New York Law Review

Tag: corroboration

  • People v. Henry, 31 N.Y.3d 273 (2018): Admissibility of Prior Conduct Evidence in Child Sexual Abuse Cases

    31 N.Y.3d 273 (2018)

    In child sexual abuse cases, evidence of a defendant’s prior consensual sexual conduct with adults, if it demonstrates a unique pattern of behavior mirroring the alleged abuse, may be admissible to corroborate a victim’s testimony, provided its probative value outweighs its potential for prejudice.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of evidence concerning a defendant’s prior sexual conduct in a child sexual abuse case. The court held that evidence of the defendant engaging in oral sex with consenting adults in a manner similar to the alleged abuse of the children was properly admitted to corroborate the victims’ testimony. The court distinguished this evidence from inadmissible propensity evidence, emphasizing its relevance in demonstrating a distinctive pattern. The court further affirmed the trial court’s discretion in balancing the probative value of the evidence against potential prejudice to the defendant.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with sexually abusing two minor sisters. The girls described being forced by the defendant to perform oral sex while he smoked crack cocaine with his shirt over his head. The prosecution sought to introduce evidence that the defendant engaged in the same sexual acts with the girls’ mother and another adult woman. The trial court admitted the evidence of the defendant’s similar sexual conduct with adults. The defendant was found guilty by the jury.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether evidence of the defendant’s prior consensual sexual conduct with adults was properly admitted, despite the defendant’s argument that it was impermissible propensity evidence.

    2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its potential for prejudice.

    Holding

    1. No, because the evidence was not considered propensity evidence and was relevant to corroborating the victims’ testimony.

    2. No, because the trial court properly balanced the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the evidence of the defendant’s prior sexual conduct with adult women was not “propensity” evidence because it did not show a propensity to commit the crimes charged, but instead demonstrated a unique, corroborating pattern of behavior. The court stated that the defendant engaging in oral sex with consenting adult women in the same manner as the alleged abuse of the victims, while smoking crack, showed no propensity to commit the crimes for which he was on trial. The court emphasized that the evidence corroborated the girls’ accounts of their abuse. The Court further noted that the trial court’s admission of the evidence was proper since it was relevant and probative to the People’s case. The Court also found that the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by the prejudice. The court recognized that almost all relevant evidence is prejudicial to some degree. The Court referenced the trial court’s broad discretion in determining evidentiary matters and the high threshold for overturning such decisions.

    Practical Implications

    This case provides guidance to prosecutors and defense attorneys regarding the admissibility of prior conduct evidence in child sexual abuse cases. It establishes that evidence of a defendant’s prior sexual conduct with adults, similar to the alleged abuse, can be admissible if it corroborates the victim’s testimony and demonstrates a unique pattern, provided the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for prejudice. Attorneys should consider the specific facts of the case and the need for corroboration when arguing for or against the admissibility of such evidence. This case underscores the importance of a detailed evidentiary analysis. The ruling requires that the court’s decision to admit such evidence be made with care.

  • People v. Taylor, 26 N.Y.3d 18 (2015): Jury Must Decide Accomplice Status When Evidence is Disputed

    People v. Taylor, 26 N.Y.3d 18 (2015)

    When evidence presents a factual dispute as to whether a witness participated in the crime, the jury must decide if the witness is an accomplice and whether their testimony needs corroboration.

    Summary

    Taylor was convicted of manslaughter based largely on the testimony of Mogavero, who claimed to witness Taylor beat the victim. Taylor argued that Mogavero was an accomplice, requiring corroboration of his testimony. The Court of Appeals held that because evidence presented a factual question about Mogavero’s involvement, the trial court erred in not instructing the jury to determine if Mogavero was an accomplice. The error was not harmless because Mogavero’s testimony was crucial, and the corroborating evidence was not overwhelming. The Court reversed the conviction, allowing the People to resubmit the manslaughter charge to a grand jury.

