New York Law Review

Tag: Courtroom Closure

  • People v. Martucci, 73 N.Y.2d 816 (1988): Exception to Public Trial Right for Inadvertent Courtroom Closures

    People v. Martucci, 73 N.Y.2d 816 (1988)

    A brief and inadvertent continuation of a proper courtroom closing, unnoticed by participants, does not violate a defendant’s right to a public trial; a denial of the public trial right requires an affirmative act by the trial court explicitly overcoming the presumption of openness.

    Summary

    Martucci was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. During the trial, the courtroom was properly closed for an undercover officer’s testimony. However, it inadvertently remained closed for Martucci’s subsequent testimony. The trial court denied Martucci’s motion for a mistrial, stating the closure was inadvertent. The Appellate Division upheld the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the inadvertent continuation of the closure, unnoticed by any participants, did not violate Martucci’s right to a public trial because there was no affirmative act by the trial court explicitly overcoming the presumption of openness.

    Facts

    Martucci was on trial for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree.

    The trial court ordered the courtroom closed to the public during the testimony of an undercover police officer, which was a proper closure.

    After the undercover officer’s testimony, the courtroom inadvertently remained closed during Martucci’s own testimony.

    Martucci moved for a mistrial, arguing that his right to a public trial had been violated.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Martucci’s motion for a mistrial.

    The Appellate Division upheld Martucci’s conviction.

    The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the inadvertent continuation of a proper courtroom closing, which was not noticed by any of the participants, violates the defendant’s right to a public trial.

    Holding

    No, because a denial of the public trial right requires an affirmative act by the trial court excluding persons from the courtroom, which in effect explicitly overcomes the presumption of openness.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the right to a public trial is not absolute and that an inadvertent error does not automatically warrant a reversal. The court distinguished the case from situations where the trial court affirmatively acted to close the courtroom. The court reasoned that “[a] denial of the public trial right requires an affirmative act by the trial court excluding persons from the courtroom, which in effect explicitly overcomes the presumption of openness.”

    The court distinguished this situation from cases like People v. Jones, 47 NY2d 409, where there was an explicit closure order violating the defendant’s rights. The court emphasized that the brief and inadvertent nature of the continued closure, unnoticed by anyone, meant that none of the purposes of the public trial guarantee were offended. The court noted there was no intentional or deliberate act by the court to exclude the public during the defendant’s testimony.

    The Court held, “The brief and inadvertent continuation of a proper courtroom closing, which was not noticed by any of the participants, did not violate defendant’s right to a public trial.” This ruling establishes a narrow exception to the public trial right where the closure is inadvertent and unnoticed.

  • People v. Kan, 78 N.Y.2d 54 (1991): Limits on Courtroom Closure During Testimony

    People v. Kan, 78 N.Y.2d 54 (1991)

    A trial court’s power to exclude the public from a trial, while discretionary, must be “sparingly exercised” and any closure must be no broader than necessary to protect a demonstrated, overriding interest, especially when it infringes on a defendant’s right to a public trial and their family’s presence.

    Summary

    Kin Kan was convicted of a drug offense after a trial where the courtroom was closed during the testimony of a key cooperating witness due to fears of retaliation. This closure excluded everyone, including Kan’s family. The New York Court of Appeals reversed her conviction, holding that the blanket closure, specifically the exclusion of Kan’s family, violated her Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The court emphasized that while the right to a public trial is not absolute, closure must be narrowly tailored and supported by specific findings, which were lacking in this case regarding Kan’s family.

    Facts

    Kan, along with a codefendant Harry Ip, and an accomplice were charged with drug offenses. The accomplice pleaded guilty and agreed to testify against Kan and Ip. Prior to the trial, the prosecution requested the courtroom be closed to the public during the accomplice’s testimony, citing fears of retaliation due to the gang-related nature of the crime. The accomplice testified he feared retaliation from Kan’s associates and from individuals involved in ongoing investigations where he was a confidential informant. The trial court granted the request, closing the courtroom to all spectators during the accomplice’s testimony.

    Procedural History

    Kan and Ip were convicted. Ip’s conviction was affirmed on appeal in state court but later overturned in federal court on habeas corpus review, based on a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. Kan’s appeal to the Appellate Division resulted in a reversal of her conviction, citing the federal court’s decision in Ip’s case. A dissenting Justice granted leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals then heard Kan’s appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court violated Kan’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial by closing the courtroom to all spectators, including her family, during the testimony of a key witness, based on generalized fears of retaliation without specific findings justifying the exclusion of her family.

