New York Law Review

Tag: Correctional Facilities

  • Bizio v. Dorsey, 21 N.Y.3d 95 (2013): State’s Right to Force-Feed Inmate on Hunger Strike

    Bizio v. Dorsey, 21 N.Y.3d 95 (2013)

    When an inmate’s prolonged hunger strike creates a substantial risk of death or serious permanent injury, the state’s interest in preserving life and maintaining institutional order outweighs the inmate’s qualified right to refuse medical treatment.

    Summary

    Leroy Dorsey, a state inmate, engaged in a hunger strike to obtain a transfer and highlight alleged mistreatment. When his health deteriorated, the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) sought a court order to force-feed him via a nasogastric tube. The New York Court of Appeals held that the state’s interest in preserving life and preventing institutional instability outweighed Dorsey’s right to refuse medical treatment, justifying the forced feeding. The Court emphasized that Dorsey’s actions created the life-threatening condition, distinguishing it from cases involving pre-existing illnesses or injuries.

    Facts

    Leroy Dorsey, an inmate, began a hunger strike at Great Meadow Correctional Facility to secure a transfer and draw attention to claims of abuse.
    Dorsey had previously engaged in hunger strikes with similar motivations.
    Medical staff repeatedly warned Dorsey that his refusal to eat was causing potentially irreversible organ damage and would lead to death.
    Dorsey only ingested small amounts of liquids, insufficient to sustain his health.
    After a month, Dorsey had lost 11.6% of his body weight.

    Procedural History

    DOCCS petitioned the court for an order permitting medical staff to insert a nasogastric tube to provide nutrition and hydration.
    Supreme Court granted DOCCS’ application, allowing force-feeding unless Dorsey consumed a nutritional supplement and solid food voluntarily.
    Dorsey resumed eating but appealed the order.
    The Appellate Division deemed the case moot because the hunger strike had ceased but addressed the core issue of the State’s right to force-feed, ruling in favor of DOCCS.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted Dorsey leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the inmate’s claim that the force-feeding order violated his constitutional right to refuse medical treatment was preserved for review.
    2. Whether the State had the right to secure a force-feeding order when an inmate, not intending to die, was engaging in a hunger strike to bring attention to grievances and obtain a transfer.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because it was clear from his posture that he viewed the insertion of a nasogastric feeding tube as an unconstitutional invasion of his bodily integrity.
    2. Yes, because when “an inmate’s refusal to eat has placed that inmate at risk of serious injury and death . . . the State’s interest in protecting the health and welfare of persons in its custody outweighs an individual inmate’s right to make personal choices about what nourishment to accept” (91 AD3d at 1053).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court addressed the preservation of the constitutional claim, noting DOCCS initiated the proceedings, relying on Matter of Von Holden v Chapman, which involved similar constitutional objections. The Court found that despite Dorsey’s initial reference to the Eighth Amendment, the hearing court understood the argument as based on the right to avoid unwanted medical intervention, given DOCCS’s reliance on Von Holden.
    The Court emphasized the State’s interest in preserving life, preventing suicide, and maintaining order within correctional facilities, especially when an inmate’s actions create a life-threatening condition.
    Distinguishing from Rivers v Katz and Matter of Fosmire v Nicoleau, the Court highlighted that Dorsey’s condition was self-inflicted, triggering the State’s interest in preventing suicide. The Court stated, “Whatever his purported intent, by refusing to eat for a prolonged period of time despite repeated warnings concerning the imminent physiological damage that behavior was causing, Dorsey knowingly inflicted injury on himself that, if continued, would result in his death.”
    The Court applied the Turner v Safley standard, which states that prison regulations impinging on constitutional rights are valid if reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. The Court determined that DOCCS’s actions were reasonably related to preserving life, preventing suicide, and maintaining institutional order, all legitimate penological objectives.
    The Court noted that Dorsey’s claim that he sought a transfer and brought attention to alleged mistreatment by DOCCS undermined his interest in continuing the hunger strike, as he had other available means to pursue those objectives. His stated intent did not negate the risks associated with his self-inflicted starvation.

  • People v. Finley, 10 N.Y.3d 647 (2008): Defining ‘Dangerous Contraband’ in Prison

    10 N.Y.3d 647 (2008)

    Small amounts of marihuana, even when possessed by inmates in detention facilities, do not automatically constitute “dangerous contraband” under New York Penal Law § 205.00(4) and § 205.25(2); rather, the item must have characteristics creating a substantial probability of causing death, serious injury, escape, or major threats to institutional safety.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether possessing small amounts of marihuana in prison constituted the felony of promoting prison contraband in the first degree. The Court held that such small amounts of marihuana do not automatically qualify as “dangerous contraband.” The Court reasoned that a broad interpretation would nullify the misdemeanor offense of promoting prison contraband in the second degree and that the legislative history indicated a narrower definition was intended. The Court emphasized that for an item to be considered “dangerous contraband,” its characteristics must create a substantial probability of causing death, serious injury, escape, or other major threats to the facility.

    Facts

    In People v. Salters, an inmate’s girlfriend was caught attempting to smuggle 9.3 grams of marihuana into a correctional facility. In People v. Finley, an inmate was found with three marihuana joints in a correctional facility. In both cases, the inmates were charged with promoting prison contraband in the first degree, a felony, based on the assertion that the marihuana was “dangerous contraband.” The prosecution argued that the marihuana could be used in a manner that endangered the safety and security of the detention facilities.

    Procedural History

    In Salters, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to reduce the charges to a misdemeanor and the Appellate Division affirmed the felony conviction. In Finley, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the felony charge but allowed a jury charge on the lesser-included misdemeanor; the Appellate Division affirmed the felony conviction. Both cases were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether small amounts of marihuana, such as those possessed by the defendants, constitute “dangerous contraband” under Penal Law § 205.00(4) and § 205.25(2), thereby justifying a felony conviction for promoting prison contraband in the first degree.

    Holding

    No, because the term “dangerous contraband” requires a showing that the item is likely to cause death or serious injury, facilitate an escape, or bring about other major threats to a detention facility’s institutional safety or security. The small amounts of marihuana in these cases did not meet that standard.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the statute distinguishes between “contraband” and “dangerous contraband,” with the latter carrying more severe penalties. The Court emphasized that the term “use” in the definition of dangerous contraband refers to the application or employment of the item. The Court rejected the People’s argument that any item that could lead to altercations and inmate disobedience should be considered dangerous contraband, as this would effectively nullify the misdemeanor crime of promoting prison contraband in the second degree. The Court relied on the legislative history of the prison contraband provisions, noting that the felony offense was originally intended to address items that could endanger life or limb. The Court stated, “We therefore conclude that the test for determining whether an item is dangerous contraband is whether its particular characteristics are such that there is a substantial probability that the item will be used in a manner that is likely to cause death or other serious injury, to facilitate an escape, or to bring about other major threats to a detention facility’s institutional safety or security.” The Court also noted the Marihuana Reform Act of 1977, which decriminalized possession of small amounts of marihuana, indicating a more lenient legislative approach. The Court concluded that the small amounts of marihuana in these cases did not present a substantial probability of causing the harms associated with “dangerous contraband.” Dissenting, Judge Pigott argued that in Salters, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence that the 9.3 grams of marihuana could be sold or bartered, potentially leading to violent altercations. However, Judge Pigott concurred that the trial court erred by not charging the lesser included offense.