Matter of Cordero v. Corbisiero, 80 N.Y.2d 771 (1992)

An agency’s policy of general applicability that prescribes a procedure or practice requirement must be formally promulgated as a rule under the State Administrative Procedure Act (SAPA) § 202.

Summary

This case concerns whether the New York State Racing and Wagering Board’s “Saratoga policy,” requiring suspensions for infractions at the Saratoga racetrack to be served during the following year’s Saratoga meet, constitutes a “rule” under the State Administrative Procedure Act (SAPA). The Court of Appeals held that the Saratoga policy did fit the definition of a rule because it was a policy of general applicability that prescribed a procedure or practice requirement of the agency, and the policy was not formally promulgated by the Board pursuant to the rule-making procedures set forth in SAPA § 202. Thus, it could not be applied in this case.

Facts

A jockey, Cordero, committed an infraction at the Saratoga racetrack. Following an unsuccessful administrative appeal to the New York State Racing and Wagering Board, a suspension was imposed. The Board’s “Saratoga policy” dictated that such suspensions be served during the subsequent Saratoga meet.

Procedural History

The Appellate Division’s judgment was modified by the Court of Appeals, annulling the portion of the Board’s determination that mandated the penalty be served during Saratoga racing days. The matter was remitted to the Board for further proceedings.

Issue(s)

Whether the Racing Board’s “Saratoga policy”—requiring that a suspension imposed for an infraction committed at the Saratoga racetrack be served at the Saratoga meet the following year—constitutes a “rule” as defined by State Administrative Procedure Act § 102 (2) (a) (i), thus requiring formal promulgation under SAPA § 202.

Holding

Yes, because the Saratoga policy is an agency’s stated policy of general applicability which prescribes a procedure or practice requirement of the agency.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that the Saratoga policy applied “to every jockey * * * who elect[s] to race at Saratoga, commit[s] an infraction there, and unsuccessfully appeal[s] to the Board.” This, the court held, fits the definition of a rule as “a fixed, general principle applied without regard to the facts and circumstances of the individual case.”

The Board argued that the Saratoga policy did not fit the definition of a rule because it only affected the implementation of a penalty, not the jockey’s conduct. The court rejected this argument, clarifying that the policy “establishes a mandatory procedure that pertains only to when and where a Saratoga suspension must be served in the event of an appeal.”

Thus, the court concluded that the Saratoga policy fits the definition of a rule under State Administrative Procedure Act § 102 (2) (a) (i), which requires formal promulgation of such rules under SAPA § 202. The court did not address the petitioner’s alternative argument that the Board arbitrarily and capriciously applied its Saratoga policy in this case.