New York Law Review

Tag: CPL 270.35

  • People v. Rodriguez, 10 N.Y.3d 951 (2008): Standard for Dismissing a Sworn Juror

    People v. Rodriguez, 10 N.Y.3d 951 (2008)

    A sworn juror may only be dismissed if the court determines the juror is grossly unqualified to serve, meaning the juror possesses a state of mind that would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed an Appellate Division order and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial court improperly dismissed a sworn juror. The juror had informed the court that she might have worked with the complainant and recalled he was fired for a gun-related incident. However, she assured the court she could remain impartial. The trial court dismissed her, reasoning that it was simply substituting one qualified juror for another. The Court of Appeals found this dismissal improper because the juror was not shown to be grossly unqualified.

    Facts

    During the trial, after the complainant testified, a sworn juror informed the court that she and the complainant may have worked at the same nursing center. She had some recollection that the complainant was fired for an incident involving a gun. However, the juror stated she was “100 percent sure” she could remain impartial and that the information would not influence her decision because she did not know the complainant well and was not involved in the incident. She also stated that she would not mention this to the other jurors.

    Procedural History

    The People sought the juror’s removal, and the trial court dismissed her over the defendant’s objection, replacing her with an alternate juror. The defendant appealed the conviction, arguing that the dismissal was improper. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the County Court improperly dismissed a sworn juror over the defendant’s objection, when the juror stated that she could remain impartial despite a possible prior association with the complainant and knowledge of a negative incident involving him.

    Holding

    Yes, because the court failed to determine that the juror was grossly unqualified to serve, as required by CPL 270.35(1) and the juror stated that she could remain impartial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on CPL 270.35(1), which permits dismissal of a sworn juror only if he or she is “grossly unqualified to serve.” The court referenced People v. Buford, 69 NY2d 290, 298 (1987), stating that a juror is grossly unqualified only when it becomes obvious that the juror possesses a state of mind that would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict. The court emphasized that the trial court must conduct a probing inquiry and consider the juror’s answers and demeanor to ascertain whether their state of mind will affect deliberations. The court quoted Buford, noting that a court may not speculate as to possible partiality based on equivocal responses but must be convinced that the juror’s knowledge will prevent an impartial verdict.

    Here, the juror explicitly stated she was “100 percent sure” she could remain impartial. The trial court’s reasoning that it was merely substituting one qualified juror for another was insufficient to justify the dismissal. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court failed to determine the juror was grossly unqualified or, indeed, unqualified at all. The Court stated, “[A]t worst ‘what I’m doing is substituting one qualified juror for another qualified juror.’ On this record, the juror’s dismissal was improper, and thus defendant is entitled to a new trial.”

  • People v. Jeanty, 94 N.Y.2d 507 (2000): Discharging and Replacing Jurors Based on Unavailability

    People v. Jeanty, 94 N.Y.2d 507 (2000)

    Under CPL 270.35(2), a trial court may discharge and replace a juror with an alternate if, after a reasonably thorough inquiry, it determines the juror will not appear within two hours of the scheduled resumption of the trial.

    Summary

    This case clarifies the application of CPL 270.35(2), which governs the discharge and replacement of jurors. The New York Court of Appeals held that trial courts have the discretion to replace jurors who, after a reasonable inquiry, are not expected to appear within two hours of the trial’s scheduled resumption. The Court emphasized that the statute establishes a bright-line rule designed to prevent trial delays, and that the two-hour timeframe is not an arbitrary limit but a constitutionally acceptable balance. This decision affirmed convictions in three separate cases where jurors were replaced after being deemed unavailable.

    Facts

    In People v. Jeanty, a juror called to report being in a car accident and going to the hospital. After several hours, the juror still could not estimate a return time. In People v. Jones, two jurors called in sick/unavailable; one with the flu, the other dealing with a burglary at their store. The trial court replaced them, citing authority to do so if jurors are at least two hours late. In People v. Artis, a juror felt ill during the final jury charge and was sent home. After the lunch recess, she remained too ill to return, and the court replaced her despite defense counsel’s objection to waiting until Monday.

