New York Law Review

Tag: CPL 250.10

  • People v. Gonzalez, 22 N.Y.3d 541 (2014): Notice Requirement for Extreme Emotional Disturbance Defense

    22 N.Y.3d 541 (2014)

    A defendant who requests an Extreme Emotional Disturbance (EED) jury charge based solely on evidence presented by the prosecution is not required to provide statutory notice under CPL 250.10.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder after killing his boss. At trial, the prosecution introduced defendant’s confession, which included statements suggesting he “lost his mind” during the altercation. The defense initially filed notice of intent to present psychiatric evidence for an EED defense but later withdrew it. At the charge conference, the defense requested an EED charge based on the prosecution’s evidence. The trial court agreed to give the charge only if the prosecution could rebut it with its own psychiatric expert. The defense then withdrew the request. The New York Court of Appeals held that CPL 250.10 doesn’t require notice when a defendant relies solely on the prosecution’s evidence for an EED defense.

    Facts

    Defendant killed his boss, Wilfredo Lebrón, with a hammer and dismembered the body. He disposed of the body parts in garbage cans. The police found the body and defendant confessed. In a written statement and a videotaped confession, defendant claimed Lebrón had attacked him first. In the videotaped confession, the defendant stated that he had “lost [his] mind” and was “out of [his] mind”. He also stated that Lebrón had abused him for weeks prior to the killing.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was charged with second-degree murder, manslaughter, and other related charges. Before trial, defendant filed a CPL 250.10 notice, indicating intent to present psychiatric evidence for an EED defense. He was examined by both the defense and prosecution’s psychiatrists. Prior to trial, the defense stated an intent to withdraw the CPL 250.10 notice. At trial, the prosecution introduced defendant’s confessions. The defense rested without presenting a case. At the charge conference, the defense requested an EED charge based on the prosecution’s evidence. The trial court agreed to give the charge, but only if the prosecution could rebut the evidence with their psychiatric expert. The defense withdrew the request for the charge. The jury convicted defendant of second-degree murder. The defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether CPL 250.10 requires a defendant to provide notice of intent to offer evidence in connection with an EED defense when the defendant offers no evidence at trial but requests an EED jury charge based solely upon evidence presented by the People.

    Holding

    1. No, because CPL 250.10 requires notice only when a defendant affirmatively presents psychiatric evidence, not when the defendant relies solely on the prosecution’s evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 250.10 requires notice when a defendant “intends to present psychiatric evidence.” The statute defines this as “evidence of mental disease or defect to be offered by the defendant in connection with” an EED defense. The court highlighted the active terms, “present” and “offer,” suggesting that the defendant must affirmatively seek to admit psychiatric evidence. Here, the defendant did not offer any evidence; he merely relied on the prosecution’s evidence. The court noted that the purpose of CPL 250.10 is to prevent unfair surprise to the prosecution. Here, the prosecution introduced the evidence themselves and could not claim surprise. The court also found that the trial court abused its discretion by conditioning the EED charge on the People’s presentation of their expert’s testimony. Because no notice was required, there was no statutory basis for allowing the People to use the psychiatric examination against the defendant. Quoting People v. Diaz, 15 NY3d 40, 46 (2010), the court stated “The statutory notice provision is grounded on principles of fairness and is intended ‘to prevent disadvantage to the prosecution as a result of surprise’ occasioned by the defendant’s sudden interposition of psychiatric evidence and an accompanying mental infirmity defense”.

  • People v. Diaz, 17 N.Y.3d 43 (2011): Notice Requirement for Extreme Emotional Disturbance Defense

    17 N.Y.3d 43 (2011)

    A defendant must provide notice under CPL 250.10 when raising an extreme emotional disturbance defense, even if relying solely on lay testimony rather than expert psychiatric evidence.

    Summary

    Teofilo Diaz was convicted of second-degree murder for strangling his former girlfriend. Diaz sought to assert an extreme emotional disturbance defense, claiming he “went crazy” after the victim told him their son wasn’t his. The prosecution argued Diaz failed to provide the notice required by CPL 250.10(2). The trial court allowed late notice and an examination by the People’s psychiatrist. The New York Court of Appeals held that the notice requirement of CPL 250.10 applies even when the defendant intends to rely solely on lay testimony to prove the defense, as fairness dictates the prosecution have an opportunity to rebut such claims.

    Facts

    Teofilo Diaz strangled his former girlfriend, Felipa Santana, after she told him that their son wasn’t his. This occurred shortly after Diaz was released from prison for assaulting Santana, and violated an order of protection. Diaz fled to Florida and was apprehended a year later. He was charged with murder, criminal contempt, and endangering the welfare of a child.

    Procedural History

    The trial court allowed Diaz to file a late notice of intent to present an extreme emotional disturbance defense, and granted the prosecution time for a psychiatric examination of Diaz. Diaz was convicted of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the notice requirement of CPL 250.10 applies when a defendant intends to raise an extreme emotional disturbance defense relying solely on lay testimony.

