New York Law Review

Tag: Coram Nobis

  • People v. Patel, Andrews, Kruger, 22 N.Y.3d 606 (2014): Limits on Coram Nobis Relief for Untimely Appeals

    People v. Patel, Andrews, Kruger, 22 N.Y.3d 606 (2014)

    Coram nobis relief for an untimely appeal is a narrow exception, available only when a defendant has no other procedural recourse and could not reasonably have discovered the attorney’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal within the one-year statutory grace period.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals clarified the scope of coram nobis relief for defendants seeking to file untimely appeals, particularly in light of the decision in People v. Syville. The Court held that coram nobis is a narrow exception, available only when a defendant has no other procedural recourse and could not reasonably have discovered the attorney’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal within the one-year statutory grace period. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s grant of coram nobis relief in Patel because Patel had previously sought relief under CPL 460.30 within the one-year period. The Court affirmed the denial of coram nobis relief in Andrews because Andrews failed to offer sufficient factual allegations supporting his claim of ineffective assistance. The Court also affirmed the denial of coram nobis relief in Kruger, holding that it does not extend to discretionary criminal leave applications to the Court of Appeals.

    Facts

    • People v. Vinod Patel: Patel pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography and waived his right to appeal. Within the one-year grace period, he sought permission to file a late notice of appeal, claiming ineffective assistance. The Appellate Division initially rejected his application. After Syville, Patel sought coram nobis relief, which the Appellate Division granted.
    • People v. Churchill Andrews: Andrews pleaded guilty to selling narcotics and waived his right to appeal. He later filed a CPL article 440 motion, which was denied. He then moved for coram nobis relief, claiming ineffective assistance for failure to file a notice of appeal. The Appellate Division rejected both applications.
    • People v. Kevin Kruger: Kruger pleaded guilty to burglary and waived his right to appeal. The Appellate Division affirmed his conviction. Kruger later sought coram nobis relief to file a late criminal leave application, claiming his lawyer failed to do so. The Appellate Division denied the motion.

    Procedural History

    • Patel: The Appellate Division initially denied Patel’s CPL 460.30 motion but later granted coram nobis relief. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.
    • Andrews: The Supreme Court denied Andrews’ CPL article 440 motion. The Appellate Division affirmed that denial and also denied his coram nobis motion. Andrews appealed the coram nobis decision to the Court of Appeals.
    • Kruger: The Appellate Division denied Kruger’s coram nobis motion. Kruger appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether coram nobis relief is available when a defendant has previously sought relief under CPL 460.30 within the one-year grace period.
    2. Whether a motion for coram nobis relief provided sufficient factual allegations to support the assertion that the lawyer failed to inform the defendant about pursuing an appeal or file a notice of appeal.
    3. Whether the reasoning of Syville applies to discretionary criminal leave applications to the Court of Appeals.

    Holding

    1. No, because coram nobis is available only when a defendant has no other procedural recourse.
    2. No, because Syville requires a defendant to demonstrate that appellate rights were lost as a result of ineffective assistance, supported by specific factual allegations.
    3. No, because there is no federal constitutional right to legal representation on a discretionary application for an appeal to a state’s highest court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that Syville established a narrow exception to the CPL 460.30 time limit for coram nobis relief, available only in rare cases where a defendant has no other procedural recourse. In Patel, the Court reasoned that because Patel had availed himself of the CPL 460.30 procedure within the one-year grace period, he could not later seek similar relief via coram nobis. The Court distinguished pre-CPL cases, noting that they were largely abrogated by the codification of coram nobis remedies.

    In Andrews, the Court found that Andrews’ coram nobis application lacked sufficient factual allegations to support his claim of ineffective assistance. Unlike the defendants in Syville, Andrews made only perfunctory claims without providing specific details or countering the attorney’s assertion that Andrews had decided against an appeal.