    Holding

    Yes, because the trial court’s closure order was broader than necessary to protect the witness’s safety and lacked specific justification for excluding Kan’s family, thus violating her Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the four-prong test from Waller v. Georgia to assess the closure’s propriety. The court found deficiencies in all four prongs, specifically regarding the exclusion of Kan’s family. First, while the state presented an overriding interest in protecting the witness, the court found the closure was broader than necessary. The accomplice stated that he did not fear Kan’s family specifically. Second, the court stated, “The trial court did not specify or justify closure with respect to Kan’s family on the record, despite her counsel’s specific objection in that regard, and we discern no record basis for doing so.” Third, reasonable alternatives to closure were not sufficiently explored, particularly the possibility of allowing Kan’s family to remain. The court noted Kan’s need for her family’s presence, as she did not speak English and relied on interpreters. The Court emphasized the importance of narrowly tailoring any closure to the specific circumstances, stating that “the balance of interests must be struck with special care”. The court also noted that because Kan was deprived of her constitutional right to a public trial, reversal and a new trial were required irrespective of prejudice, citing People v. Jones, 47 N.Y.2d 409, 415-417. It concluded that this right was violated because the closure was not “narrowly tailored” in respect to Kan’s family’s exclusion. The Court declined to address the impact of the federal court decision in codefendant Ip’s case, deciding the issue based on independent review of Kan’s direct appeal.

  • People v. Clemons, 78 N.Y.2d 48 (1991): Requirements for Courtroom Closure During Testimony

    78 N.Y.2d 48 (1991)

    A trial court must conduct a sufficient inquiry and articulate specific reasons on the record before closing a courtroom to the public, balancing the defendant’s right to a public trial against other interests, such as protecting a witness from incapacitating embarrassment.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of rape, sexual abuse, and kidnapping. Prior to the complainant’s testimony, the prosecutor requested the courtroom be closed, citing the complainant’s discomfort due to the nature of her testimony. The trial court, after a brief exchange and over defense counsel’s objection, ordered the closure without further inquiry or explanation. The Appellate Division reversed, finding a violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry or articulate sufficient reasons on the record to justify the closure.

    Facts

    In May 1988, the defendant was indicted on charges stemming from the alleged rape and abduction of a young woman. At trial, before the complainant’s testimony, the prosecutor requested the courtroom be closed to the public based on the complainant’s request due to the sensitive nature of her testimony. The defense opposed the closure. The trial court summarily granted the closure motion without further inquiry or stating any reasons for its decision.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted on all charges. The Appellate Division reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial, holding that the courtroom closure violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial by ordering the courtroom closed during the complainant’s testimony based solely on the prosecutor’s representation of the complainant’s wishes, without conducting a sufficient inquiry or articulating reasons for the closure on the record.

    Holding

    No, because the Sixth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the defendant’s right to a public trial against other interests, and the trial court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry or articulate specific reasons on the record to justify closing the courtroom.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the right to a public trial is a fundamental privilege, ensuring fairness and preventing abuse of judicial power. While recognizing that this right is not absolute and may be balanced against other societal concerns, such as protecting witnesses, the court stressed that any closure must be preceded by a careful inquiry to ensure the defendant’s right is not sacrificed for less than compelling reasons. The court referenced the Supreme Court’s holding in Waller v. Georgia, stating that closure determinations require a close examination of competing interests in the specific context of the case, and reasons for closure must be articulated on the record with sufficient specificity for appellate review. The Court found the trial court’s actions deficient because the closure was based solely on the prosecutor’s representation of the complainant’s wishes, without any independent assessment of the potential impact of testifying in open court on the complainant. There was no indication the judge assessed the emotional impact on the witness. Because the trial court failed to make an adequate inquiry or provide specific reasons for its decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order for a new trial. The court cited People v. Jones, 47 N.Y.2d 409, 414-415 stating that no closure can be tolerated that is not preceded by an inquiry careful enough to assure the court that the defendant’s right to a public trial is not being sacrificed for less than compelling reasons. The court stated, “While the Sixth Amendment does not require a judicial insensitivity to the very real problems that rape victims may face in having to testify in open court… it nonetheless does demand a more careful balancing and weighing of the competing interests than that conducted by the trial court here”.

  • People v. Clemons, 78 N.Y.2d 48 (1991): Standard for Courtroom Closure Based on Witness Embarrassment

    People v. Clemons, 78 N.Y.2d 48 (1991)

    A trial court’s decision to close the courtroom based on a witness’s asserted embarrassment requires an adequate inquiry to ensure the closure is necessary to protect an overriding interest and that the defendant’s right to a public trial is not unnecessarily sacrificed.