    Facts

    Defendant Taylor was charged with second-degree murder for the beating death of Merced. The prosecution’s key witness, Mogavero, testified that he witnessed Taylor, Clarke, and Velez beat Merced after a night of drinking. Mogavero admitted to punching Merced twice at the beginning of the altercation. Mogavero stated that Taylor later struck Merced with a mop handle while Merced lay on a porch. Mogavero admitted to helping move Merced to the porch. Taylor, in a statement to police, admitted to being present and poking Merced with a mop handle but denied beating him.

    Procedural History

    The Monroe County Court denied Taylor’s request for an “accomplice as a question of fact” jury instruction. The jury acquitted Taylor of murder but convicted him of first-degree manslaughter. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred by failing to submit to the jury the question of whether Mogavero was an accomplice in fact, and if so, whether his testimony was sufficiently corroborated.

    Holding

    Yes, because the evidence presented a factual question as to Mogavero’s participation in the crime; therefore, the trial court should have instructed the jury on accomplice-in-fact.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Under CPL 60.22, a defendant cannot be convicted solely on an accomplice’s testimony without corroborating evidence. The court determines if a witness is an accomplice as a matter of law. However, if a factual dispute exists regarding the witness’s role, the jury must decide if the witness is an accomplice in fact. Here, evidence suggested Mogavero participated in the crime. He admitted to punching Merced, which could have contributed to the death, according to the forensic pathologist. Mogavero helped move the body, potentially to cover up the crime. The Court noted, “different inferences may reasonably be drawn from Mogavero’s testimony and the forensic evidence, as to Mogavero’s role as an accomplice.”

    The Court reasoned that the failure to provide the instruction was not harmless because Mogavero was the key eyewitness, and the corroborating evidence was not overwhelming. The defendant’s statement to police contradicted Mogavero’s testimony, and the jury could have reasonably discounted Mogavero’s testimony. As the Court noted, “Where the jury could have chosen to discount the testimony of the People’s eyewitness and the proof of defendant’s guilt was not overwhelming, it cannot be said that the failure to properly charge the jury was harmless error.” Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction.

  • People v. Santiago, 22 N.Y.3d 736 (2014): Corroboration of Confession & Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

    People v. Santiago, 22 N.Y.3d 736 (2014)

    A defendant’s confession must be corroborated by independent evidence that a crime was committed by someone, but need not be evidence that the crime was committed by the defendant, and the failure to renew a motion to dismiss based on lack of corroboration after presenting a defense waives the issue on appeal unless a general motion to dismiss is made after the defense rests and the trial court makes specific findings as to corroboration.

    Summary

    Cheryl Santiago was convicted of manslaughter for the death of her stepdaughter. Her confession to police was a key piece of evidence. She argued her confession lacked sufficient corroboration, that certain letters introduced at trial were improperly redacted, and that her counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a PowerPoint presentation during the prosecutor’s summation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s modification of the conviction from second-degree murder to second-degree manslaughter, finding sufficient corroborating evidence and no ineffective assistance of counsel.