    Regarding Kruger, the Court distinguished between appeals as of right and discretionary criminal leave applications. Because there is no federal constitutional right to counsel for discretionary appeals to a state’s highest court, the failure to file a CLA does not necessarily establish ineffective assistance of counsel or a due process violation. The court stated, “[U]nlike an appeal as of right, however, there is no federal constitutional entitlement to legal representation on a discretionary application for an appeal to a state’s highest court (see Ross v Moffitt, 417 US 600, 615-616 [1974]; Halbert v Michigan, 545 US at 611-612; Hernandez v Greiner, 414 F3d 266, 269-270 [2d Cir 2005]). Thus, the failure to file a CLA, standing alone, does not necessarily establish that Kruger was deprived of effective assistance of counsel or due process of law (see Wainwright v Torna, 455 US 586, 587-588 [1982]).”

  • People v. Townsley, 20 N.Y.3d 294 (2012): Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel and Attorney-Witness Conflicts

    People v. Townsley, 20 N.Y.3d 294 (2012)

    Appellate counsel’s failure to raise a clear conflict of interest on the part of trial counsel constitutes ineffective assistance, warranting coram nobis relief.

    Summary

    Townsley was convicted of murder and assault. During trial, the prosecutor implied defense counsel colluded with a witness to fabricate a defense. Townsley’s appellate counsel did not argue this potential conflict of interest on direct appeal. The New York Court of Appeals held that appellate counsel’s failure to raise the conflict of interest issue constituted ineffective assistance of counsel because the prosecutor’s implication created a situation where defense counsel should have testified, and the appellate counsel’s failure to recognize and argue this point fell below the standard of meaningful representation.

    Facts

    Townsley was convicted for the shooting death of Lynell James and the wounding of Johmar Brangan. The prosecution’s witnesses identified Townsley as the shooter. Townsley’s defense was that Simeon Nelson, the leader of a drug ring, committed the crime, and the witnesses were afraid to accuse Nelson. During cross-examination, the prosecutor insinuated that Townsley and his attorneys met with Nelson to coordinate a false defense, suggesting collusion. The defense attorney attempted to rebut this insinuation during summation.

    Procedural History

    Townsley was convicted in June 1995 and his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. His pro se habeas petition was denied. He then moved to vacate the conviction, arguing ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to a conflict of interest; this motion was denied. He then petitioned for a writ of error coram nobis, which was denied by the Appellate Division. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that trial counsel was conflicted due to the prosecutor’s implication that they colluded with a witness, thereby requiring them to testify and violating the advocate-witness rule?

    Holding

    Yes, because the prosecutor’s insinuation created a conflict of interest under the advocate-witness rule that appellate counsel should have recognized and argued on direct appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals, in dissent, focused on whether appellate counsel provided “meaningful representation.” Citing People v. Stultz, the dissent noted appellate advocacy is meaningful if it reflects a competent grasp of facts, law, and procedure. The dissent argued that appellate counsel should have recognized that trial counsel operated under a conflict of interest. The prosecutor’s cross-examination implied the defense lawyers colluded with Nelson to fabricate a defense, potentially violating the advocate-witness rule. The dissent argued that defense counsel’s testimony became necessary to rebut the prosecutor’s insinuation. The failure of trial counsel to recognize and address this conflict, coupled with the appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issue on appeal, constituted ineffective assistance, warranting coram nobis relief. The dissent cited appellate counsel’s own affirmation stating he “did not perceive the conflict of interest issue” as evidence that there was no strategic reason for the omission. The dissent also pointed to the prosecutor’s inflammatory statements during summation, which trial counsel failed to object to, further supporting the claim of ineffectiveness. The dissent reasoned that the combination of the conflict and the unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct should have been apparent to any reasonable appellate counsel.

  • People v. Turner, 16 N.Y.3d 933 (2011): Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel Requires Egregious and Prejudicial Error

    People v. Turner, 16 N.Y.3d 933 (2011)

    To establish ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s failure to raise a specific issue on appeal was both an egregious error and prejudicial to the defendant’s case.

