New York Law Review

Tag: CPL 190.75

  • People v. Davis, 19 N.Y.3d 265 (2012): Limits on De Facto Grand Jury Dismissals

    People v. Davis, 19 N.Y.3d 265 (2012)

    A prosecutor’s withdrawal of a case from a grand jury due to witness unavailability is not a de facto dismissal requiring court authorization for re-presentation unless the grand jury has fully considered the evidence and charges.

    Summary

    Defendants Davis and McIntosh were indicted for assault after an incident at a nightclub. The prosecution initially presented evidence to a grand jury against McIntosh only, as Davis had not yet been apprehended, but withdrew the case due to witness unavailability. Later, both Davis and McIntosh were indicted by a second grand jury. The Court of Appeals held that the withdrawal from the first grand jury was not the functional equivalent of a dismissal requiring court authorization before re-presentation, because the first grand jury had not fully considered the evidence and charges against both defendants.

    Facts

    Lynn Walker was severely injured in an altercation at a nightclub, allegedly instigated by Davis and joined by McIntosh. McIntosh was arrested shortly after the incident, while Davis was apprehended later. The People began presenting evidence to a grand jury against McIntosh before Davis was arrested, advising the jury that it was a “continued case.” Walker testified that both Davis and McIntosh assaulted her. The People withdrew the case due to witness unavailability and the grand jury’s term expiring. Later, the People presented evidence to another grand jury against both Davis and McIntosh, who were subsequently indicted.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss the indictment. Davis was convicted of assault, while McIntosh was acquitted of first-degree assault but convicted of second-degree assault. The Appellate Division reversed the judgments, holding that the withdrawal from the first grand jury was the functional equivalent of a dismissal under People v. Wilkins, requiring court permission before re-presentment. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s orders.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People’s withdrawal of their case from the first grand jury presentation, due to witness unavailability, constituted the functional equivalent of a dismissal pursuant to CPL 190.75, requiring court authorization before re-presentment to a second grand jury.

    Holding

    Yes for McIntosh; No for Davis. The order is reversed because the People had instructed the first grand jury that only McIntosh was the target of the proceedings. As to McIntosh, no, because the proceedings before the first grand jury had not progressed to the point where it had fully considered the evidence and the charges against McIntosh.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Wilkins, which held that a pre-vote withdrawal of charges after the presentation was complete was the functional equivalent of a dismissal. The Court emphasized that Wilkins applies only in limited circumstances where the withdrawal is “fundamentally inconsistent with the objectives underlying CPL 190.75,” such as curtailing prosecutorial excess and maintaining grand jury independence (People v. Gelman, 93 N.Y.2d 314, 319 (1999)). For Davis, since the People never sought an indictment from the first grand jury against Davis, Wilkins is irrelevant since there were no charges against Davis to be withdrawn (see People v Santmyer, 255 AD2d 871, 871 [4th Dept 1998]). The Court found that the first grand jury had not fully considered the evidence and charges against McIntosh because the People intended to present additional witnesses and had informed the grand jury that it was a continuing case. The Court emphasized that there was no evidence that the People withdrew their case to find a more compliant grand jury. The court reasoned that the focus should be on “the extent to which the Grand Jury considered the evidence and the charge” (Wilkins, 68 NY2d at 274). Because the People withdrew the charges before fully presenting their case, it did not constitute a de facto dismissal requiring court authorization.

  • People v. Cade, 74 N.Y.2d 410 (1989): Limits on Grand Jury Re-Presentation After Withdrawal

    74 N.Y.2d 410 (1989)

    When the People withdraw a case from a grand jury before the grand jury has had an opportunity to fully consider the evidence and the charges, judicial approval is not required to resubmit the charges to a subsequent grand jury.

    Summary

    Cade was convicted of arson. Prior to trial, he argued that the indictment should be dismissed because the charges had been improperly submitted to the second grand jury without court approval, violating CPL 190.75 and People v. Wilkins. The first grand jury heard testimony from a firefighter and a fire inspector, but neither witness linked Cade to the crime. The prosecution withdrew the case because a key witness was unavailable and the grand jury refused to extend its term. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the first grand jury did not fully consider the evidence or charges against the defendant, the withdrawal was not equivalent to a dismissal, and judicial approval wasn’t needed to resubmit to a second grand jury.

    Facts

    Cade was convicted of first-degree arson for allegedly hiring four men to set fire to an apartment building he owned. The building was subject to rent control, and Cade sought to convert it into condominiums.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Cade’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecutor’s withdrawal of a case from a grand jury, after presenting minimal evidence that does not link the defendant to the crime, constitutes a dismissal requiring judicial approval before resubmitting the case to another grand jury under CPL 190.75.