    Summary

    In a prosecution for assault, controlled substance possession, and weapon possession, the trial court closed the courtroom to the defendant’s family and friends during the cross-examination of a key prosecution witness, the defendant’s former girlfriend, based on the prosecutor’s representation that she would be embarrassed to testify about the defendant forcing cocaine on her in connection with sexual practices. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s affirmance, holding that the trial court’s inquiry was insufficient to justify the closure because the court relied solely on the prosecutor’s representations without directly questioning the witness about her alleged embarrassment. This violated the defendant’s right to a public trial.

    Facts

    The defendant was prosecuted for assault, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of a weapon.
    The prosecution’s key witness, the defendant’s former girlfriend, initially denied using cocaine or allowing the defendant to bring drugs into her apartment.
    Medical records revealed she had told hospital personnel she used cocaine.
    The prosecutor stated that when confronted, the witness claimed the defendant forced cocaine on her during sexual practices and she didn’t consider that “use” by her; she feared public humiliation by the defendant’s relatives and friends if she disclosed these facts.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for a mistrial but allowed him to recall the witness.
    The prosecutor moved to close the courtroom during the witness’s additional cross-examination due to her alleged embarrassment; the defense objected.
    The trial court, taking “judicial notice” of the testimony’s embarrassing nature, excluded the defendant’s family, friends, and other uninterested spectators.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court conducted a sufficient inquiry to justify closing the courtroom to the defendant’s family and friends based on the prosecutor’s representation that a witness would be unduly embarrassed by her testimony.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court’s sole reliance on the prosecutor’s representations, without directly questioning the witness about her alleged embarrassment, was insufficient to justify the courtroom closure. The Court held that this violated the defendant’s right to a public trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that witness embarrassment or anxiety could, in appropriate circumstances, warrant courtroom closure. However, the court emphasized that such a decision requires an adequate inquiry to balance the witness’s concerns against the defendant’s right to a public trial. The court stated, “A witness’ embarrassment or anxiety might in appropriate circumstances warrant closure.” The court found the trial court’s inquiry insufficient because it relied solely on the prosecutor’s representations without any direct assessment of the witness’s claimed embarrassment. The court quoted People v. Jones, 47 NY2d 409, 414-415, stating the inquiry was not “careful enough to assure the court that the defendant’s right to a public trial is not being sacrificed for less than compelling reasons.” The court suggested that the trial judge should have conferred with the witness herself to assess the validity and extent of her claimed embarrassment, similar to the procedure in People v. Joseph, 59 NY2d 496, where the trial judge conferred with the complainant in the robing room. The absence of such an inquiry rendered the closure improper in this case.

  • People v. Colon, 71 N.Y.2d 410 (1988): Locking Courtroom Doors During Jury Instructions and Public Trial Rights

    People v. Colon, 71 N.Y.2d 410 (1988)

    Locking courtroom doors during jury instructions to prevent disruption, while allowing those already present to remain, does not violate a defendant’s right to a public trial.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court’s practice of locking courtroom doors during jury instructions, preventing late entry and early exit, violated the defendant’s right to a public trial. The court held that this practice, intended to prevent disruption and ensure jury concentration, did not constitute a closure of the proceedings because it did not explicitly exclude anyone already present. The court distinguished this limited restriction from complete closures requiring specific findings and less restrictive alternatives, finding the trial judge’s action a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction on access to the trial.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of criminal sale and possession of cocaine. Before the jury charge, defense counsel objected to the trial judge’s practice of locking the courtroom doors during instructions. The judge explained this was to prevent distractions to the jury caused by spectators entering or leaving. The doors would remain locked for the duration of the charge. The defense argued this violated the defendant’s right to a public trial.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without addressing the courtroom closure issue. After the First Department ruled similarly in People v. Venters, the defendant moved for reargument, which was denied. Leave to appeal was granted by a Judge of the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether locking the courtroom doors during the Trial Judge’s charge to the jury — thereby precluding access to those who arrive after commencement of the charge, and prohibiting those who have elected to stay from leaving during its delivery — violates defendant’s constitutional right to a public trial.