    Summary

    Defendant, convicted of multiple offenses related to drunk driving and a fatal accident, sought coram nobis relief, claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. He argued that his appellate counsel should have challenged the trial court’s admission of a videotape showing his consent to a blood test, which included prejudicial statements. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of coram nobis relief, holding that appellate counsel’s failure to raise this issue was not an egregious error and was unlikely to be prejudicial, as the admissibility of the videotape was a matter of trial court discretion and the argument for its exclusion was not clear-cut.

    Facts

    The defendant, while driving drunk, struck and killed a young mother. At trial, the prosecution presented a videotape where the defendant consented to a blood test but added a statement about not releasing the police from responsibility if the needle broke in his arm. Defense counsel objected to the portion of the tape after the consent, arguing it was irrelevant and prejudicial. The trial court admitted the full tape, stating it was probative of the defendant’s mindset before the accident.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. He appealed, and his conviction was affirmed. He then sought coram nobis relief, arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to challenge the admission of the videotape on direct appeal. The Appellate Division denied the application. The New York Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order denying coram nobis relief.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant was deprived of effective assistance of appellate counsel when his appellate counsel failed to raise, on direct appeal, the issue of the trial court’s admission of the videotape.

    Holding

    No, because the issue of the admission of the videotape was a matter of discretion for the trial court, and appellate counsel’s error, if any, was not egregious and unlikely to have been prejudicial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that a single failing by counsel could constitute ineffective assistance if it is “egregious and prejudicial.” However, such instances are rare and typically involve clear-cut and dispositive issues. The court reasoned that the admissibility of the videotape was within the trial court’s discretion. While an argument could have been made that the tape was irrelevant under the then-accepted understanding of the mens rea for depraved indifference murder, this argument was not clear-cut. The court distinguished this case from situations where a single error by appellate counsel was deemed so egregious and prejudicial as to warrant coram nobis relief. The court noted, “It certainly cannot be said that its omission from defendant’s appellate brief was inconsistent with the conduct of ‘a reasonably competent appellate attorney’”. The Court emphasized the high bar for establishing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and the lack of precedent supporting the defendant’s claim that his appellate counsel’s performance fell below that standard. The Court observed that the parties cited no case where a similar argument – that evidence of the defendant’s emotional state was improperly admitted to show depraved indifference – was made, successfully or unsuccessfully, on appeal.

  • People v. Syville, 15 N.Y.3d 381 (2010): Coram Nobis Relief for Missed Appeal Deadlines Due to Attorney Error

    People v. Syville, 15 N.Y.3d 381 (2010)

    A defendant whose direct appeal is lost due to the unconstitutionally deficient performance of counsel in failing to file a timely notice of appeal may seek relief via a writ of error coram nobis, even after the statutory CPL 460.30 deadline has passed, if the defendant could not reasonably have discovered the error within the one-year grace period.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether coram nobis is available to defendants who missed the CPL 460.30 deadline for filing a late notice of appeal because they were unaware their attorneys failed to file a notice of appeal as requested. The Court held that coram nobis is an appropriate remedy when an attorney fails to file a timely notice of appeal and the defendant could not reasonably have discovered this error within the statutory one-year grace period. This decision recognizes a due process exception to the strict CPL 460.30 time limit, ensuring defendants are not penalized for attorney errors they could not have reasonably detected.

    Facts

    In Syville, the defendant requested his attorney file a notice of appeal after a weapons conviction in November 2004. The attorney mistakenly believed it was premature to file the notice while other charges were pending. The attorney filed a late notice of appeal in March 2006. Syville discovered the error in July 2006, after the one-year CPL 460.30 grace period had passed. In Council, the defendant asked his attorney to file a notice of appeal after his February 2007 conviction and even paid the attorney $2,000 for this service. The attorney neglected to file the notice due to “law office failure.” Council discovered the error more than two years later.