    Holding

    No, because the key factor in determining whether an unauthorized withdrawal of the case must be treated as a dismissal is the extent to which the grand jury considered the evidence and the charge. Here, the grand jury did not have the opportunity to fully evaluate the evidence or charges against an identified defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that CPL 190.75 aims to prevent repeated resubmissions of charges to successive grand juries after a dismissal. The court distinguished People v. Wilkins, where the prosecution’s presentation to the first grand jury was complete, and all witnesses had testified. In that case, withdrawal was deemed equivalent to a dismissal. Here, the court reasoned that because the first grand jury heard limited evidence that did not link Cade to the crime, and the case was withdrawn due to witness unavailability, the grand jury did not have an adequate opportunity to consider the evidence and charges. The court stated, “[T]he key factor in determining whether an unauthorized withdrawal of the case must be treated as a dismissal is the extent to which the Grand Jury considered the evidence and the charge.” The court concluded that allowing resubmission without judicial approval in this context did not undermine the integrity of the grand jury proceedings or the purpose of CPL 190.75. The court also found that a remark by the judge’s law clerk did not render Cade’s waiver of his right to a jury trial involuntary, because there was no promise of favorable treatment.

  • People v. Young, 94 N.Y.2d 692 (2000): Limits on Prosecutorial Influence over Grand Jury Reconsideration

    People v. Young, 94 N.Y.2d 692 (2000)

    A Grand Jury may reconsider a no true bill vote only if the decision to reconsider is truly sua sponte and not the result of prosecutorial intervention; otherwise, the prosecutor must seek court permission to resubmit the charge.

    Summary

    Young was charged with robbery. The grand jury initially voted a no true bill on the robbery charge but, after the prosecutor reacted with visible disbelief and the District Attorney addressed the jury, they reconsidered and indicted him. The New York Court of Appeals held that the prosecutor’s reaction improperly influenced the grand jury’s decision to reconsider, violating the statute prohibiting resubmission of charges without court authorization. The court emphasized the importance of grand jury independence and curbing prosecutorial excess.

    Facts

    Young and two others allegedly beat and robbed Lee Cornell. The case was presented to a grand jury, which initially voted 12-10 against indicting Young for robbery, opting instead for a prosecutor’s information on assault. Upon receiving the vote, the Assistant District Attorney visibly reacted with disbelief. Although the Grand Jury had voted a no true bill on the robbery charge, the vote was never filed as a finding of dismissal under CPL 190.75 (1). The following day, the District Attorney spoke to the Grand Jury at its request, and at least one of the jurors expressed disapproval of the Assistant’s reaction to their vote. The District Attorney advised the jurors that they could reconsider any vote that had not been handed up. A week later, the grand jury recalled Cornell, heard further testimony, and subsequently indicted Young for robbery and assault.

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed the indictment, finding that the prosecutor’s conduct influenced the grand jury’s reconsideration. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the grand jury’s decision was sua sponte. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, dismissing the indictment but allowing the assault charge to proceed via prosecutor’s information, subject to the People seeking leave to resubmit the robbery charge.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a Grand Jury may reconsider its vote of a no true bill without court permission pursuant to CPL 190.75 (3), under circumstances which incontrovertibly indicate prosecutorial involvement in the Grand Jury’s deliberative process.

    Holding

    No, because the prosecutor’s intervention compromised the grand jury’s independence, requiring the prosecutor to seek court permission before resubmitting the charge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    CPL 190.75(3) prohibits resubmitting a charge dismissed by a grand jury without court leave, preventing prosecutorial abuse. While a grand jury can reconsider a dismissal sua sponte before filing, prosecutorial intervention taints the process. The court distinguished this case from situations where the Grand Jury acts on its own: “Once the Grand Jury has indicated its rejection of the People’s evidence, then the customarily unfettered prosecutorial discretion in dealing with the Grand Jury is checked by the necessity of judicial authorization to resubmit.” The court found the prosecutor’s reaction to the initial vote contributed to the reconsideration, undermining the grand jury’s independence. The court stated, “The inference is undeniable that the prosecutor’s action upon receiving the initial vote sheet contributed to the Grand Jury’s decision to reconsider its prior action. Therefore resubmission of the robbery charge violated the prerequisite of CPL 190.75 (3).” Even without bad faith, the appearance of influence is enough to require court authorization for resubmission. This protects the grand jury’s independence and curbs potential prosecutorial overreach, consistent with the statute’s intent.