    Facts

    Defendant married Santos Santiago, who had a one-year-old daughter, Justice. Defendant was not fond of Justice. On October 23, 2007, Defendant and Santos quarreled over Justice. That evening, Defendant put Justice to bed. The next morning, Santos left for work, and shortly after, Defendant called him, claiming Justice was not moving. Santos returned to find Justice dead. Defendant initially stated she found Justice lifeless with a plastic bag nearby, but later confessed to placing her hands over Justice’s mouth and nose to quiet her.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was charged with second-degree murder. Her motion to suppress her statements was denied after a Huntley hearing. At trial, the jury found her guilty of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reducing the conviction to second-degree manslaughter, finding the evidence insufficient to prove intent to kill. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s confession was sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence at trial to support a conviction.
    2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain letters into evidence that were not sufficiently redacted.
    3. Whether defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel when her trial counsel failed to object to a PowerPoint display during the People’s summation.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because there was independent evidence that a crime occurred, corroborating the defendant’s confession.
    2. No, because defense counsel did not specifically object to the portions of the letters now claimed to be prejudicial, thus failing to preserve the issue for review.
    3. No, because the failure to object to the PowerPoint presentation did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness considering counsel is afforded wide latitude in summation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court addressed the corroboration requirement of CPL § 60.50, stating that the additional evidence must show that the charged crime was committed by someone, not necessarily the defendant. The Court cited People v. Lipsky, 57 N.Y.2d 560, 571 (1982), stating that the statute is satisfied by some proof that a crime was committed by someone. Here, the testimony of Dr. Baden, indicating that Justice would not have allowed herself to suffocate from a loose object, provided independent evidence of a crime. The Court noted the general rule that failure to renew a motion to dismiss at the close of all proof constitutes a waiver of any challenge to the denial of a motion to dismiss made at the close of the People’s case. As to the letters, the Court held that because defense counsel did not specifically object to the overtly sexual portions, the argument was unpreserved. The Court also found no ineffective assistance of counsel, as defense counsel had successfully achieved some redactions and the court issued a limiting instruction. Finally, regarding the PowerPoint presentation during summation, the Court found that failing to object to the PowerPoint presentation was not ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel has wide latitude during summation, quoting People v. Ashwal, 39 N.Y.2d 105, 109 (1976), stating counsel is to be afforded the widest latitude by way of comment, denunciation or appeal in advocating his cause.

  • People v. Suber, 19 N.Y.3d 248 (2012): Corroboration Not Required for Information’s Facial Sufficiency

    People v. Suber, 19 N.Y.3d 248 (2012)

    A defendant’s admission need not be corroborated to satisfy the prima facie case requirement for an information.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that an information charging a defendant with failing to register as a sex offender was facially sufficient, even though the defendant’s admission of moving to certain residences without notification was not corroborated. The Court reasoned that while CPL 60.50 requires corroboration for a conviction based on an admission, the statutes governing informations (CPL 100.40) do not explicitly mandate corroboration for an information to be facially valid. Therefore, the Appellate Term’s reversal of the defendant’s conviction was incorrect. The Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated the conviction.

    Facts

    Defendant Frank Suber, a registered sex offender, moved to two different addresses in Brooklyn in December 2005 and February 2006 without notifying the Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) or verifying his address with local law enforcement, as required by Correction Law § 168-f. He eventually informed a police officer about his prior Brooklyn residences. Based on this admission, the People filed a misdemeanor information charging him with failing to register and verify his address.

    Procedural History

    In Criminal Court, the defendant challenged the facial sufficiency of the information, arguing that it lacked corroboration of his admissions. The Criminal Court found corroboration unnecessary and accepted his guilty plea. The Appellate Term reversed, holding that corroboration was required and the absence thereof rendered the information jurisdictionally insufficient. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s admissions must be corroborated to satisfy the prima facie case requirement for an information.

    Holding

    No, because the Criminal Procedure Law does not explicitly require corroboration of a defendant’s admission to establish a prima facie case in an information.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 60.50, which requires corroboration for a conviction based solely on a confession or admission, does not apply to the facial sufficiency of charging instruments. The Court emphasized that while an information must establish a prima facie case with non-hearsay allegations, the relevant statute (CPL 100.40) does not expressly mandate corroboration of admissions. The Court distinguished the requirements for informations from those for indictments, where corroboration is explicitly required by CPL 70.10(1) and 190.65(1). The Court noted the legislative history, pointing out that the legislature removed the term “legally sufficient evidence” which incorporates a corroboration requirement, when drafting the information provision. The Court also stated, “Since clear and unequivocal statutory language is presumptively entitled to authoritative effect CPL 100.40 (1) does not mandate corroboration of an admission in an information.” The Court clarified that while corroboration is not required for the *information* to be valid, CPL 60.50 *does* require corroboration before a conviction can be obtained at trial based solely on the defendant’s admission. The dissenting opinion argued that the majority departed from precedent and that an information must contain allegations establishing a legally sufficient case, which includes corroboration of admissions. The majority addressed the dissent’s reliance on People v. Alejandro and Matter of Jahron S. by stating “To the extent that Alejandro and Jahron S. may have tended to equate a prima facie case for an information or a juvenile delinquency petition with legally sufficient evidence under CPL 70.10 (1), those portions of the writings were dicta and, as we now explain, are incompatible with the governing statutes.”