    Procedural History

    In Syville, the Appellate Division denied Syville’s applications for relief under CPL 460.30 and coram nobis. A judge of the Court of Appeals granted Syville leave to appeal. In Council, the Appellate Division denied Council’s coram nobis application, even though the People did not oppose the request. A judge of the Court of Appeals granted Council leave to appeal. Both cases were consolidated for appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, who discovers after the expiration of the CPL 460.30 grace period that a notice of appeal was not timely filed due to ineffective assistance of counsel, has recourse through a coram nobis application.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Due Process Clause requires that some avenue for relief be provided when the right to appeal has been lost due solely to the unconstitutionally deficient performance of counsel in failing to file a timely notice of appeal, and coram nobis is the appropriate procedural vehicle in New York.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court recognized that while states are not constitutionally required to grant criminal defendants an appeal as of right, when a state does provide such a right, it must ensure that the appeal is more than a meaningless ritual by affording a right to counsel. “[A] first appeal as of right…is not adjudicated in accord with due process of law if the appellant does not have the effective assistance of an attorney.” When defense counsel disregards a client’s timely request to file a notice of appeal, the attorney acts in a professionally unreasonable manner, and the defendant’s appellate rights are extinguished. The Court explained that CPL 460.30 eliminated the need for resentencing as a basis to extend the time for timely filing a notice of appeal but also imposed a one-year limit for the filing of a motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal. Coram nobis remains available to alleviate a constitutional wrong when a defendant has no other procedural recourse, especially when the alleged constitutional errors do not appear on the trial record, and the defendant could not have brought these errors to the attention of the trial courts. The Court held that, in these specific circumstances, the defendants could pursue their appeals, and remitted both cases to the Appellate Division for further proceedings.

  • People v. D’Alessandro, 11 N.Y.3d 216 (2008): Distinguishing Coram Nobis Relief from Motions for Reargument

    People v. D’Alessandro, 11 N.Y.3d 216 (2008)

    A motion seeking coram nobis relief based on a new argument, not previously raised, should not be characterized as a motion for reargument, even if it pertains to the same general issue as a prior coram nobis application.

    Summary

    D’Alessandro appealed the Appellate Division’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis, arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise a speedy trial claim. The Appellate Division treated the petition as a motion to reargue a prior, pro se coram nobis application. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the second petition raised a novel argument, distinct from the first, and thus should not have been characterized as a motion to reargue. The court emphasized its authority to examine the true nature of the petition, irrespective of the Appellate Division’s label, and remitted the case for consideration of the merits of D’Alessandro’s claim.

    Facts

    D’Alessandro’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal in 1996. Nearly twelve years later, represented by counsel, he petitioned the Appellate Division for a writ of error coram nobis, asserting ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. This claim was based on his appellate counsel’s failure to argue a speedy trial violation. D’Alessandro previously filed a pro se coram nobis application nine years earlier, which was denied.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division denied D’Alessandro’s second petition, deeming it a motion to reargue its prior denial of his first coram nobis application. D’Alessandro appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the matter for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division properly characterized D’Alessandro’s petition for a writ of error coram nobis as a motion to reargue a prior coram nobis application.

    Holding

    No, because D’Alessandro’s second petition raised a novel argument, not previously presented, regarding the alleged speedy trial violation; thus, the Appellate Division erred in treating it as a motion for reargument.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals asserted its authority to look beyond the Appellate Division’s characterization of the petition, citing People v. Giles, 73 NY2d 666 (1989). The court emphasized that a motion to reargue, under CPLR 2221(d)(2), must be based on matters of fact or law allegedly overlooked or misapprehended by the court in determining the prior motion. A motion to reargue “is not an appropriate vehicle for raising new questions . . . which were not previously advanced” (People v. Bachert, 69 NY2d 593, 597 (1987). D’Alessandro’s second petition raised a new argument: that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds, citing People v. McKenna, 76 NY2d 59 (1990) and People v. Correa, 77 NY2d 930 (1991). The People conceded that D’Alessandro “never raised the speedy trial claims advanced in his current petition.” The Court distinguished the case from People v. Mazzella, 13 NY2d 997 (1963), noting that Mazzella involved a coram nobis writ brought at the trial level and predated the codification of CPL Article 440. The court emphasized that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should first be heard in the court where the alleged deficiency occurred (citing Bachert). Remitting the case allows for two potential reviews of the claims—one by the Appellate Division and, if unsuccessful, another by the Court of Appeals on a motion for leave to appeal.

