New York Law Review

Tag: Correction Law Article 23-A

  • Matter of Arrocha v. Board of Educ. of City of New York, 91 N.Y.2d 363 (1998): Licensing Restrictions Based on Prior Convictions

    Matter of Arrocha v. Board of Educ. of City of New York, 91 N.Y.2d 363 (1998)

    Under New York Correction Law Article 23-A, a public agency may deny a license or employment to a person previously convicted of a crime if there is a direct relationship between the crime and the license sought, or if granting the license would pose an unreasonable risk to property or the safety and welfare of specific individuals or the general public.

    Summary

    Arrocha, previously convicted of selling cocaine, applied for a teaching license. The Board of Education denied his application, citing the risk he posed to students. Arrocha challenged this decision, arguing it violated Correction Law Article 23-A. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ decisions in favor of Arrocha, holding that the Board of Education had a rational basis for denying the license, properly considering the serious nature of the crime, Arrocha’s age at the time of the offense, and the need to protect students. The Court emphasized that while a certificate of relief from disabilities creates a presumption of rehabilitation, it does not guarantee licensure and the Board appropriately weighed all factors.

    Facts

    In 1987, Arrocha was convicted of selling cocaine (a B felony). He served the minimum sentence. In 1996, he applied for a teaching license in New York City. He disclosed his conviction and provided a certificate of relief from disabilities. He also submitted letters of recommendation and evidence of educational achievements during and after his incarceration.

    Procedural History

    The Board of Education denied Arrocha’s application. Arrocha filed a CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging the denial. The Supreme Court ruled in Arrocha’s favor, ordering the Board to grant the license. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Board of Education appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Board of Education acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and in violation of Article 23-A of the New York Correction Law, when it denied Arrocha’s application for a teaching license based on his prior drug conviction, despite his certificate of relief from disabilities and evidence of rehabilitation.

    Holding

    No, because the Board of Education rationally considered all factors required by Correction Law § 753, and giving greater weight to the seriousness of the crime and the need to protect students did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the Board’s decision was an administrative action subject to review for arbitrariness. Article 23-A of the Correction Law prohibits discrimination against ex-offenders, but it allows denial of a license if there’s a direct relationship between the crime and the license sought, or if granting the license would pose an unreasonable risk. The Board denied the license under the “unreasonable risk” exception, citing potential harm to students. Correction Law § 753 requires the Board to consider eight factors, including public policy, job duties, the crime’s bearing on fitness, time elapsed since the offense, the applicant’s age at the time of the offense, the seriousness of the offense, evidence of rehabilitation, and the agency’s interest in protecting safety. The Court acknowledged the presumption of rehabilitation created by the certificate of relief from disabilities but emphasized this is only one factor. The Court stated: “[i]n some cases, consideration of other factors such as severity of the criminal offenses, the age of the offender at the time of the offenses, the passage of time between the offenses and the application, and the nature of the license or employment sought can warrant denial of the license notwithstanding the absence of new evidence specifically addressed at overcoming the presumption of rehabilitation”. The Board properly considered all eight factors, and the court deferred to the Board’s judgment in weighing those factors. The Court concluded that the Board gave greater weight to the seriousness of Arrocha’s felony conviction and its duty to protect school children. This did not constitute an abuse of discretion, and the lower courts erred in substituting their judgment for that of the Board.

  • Bonacorsa v. Van Lindt, 71 N.Y.2d 605 (1988): Effect of Certificate of Good Conduct on License Denial

    Bonacorsa v. Van Lindt, 71 N.Y.2d 605 (1988)

    A certificate of good conduct creates a presumption of rehabilitation under New York Correction Law Article 23-A, which the licensing agency must consider even when a direct relationship exists between the applicant’s prior crime and the license sought; however, the agency retains discretion to deny the license after considering all relevant factors, including public safety.

    Summary

    Joseph Bonacorsa, whose harness racing license was revoked following federal convictions for perjury and obstruction of justice related to race fixing, applied for a new license after receiving a certificate of good conduct. The New York Racing and Wagering Board denied his application, citing the direct relationship between his crimes and the racing industry. Bonacorsa challenged the denial, arguing the certificate entitled him to a presumption of rehabilitation. The Court of Appeals held that the certificate creates a presumption that the Board must consider, but the Board retains the discretion to deny the license after evaluating all relevant factors under Correction Law § 753(1). The Court found the Board’s denial was not arbitrary or capricious.

    Facts

    Bonacorsa was previously licensed as a harness racehorse owner, trainer, and driver. In 1973, he testified before a federal grand jury investigating corruption in harness racing. As a result of his testimony, he was convicted of making a false declaration to a grand jury and obstructing justice. These charges stemmed from his concealing the true ownership of a racehorse connected to an individual previously barred from racing for race-fixing allegations. His license was revoked in 1974 following these convictions. After completing his sentence, Bonacorsa obtained a certificate of good conduct from the New York State Board of Parole. In 1985, he reapplied for a racing license.

    Procedural History

    The Racing and Wagering Board denied Bonacorsa’s application after a hearing. Bonacorsa filed an Article 78 proceeding challenging the Board’s decision. The Supreme Court granted the petition, annulling the Board’s decision and remitting the matter for further consideration. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision and dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals granted Bonacorsa leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the presumption of rehabilitation accorded by a certificate of good conduct under Correction Law § 753(2) applies when a public agency denies a license due to a direct relationship between the applicant’s criminal conviction and the license sought.

