New York Law Review

Tag: Corroborating Evidence

  • People v. Branch, 28 N.Y.3d 1159 (2017): Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification

    People v. Branch, 28 N.Y.3d 1159 (2017)

    The decision to admit or exclude expert testimony on factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness identification rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, which must balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial or harmful effects.

    Summary

    In this New York Court of Appeals case, the court addressed the admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness identification. The defendant was convicted of murder and robbery, in part based on eyewitness testimony. The trial court excluded expert testimony on factors affecting the reliability of the eyewitness identification, finding the testimony unnecessary because of corroborating evidence. The Appellate Division reversed, finding an abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the trial court acted within its discretion. The Court emphasized the balancing test between probative value and prejudicial effects when assessing the admissibility of such expert testimony. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to exclude the expert testimony.

    Facts

    On December 27, 2008, an eyewitness was in front of a barbershop when a robbery and murder occurred. Four men entered the shop, demanding money and drugs. One man fatally shot the victim. Later, a witness identified the defendant in a lineup as one of the perpetrators. The getaway driver implicated the defendant in the crime. At trial, the defendant moved to introduce expert testimony on factors influencing eyewitness identification. The trial court initially denied the motion, but then granted permission to revisit the issue. After the prosecution presented its case, the defense renewed the motion to present the expert witness, which the trial court denied, concluding that the eyewitness testimony was corroborated by the getaway driver. The defendant was convicted on all counts.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted by a jury in Supreme Court. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding the trial court abused its discretion by precluding expert testimony on eyewitness identification. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by precluding the defense from presenting expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification.

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court properly exercised its discretion in balancing the probative value of the expert testimony against its potential for prejudice or other harmful effects, given the corroborating evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by precluding expert testimony on eyewitness identification. The court reaffirmed that the admissibility of such expert testimony is within the trial court’s discretion. The court clarified that the trial court must weigh the request to introduce expert testimony against factors such as the centrality of the identification issue and the existence of corroborating evidence. The court emphasized that trial courts have the power to limit the amount and scope of evidence presented. The court found that, in this case, the trial court correctly balanced the probative value of the expert testimony against its potential for prejudice, particularly given the corroborating evidence from the getaway driver.

    Practical Implications

    This case provides a clear reminder of the trial court’s gatekeeping role in admitting expert testimony. Attorneys must be prepared to persuade the trial court that the expert testimony is necessary to assist the jury, considering the strength of other evidence. This case reinforces the importance of building a record that demonstrates the reliability of eyewitness identification, especially when corroborating evidence exists. The decision underscores that the admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness identification is highly fact-dependent, with the trial court having broad discretion to make the ultimate decision. The decision can affect how attorneys prepare for trial, emphasizing the need to present clear arguments regarding the probative value and potential prejudice of proposed expert testimony.

  • People v. Santiago, 17 N.Y.3d 661 (2011): Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification

    People v. Santiago, 17 N.Y.3d 661 (2011)

    In cases that hinge on eyewitness identification, expert testimony on the reliability of such identifications should be admitted when there is little or no corroborating evidence, and the testimony concerns relevant, generally accepted scientific principles beyond the ken of the average juror.

    Summary

    Edwin Santiago was convicted of assault based largely on eyewitness identification. The trial court denied Santiago’s request to present expert testimony on factors affecting eyewitness reliability. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion. The Court emphasized that when a case relies heavily on eyewitness testimony and lacks corroborating evidence, expert testimony on eyewitness identification is crucial to educate the jury about potential pitfalls in eyewitness memory and perception. The Court outlined a two-stage inquiry for determining admissibility: (1) whether the case turns on eyewitness accuracy with little corroboration and (2) relevance, general acceptance in the scientific community, qualification of the expert, and whether the testimony is beyond the ken of the average juror.

    Facts

    A woman was attacked at a subway station. The assailant’s face was partially concealed. The victim described the assailant to police. Two other witnesses, Edwin Rios and Pablo Alarcon, also saw the assailant. Police created a sketch based on the victim’s description. Alarcon saw the assailant put away a knife. Nine days later, police arrested Edwin Santiago for selling Metrocard swipes. The victim identified Santiago in a photo array and a lineup. Alarcon initially claimed he didn’t recognize anyone in the photo array but later identified Santiago with 80% confidence. Rios identified Santiago in a lineup after the initial trial motion.

    Procedural History

    Santiago was indicted for first-degree assault. He moved to introduce expert testimony on eyewitness identification, which was denied by the trial court without a Frye hearing. After a suppression hearing, Santiago was convicted of assault. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Santiago’s motion to admit expert testimony on eyewitness identification when the case turned on the accuracy of a single eyewitness identification.

    2. Whether the subsequent identifications by Rios and Alarcon constituted sufficient corroborating evidence to negate the need for expert testimony on eyewitness identification.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the proposed expert testimony concerned relevant, generally accepted scientific principles beyond the ken of the average juror, and the case initially rested solely on the victim’s identification.