  • People v. Borrell, 15 N.Y.3d 367 (2010): Standard for Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

    People v. Borrell, 15 N.Y.3d 367 (2010)

    Appellate counsel provides meaningful representation when they demonstrate a competent grasp of the facts, the law, and appellate procedure, supported by appropriate authority and argument; failing to raise a potentially meritorious issue does not automatically constitute ineffective assistance.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the defendant’s consecutive sentences for two robbery counts were illegal. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s grant of a writ of error coram nobis, holding that counsel’s performance was not constitutionally deficient. The Court reasoned that the sentencing issue was not clear-cut, and counsel may have made a strategic decision to focus on other issues, some of which were successful. The Court emphasized that meaningful representation does not require perfection, and the overall representation was adequate.

    Facts

    Defendant was convicted on consolidated appeals from two judgments for robbery and related crimes. He argued his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that consecutive sentences were improperly imposed for two counts of first-degree robbery. These counts stemmed from events during an armed robbery of a bar and its patrons. The Appellate Division initially appeared to agree that the sentences should have been concurrent because the convictions arose from the same transaction.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division granted the defendant’s petition for a writ of error coram nobis, seemingly faulting appellate counsel for not raising the sentencing issue. The People appealed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and denied the coram nobis application.

    Issue(s)

    Whether appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issue of the legality of consecutive sentences constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, thereby warranting coram nobis relief.

    Holding

    No, because appellate counsel displayed a competent grasp of the facts, law, and appellate procedure, supported by appropriate authority and argument; and because the sentencing issue was not so clear-cut as to render the failure to raise it a sign of ineffective assistance.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the “meaningful representation” standard from People v. Stultz, holding that appellate counsel provides meaningful representation when they demonstrate “a competent grasp of the facts, the law and appellate procedure, supported by appropriate authority and argument.” The Court emphasized that the key inquiry is whether counsel’s actions were consistent with those of a reasonably competent appellate attorney, not whether a better result could have been achieved. The Court noted the standard is “undemanding” and tolerates errors where the overall representation is “meaningful.” The Court distinguished this case from People v. Turner, where coram nobis relief was appropriate because counsel failed to raise a “clear-cut and completely dispositive” statute of limitations defense. Here, the sentencing argument depended on an analysis of a complex transaction and overlapping elements, making it less clear-cut. Further, the Court pointed out the issue’s uncertain efficacy, as evidenced by the Appellate Division’s differing outcomes and the unsuccessful CPL 440.20 motion. The Court also emphasized that the defendant failed to demonstrate the absence of strategic or legitimate explanations for not briefing the issue. Appellate counsel could have tactically chosen to focus on other issues. Here, counsel successfully argued for reversal of convictions on seven counts. The court stated: “While it may ultimately be determined that defendant should have been sentenced concurrently, as he now contends, and that the representation at issue would have been more efficacious had the issue been raised on the appeal, the relevant and, indeed, dispositive threshold issue on this coram nobis application is not whether defendant’s representation could have been better but whether it was, on the whole, constitutionally adequate. This less exacting standard was met by counsel on the appeal.” Judge Pigott dissented, arguing that the Appellate Division correctly granted the application because appellate courts routinely grant coram nobis applications when appellate counsel fails to raise an issue on direct appeal that the court concludes may have merit.

  • People v. Turner, 5 N.Y.3d 478 (2005): Counsel Ineffectiveness for Failure to Raise Statute of Limitations Defense

    5 N.Y.3d 478 (2005)

    A criminal defendant is deprived of their constitutional right to effective legal representation when both trial and appellate lawyers fail to recognize a statute of limitations defense that would have prevented the defendant’s conviction, constituting an egregious and prejudicial error.

