remaining adjournment period was deemed unpreserved because it was not raised below. The Court emphasized the importance of a clear record in determining speedy trial claims, stating that the People have a duty to clarify the reasons for delays, especially after declaring readiness. The Court noted that, “Because the People failed to clarify, on the record, the basis for this adjournment, the period was properly charged to them.” The court effectively reinforced the prosecution’s obligation to maintain a clear record regarding readiness and the reasons for any subsequent delays, lest those delays be attributed to them, potentially leading to dismissal of the case.

  • People v. Wilson, 86 N.Y.2d 753 (1995): Adequacy of Readiness Statements for Speedy Trial

    People v. Wilson, 86 N.Y.2d 753 (1995)

    A statement of readiness for trial is sufficient for speedy trial purposes under CPL 30.30(1)(a) if the prosecution communicates its readiness on the record and is, in fact, ready to proceed at that time.

    Summary

    The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing a violation of his speedy trial rights under CPL 30.30(1)(a). The Appellate Division had previously reversed the initial conviction and ordered a new trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the prosecution’s statement of readiness, made within six months of the Appellate Division’s reversal, satisfied the requirements of CPL 30.30(1)(a). The Court clarified that a valid statement of readiness must be communicated on the record and reflect actual readiness, not merely a prediction of future readiness. Here, the prosecution secured the complainant’s cooperation, possessed a valid accusatory instrument, and had produced the defendant.

    Facts

    The defendant was originally convicted, but the Appellate Division reversed this conviction and remanded for a new trial. On March 22, 1990, following the reversal, the prosecution stated, “we have been in contact with the victim. Our intentions are to go forward.” The defendant subsequently argued that the People violated his right to a speedy trial by not being ready within six months as required by CPL 30.30(1)(a).

    Procedural History

    1. The defendant was initially convicted, but the Appellate Division reversed and remanded for a new trial.
    2. On the defendant’s second appeal, the Appellate Division remitted the case to County Court for a CPL 30.30 hearing.
    3. After the hearing, the Appellate Division upheld the conviction.
    4. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution’s statement, “we have been in contact with the victim. Our intentions are to go forward,” was a sufficient indication of readiness to satisfy the requirements of CPL 30.30(1)(a) for speedy trial purposes.

    Holding

    Yes, because the prosecution communicated their readiness on the record within six months of the Appellate Division’s reversal of the initial conviction, and possessed the ability to proceed with trial at that time.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied CPL 30.30(1)(a), which requires the People to be ready for trial within six months of the commencement of a criminal action. In this case, the relevant date for calculating the six-month period was the date of the Appellate Division’s reversal of the defendant’s first conviction. The court relied on its prior decision in People v. Kendzia, 64 N.Y.2d 331, which established a two-pronged test for a valid statement of readiness: (1) the People must communicate their state of readiness on the record, and (2) the People must, in fact, be ready to proceed when they proclaim readiness.

    The Court found that the first element of Kendzia was satisfied by the prosecution’s on-the-record statement to the court. As to the second element, the Court emphasized that CPL 30.30 requires actual readiness, “and not a prediction or expectation of future readiness.” The court found that the People met this standard because they had secured the complainant’s cooperation for retrial, possessed a valid accusatory instrument, and had produced the defendant. The statement was therefore deemed a valid declaration of readiness, and the defendant’s speedy trial rights were not violated. The Court distinguished the facts from situations where the prosecution merely expresses a hope or expectation of future readiness, emphasizing the need for the prosecution to have taken concrete steps demonstrating their preparedness to proceed to trial. The Court agreed with the prior courts’ determination that the statement sufficiently indicated the People’s readiness for trial.

  • People v. Luperon, 85 N.Y.2d 71 (1995): Due Diligence and Speedy Trial Rights for Absent Defendants

    85 N.Y.2d 71 (1995)

    To exclude the period when a bench warrant is outstanding from speedy trial calculations under CPL 30.30(4)(c), the prosecution must demonstrate due diligence in attempting to locate the defendant during that entire period; a lack of diligence during any portion of the period renders that portion non-excludable.

    Summary

    Luperon was charged with attempted murder. After his release, he failed to appear in court, and a bench warrant was issued. More than 15 months later, Luperon moved to dismiss the charges, arguing the People’s statement of readiness was untimely. The court addressed whether the entire period the bench warrant was outstanding was excludable, even though there was a 69-day gap before efforts to execute the warrant began. The Court of Appeals held that the 69-day period was not excludable because the police’s subsequent efforts did not retroactively excuse their prior inaction. Because the delay exceeded the statutory limit, the indictment should have been dismissed.

    Facts

    Luperon was arraigned on a felony complaint for shooting his landlord on August 2, 1989, and released on August 4. He failed to appear on September 14, 1989, and a bench warrant was issued. He was arrested on unrelated charges on October 16, 1989, and released again on October 20, 1989, while the Grand Jury had not acted. He was indicted on December 8, 1989, but never received notice of his indictment or an arraignment date. An ex parte arrest order was issued on December 19, 1989. Luperon was not located until October 5, 1990, after being spotted by his former landlady. The People declared readiness on October 26, 1990.

