New York Law Review

Tag: CPL 270.15

  • People v. Scott, 15 N.Y.3d 590 (2010): Applying the Rape Shield Law & Jury Selection

    People v. Scott, 15 N.Y.3d 590 (2010)

    New York’s Rape Shield Law (CPL 60.42) generally prohibits evidence of a victim’s sexual conduct, but a trial court has discretion to admit such evidence if it is relevant and admissible in the interests of justice; furthermore, a trial court has discretion in ruling on challenges for cause regarding jurors.

    Summary

    This case concerns the admissibility of evidence of a victim’s sexual conduct under New York’s Rape Shield Law and challenges for cause during jury selection. The defendant was convicted of rape in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court did not err in precluding certain evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct and in its rulings regarding jury selection, finding no abuse of discretion. The court emphasized the importance of protecting victims from harassment and confusion of jurors, while also recognizing the court’s role in ensuring an impartial jury.

    Facts

    K.D., a minor, attended a party where she consumed alcohol and marijuana. She later claimed to have had intercourse with both Steven A. and the defendant, Scott. Initially, she only accused Steven A., but later accused the defendant of rape. At trial, K.D. testified that the defendant raped her. Another attendee, A.B., testified that K.D. was crying and wearing only a sheet after being alone with the defendant. The defense sought to introduce evidence of K.D.’s sexual activity with Steven A. to explain her emotional state, but the trial court largely prohibited this evidence.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with rape in the first degree (forcible), rape in the second degree (statutory), and endangering the welfare of a child. The County Court initially granted the defendant’s motion to introduce evidence of K.D.’s sexual conduct but later reversed its decision. The jury acquitted the defendant of first-degree rape but convicted him of second-degree rape and endangering the welfare of a child. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in precluding evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct with another person around the time of the alleged rape, pursuant to CPL 60.42 (5)?

    2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in its rulings regarding the disqualification and retention of jurors?

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court appropriately applied CPL 60.42 (5) and the evidence’s relevance was contingent on the People introducing evidence of bruising, which they did not do.

    2. No, because the trial court’s actions were within its discretion under CPL 270.15 (4) and CPL 270.20, and leaning towards disqualification of a potentially biased juror is permissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Rape Shield Law, CPL 60.42, generally prohibits the introduction of evidence of a victim’s sexual conduct in sex offense prosecutions to protect victims from harassment and prevent juror confusion. The court acknowledged that CPL 60.42 (5) allows for an exception “in the interests of justice,” but emphasized that this discretion should be exercised cautiously. The court found that the trial court’s decision to preclude evidence of K.D.’s sexual activity with Steven A. was appropriate because the People did not introduce evidence of bruising caused by sexual contact and attributed to the defendant, which was the basis upon which the defense argued for admissibility.

    Regarding jury selection, the court cited CPL 270.15 (4) and CPL 270.20, which govern challenges for cause. The court acknowledged the trial court’s failure to make a probing inquiry of the sworn juror who expressed reservations about the lack of DNA evidence. However, the court stated that discharging this juror was authorized and proper under CPL 270.15(4). The Court also noted that a trial court should err on the side of disqualifying a prospective juror of dubious impartiality, quoting People v. Branch, 46 NY2d 645, 651 (1979): “trial court should lean toward disqualifying a prospective juror of dubious impartiality, rather than testing the bounds of discretion by permitting such a juror to serve”. The court found no error in refusing to disqualify the other prospective juror, citing People v. Provenzano, 50 NY2d 420 (1980), because the relationship between the prosecutor and that juror was distant in time and limited in nature.

  • People v. Alston, 88 N.Y.2d 519 (1996): Permissible Jury Selection Methods Under New York Criminal Procedure Law

    88 N.Y.2d 519 (1996)

    CPL 270.15 allows trial courts flexibility in jury selection, permitting methods where the prosecution exercises peremptory challenges before the defendant, without requiring the prosecution to exhaust all challenges to the entire panel at once.

    Summary

    The case addresses whether New York’s Criminal Procedure Law (CPL 270.15) mandates the prosecution to make all peremptory challenges to a jury array before the defendant makes any, or if the court can require sequential challenges to individual jurors or subsets. The Court of Appeals held that CPL 270.15 allows trial courts flexibility in jury selection as long as the prosecution exercises peremptory challenges before the defendant and doesn’t challenge a juror already accepted by both parties. This decision upheld the trial courts’ methods and affirmed the defendants’ convictions.

    Facts

    In People v. Alston, after initial rounds of jury selection, the trial court directed the parties to exercise peremptory challenges to the first five prospective jurors to complete the jury. The defendant objected, arguing the prosecution had to challenge the entire panel. In People v. Morris, the court instructed attorneys to make peremptory challenges juror by juror, with the prosecution going first. The defendant objected, arguing CPL 270.15 required the prosecution to exhaust all peremptory challenges against the entire panel before the defense made any.

    Procedural History

    Both defendants appealed their convictions, arguing that the trial courts’ methods violated CPL 270.15. The Appellate Division rejected these arguments. The cases were consolidated on appeal to the New York Court of Appeals due to the similar issue regarding jury selection procedures.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CPL 270.15 mandates that the prosecution exercise all peremptory challenges to a particular array of jurors before the defendant is required to exercise any peremptory challenges to that array, or whether the trial court has discretion to implement alternative methods.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 270.15 provides flexibility in jury selection, permitting methods where the prosecution exercises peremptory challenges before the defendant, and the prosecution does not challenge a juror already accepted by both parties, consistent with the statute’s language and history.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that CPL 270.15 allows flexibility in jury selection. Specifically, the court noted the ambiguity in CPL 270.15 (2), stating that the phrase “[t]he people must exercise their peremptory challenges first” can be interpreted to mean that each prosecution challenge must precede each defense challenge, rather than requiring all prosecution challenges to precede any defense challenges. The court reasoned that interpreting the statute to require the prosecution to exhaust all peremptory challenges to the entire panel would give some defendants a tactical advantage, dependent on the judge’s discretionary decisions regarding filling the jury box. Quoting People v. McQuade, the court acknowledged that “the requirement…that the People shall challenge first, is the only substantial advantage remaining to a defendant.” The Court found that the historical rule that the People make peremptory challenges first, and never be permitted to go back and challenge a juror accepted by the defense was not violated by the juror-by-juror method. The dissent argued the statute plainly requires the People to exercise all peremptory challenges to the panel “first,” before the defense begins and that once the defense exercises its challenge or challenges, the statute precludes the People from challenging any juror then in the box, not just those jurors in the box whom “both sides have had an opportunity” to challenge.