    Whether, notwithstanding the presumption of rehabilitation, the public agency retains the discretion to deny the application after examining the factors listed in Correction Law § 753(1).

    Holding

    Yes, because the presumption of rehabilitation created by the certificate of good conduct applies even when the statutory definition of a direct relationship has been satisfied. The agency must consider the factors mentioned in section 753(1) to determine if the direct relationship is sufficiently attenuated to warrant issuing the license.

    Yes, because even with the presumption of rehabilitation, the agency retains discretion to deny the license after considering the factors in Correction Law § 753(1) and determining that the public interest and safety outweigh the presumption of rehabilitation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Article 23-A of the Correction Law aims to eliminate bias against ex-offenders by requiring employers and public agencies to deal equitably with them, while also protecting public safety. While the statute generally prohibits denying a license based solely on an applicant’s status as an ex-offender, it recognizes exceptions for direct relationships between the crime and the license sought or where the license would pose an unreasonable risk.

    The court reasoned that the presumption of rehabilitation applies even when a direct relationship exists. Section 752 states a conviction cannot be considered a basis for denial when the applicant has a certificate, unless one of the two exceptions apply. The Court noted the need to give meaning to the provisions, determining that consideration must be given to the certificate where a direct relationship applies, though the public agency retains the discretion to deny.

    The Court differentiated between the direct relationship exception and the unreasonable risk exception. In both cases, the certificate creates a presumption of rehabilitation but does not establish a prima facie entitlement to the license. It’s only one of eight factors to consider under §753(1). The Board’s determination was not arbitrary or capricious. The Hearing Officer considered the factors in § 753(1), including the public policy of encouraging licensure of ex-offenders, the time elapsed since the conviction, Bonacorsa’s age and experience, and the seriousness of the offenses. Most importantly, the Hearing Officer considered the Board’s legitimate interest in protecting public safety. The court cited Matter of Tappis v. New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., stating that denying a license to someone involved in covering up for another who was barred from horse racing is a legitimate way to prevent the appearance of impropriety. The Court held that the Board did not discriminate against Bonacorsa solely because he had been convicted of criminal offenses.

  • Matter of Costello v. Waterfront Commission, 72 N.Y.2d 1019 (1988): Applicability of Correction Law to Interstate Compact Agencies

    Matter of Costello v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 72 N.Y.2d 1019 (1988)

    Article 23-A of the New York Correction Law, concerning employment opportunities for former inmates, does not apply to the Waterfront Commission, an agency established by an interstate compact between New York and New Jersey.

    Summary

    Costello, convicted of multiple felonies, sought restoration to the longshoremen’s register as a checker, arguing the Waterfront Commission improperly denied his application by ignoring Article 23-A of the Correction Law. The Commission cited the seriousness of Costello’s crimes and his lack of good character. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s annulment of the Commission’s determination, finding a rational basis for the denial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing with the Appellate Division’s rationale and adding that Article 23-A does not apply to the Waterfront Commission because the legislature did not properly amend the interstate compact that created the commission.

    Facts

    Costello had four felony convictions stemming from two schemes to defraud Las Vegas casinos.
    He applied for restoration to the longshoremen’s register as a checker with the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor.
    The Waterfront Commission denied his application, citing the severity of his crimes and a lack of good character and integrity required for the checker position.

    Procedural History

    Costello initiated an Article 78 proceeding to challenge the Waterfront Commission’s decision.
    Supreme Court initially granted Costello’s petition, annulling the Commission’s determination.
    The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision and dismissed the petition, finding a rational basis for the Commission’s denial.
    Costello appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Waterfront Commission erred in denying Costello’s application for restoration to the longshoremen’s register.
    Whether the provisions of Article 23-A of the Correction Law apply to the New York/New Jersey Waterfront Commission.

    Holding

    No, the Waterfront Commission did not err in denying Costello’s application because a rational basis existed for the decision due to the seriousness of Costello’s prior felony convictions and his lack of good character.
    No, Article 23-A of the Correction Law does not apply to the Waterfront Commission because the New York Legislature did not properly amend the interstate compact that created the Commission to include the requirements of Article 23-A.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division that the Waterfront Commission had a rational basis to deny Costello’s application, referencing the Waterfront Commission Act and the precedent set in Matter of Sudano v Waterfront Commn., 87 AD2d 633.
    The court emphasized that the Waterfront Commission was established by an Interstate Compact approved by Congress, making it subject to specific requirements for amendments and supplements as outlined in McKinney’s Unconsolidated Laws of NY § 9870.
    According to the compact, amendments require legislative action by both New York and New Jersey.
    The Court found no indication that the New York Legislature intended Article 23-A to apply to the Waterfront Commission. The court emphasized the absence of any reference to the Waterfront Commission in the text and legislative history of Article 23-A.
    The court reasoned, “In the present case, the absence from the text and legislative history of article 23-A of any reference to the Waterfront Commission, coupled with the absence of an express statement that the Legislature was amending or supplementing the provisions of the ‘Compact’ and that article 23-A would take effect upon the enactment by New Jersey of legislation of identical effect, if it had not already done so, indicates that the New York Legislature never intended article 23-A to apply to the Waterfront Commission.”
    The Court rejected the argument that similar public policies in New York and New Jersey regarding employment opportunities for former inmates were sufficient to amend the compact.
    Therefore, the Waterfront Commission did not err by not applying Article 23-A when denying Costello’s application.