    Procedural History

    Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, alleging the People were unready for 451 days. The trial court denied the motion after a hearing. Luperon was convicted of first-degree assault and second-degree criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding the police demonstrated diligence. The Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People can exclude the entire period a bench warrant is outstanding under CPL 30.30(4)(c) when there was a period of 69 days between the issuance of the warrant and the start of efforts to execute it.

    Holding

    No, because a showing of diligent efforts to execute the bench warrant is a prerequisite to the application of the statutory exclusion. The 69 days of delay between the warrant’s issuance and assignment for enforcement are not excludable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    CPL 30.30(4)(c) excludes the period a bench warrant is outstanding if the defendant is absent or unavailable, defined as location unknown with attempts to avoid apprehension, or presence for trial cannot be obtained with due diligence. The Court stated a showing of diligent efforts to execute the warrant is a prerequisite to applying the exclusion. While diligence is a mixed question of law and fact, the Court may inquire whether the fact finder’s conclusions are supported by the record.

    The Court rejected the People’s argument to excuse the pre-assignment delay for “reasonable administrative delay.” The Court reasoned that the “due diligence” standard is flexible enough to consider processing demands where warranted by the facts. The Court clarified they were not holding that time spent processing a warrant is always chargeable to the People.

    The Court held because the People failed to offer any basis for excluding the 160 days of delay during other periods and the 69-day delay between the warrant issuance and assignment, the total unexcused delay exceeded the statutorily permitted time. The Court noted that “[t]hose officials are bound by their oaths of office to make all reasonable efforts to enforce judicially issued warrants.”

  • People v. England, 84 N.Y.2d 1 (1994): Actual Readiness Required for Speedy Trial

    84 N.Y.2d 1 (1994)

    A valid statement of readiness for trial requires the People to be actually ready to proceed at the time the statement is made, and readiness is not established where the People’s own conduct has made it impossible for the defendant to be arraigned within the statutory speedy trial period.

    Summary

    Crystal England was arrested on a felony complaint on June 24, 1992. Six months later, on December 24, 1992, the Grand Jury handed up an indictment, and the People filed a notice of readiness for trial. England moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the People were not ready for trial within the six-month statutory period under CPL 30.30. The County Court granted the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the People’s delay in securing an indictment, making arraignment impossible within the statutory period, rendered their statement of readiness illusory.

    Facts

    On June 24, 1992, Crystal England was arrested on a felony complaint. She was arraigned in Town Court and released under supervision. On December 24, 1992, six months after the initial complaint, the Grand Jury issued an indictment. The People filed a notice of readiness for trial along with the indictment on the same day. England had not yet been arraigned on the indictment as of December 24th.

    Procedural History

    England moved to dismiss the indictment for failure to comply with CPL 30.30. The County Court granted the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted the People leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People can validly declare readiness for trial when, as a result of their own delay in obtaining an indictment, the defendant cannot be arraigned and thus trial cannot commence within the statutory speedy trial period.

    Holding

    No, because the People’s statement of readiness was meaningless when arraignment within the statutory period was impossible due to the People’s delay in securing an indictment. A valid declaration of readiness requires actual readiness, not just a pro forma announcement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    CPL 30.30 requires dismissal of a felony indictment if the People are not ready for trial within six months of the commencement of the criminal action. The statutory period began with the filing of the felony complaint on June 24, 1992, and expired on December 24, 1992.

    The Court emphasized that “trial readiness in CPL 30.30 means both a communication of readiness by the People on the record and an indication of present readiness.” People v. Kendzia, 64 N.Y.2d 331, 337. The inquiry is whether the People have done all that is required of them to bring the case to a point where it may be tried. The Court distinguished delays caused by court congestion, which do not affect the People’s readiness, from delays caused by the People’s own inaction.

    The Court reasoned that because a defendant cannot be brought to trial before arraignment (CPL 1.20[9]), the People’s failure to secure an indictment in a timely manner, thereby preventing arraignment within the statutory period, rendered their statement of readiness meaningless. “Where the trial court and Appellate Division have found the relevant period to be entirely chargeable to the unexplained laxity of the People, the announcement of trial readiness before defendant was even brought before the court can only be an empty declaration, insufficient to satisfy CPL 30.30.”

    The dissent argued that the majority’s ruling effectively shortens the six-month period provided by CPL 30.30, requiring the People to ensure not only that they are ready for trial but also that the defendant can be arraigned within that period. The dissent contended that the People had performed all the tasks required of them within the 183 days and that the delay in arraignment was the court’s responsibility. The dissent viewed the majority’s decision as improperly blending the analyses for pre-readiness and post-readiness delay.