    Summary

    Donald Turner was convicted of manslaughter for a 1982 shooting, but wasn’t arrested until 1998. At trial, his attorney failed to raise the statute of limitations (5 years for manslaughter), even when the prosecution requested a manslaughter charge. Turner’s appellate counsel also missed this, focusing instead on a Rosario violation. After unsuccessful federal habeas corpus proceedings, Turner filed a second petition for a writ of error coram nobis, arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to argue ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s grant of the writ, finding the missed statute of limitations defense an egregious error depriving Turner of effective counsel.

    Facts

    In 1982, Donald Holloman was fatally shot in Brooklyn. Witnesses identified Turner as the shooter, but he fled and wasn’t arrested until 1998, almost 16 years later.

    Procedural History

    Turner was indicted for second-degree murder (no statute of limitations). At trial in 1999, the prosecution requested a jury instruction for first-degree manslaughter as a lesser included offense. The defense opposed the charge on other grounds but didn’t raise the statute of limitations (5 years for manslaughter). He was acquitted of murder but convicted of manslaughter. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied. Turner’s application for a writ of error coram nobis arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was denied. The U.S. District Court denied habeas relief but suggested a claim based on appellate counsel’s failure to argue trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. Turner then filed a second coram nobis petition, which the Appellate Division granted. The Court of Appeals affirmed this grant.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that trial counsel was ineffective.
    2. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the statute of limitations defense.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the failure to raise such a clear and dispositive defense, without a reasonable explanation, falls below an objective standard of reasonableness for effective assistance of counsel.
    2. Yes, because no reasonable defense lawyer could have found the statute of limitations argument so weak as to be not worth raising, given existing case law and the potential for a winning argument.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on both the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, § 6 of the New York Constitution, which guarantee the right to effective assistance of counsel. The Court acknowledged the Strickland v. Washington standard for ineffective assistance, requiring a showing that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this prejudiced the defendant. While acknowledging a deferential standard for reviewing counsel’s performance, the Court found this case presented a rare instance where a single error—failure to raise a clear statute of limitations defense—was so egregious and prejudicial as to constitute ineffective assistance. The Court found that the statute of limitations defense was clearly applicable, and the existing case law at the time (specifically People v. Di Pasquale) supported the argument that even as a lesser included offense, the time-barred manslaughter charge should not have been submitted to the jury. The Court dismissed arguments that trial counsel might have strategically welcomed the manslaughter charge, noting that counsel actually opposed the charge. It also rejected the idea that appellate counsel could reasonably forego the statute of limitations argument in favor of another argument, since the omitted argument was so strong and could have been raised in addition to the other point. The court explicitly stated, “Such a failure, in the absence of a reasonable explanation for it, is hard to reconcile with a defendant’s constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.”

  • People v. Stultz, 2 N.Y.3d 277 (2004): Defining Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel in New York

    2 N.Y.3d 277 (2004)

    The standard for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in New York is whether the attorney provided “meaningful representation,” assessed by competence in facts, law, and procedure, not by a strict prejudice test.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of defendant Stultz’s coram nobis application, holding that his appellate counsel provided meaningful representation. Stultz argued his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge trial counsel’s decision not to introduce a witness’s potentially exculpatory statement. The Court established that the “meaningful representation” standard, previously applied to trial counsel, also applies to appellate counsel. The Court found appellate counsel was effective, noting the extensive brief raised several significant issues and that the omitted argument lacked merit.

    Facts

    Stultz was convicted of second-degree murder and weapons possession based on evidence including eyewitness testimony and phone records. A witness, Dolberry, initially told police that another man, Anderson, was the shooter, but she refused to testify at trial, invoking her Fifth Amendment right. The prosecution declined to grant her immunity, and the trial court did not compel her testimony. Defense counsel did not attempt to introduce Dolberry’s prior statements.