    Procedural History

    In Jeanty and Jones, the Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. In Jones, the court also held that the juror discharge issue was unpreserved for review. In Artis, the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, citing consistency with People v. Page. All three cases were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which consolidated them for review. The Court of Appeals then affirmed the lower court rulings in all three cases.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CPL 270.35(2) permits a trial court to discharge and replace a juror with an alternate if the juror is not expected to appear within two hours of the scheduled resumption of the trial, after a reasonably thorough inquiry into the juror’s availability.

    Holding

    Yes, because CPL 270.35(2) allows a court to presume a juror is unavailable and to discharge them if they fail to appear or if there is no reasonable likelihood they will appear within two hours of the scheduled resumption of the trial, provided the court has conducted a reasonably thorough inquiry.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the 1996 amendments to CPL 270.35 were intended to create a bright-line rule for juror replacement, addressing perceived ambiguities after People v. Page. The Court stated the statute requires a “reasonably thorough inquiry” into the juror’s unavailability and codifies the holding in People v. Page to ascertain when the absent juror might arrive at the courthouse. Furthermore, the statute explicitly allows the court to presume unavailability if a juror fails to appear or is unlikely to appear within two hours. The Court rejected arguments that the two-hour rule only applied to missing jurors or created a rebuttable presumption, stating that such interpretations would contradict the legislative intent to avoid trial delays and provide clear guidelines. The two-hour rule strikes a constitutionally acceptable balance between the need to avoid uncertainty and delay and the defendant’s right to an orderly jury trial. The Court emphasized that the “reasonably thorough inquiry” requirement ensures against arbitrary decision-making and that the statute does not compel replacement but grants discretion to the trial court. In Artis, the court specifically addressed the constitutional right to trial by jury, stating that the procedures followed were not arbitrary and did not disrupt the defendant’s constitutional right. The Court ultimately affirmed the trial courts’ decisions in all three cases, finding they had complied with CPL 270.35(2) and acted within their discretion.

  • People v. Jeanty, 94 N.Y.2d 756 (1999): Oral Consent Sufficient for Juror Substitution Before Deliberations

    People v. Jeanty, 94 N.Y.2d 756 (1999)

    Substitution of an alternate juror for a regular juror before deliberations begin does not require written consent from the defendant; oral consent is sufficient.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of criminal sale and possession of a controlled substance. Before deliberations, a juror was late due to medical issues and was verbally abusive to the court clerk. With the defendant’s explicit oral consent in court, the judge substituted an alternate juror. On appeal, the defendant argued that substituting a juror is akin to waiving the right to a jury trial, necessitating written consent. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that written consent is only required after deliberations have begun, aligning with the plain language of CPL 270.35 and distinguishing pre-deliberation substitutions.

    Facts

    During the defendant’s trial for criminal sale and possession of a controlled substance, the jurors were instructed to arrive at 11:00 a.m. One juror was late. At 2:15 p.m., the court clerk contacted the juror, who claimed to be suffering from muscle spasms and stated she had informed her employer to notify the court of her unavailability. The juror became verbally abusive when questioned about why she hadn’t contacted the court directly. The defense counsel initially consented to substitution if the juror didn’t appear after lunch.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted after a jury trial. The defendant appealed, arguing that the substitution of the juror without written consent was a violation of his right to a jury trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the substitution of a sworn juror pursuant to CPL 270.35 before the commencement of jury deliberations is equivalent to waiver of the right to trial by jury, thus requiring written consent from the defendant.

    Holding

    No, because the concerns present when substitution occurs after deliberations have begun are not present before deliberations, and the plain language of CPL 270.35 only requires written consent after deliberations have begun.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Page and People v. Ryan, which held that replacing a deliberating juror required written consent because it implicated the constitutional right to a jury trial. The Court reasoned that those cases were concerned with the possibility that more than 12 jurors would express their views on the evidence and the defendant’s guilt or innocence. “Those same concerns are not present when the substitution occurs in the predeliberation stage.” The Court relied on the plain language of CPL 270.35, which explicitly requires written consent only for substitutions occurring after deliberations have begun. Prior to deliberations, the court noted that there is no material distinction between regular and alternate jurors. As the defendant gave his voluntary oral consent to the discharge of the juror before deliberations began, there was no statutory violation. The court emphasized that the defendant gave his “voluntary oral consent to the discharge of the juror prior to deliberations, no error lies as there was no statutory violation.”

