Tag: County Charter

  • Matter of Buerk v. Erie County Legislature, 43 N.Y.2d 230 (1977): Legislative Equivalency Doctrine for Abolishing Public Offices

    Matter of Buerk v. Erie County Legislature, 43 N.Y.2d 230 (1977)

    An office created by a County Charter or Administrative Code can only be abolished through legislative action of equal dignity, such as a local law, and not merely by omitting salary appropriations from the county budget.

    Summary

    This case concerns the power of the Erie County Legislature to abolish positions established by the County Charter and Administrative Code by simply removing their salary appropriations from the budget. The Court of Appeals held that such positions can only be abolished through a legislative act of equal dignity, such as a local law, which is subject to the County Executive’s veto power. The Court reasoned that omitting salary items from the budget, which is not subject to the same veto power, is not equivalent to amending the Charter or Code and is therefore ineffective to abolish the positions. This maintains the check and balance between the legislative and executive branches.

    Facts

    The Erie County Executive submitted a tentative budget for 1977 to the County Legislature, which included salary items for the positions of Deputy County Executive, Deputy Commissioner of Public Works-Buildings and Grounds, Deputy Director of Purchasing, Deputy Commissioner-Recreation, and County Forester. Subsequently, the County Legislature adopted an amended budget, excising the salary items for these five positions. The County Executive contended that these deletions were invalid, as the positions were created by the County Charter or Administrative Code.

    Procedural History

    The petitioners, members of the Erie County Legislature and citizen-taxpayers, initiated litigation by submitting a controversy on an agreed statement of facts to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division directed that the 1977 budget should not include the positions. The County Executive appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Erie County Legislature can abolish positions in county government, established by the County Charter and Administrative Code, by striking salary appropriations for those positions from the budget submitted by the County Executive.

    Holding

    No, because the abolition of such positions requires a legislative act of equal dignity to the act that created them, such as a local law, and simply removing salary appropriations from the budget does not meet this requirement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the positions in question were expressly created by provisions of the County Charter or Administrative Code. Amendments to the Charter and Code require a local law, which is subject to an initial veto by the County Executive. The adoption of the county budget, however, is effected by a majority vote of the County Legislature, and the County Executive’s veto power is limited to increases over the tentative budget, not legislative decreases. The Court emphasized the importance of the check and balance assured by the executive veto, stating that omitting salary items from the budget “was not, in terms of the required procedures, the legislative equivalent of the adoption of a local law amending the County Charter and Administrative Code to eliminate the positions.” The Court cited Matter of Moran v La Guardia, stating, “To repeal or modify a statute requires a legislative act of equal dignity and import. Nothing less than another statute will suffice.” The Court also noted that the doctrine of legislative equivalency has been applied with respect to the abolition of offices in local government. The Court rejected the argument that Section 204 of the County Law authorized the abolition of these positions by budget adoption because even if it did, the County Law would conflict with the Charter and Code, and the Charter and Code would prevail. The Court concluded that the petitioners were not entitled to the judgment directing that the positions not be included in the budget.

  • Matter of Town of Smithtown v. Suffolk County Planning Commission, 36 N.Y.2d 370 (1975): County Authority over Town Zoning

    Matter of Town of Smithtown v. Suffolk County Planning Commission, 36 N.Y.2d 370 (1975)

    A county charter amendment may grant a county planning commission veto power over town zoning changes near municipal boundaries, but the commission must adhere strictly to the voting requirements specified in the charter for such a veto to be effective.

    Summary

    This case concerns a dispute between the Town of Smithtown and the Suffolk County Planning Commission over a zoning change proposed by the town. The County Planning Commission disapproved the change, but the town argued that the commission’s action was invalid. The Court of Appeals held that while the county had the authority to veto the zoning change through a charter amendment, the disapproval was ineffective because it did not receive the required two-thirds vote of the entire commission membership. This case clarifies the balance of power between county and town governments regarding zoning decisions and emphasizes the importance of adhering to procedural requirements in local government actions.

    Facts

    The Town of Smithtown approved a zoning change to allow for an automobile dealership near the Village of The Branch. The Village protested, and the Suffolk County Planning Commission reviewed the change. The commission, which had 13 members appointed out of a possible 15, held a public hearing where nine members were present. The commission voted eight to zero, with one abstention, to disapprove the zoning change. Smithtown then initiated an Article 78 proceeding, arguing that the county’s disapproval was invalid.

    Procedural History

    The Town of Smithtown filed an Article 78 proceeding to annul the County Planning Commission’s determination. The Appellate Division annulled the determination based on a prior case, Matter of We’re Assoc. Co. v. Bear, which held that a similar county veto power was superseded by the General Municipal Law. The Suffolk County Planning Commission appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an amendment to the Suffolk County Charter can grant the County Planning Commission veto power over town zoning changes, superseding Section 239-m of the General Municipal Law.

    2. Whether a vote of eight out of nine members present at a County Planning Commission hearing, where the commission was authorized to have 15 members, constitutes a two-thirds majority required for disapproval under the County Charter.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Section 1330 of the County Charter, enacted after the relevant amendment to the General Municipal Law, is a valid partial transfer of function from town to county, authorized under the State Constitution and the Municipal Home Rule Law.

    2. No, because the County Charter requires a two-thirds vote of the entire commission membership, not just two-thirds of those present and voting.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the State Constitution and the Municipal Home Rule Law empower counties to adopt and amend their forms of government, including transferring functions between different levels of local government. The Court found that Section 1330 of the Suffolk County Charter validly transferred zoning review power to the county, superseding the conditional review power outlined in Section 239-m of the General Municipal Law.

    However, the Court also emphasized that the County Planning Commission’s disapproval was ineffective because it failed to meet the voting requirements of Section 1330 of the Suffolk County Charter. The charter stipulated that disapproval required “a two-thirds vote of such commission.” The Court interpreted this language to mean two-thirds of the entire authorized membership of the commission (15 members), not just two-thirds of those present. Since only eight members voted to disapprove, the requirement was not met, and the town zoning change was deemed approved. The court cited Savatgy v. City of Kingston, 20 N.Y.2d 258 (1967) and Matter of Downing v. Gaynor, 47 Misc.2d 535 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1965) to reinforce the principle that “two-thirds vote of such commission” means two-thirds of the entire commission, not merely of those present.

    The Court distinguished the present case from situations where a simple majority is required, noting that the explicit two-thirds requirement necessitates a higher threshold. “Whenever three or more public officers are given any power or authority * * * a majority of the whole number of such persons or officers * * * shall constitute a quorum and not less than a majority of the whole number may perform and exercise such power, authority or duty.” General Construction Law § 41. Because the county charter required a two-thirds vote for disapproval, the simple majority rule does not apply.

    The Court stated, “The statutory language ‘two-thirds vote of such commission’, different and distinguishable from other formulations of the vote required to take action in a deliberative body, has generally been interpreted to require favorable votes of two thirds of the entire commission.”