  • People v. Brensic, 89 N.Y.2d 579 (1997): Corroboration of Underlying Felony in Hindering Prosecution

    People v. Brensic, 89 N.Y.2d 579 (1997)

    In a prosecution for hindering prosecution, CPL 60.50 requires independent corroborative evidence that the underlying felony occurred, but the threshold for such corroboration is low and can be satisfied by evidence such as the victim’s death, the suspect being a fugitive, and the suspect’s consciousness of guilt.

    Summary

    Brensic was convicted of hindering prosecution for assisting her common-law husband, Rivera, who she knew had committed a class A felony (murder). The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that while CPL 60.50 requires corroboration of the underlying felony in hindering prosecution cases, the prosecution met this requirement. The court emphasized that the corroboration requirement exists to prevent convictions based solely on confessions when no crime has actually occurred. Here, testimony from investigating officers about the victim’s murder, Rivera’s status as a suspect and fugitive, and his violent flight from police provided sufficient corroboration.

    Facts

    Brensic provided a detailed statement to police that her common-law husband, Marcus Rivera, and others planned and carried out the murder of Roberto Corperone. She admitted to twice thwarting police efforts to apprehend Rivera by warning him in advance of their arrival. Detectives eventually apprehended Rivera in Philadelphia without Brensic’s knowledge after he violently resisted arrest and fled. Brensic was subsequently charged and convicted of hindering prosecution in the first degree.

    Procedural History

    Following a non-jury trial, Brensic was convicted of two counts of hindering prosecution in the first degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Brensic appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by permission of an Appellate Division Justice.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to sustain Brensic’s conviction for hindering prosecution in the first degree.
    2. Whether the People provided sufficient corroboration under CPL 60.50 of Brensic’s statement that a class A felony (murder) had occurred.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Brensic’s detailed statement provided an eyewitness account of the intentional murder of Corperone, and the detectives’ testimony supported the conclusion that Brensic warned Rivera of impending apprehension.
    2. Yes, because CPL 60.50 requires some independent evidence that the underlying felony occurred. Here, the testimony of the investigating officers regarding Corperone’s murder, Rivera’s status as a suspect and fugitive, his indictment, and his violent flight from police provided sufficient corroboration.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that to prove hindering prosecution in the first degree, the People must prove that the assisted person committed a class A felony. While the statute does not require proof of arrest or conviction, it does require proof of each element of the underlying felony. The court stated that the standard of review for legal sufficiency is “whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, could lead a rational trier of fact to conclude that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”

    Regarding corroboration, the court explained that CPL 60.50 requires “additional proof that the offense charged has been committed,” but does not mandate independent evidence of every component of the crime. The statute requires “some proof, of whatever weight, that a crime was committed by someone” to avert ” ‘the danger that a crime may have been confessed when no crime in any degree has been committed by anyone.’ ” The court distinguished felony murder cases, where corroboration of the underlying felony is not required, because in those cases, the felony serves as a substitute for malicious intent. In contrast, without the underlying felony in a hindering prosecution case, no crime has been committed at all.

    The court emphasized the relatively low threshold for corroboration under CPL 60.50. Here, the detectives’ testimony that Corperone had been murdered, that Rivera was the immediate suspect, that a fugitive warrant was issued for his arrest, and that Rivera violently resisted arrest and fled from police constituted sufficient corroboration. Specifically, the court pointed to Rivera’s “consciousness of guilt” as crucial corroborating evidence. As the Court stated, “proof of motive or flight, may ‘be held to constitute the essential additional proof.’ ”

  • People v. Vasquez, 88 N.Y.2d 561 (1996): Admissibility of 911 Calls as Present Sense Impressions

    88 N.Y.2d 561 (1996)

    For a statement to be admissible under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule, it must be made substantially contemporaneously with the event it describes and be corroborated by independent evidence supporting the statement’s content.