    2. No, because the corroborating identifications were not sufficiently reliable to obviate the need for expert testimony, given that Alarcon’s identification was uncertain and potentially tainted, and Rios’s identification may have been influenced by the police sketch.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the two-stage inquiry established in People v. LeGrand. Initially, the case turned on the victim’s identification alone. The Court emphasized the importance of expert testimony in cases where eyewitness identification is crucial and lacks corroboration, citing People v. Drake, 7 N.Y.3d 28, 31 (2006) (“courts are encouraged … in appropriate cases” to grant defendants’ motions to admit expert testimony on this subject). The Court found that testimony concerning the lack of correlation between confidence and accuracy, confidence malleability, and the effects of post-event information was relevant and beyond the ken of the average juror, citing People v. Abney, 13 N.Y.3d 251 (2009) and LeGrand. “Trial error is only harmless when there is overwhelming proof of the defendant’s guilt and no significant probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant were it not for the error” People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 242 (1975). The Court distinguished People v. Allen, 13 N.Y.3d 251 (2009), where a second, highly reliable eyewitness identification existed. Here, the corroborating identifications were questionable. The Court held that the trial court should have considered testimony on unconscious transference, given that Alarcon and Rios had seen images of Santiago before identifying him. The Court stated that the errors were not harmless because proof of defendant’s guilt was not overwhelming. The Court reversed the order and ordered a new trial.

  • People v. Abney, 13 N.Y.3d 251 (2009): Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification

    People v. Abney, 13 N.Y.3d 251 (2009)

    When a case hinges on the accuracy of eyewitness identifications with minimal corroborating evidence, excluding expert testimony on eyewitness reliability is an abuse of discretion if the testimony is relevant, scientifically accepted, offered by a qualified expert, and addresses topics beyond the average juror’s understanding.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness identification reliability in two cases, Abney and Allen. In Abney, where a robbery conviction rested solely on a 13-year-old victim’s identification, the court held it was an abuse of discretion to exclude expert testimony on factors affecting eyewitness accuracy, particularly regarding witness confidence. In Allen, where corroborating evidence existed, the court upheld the trial court’s decision to exclude such testimony. The court emphasized that expert testimony should be admitted when it can aid the jury in understanding factors affecting eyewitness reliability that are beyond common knowledge, but its exclusion may be appropriate when other evidence supports the conviction.

    Facts

    In Abney, Farhana U. was robbed at knifepoint in a subway station. She identified Quentin Abney from a photo array and later in a lineup. At trial, Abney presented an alibi defense. In Allen, Gregory Allen was convicted of robbing a barbershop. Two witnesses, Bierd and Almonte, identified Allen. Bierd recognized Allen from the neighborhood. Allen refused to participate in a lineup without masks for all participants.

    Procedural History

    In Abney, the trial court denied Abney’s motion to present expert testimony on eyewitness identification. The Appellate Division affirmed, citing corroborating evidence. The Court of Appeals reversed. In Allen, the trial court denied Allen’s motion to admit expert testimony. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that decision as well.

    Issue(s)

    1. In Abney, whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification when the case turned on the accuracy of a single eyewitness and there was little to no corroborating evidence.
    2. In Allen, whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request to adduce expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification when there were multiple eyewitnesses and some corroborating evidence.

    Holding

    1. In Abney, yes, because the case hinged on a single eyewitness identification with no corroborating evidence, and the expert testimony concerned topics beyond the ken of the average juror.
    2. In Allen, no, because the case did not depend exclusively on one eyewitness’s testimony and corroborating evidence existed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on its prior decisions in People v. Lee, People v. Young, and especially People v. LeGrand, which established a framework for assessing the admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness identification. In Abney, the court emphasized that when a case rests solely on eyewitness testimony, excluding expert testimony on factors affecting eyewitness accuracy is an abuse of discretion if the testimony is relevant, scientifically accepted, offered by a qualified expert, and addresses topics beyond the average juror’s understanding. The court found the trial court erred in not allowing testimony on witness confidence and should have held a Frye hearing on other factors. In Allen, the court found the presence of multiple eyewitnesses and corroborating evidence (Allen’s use of nicknames given to police by a witness, Allen’s knowledge that robbers wore masks) distinguished it from LeGrand and supported the trial court’s decision to exclude expert testimony. The court stated that because the case did not turn entirely on one uncorroborated eyewitness, it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude the expert testimony. The court also noted that factors such as stress and disguise were within the jury’s common sense understanding, and did not require expert explanation.

  • People v. LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449 (2007): Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification

    People v. LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449 (2007)

    Where a case hinges on the accuracy of eyewitness identifications with little corroborating evidence, excluding expert testimony on eyewitness reliability, if relevant, generally accepted, and beyond the ken of the average juror, is an abuse of discretion.