    Procedural History

    Following his conviction, Stultz appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed. Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied. Stultz then sought a writ of error coram nobis from the Appellate Division, arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to challenge trial counsel’s decision regarding Dolberry’s statement. The Appellate Division denied the application, and Stultz was granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the standard for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in New York is the same “meaningful representation” standard applied to trial counsel, and whether Stultz’s appellate counsel met that standard.

    Holding

    Yes, because the “meaningful representation” standard should apply equally to both trial and appellate counsel in New York. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s denial of coram nobis relief, finding that Stultz’s appellate counsel provided meaningful representation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the “meaningful representation” standard, established in People v. Baldi, is appropriate for evaluating appellate counsel effectiveness. The Court emphasized the importance of competent grasp of facts, law, and appellate procedure. While appellate counsel has latitude in selecting issues, the representation must be supported by appropriate authority and argument. The Court rejected Stultz’s claim that appellate counsel should have challenged trial counsel’s failure to introduce Dolberry’s statement because that statement lacked sufficient indicia of reliability under People v. Robinson. The Court noted Dolberry’s potential motives for making a false statement and the implausibility of her invoking the Fifth Amendment. The Court stated: “Appellate advocacy is meaningful if it reflects a competent grasp of the facts, the law and appellate procedure, supported by appropriate authority and argument.” The Court further explained, “[e]ffective appellate representation by no means requires counsel to brief or argue every issue that may have merit.” They found appellate counsel’s decision not to raise the issue was a reasonable strategic choice. The Court explicitly distinguished the New York standard from the federal standard articulated in Strickland v. Washington, which requires demonstrating prejudice—that the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s errors. New York requires a showing of prejudice, but it is not an indispensable element; the focus remains on the overall fairness of the proceedings.

  • People v. Bachert, 69 N.Y.2d 593 (1987): Establishing Coram Nobis as Remedy for Ineffective Appellate Counsel

    People v. Bachert, 69 N.Y.2d 593 (1987)

    When a defendant claims ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the proper procedural vehicle for review is a writ of error coram nobis, brought in the intermediate appellate court where the alleged deficiency occurred, until the legislature enacts a specific statutory remedy.

    Summary

    Rickey Bachert was convicted of burglary, criminal trespass, and petit larceny. After his conviction was affirmed on appeal, Bachert collaterally attacked his conviction, arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise prosecutorial misconduct and challenge repugnant verdicts. The trial court denied the motion, citing a lack of jurisdiction under CPL 440.10. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that CPL 440.10 could incorporate ineffective appellate counsel claims. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that coram nobis in the appellate court is the appropriate remedy. The Court emphasized that CPL 440.10 is not designed for appellate counsel ineffectiveness claims and urged the legislature to create a comprehensive statutory remedy.

    Facts

    Rickey Bachert was convicted of burglary in the second degree, criminal trespass in the second degree, and petit larceny after a jury trial.

    Bachert appealed the conviction, and the Appellate Division affirmed.

    Leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied.

    Bachert then moved to vacate the judgment in the trial court, alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel due to counsel’s failure to raise issues of prosecutorial misconduct and challenge the verdicts as repugnant.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Bachert’s motion to vacate, holding that it lacked jurisdiction under CPL 440.10 to review claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

    The Appellate Division reversed and remitted for further proceedings, concluding that CPL 440.10 (1)(h) could be broadly construed to incorporate ineffective appellate counsel claims.

    The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CPL 440.10 is the appropriate procedural vehicle to challenge a judgment of conviction based on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 440.10 does not encompass claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; the proper procedure is a common-law coram nobis proceeding brought in the appellate court where the alleged ineffective assistance occurred.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that CPL 440.10(1)(h) addresses whether the *judgment itself* was obtained in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights. Appellate courts do not render judgments of conviction, they only affect them.

    The Court also found that a motion for reargument (CPL 470.50) is not an acceptable solution, as it is not appropriate for raising new questions. The Court noted that the time frame for making reargument motions would lead to disparate treatment and that reargument is not traditionally perceived as providing the fresh examination required for alleged deprivations of counsel.