    Summary

    This case consolidates three appeals concerning the admissibility of 911 calls as present sense impressions. The New York Court of Appeals clarified the requirements for this hearsay exception, emphasizing contemporaneity and corroboration. In People v. Vasquez, a 911 call reporting a shooting was deemed inadmissible due to lack of corroboration of the caller’s description. In People v. Dalton, the defendant’s 911 call after a shooting was excluded because it wasn’t contemporaneous with the event. In People v. Adkinson, a 911 call reporting a sexual assault was deemed inadmissible. The Court affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, stressing the need for statements to be made during or immediately after the event and supported by independent evidence to ensure reliability.

    Facts

    • People v. Vasquez: An anonymous 911 caller reported a shooting, describing a black man fleeing. A defense witness described the shooter differently.
    • People v. Dalton: The defendant called 911 after shooting the victim, claiming self-defense.
    • People v. Adkinson: A victim’s aunt called 911 after a sexual assault; the victim stated he couldn’t see the attacker’s face, contradicting his later testimony.

    Procedural History

    • People v. Vasquez: The trial court excluded the 911 call; the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    • People v. Dalton: The trial court excluded the 911 call; the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    • People v. Adkinson: The trial court excluded the 911 call; the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    • Each case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the 911 call in People v. Vasquez was admissible as a present sense impression.
    2. Whether the 911 call in People v. Dalton was admissible as a present sense impression or an excited utterance.
    3. Whether the 911 call in People v. Adkinson was admissible as a present sense impression.

    Holding

    1. No, because the content of the 911 call was not sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence.
    2. No, because the statement was not contemporaneous with the event, nor was it made under the stress of excitement.
    3. No, because the statement was not contemporaneous with the event.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the present sense impression exception requires both contemporaneity and corroboration. Contemporaneity means the statement must be made during or immediately after the event, leaving no time for reflection. Corroboration requires independent evidence supporting the substance of the statement. In Vasquez, the 911 call lacked corroboration because the caller’s description of the fleeing man differed from the defense witness’s description of the shooter. In Dalton, the defendant’s call was made after the shooting and his retreat indoors, allowing time for reflection. The court noted, “Without satisfaction of this requirement, the essential assurance of reliability—the absence of time for reflection and the reduced likelihood of faulty recollection—is negated.” In Adkinson, the victim’s statement on the 911 call was not contemporaneous with the assault. The Court distinguished present sense impressions from excited utterances, noting that the former relies on contemporaneity and corroboration, while the latter depends on the declarant’s excited state. The Court stated, “‘Excited utterances’ are the product of the declarant’s exposure to a startling or upsetting event that is sufficiently powerful to render the observer’s normal reflective processes inoperative…’Present sense impression’ declarations, in contrast, are descriptions of events made by a person who is perceiving the event as it is unfolding.”

  • In re Christina F., 74 N.Y.2d 532 (1989): Child’s Testimony as Corroboration in Abuse Cases

    In re Christina F., 74 N.Y.2d 532 (1989)

    In child protective proceedings, a child’s in-court, cross-examined, but unsworn testimony can corroborate their prior out-of-court statements to support a finding of abuse.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a child’s in-court testimony can corroborate their prior out-of-court statements in a child protective proceeding, where the child alleges sexual abuse. The Onondaga County Department of Social Services initiated proceedings against the father, alleging abuse of his daughter. The Family Court found the father had abused his daughter, relying on the daughter’s testimony and previous statements. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the child’s in-court testimony, subject to cross-examination, could corroborate her prior statements, satisfying the corroboration requirement under the Family Court Act.

    Facts

    Five-year-old Christina told a detective that her father had done “bad things” to her, including touching her vagina and masturbating in the bathroom. She demonstrated these acts with anatomically correct dolls. The father admitted to a police officer that Christina had placed his hand on her vagina on two occasions. Christina testified in court, without oath, recounting the same incidents with more detail. The father denied all allegations of abuse.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court found that Christina’s in-court testimony corroborated her earlier statements and concluded that the father had abused Christina. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court’s ruling. The New York Court of Appeals granted review to determine if the child’s testimony was sufficient corroboration.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a child’s in-court, unsworn, but cross-examined testimony can corroborate their previous out-of-court statements to establish a prima facie case of abuse in a child protective proceeding, in the absence of other corroborative evidence.