    Holding

    No, because the practice is a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction designed to prevent disruption and does not constitute a true closure of the courtroom.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the importance of the right to a public trial, tracing its roots to the abolition of the Star Chamber and emphasizing its role in ensuring fairness and public confidence in the judicial process. However, the court noted that this right is not absolute and must be balanced against other interests, such as ensuring a fair trial and protecting witnesses. The Court distinguished the act of locking the doors from a complete closure, which explicitly excludes members of the public. Instead, the Court characterized this action as a reasonable “time, place, and manner” restriction on access to the trial, analogous to restrictions on street use. The Court emphasized the importance of the jury charge, stating: “The charge to the jury is a solemn and comparatively complex phase of the trial requiring precision and concentration on the part of both the jury and the Trial Judge… It is during the charge that the jury is instructed on the law applicable to the case, the time they must master often difficult and interrelated principles”. The court reasoned that the need to maintain order and prevent disruption during this critical phase justified the limited restriction on access. The court also upheld the trial court’s decision to deny a challenge for cause regarding a prospective juror with relatives on the police force, finding no inherent bias.

  • People v. Jelke, 408 N.E.2d 666 (N.Y. 1980): Permissible Scope of Courtroom Closure During Sensitive Testimony

    People v. Jelke, 408 N.E.2d 666 (N.Y. 1980)

    A trial court may, without violating a defendant’s right to a public trial, order a limited closure of the courtroom during a witness’s sensitive testimony to prevent disruption, provided the closure is not absolute and the defendant can have anyone he desires present.

    Summary

    Jelke was convicted of rape, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. The court held that the trial court’s limited closure of the courtroom during the complainant’s testimony did not violate Jelke’s right to a public trial. The trial judge, familiar with the case from a prior trial, knew the testimony would be embarrassing and that courthouse employees were disrupting proceedings. The court allowed Jelke to have anyone he wanted present. The Court of Appeals found that this limited closure to prevent disruption during sensitive testimony was permissible.

    Facts

    Jelke was on trial for rape. The trial judge had presided over Jelke’s previous trial on the same charges. The judge was aware of the embarrassing nature of the complainant’s testimony. The judge knew that courthouse employees were entering and exiting the courtroom out of curiosity during such testimony, creating a disturbance.
    At the time the closure order was issued, no spectators were present, and no one was seeking to enter the courtroom. The court informed Jelke that anyone he wanted present would be admitted.

    Procedural History

    Jelke was convicted at trial. He appealed, arguing that the limited courtroom closure violated his right to a public trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Jelke then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, upholding the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court’s limited closure of the courtroom during the complainant’s testimony constituted an abuse of discretion or a denial of the defendant’s right to a public trial.

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial judge knew of the embarrassing nature of the testimony, was aware of disruptions, no spectator was present when the order was issued and the defendant could have anyone he wanted present.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court’s limited closure was justified to prevent disruption during the complainant’s sensitive testimony. The court emphasized several key factors: (1) the trial judge’s familiarity with the case and the nature of the testimony from the prior trial; (2) the disruptive presence of courthouse employees; (3) the absence of spectators at the time of the closure order; and (4) the court’s willingness to admit anyone the defendant desired to be present.

    The court distinguished the situation from a complete or arbitrary closure, stating that “[t]here is no indication that the court excluded or intended to exclude any member of the public who sought to attend the trial.” The court emphasized that the closure was a limited measure to maintain order and decorum during sensitive testimony and did not constitute a denial of the defendant’s right to a public trial.

    The Court also addressed the People’s questioning of the defendant concerning a co-defendant’s prior testimony. The Court found no reversible error, as the substance of the prior testimony was not introduced. Further, the defense failed to make a motion to strike or request curative instructions.

  • People v. Jelke, 49 N.Y.2d 363 (1980): Public Trial Right and Limited Courtroom Closure

    People v. Jelke, 49 N.Y.2d 363 (1980)

    A trial court may, without violating a defendant’s right to a public trial, exclude all spectators, including the defendant’s family and friends, during the testimony of a particular witness if the circumstances warrant such action to foster the truth-discovery process.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a defendant’s right to a public trial was not violated when the trial court closed the courtroom to all spectators, including family and friends, during the complainant’s testimony in a sodomy trial. The closure was ordered due to the sensitive and embarrassing nature of the victim’s testimony and her expressed discomfort in testifying before a public audience. The court reasoned that this limited closure was justified to foster the truth-discovery process and did not defeat the purposes of a public trial.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of robbery and sodomy arising from an incident where he and another man accosted and robbed a couple, and sodomized the woman. Prior to the complainant’s testimony at trial, the prosecutor requested the courtroom be cleared due to the sensitive nature of the evidence. Defense counsel objected, noting the presence of the defendant’s family and friends. The trial judge conferred with counsel and the complainant, who expressed discomfort about testifying publicly regarding the “demeaning” acts. The judge then granted the prosecutor’s request to clear the courtroom solely during the victim’s testimony. The courtroom was open to all for the remainder of the trial, and the defendant’s family was present.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree and sodomy in the first degree in the trial court. He appealed, arguing that the courtroom closure violated his right to a public trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial when it excludes all spectators, including the defendant’s family and friends, during the testimony of a witness due to the sensitive nature of the testimony and the witness’s expressed discomfort in testifying publicly.