  • People v. Page, 88 N.Y.2d 1 (1996): Requirement of Written Consent for Juror Substitution During Deliberations

    88 N.Y.2d 1 (1996)

    Under New York law, substitution of an alternate juror after deliberations have begun requires the defendant’s explicit written consent, personally signed in open court, to ensure protection of the constitutional right to a jury of twelve.

    Summary

    Kenneth Page was convicted of grand larceny and unauthorized use of a vehicle. After jury deliberations began, a juror became ill and was excused. Defense counsel stated that Page consented to substituting an alternate juror, and Page confirmed this orally. However, the court did not obtain written consent. Page appealed, arguing that the lack of written consent violated CPL 270.35 and the state constitution. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that written consent is mandatory for a valid waiver of the right to a jury of twelve when substituting an alternate juror post-deliberation. The court emphasized the importance of the written consent requirement as a safeguard of the constitutional right to a jury trial.

    Facts

    Page was accused of stealing Erik Moore’s car. After jury selection, including alternates, one juror was replaced mid-trial due to absence (not at issue on appeal). After deliberations began, a juror became ill and was excused. Page’s counsel informed the court that Page consented to replacing the juror with an alternate, citing Page’s lengthy incarceration and desire for resolution. Page orally confirmed his consent. The trial court instructed the reconstituted jury to begin deliberations anew. Page was convicted.

    Procedural History

    Page moved to set aside the verdict under CPL 330.30(1), arguing the juror substitution was invalid without written consent. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed, stating that requiring written consent would elevate form over substance. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under CPL 270.35 and the New York Constitution, a defendant’s oral consent is sufficient to substitute an alternate juror after deliberations have commenced, or whether written consent, signed by the defendant in open court, is required.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 270.35 and the New York Constitution mandate written consent, personally signed by the defendant in open court, for a valid waiver of the right to a jury of twelve when an alternate juror is substituted after deliberations have begun.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the constitutional right to a jury trial, which includes the right to a jury of twelve. While this right can be waived, the New York Constitution requires a written instrument signed by the defendant in open court. CPL 270.35 mirrors this requirement for juror substitution during deliberations, incorporating the constitutional safeguard. The court reasoned that this explicit requirement ensures the defendant fully understands the implications of waiving the right to a jury of twelve. The court distinguished federal law, noting that the federal constitution does not guarantee a jury of twelve. It rejected the argument that instructing the reconstituted jury to begin deliberations anew cured the defect, as the initial substitution without written consent was a violation. The court stated that the framers added the requirement of a written, signed instrument to article I, § 2 in order to ensure that criminal defendants understood the significance of giving up their fundamental right to a jury trial and its essential components, noting, “it is a human habit to think twice before one signs a paper.”

  • People v. Rodriguez, 71 N.Y.2d 214 (1988): When a Juror’s Racial Bias Requires Dismissal

    People v. Rodriguez, 71 N.Y.2d 214 (1988)

    A juror must be dismissed as grossly unqualified if, during trial, they express racial or other invidious bias against the defendant, unless the court determines, after a probing inquiry, that the juror can render an impartial verdict unaffected by such bias and the juror provides unequivocal assurance of impartiality.