    Holding

    Yes, because the child’s in-court testimony provides an opportunity to test the child’s veracity and the accuracy of their perceptions, adding to the reliability of the hearsay evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the purpose of corroboration is to ensure the reliability of hearsay evidence, not to reflect an inherent distrust of children’s statements. The court pointed to Family Court Act § 1046 (a) (vi), stating that corroboration is defined as “any other evidence tending to support the reliability of the previous statements”. Unlike mere repetition of out-of-court statements, in-court testimony allows for cross-examination and observation of the child by the court, which can enhance the reliability of the child’s prior statements. The court distinguished this situation from Matter of Nicole V., where the court held that multiple out-of-court statements cannot cross-corroborate each other because that does nothing to enhance their trustworthiness or eliminate their inherent unreliability. The Court stated that, “Merely replicating the out-of:court hearsay statements in other out-of-court hearsay settings obviously does nothing to enhance their trustworthiness or eliminate their inherent unreliability.” The court deferred to the Family Court’s discretion in determining whether the child’s testimony reliably corroborated her out-of-court statements in this specific case, stating that “Family Court Judges presented with the issue have considerable discretion to decide whether the child’s out-of-court statements describing incidents of abuse or neglect have, in fact, been reliably corroborated and whether the record as a whole supports a finding of abuse.” The court noted that the Family Court had the opportunity to observe the child and assess her credibility. Ultimately, the court found that the petitioner had satisfied its burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

  • Matter of Nicole V., 71 N.Y.2d 112 (1987): Corroboration of Child Hearsay Statements in Abuse Cases

    Matter of Nicole V., 71 N.Y.2d 112 (1987)

    In child protective proceedings, a child’s out-of-court statements regarding abuse can be corroborated by any evidence tending to support the reliability of the statements, including expert testimony on child sexual abuse syndrome and, under certain circumstances, the consistent out-of-court statements of other children.

    Summary

    This case addresses the evidentiary standards for establishing child abuse in New York Family Court. The Court of Appeals held that a child’s out-of-court statements alleging sexual abuse can be corroborated by expert testimony regarding the child sexual abuse syndrome and, under specific conditions, by the consistent out-of-court statements of other children. This ruling clarified the flexible standard for corroboration under Family Court Act § 1046(a)(vi), emphasizing the importance of protecting children while ensuring due process for parents. The Court affirmed Family Court findings of abuse in two separate cases, highlighting the types of evidence considered sufficient for corroboration.

    Facts

    In Matter of Nicole V., Nicole, a 3 1/2-year-old, made out-of-court statements describing sexual abuse by her father. The evidence presented included testimony from Nicole’s mother, a caseworker, and Nicole’s therapist, as well as a medical report indicating a ruptured hymen. In Matter of Francis W. Jr., Samuel W., and David C., three brothers made out-of-court statements detailing sexual abuse by their mother. The evidence included affidavits summarizing interviews with the children and testimony from a foster parent and a neighbor.

    Procedural History

    In Matter of Nicole V., the Bronx County Family Court found that Lawrence V., Nicole’s father, had sexually abused her. The Appellate Division affirmed. In Matter of Francis W. Jr., Samuel W. and David C., the Onondaga County Family Court found that Mary Alice C., the mother, had sexually abused her three sons. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals to address the issue of corroboration of children’s hearsay statements.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether expert testimony regarding child sexual abuse syndrome can serve as sufficient corroboration of a child’s out-of-court statements in a child protective proceeding?
    2. Whether the out-of-court statements of multiple children can cross-corroborate each other to satisfy the corroboration requirement of Family Court Act § 1046(a)(vi)?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because expert testimony on the characteristics of sexually abused children can provide corroboration of a child’s statements, if the expert’s opinion is based on the child’s behavior and statements showing symptoms of abuse.
    2. Yes, because the consistent and independent out-of-court statements of multiple children, describing similar incidents of abuse by the same perpetrator, can cross-corroborate each other and provide sufficient evidence to support a finding of abuse.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Family Court Act § 1046(a)(vi) requires corroboration of a child’s out-of-court statements to ensure reliability. The statute allows for a flexible standard of corroboration, including “any other evidence tending to support the reliability of the previous statements.” Expert testimony on child sexual abuse syndrome is admissible because the psychological and behavioral characteristics of abused children are not generally known to the average person. Such testimony can validate a child’s statements by showing that the child exhibits symptoms consistent with abuse. The Court emphasized that such experts need not be independent, and that any bias can be addressed through cross-examination.

