New York Law Review

Tag: Cowan v. Kern

  • Matter of Cowan v. Kern, 41 N.Y.2d 591 (1977): Substantial Evidence Standard for Zoning Variances

    Matter of Cowan v. Kern, 41 N.Y.2d 591 (1977)

    When reviewing zoning determinations by the Board of Standards and Appeals, the Board of Estimate’s power is limited to assessing whether substantial evidence supports the BSA’s determination.

    Summary

    This case concerns a challenge to the New York City Board of Estimate’s disapproval of a zoning variance granted by the Board of Standards and Appeals (BSA). The petitioner sought a variance to construct a commercial building in a residentially zoned area. The Court of Appeals held that the Board of Estimate exceeded its authority by overturning the BSA’s decision, as the BSA’s grant of the variance was supported by substantial evidence. The court emphasized that the Board of Estimate’s review is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the BSA’s determination, and the petitioner demonstrated the necessary criteria for a variance.

    Facts

    The petitioner sought a zoning variance to build a two-story commercial building in Staten Island, an area zoned residential. The Board of Standards and Appeals (BSA) initially granted the variance. The Board of Estimate of the City of New York overturned the BSA’s decision, arguing that the petitioner failed to meet the criteria for a variance.

    Procedural History

    The petitioner initiated an Article 78 proceeding challenging the Board of Estimate’s disapproval. The Supreme Court, Richmond County, initially ruled in favor of the petitioner, reinstating the BSA’s grant of the variance. The Appellate Division reversed this decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the Supreme Court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Board of Estimate exceeded its authority by overturning the BSA’s grant of the zoning variance.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the BSA’s determination was supported by substantial evidence, and the Board of Estimate’s review power is limited to assessing whether such evidence exists.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the Board of Estimate’s power to review zoning determinations of the BSA is limited by subdivision c of section 668 of the City Charter to whether there was substantial evidence to support the BSA’s determination. The Court found that the petitioner had presented substantial evidence satisfying all five criteria necessary for a variance:

    • Unique physical characteristics of the lot creating unnecessary hardship.
    • No reasonable rate of return from the permitted use.
    • The variance would not alter the essential character of the neighborhood.
    • The hardship was not self-created.
    • The variance was the minimum necessary to afford relief.

    The court stated, “A review of the record demonstrates, however, that petitioner established by substantial evidence that: there were unique physical characteristics to the lot that would create unnecessary hardship in complying with the zoning provisions; there would be no reasonable rate of return from the permitted use; a variance would not alter the essential character of the neighborhood; the hardship was not self-created; and the variance was the minimum necessary to afford relief.” Because the BSA’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, the Board of Estimate erred in overturning it. The court also dismissed the petitioner’s constitutional challenge to the city charter provisions as without merit.

  • Matter of Cowan v Kern, 41 N.Y.2d 591 (1977): Area Variances and Aesthetic Considerations

    Matter of Cowan v Kern, 41 N.Y.2d 591 (1977)

    A Zoning Board of Appeals may not deny an area variance based solely on aesthetic considerations unless specifically authorized by local law with sufficient guidance to prevent arbitrariness.

    Summary

    Cowan, owner of a substandard lot, sought an area variance to build a narrow residence. The Board of Zoning Appeals denied the variance, citing aesthetic concerns that the proposed structure would be an “aesthetic abomination” and depreciate property values. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that while aesthetic considerations are a valid public purpose, the Board lacked specific authority under local law to deny an area variance solely on aesthetic grounds. The court emphasized the need for delegated authority and guidance to prevent arbitrary decisions.

    Facts

    Cowan owned a corner lot measuring 100 feet by 47 feet. Zoning ordinances required a 50-foot frontage. The lot was created when a corporation, in which Cowan had an interest, subdivided a larger plot into three lots. Two of the lots met zoning requirements, while Cowan’s did not. Cowan sought to build a 20-foot wide residence. Other undersized lots with residences existed nearby.

    Procedural History

    The Board of Zoning Appeals denied Cowan’s request for an area variance. Supreme Court sustained the Board’s decision. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the denial arbitrary. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a Zoning Board of Appeals may deny an area variance based solely on aesthetic considerations, absent specific authorization in local law.

    Holding

    No, because a Zoning Board of Appeals must have specific authorization from local law to deny an area variance based solely on aesthetics; absent such authorization, the denial is improper.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged that aesthetic considerations can be a valid public purpose for land use regulation, citing Suffolk Outdoor Adv. Co. v Hulse, 43 NY2d 483, 489-490. However, it emphasized that the public interest in aesthetic regulation is not as strong as in cases involving public safety. The court stated that the Zoning Board of Appeals was “without power to deny an area variance on aesthetic grounds” because it lacked specific authorization from local law. The court reasoned that zoning boards can only exercise authority properly delegated to them. Since the village ordinance (section 16-23) did not provide the necessary authority or guidance, the denial of the variance was improper. The court also noted the apparent incongruity of denying a variance based on aesthetics when the proposed use was otherwise permitted. The court cited Matter of Tandem Holding Corp. v Board of Zoning Appeals of Town of Hempstead, 43 NY2d 801, 802, reinforcing the need for specific authorization to prevent arbitrariness.