    Summary

    During deliberations in a criminal trial for drug offenses, a juror informed the court that she was biased against dark-skinned Hispanics due to a recent negative experience. The trial judge, after questioning the juror, urged her to continue deliberating, emphasizing the consequences of a mistrial. The defendant was convicted. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the juror should have been dismissed as grossly unqualified. The Court emphasized that the juror’s expressed bias, coupled with her inability to provide unequivocal assurance of impartiality, mandated her dismissal under CPL 270.35.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of criminal sale and possession of a controlled substance. During jury deliberations, one juror stated she wished to be excused because, after being selected, she was “bothered, touched, handled by a dark Hispanic man on the subway” and was holding that against the defendant, stating, “At the moment, yes, sir, I am [condemning the whole Hispanic race because a Hispanic touched me on the subway].” Despite the juror’s expressed bias, the trial judge urged her to continue deliberating, emphasizing the potential mistrial.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted after a jury trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motions for a mistrial and to set aside the verdict, based on the juror’s bias. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in failing to dismiss a juror who expressed racial bias against the defendant during jury deliberations, thereby violating the defendant’s right to an impartial jury.

    Holding

    Yes, because when a juror expresses racial or other invidious bias against the defendant during trial, the juror must be dismissed as “grossly unqualified” unless the trial court determines, after a probing inquiry, that the juror can render an impartial verdict and the juror provides unequivocal assurance of impartiality.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a fair trial, including the right to an impartial jury. CPL 270.35 mandates the dismissal of a juror who is “grossly unqualified to serve.” The Court distinguished this case from People v. Buford, where the jurors’ concerns were minor and they gave unambiguous assurances of fairness. In this case, the juror explicitly stated her racial bias against Hispanics and did not provide unequivocal assurance that she could set aside this bias. The Court stated, “where, during the course of a trial, the court learns that a juror is racially or otherwise invidiously biased against the defendant due to an incident occurring after voir dire, the juror must be discharged as ‘grossly unqualified’ unless (1) the trial court makes a determination on the record, following a probing and tactful inquiry with the juror, that the juror can render an impartial verdict according to the evidence and that her verdict will not be influenced by such bias; and (2) the trial court’s determination is supported in the record by the juror’s answers to the court’s questions including unequivocal assurance from the juror that he or she will decide the case solely on the evidence and free from any effect of the bias.” The Court also noted that the trial court erred in overemphasizing the consequences of a mistrial to the individual juror. The juror’s statement that she would “try” to deliberate impartially was deemed insufficient to overcome the expressed bias.

  • People v. Rodriguez, 71 N.Y.2d 662 (1988): Standard for Discharging a Sworn Juror

    People v. Rodriguez, 71 N.Y.2d 662 (1988)

    A sworn juror may only be discharged as “grossly unqualified” when it becomes obvious that the juror possesses a state of mind that would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict.

    Summary

    This case clarifies the standard for discharging a sworn juror under CPL 270.35. The Court of Appeals held that a juror can only be excused after being sworn if it’s clear they cannot render an impartial verdict due to a state of mind preventing fair deliberation. Speculation about potential partiality is insufficient; the trial court must conduct a probing inquiry to be convinced of the juror’s inability to be impartial. The lower courts erred by not applying this strict standard when discharging a juror, leading to a reversal of the defendant’s conviction.

    Facts

    After the jury was sworn but before the verdict, the trial court learned of information regarding a juror. The specific facts that led to the juror’s dismissal are not explicitly detailed in this memorandum opinion, but it concerned the juror’s qualifications to serve impartially.

    Procedural History

    The trial court discharged a sworn juror over the defendant’s objection. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case to determine if the correct standard was applied in discharging the juror.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court applied the correct standard under CPL 270.35 and People v. Buford when it discharged a sworn juror, specifically whether there was sufficient evidence to conclude the juror was “grossly unqualified” to serve.

    Holding

    No, because the lower courts did not apply the stringent standard articulated in People v. Buford, which requires a clear showing that the juror possesses a state of mind preventing an impartial verdict, rather than mere speculation about potential partiality.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of the standard set forth in CPL 270.35 and clarified in People v. Buford, stating that discharging a sworn juror requires more than just a possibility of partiality. The court must be convinced, after a thorough and sensitive inquiry, that the juror is actually incapable of fair deliberation and rendering an impartial verdict. The Court reiterated that the “grossly unqualified” standard is “satisfied only ‘when it becomes obvious that a particular juror possesses a state of mind which would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict’”. The court found that the lower courts had not met this standard. The decision underscores the protection against prematurely removing a juror, ensuring that a defendant’s right to a fair trial is upheld by a duly selected jury. The court explicitly referenced and relied upon its previous decision in People v. Buford to reinforce the proper application of CPL 270.35.