    In the case involving multiple children, the Court recognized that independent statements requiring corroboration can corroborate each other. The Court distinguished between the repetition of a single child’s accusation, which does not provide corroboration, and the consistent, independent accounts of multiple children detailing similar incidents of abuse. In this case, the fact that the brothers independently described specific and similar acts of abuse supported the reliability of each child’s statement, fulfilling the corroboration requirement. The court cited People v. Coleman, 42 N.Y.2d 500, 506 to support this cross-corroboration rule. The Court noted, “Because each child had consistently and independently described these particularly detailed sexual acts, the reliability of the victim’s out-of-court statements could be weighed by comparing them.”

    The Court emphasized that Family Court Judges have considerable discretion to determine whether a child’s out-of-court statements have been reliably corroborated and whether the record as a whole supports a finding of abuse.

  • People v. Groff, 71 N.Y.2d 101 (1987): Corroboration Standard for Unsworn Testimony of Child Victims

    People v. Groff, 71 N.Y.2d 101 (1987)

    When a child victim testifies without being sworn, their testimony must be corroborated by evidence tending to establish the crime and connecting the defendant with its commission to support an indictment.

    Summary

    The defendant was indicted for rape and sexual abuse of a four-year-old girl. The victim testified before the Grand Jury without being sworn because she did not understand the difference between telling the truth and lying. The New York Court of Appeals addressed the standard of corroboration required for the unsworn testimony of a child victim under CPL 60.20. The court held that the unsworn testimony is sufficient if corroborated by evidence tending to establish the crime and connecting the defendant with its commission. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order dismissing the indictment, finding sufficient corroborative evidence existed.

    Facts

    The four-year-old victim testified before the Grand Jury that the defendant, a relative, took her into the woods behind his parents’ house during a family picnic. She testified, using anatomically correct dolls, that the defendant removed their pants and had sexual intercourse with her, causing her pain. She also stated that burdocks stuck to her while in the woods. Her mother testified that her daughter’s personality changed after the picnic and that she noticed redness in her vaginal area. The victim’s father testified that his daughter and the defendant were both absent for approximately 15 minutes during the picnic and that when she returned, she was crying and had burdocks in her hair. The doctor who examined the child initially suspected a ruptured hymen, although a later exam showed it intact, he noted irritation could still have been caused by partial penetration.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with rape and sexual abuse. The County Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing the victim’s unsworn testimony was improperly admitted and insufficiently corroborated. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the unsworn testimony of a child victim must be corroborated, and if so, what standard of corroboration is required to establish a legally sufficient case before the Grand Jury?