    The Court stated that the writ of error coram nobis is the best available remedy in the circumstances, citing its history and flexibility. The Court referenced prior expansions of the writ’s scope, noting it had “not hesitated to expand its scope when necessary to afford the defendant a remedy in those cases in which no other avenue of judicial relief appeared available.” People v. Hairston, 10 N.Y.2d 92, 93-94 (1961).

    The Court held that coram nobis proceedings should be addressed in the court which rendered the order from which relief is sought. “Where, as here, it is the Appellate Division’s order that is questioned, the application should be to that court”. People ex rel. Douglas v. Vincent, 50 N.Y.2d 901, 905 (1980) (Meyer, J., dissenting).

    The Court noted its “discomfiture” with the absence of a comprehensive statutory mechanism and invited the Legislature’s prompt attention to the problem.

  • People v. Douglas, 48 N.Y.2d 547 (1979): Availability of Coram Nobis for Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

    People v. Douglas, 48 N.Y.2d 547 (1979)

    A defendant alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel may seek relief via a common-law coram nobis proceeding, allowing for a hearing on disputed facts outside the original record.

    Summary

    The case concerns whether a defendant can challenge the effectiveness of their appellate counsel in state court, even after their direct appeal has been decided. Douglas sought habeas corpus relief, claiming his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a key issue on appeal. The New York Court of Appeals held that habeas corpus was not the appropriate remedy, but a common-law coram nobis proceeding could be available, allowing for a factual hearing on the ineffectiveness claim. The dissent argued that the court should explicitly direct the transfer of the case to the Appellate Division for consideration under its common-law coram nobis jurisdiction.

    Facts

    Douglas was convicted after a trial where self-defense was a central issue.

    On appeal, his assigned counsel filed a brief that was only seven pages long and failed to address the self-defense issue.

    Douglas then sought habeas corpus relief, alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially concluded a means of presenting the issue existed.

    The Appellate Division reversed, denying habeas corpus relief.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding habeas corpus was inappropriate.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, who claims ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, is entitled to a hearing in state court to determine the validity of that claim.

    Whether common-law coram nobis is an available and appropriate procedure for raising a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in New York.

    Holding

    No, habeas corpus relief is not appropriate; however, a common-law coram nobis proceeding may be available because this allows for a factual hearing on issues outside the original record.

    Yes, common-law coram nobis is an available procedure to test whether a defendant was unconstitutionally deprived of their right to counsel on appeal because CPL article 440 was not intended to abolish the common-law writ in situations not covered by the article.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while habeas corpus might not be the appropriate avenue, the state constitution guarantees the right to counsel. Therefore, a procedure must exist to address claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

    The court highlighted the availability of common-law coram nobis, a mechanism traditionally used to address deprivations of the right to counsel. “Considered as a common-law matter, there is no question that coram nobis is available, indeed is the exclusive remedy, to test the question whether defendant was unconstitutionally deprived of his right to counsel.” The court acknowledged that CPL article 440, which incorporates coram nobis procedure, might appear to limit its application. However, the court interpreted the statute narrowly, concluding that it was not intended to abolish the common-law writ in situations not explicitly covered by the article.

    The dissent emphasized the importance of providing a clear procedural path for defendants alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Justice Meyer noted a “strong prima facie indication of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel” in this case. He argued that the court’s decision would effectively force defendants to seek relief in federal courts, which would address the issue via federal habeas corpus. The dissent advocated for transferring the case to the Appellate Division for consideration under its common-law coram nobis jurisdiction.

    The dissent also quoted People ex rel. Klein v Krueger, 25 NY2d 497, 501, 503, noting that “constitutional limitations * * * perforce override any statutory distributions of judicial power or appealability” and that “no procedural or jurisdictional problem intervenes if only because the constitutional mandates * * * are paramount and controlling over any statutory distribution of judicial power, appealability, and reviewability.”

    The dissent cited to People v Lampkins, 21 NY2d 138 that the common-law use of the writ can determine whether defendant was deprived of his right to the effective assistance of counsel on appeal.