    Holding

    No, because the limited closure was warranted by the circumstances to foster the truth-discovery process and did not defeat the overall purposes of a public trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged the general guarantee of a public trial under the Sixth Amendment and Civil Rights Law § 12, but also noted Judiciary Law § 4, which allows courts discretion to exclude those “not directly interested” in certain trials, including rape or sodomy cases. The court distinguished Matter of Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948), which involved a complete denial of public access to the trial. Here, the closure was limited to the complainant’s testimony, and the victim had expressed her discomfort testifying with unnecessary persons present. The court highlighted the purpose of a public trial: to encourage truth-discovery by subjecting participants to public scrutiny, to avoid secret proceedings, and to foster confidence in the courts. It found that these purposes were not defeated by the limited closure. The court noted the defendant offered no specific reason why his family’s presence was “compelled” other than to express their concern. The court held that “closing the courtroom to all spectators, including defendant’s family and friends, during a distraught sodomy victim’s testimony does not offend notions of fairness and justice.” The decision emphasizes balancing the defendant’s right to a public trial with the court’s need to ensure a fair trial and protect vulnerable witnesses. This case illustrates a permissible limitation on the right to a public trial, focusing on the scope and reason for the closure. The court cited People v. Jones, 82 A.D.2d 674 (1981) and United States ex rel. Latimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 691 (1977), in support of its holding.

  • People v. Hagan, 24 N.Y.2d 395 (1969): Public Trial Right and Limited Courtroom Closure

    People v. Hagan, 24 N.Y.2d 395 (1969)

    A defendant’s right to a public trial is not absolute and may be limited when necessary for the orderly administration of justice, such as protecting a witness from credible threats, provided the closure is limited in scope and duration.

    Summary

    Hagan, along with others, was convicted of assassinating Malcolm X. A key issue on appeal was whether a brief courtroom closure during a witness’s testimony, due to fears for the witness’s safety, violated the defendants’ right to a public trial. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the limited closure was justified to protect the witness and ensure his testimony. The court also found that evidence of hostility between the defendants’ Black Muslim faction and Malcolm X was admissible to show motive.

    Facts

    The defendants were convicted of assassinating Malcolm X. During the trial, a witness named Timberlake expressed fear for his life if he testified publicly and threatened to refuse to testify. Timberlake’s lawyer informed the judge on the record of the threats against the witness. The trial judge, concerned for the witness’s safety, ordered the courtroom closed to the public during Timberlake’s testimony and that of an FBI agent relating to Timberlake.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted in the trial court. They appealed, arguing that the courtroom closure violated their right to a public trial and that the admission of evidence regarding hostility between factions was improper. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court’s exclusion of the press and public from the courtroom during a portion of the trial, due to concerns for a witness’s safety, deprived the defendants of their right to a public trial?

    2. Whether the prosecutor’s comments and evidence regarding the hostility of the Black Muslim faction (to which the defendants belonged) toward Malcolm X were improperly admitted?

    Holding

    1. No, because the limited closure was justified by the need to protect the witness and ensure his testimony, and the closure was not a complete denial of public access.

    2. No, because the evidence of hostility was relevant to establishing motive, even if it related to religious conflict.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the right to a public trial is not absolute and must be balanced against the need for the orderly administration of justice. Citing United States ex rel. Bruno v. Herold, 408 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1969), the court acknowledged a trial judge’s discretion to manage the courtroom and protect witnesses. The court distinguished this case from People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56 (1954), where the courtroom was closed for the entirety of the prosecution’s case simply to protect the public from offensive testimony; here, the closure was directly related to ensuring a witness’s safety and willingness to testify.

    The Court emphasized the limited scope of the closure and the witness’s expressed fear for his life, stating: “Here, the lawyer for the witness Timberlake told the Judge on the record the witness feared for his life and threats had been made against him and that he would not testify.” The court also noted the defendants’ objection to the alternative of swearing the witness and holding him in contempt if he refused to testify.

    Regarding the evidence of hostility, the court found it relevant to establishing motive, even if it touched upon religious conflict. The court stated, “But if, indeed, the murder did grow out of the hostility of a religious conflict, this conflict becomes germane to the case. It should not be made inadmissible on general grounds. The relevancy of the relationship is to this specific case.”

    The Court also found that even if the exclusion was erroneous, it was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), because the testimony taken during the exclusion was minimal compared to the large amount of evidence presented by the prosecution.