    Summary

    Joaquin Liriano was murdered in 1991. The case stalled until 1998 when the defendant, LeGrand, was identified as a suspect based on a composite sketch made shortly after the crime. The People’s case rested solely on eyewitness identifications made nearly seven years after the crime. LeGrand sought to introduce expert testimony regarding factors affecting eyewitness reliability, which the trial court precluded after a Frye hearing. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the exclusion of the expert testimony was an abuse of discretion given the lack of corroborating evidence and the centrality of eyewitness identification.

    Facts

    Joaquin Liriano was stabbed to death in Manhattan in June 1991, and his assailant fled. Four people witnessed the attack and created a composite sketch. Two years later, LeGrand was identified as a possible suspect because he resembled the sketch. The case remained dormant until 1998, when LeGrand was arrested for burglary. The authorities then located the witnesses; one identified LeGrand as the killer, two tentatively identified him, and two could not identify him. There was no forensic or physical evidence connecting LeGrand to the stabbing.

    Procedural History

    LeGrand was charged with second-degree murder in 1999. His first trial in 2001 ended in a mistrial. Prior to his second trial, LeGrand moved to introduce expert testimony on eyewitness identification. The trial court conducted a Frye hearing and precluded the testimony. The jury found LeGrand guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in precluding expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications after determining that the proposed testimony was based on novel scientific principles not generally accepted by the relevant scientific community, where the case turned on the accuracy of eyewitness identifications and there was little or no corroborating evidence.

    Holding

    Yes, because where the case turns on the accuracy of eyewitness identifications and there is little or no corroborating evidence connecting the defendant to the crime, it is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to exclude expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications if that testimony is (1) relevant to the witness’s identification of defendant, (2) based on principles that are generally accepted within the relevant scientific community, (3) proffered by a qualified expert and (4) on a topic beyond the ken of the average juror.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals recognized an emerging trend of admitting expert psychological testimony on eyewitness identification, noting that such testimony can provide much-needed guidance to juries. The Court emphasized the trial court’s discretion in determining whether jurors would benefit from the specialized knowledge of an expert witness, considering the centrality of the identification issue and the existence of corroborating evidence.

    The Court referenced Frye v. United States, emphasizing that the thing from which a deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. The Court distinguished its prior holdings in People v. Lee and People v. Young, emphasizing that, unlike those cases, there was no corroborating evidence connecting LeGrand to the crime. The Court found that the expert’s testimony regarding the correlation between confidence and accuracy, the effect of post-event information, and confidence malleability met the Frye standard, while the effect of weapon focus did not. The Court emphasized, “Once a scientific procedure has been proved reliable, a Frye inquiry need not be conducted each time such evidence is offered [and courts] may take judicial notice of reliability of the general procedure.”

    Ultimately, the Court concluded that the exclusion of the expert testimony was an abuse of discretion, warranting a new trial. However, it reiterated that the admissibility of such evidence also depends upon the existence of sufficient corroborating evidence to link the defendant to the crime. In the event sufficient corroborating evidence is found to exist, an exercise of discretion excluding eyewitness expert testimony would not be fatal to a jury verdict convicting defendant.

  • People v. Legrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449 (2007): Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification

    8 N.Y.3d 449 (2007)

    The admissibility of expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, after considering the specific facts of the case.

    Summary

    This case addresses the admissibility of expert testimony concerning the reliability of eyewitness identification. The Court of Appeals held that such testimony is not per se inadmissible, and the decision to admit it rests within the trial court’s discretion. The trial court must weigh factors like the centrality of the identification issue and the presence of corroborating evidence. In Legrand, the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the expert testimony, given the circumstances of the case, including corroborating evidence beyond the eyewitness identification.

    Facts

    Michael Perani’s car was stolen at gunpoint in a well-lit area. He was only a few feet from the defendant during the robbery. Two months later, defendant was arrested driving Perani’s stolen vehicle. More than six months after the arrest, Perani identified the defendant in a photographic array and later in a lineup.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree. Before trial, the hearing court summarily denied defendant’s motion to introduce expert testimony on eyewitness identification reliability. At trial, the trial court denied a renewed request. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to introduce expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification.
    2. Whether the photographic array presented to the victim was unduly suggestive.

    Holding

    1. No, because given the particular facts and circumstances of this case, the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
    2. No, because subtle differences in the photographs were not “sufficient to create a substantial likelihood that the defendant would be singled out for identification”.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the admissibility and limits of expert testimony are primarily within the trial court’s discretion. It is up to the trial court to decide when jurors can draw conclusions based on their own experience versus when they would benefit from expert knowledge. The court recognized that while jurors may have personal experience with factors affecting eyewitness reliability, psychological studies on identification accuracy are not within the ken of the typical juror. The court acknowledged that the hearing court failed to exercise its discretion in summarily rejecting the motion. However, the trial court did consider the renewed request, weighing it against the centrality of the identification and the existence of corroborating evidence (the defendant being arrested in the stolen car). This corroborating evidence justified the denial of the expert testimony. The Court also found that the photo array was not unduly suggestive.