    Holding

    Yes, because the statute and principles of fairness require notice to the prosecution regardless of whether the evidence is expert or lay testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that “psychiatric evidence” as defined in CPL 250.10 encompasses any mental health evidence, including lay testimony. The purpose of the notice provision is to prevent unfair surprise and allow the prosecution an opportunity to acquire relevant information to counter the defense. Quoting People v. Berk, 88 N.Y.2d 257, 265 (1996), the Court stated that the notice provision is intended “to allow the People an opportunity to obtain any mental health evidence necessary to refute a defense of mental infirmity, it follows that it applies to any mental health evidence to be offered by the defendant in connection with such a defense.” The Court acknowledged that preclusion of a defense for failure to comply with the notice provision can implicate a defendant’s constitutional rights, and trial courts must balance these rights against the prejudice to the People. However, in this case, the court allowed the late notice and the defense was presented, mitigating any constitutional concerns. The court also determined that compelling the defendant to submit to examination by the People’s psychiatrist was authorized under CPL 250.10(3).

  • People v. Berk, 88 N.Y.2d 257 (1996): Admissibility of Psychiatric Evidence and Duty to Retreat

    88 N.Y.2d 257 (1996)

    CPL 250.10 requires a defendant to provide pretrial notice of intent to offer psychiatric evidence, even if the expert did not examine the defendant, and a defendant is only relieved of the duty to retreat from a dwelling if it is their own dwelling.

    Summary

    Defendant Berk was convicted of manslaughter and murder after fatally shooting his wife and her lover. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in excluding expert psychiatric testimony due to lack of notice under CPL 250.10 and in its jury charge regarding justification, specifically whether the house was his “dwelling.” The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that CPL 250.10 applies to all psychiatric evidence, regardless of whether it stems from an examination of the defendant, and that the jury was correct to determine if the residence was defendant’s dwelling. The court emphasized the importance of timely notice to prevent prejudice to the prosecution and ensuring the integrity of the fact-finding process.

    Facts

    Defendant and his wife, Virginia Berk, experienced marital problems. Defendant installed an eavesdropping device on their home telephone and overheard a conversation suggesting his wife was having an affair with Police Officer Joseph Valvo. One night, defendant found his wife and Valvo in bed together and shot Valvo. His wife escaped to the kitchen and called the police, but defendant shot and killed her. Defendant surrendered to the police. At trial, defendant claimed justification for shooting Valvo, alleging Valvo threatened him and the gun fired accidentally during a struggle. He also claimed extreme emotional disturbance regarding his wife’s death, stating he had no memory of shooting her.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was charged with two counts of second-degree murder. At trial, he raised the defenses of justification and extreme emotional disturbance. The trial court denied the admission of expert psychiatric testimony from Dr. Ewing, due to lack of notice to the prosecution. Defendant was convicted of first-degree manslaughter of Joseph Valvo and second-degree murder of Virginia Berk. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether CPL 250.10 requires a defendant to provide pretrial notice of intent to offer psychiatric evidence when the expert did not examine the defendant.
    2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow late notice and introduction of the mental health evidence.
    3. Whether the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury that the Sable Park Court residence was the defendant’s dwelling as a matter of law, for the purposes of the justification defense and the duty to retreat.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the plain language of the statute requires that any evidence regarding a mental disease or defect offered in relation to the defense of extreme emotional disturbance or any other defense be preceded by timely notice to the People.
    2. No, because the decision to allow late notice is discretionary, and the court weighed the defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense against the prejudice to the People from the belated notice.
    3. No, because whether the Sable Park Court residence was the defendant’s dwelling was a disputed factual question for the jury to decide, based on the conflicting evidence presented at trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 250.10 aims to prevent disadvantage to the prosecution by surprise, allowing them sufficient opportunity to obtain psychiatric and other evidence to refute the defense of mental infirmity. The court stated that, “the primary aim of the pretrial notice requirement was to ensure the prosecution sufficient opportunity ‘to obtain the psychiatric and other evidence necessary to refute’ the proffered defense of mental infirmity.” The court emphasized the broad scope of CPL 250.10, encompassing evidence related to any defense, not just those based on a formal psychiatric examination of the defendant. Refusal to allow late notice was within the trial court’s discretion, balancing the defendant’s right to present a defense with the prejudice to the prosecution from the delayed notice. The court considered the defendant’s failure to offer a good cause for the delay. Regarding the “dwelling” instruction, the court noted that while a dwelling is defined as “a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night,” the critical question was whether Sable Park Court was his dwelling. Because evidence was presented to both support and oppose the conclusion that it was, it was not error to deny the defendant’s request to instruct the jury that he had no duty to retreat, since the residence was his dwelling. The court concluded that the trial court appropriately left this factual question to the jury to decide.