  • People v. Buford, 69 N.Y.2d 290 (1987): Standard for Dismissing a Sworn Juror During Trial

    People v. Buford, 69 N.Y.2d 290 (1987)

    A sworn juror in a criminal trial may only be dismissed over the defendant’s objection if the court finds the juror is “grossly unqualified” to serve, meaning the juror possesses a state of mind that would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict.

    Summary

    This case addresses the standard for dismissing a sworn juror during a criminal trial under New York Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 270.35. The Court of Appeals held that a juror can only be dismissed if “grossly unqualified,” meaning the juror’s state of mind prevents an impartial verdict. The Court reversed the convictions in two separate cases, finding that the trial courts applied an improper, less stringent standard in excusing jurors. The key factor is whether the juror’s impartiality is clearly compromised, not merely questionable. Speculation about possible bias is insufficient for dismissal.

    Facts

    People v. Buford: During Buford’s murder trial, a forewoman saw two prosecution witnesses leaving the courthouse together and expressed concern about a possible conspiracy. The court questioned her, and she stated she could still be fair. The court excused her over the defendant’s objection.
    People v. Smitherman: During Smitherman’s weapon possession trial, a juror revealed she had personal knowledge of the shooting of the defendant’s friend, which the defendant claimed was the reason he wore a bulletproof vest. Initially, she indicated this knowledge might affect her judgment, but later stated she could still be fair and impartial. The court excused her over the defendant’s objection.

    Procedural History

    Both Buford and Smitherman were convicted in their respective trials. In both cases, the Appellate Divisions affirmed the convictions. The New York Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals and reversed the orders of the Appellate Divisions, ordering new trials for both defendants.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court in People v. Buford applied the correct standard in excusing the forewoman from the jury over the defendant’s objection.
    2. Whether the trial court in People v. Smitherman applied the correct standard in excusing the juror with personal knowledge of the defendant’s friend’s shooting over the defendant’s objection.

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court did not apply the “grossly unqualified” standard established in CPL 270.35, instead relying on speculation about possible partiality.
    2. No, because the trial court did not apply the “grossly unqualified” standard established in CPL 270.35, instead relying on the juror’s particular knowledge, even though the juror stated she could be fair.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that dismissing a sworn juror after the trial has begun requires a showing that the juror is “grossly unqualified” under CPL 270.35. This standard is higher than the standard for challenging a juror for cause during jury selection. The Court reasoned that a defendant has a constitutional right to a trial by a particular jury chosen according to law. The Court stated, “This statutory test places a greater burden upon the moving party than if the juror was challenged for cause”.

    In Buford, the forewoman’s initial concern about a conspiracy was alleviated after being informed that the witnesses’ conduct was proper. Her subsequent statements indicated she could remain fair and impartial. Therefore, it was not “obvious” that she possessed a state of mind that would prevent an impartial verdict.

    In Smitherman, the juror’s knowledge of the shooting of defendant’s friend pertained to a collateral matter, not to material facts in issue. Although the juror initially stated her knowledge would affect her deliberations, she later indicated she could convict if the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The court emphasized that the trial court must be convinced that the juror’s knowledge will prevent her from rendering an impartial verdict, and the court may not speculate. “In concluding that a juror is grossly unqualified, the court may not speculate as to possible partiality of the juror based on her equivocal responses. Instead, it must be convinced that the juror’s knowledge will prevent her from rendering an impartial verdict.” The Court found that the trial court applied a standard other than “grossly unqualified” by focusing on the juror’s “particular knowledge” rather than her actual ability to be impartial. The Court reiterated that each case must be evaluated on its unique facts and stated that the trial court’s reasons for its ruling should be placed on the record.