    Holding

    Yes, the unsworn testimony of a child victim must be corroborated. The required standard is that the testimony must be supported by evidence tending to establish the crime was committed and that the defendant committed it, because CPL 60.20 requires corroboration of unsworn testimony to ensure its trustworthiness.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 60.20 requires corroboration of unsworn testimony because a witness incapable of comprehending an oath may not understand the importance of truthfulness. The court rejected the prior, stricter standard suggested in People v. Oyola, which required corroboration of every material element of the crime. The court noted that public policy has shifted since Oyola, with the repeal of Penal Law § 130.15, which had required stringent corroboration in sex offense cases. The court held that the appropriate standard is that the unsworn testimony must be corroborated by evidence tending to establish the crime and connecting the defendant to the crime. This standard aligns with Penal Law § 130.16, which applies to victims with mental defects. The court found that the victim’s testimony was sufficiently corroborated by evidence that she went into the woods with the defendant and returned crying with burdocks in her hair, that her personality changed afterward, and that she experienced physical symptoms consistent with sexual abuse. The Court emphasized the need to “connect the defendant with the crime in such a way that the jury may be reasonably satisfied that the [witness] is telling the truth”. The court noted that “matters which in themselves may be of seeming indifference may be ‘so harmonized’ with the [witness’] narrative as to have a tendency to furnish the necessary connection between the defendant and the crime’.” The Court reinstated the indictment because the evidence presented established that the crimes occurred and reasonably linked the defendant to their commission.

  • People v. Rosner, 67 N.Y.2d 290 (1986): Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence in Perjury Cases

    People v. Rosner, 67 N.Y.2d 290 (1986)

    In New York, a perjury conviction can be based solely on circumstantial evidence, provided that evidence is sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the two-witness rule (Penal Law § 210.50) does not bar such a conviction.

    Summary

    Rosner was convicted of perjury for false statements made to a grand jury investigating a homicide. The prosecution’s case relied on circumstantial evidence to prove that Rosner lied about his interactions with John Bonizio, who was involved in the assault that led to the victim’s death. Rosner argued that the prosecution failed to establish a prima facie case because they relied entirely on circumstantial evidence and did not produce a witness who directly contradicted his statements. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to prove perjury, and the two-witness rule only requires corroboration of a witness testifying to the falsity of the defendant’s statement, not direct evidence.

    Facts

    Rosner complained to the police about Darren McNamara harassing his daughter. He expressed an intent to handle the situation himself if the police couldn’t. The next day, after the officer said he couldn’t find McNamara, Rosner stated he had “two guys that can handle it.” That evening, McNamara was assaulted by John Bonizio, a friend and former employee of Rosner’s, who beat him with a baseball bat, telling him to stay away from Rosner’s daughter. McNamara died as a result of the beating. Bonizio was later seen entering Rosner’s apartment. Before the grand jury, Rosner denied asking Bonizio to contact McNamara or speaking to Bonizio about McNamara on August 25th.

    Procedural History

    Rosner was indicted for perjury based on his grand jury testimony. At trial, the People presented circumstantial evidence linking Rosner to Bonizio and the assault on McNamara. Rosner moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing the prosecution’s case was entirely circumstantial. The trial court denied the motion, and the jury found Rosner guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a perjury conviction can be based solely on circumstantial evidence, where the alleged falsity of the defendant’s statements was capable of being proved by direct evidence.

    Holding

    Yes, because New York law does not prohibit the use of circumstantial evidence to prove perjury, and the two-witness rule only requires corroboration of a witness who testifies to the falsity of the defendant’s statement; it does not mandate direct evidence of the perjury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals rejected Rosner’s argument that circumstantial evidence is generally insufficient to prove perjury. The court emphasized that Penal Law § 210.50, the two-witness rule, only requires corroboration of a witness testifying to the falsity of the defendant’s statement. It does not preclude the prosecution from relying on circumstantial evidence. The court explicitly stated, “That holding is consistent with the limited purpose Penal Law § 210.50 serves in this State. The common-law rule was retained by the Legislature to protect ‘honest witnesses’ from unfounded, retaliatory complaints of perjury by ‘defeated litigants’.” The court clarified that People v. Doody, which Rosner cited, did not create a narrow exception for cases inherently incapable of direct proof. The court found that the two-witness rule is analogous to the accomplice rule, both designed to prevent conviction solely on the testimony of a witness with a motive to fabricate. The court concluded that the prosecution’s circumstantial evidence was sufficient to establish Rosner’s guilt, and the two-witness rule did not require the People to produce direct testimony. The court emphasized that the purpose of the two-witness rule is to protect honest witnesses from retaliatory perjury claims, not to prevent perjury convictions based on strong circumstantial evidence.